Judge: Edward B. Moreton, Jr, Case: 24SMCV02150, Date: 2024-08-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 24SMCV02150 Hearing Date: August 23, 2024 Dept: 205
Superior Court of California
County of Los Angeles – West District
Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205
SECOND CHANCE ORGANIZATION, LLC,
Plaintiff, v.
KELLIE HALIHAN, et al.,
Defendants. |
Case No.: 24SMCV02150
Hearing Date: August 23, 2024 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: DEFENDANT’S DEMURRER TO THE COMPLAINT FOR UNLAWFUL DETAINER
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BACKGROUND
This is an unlawful detainer action. The real property at issue is located at 1123 N. Vista Street, West Hollywood, CA 90046 (the “Premises”). Non-party Leonila Lizarzabura leased the Premises to Defendant Kellie Halihan pursuant to a written lease agreement (“Lease”). Plaintiff Second Chance Organization, LLC bought the Premises through a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, which title was perfected by recordation of a Corrective Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale on April 23, 2024, and it is the successor lessor on the Lease.
Defendant failed to pay rent. Plaintiff served a 3 day notice to pay rent or quit. Defendant failed to comply with the notice.
This hearing is on Defendant’s demurrer to the Complaint. Defendant demurs on the grounds that (1) the three-day notice alleged in the Complaint fails to include the payment information required by Code Civ. Proc. §1161(2); (2) the three-day notice fails to include the proper notice requirements; (3) the Complaint fails to state Plaintiff’s capacity and standing to sue; (4) the three-day notice overstates the amount of rent due as it requests money that was already paid to the previous landlord; (5) the Complaint was not properly served pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §418.10; (7) the three-day notice did not list Defendant’s proper name; the three-day notice had the name Kellie Madison that is not Defendant’s legal name.
MEET AND CONFER
In¿unlawful detainer proceedings, there is¿no requirement that a demurring defendant¿meet and confer with the party who filed the pleading being demurred to. (Code Civ. Proc., §430.41 (d),¿(d)(2)). Accordingly, there is no consequence to Defendant not having sought to meet and confer with Plaintiff.
LEGAL STANDARD
“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.) A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents).) For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)
Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 (“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”).) The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)
DISCUSSION
Defendant raises various grounds for the demurrer, for which she fails to provide any explanation. For example, Defendant argues the three day notice fails to include the payment information required by Code Civ. Proc. 1161(2), but she fails to identify what payment information is missing. She argues that the three day notice fails to include the proper notice requirements, but she does not specify what those notice requirements are or why they were not satisfied. She argues that the claim for unlawful detainer fails to state facts to constitute a cause of action or is vague and uncertain, but she offers no reasoning as to why that is. She argues that the complaint must state the plaintiff’s capacity and standing to sue, yet she does not elaborate on why the Complaint fails to allege standing.
The only ground that is stated with any specificity is that the three-day notice had the name Kellie Madison which is not Defendant’s legal name. But as Plaintiff points out, that fact is of no moment because the notice was also served on “All Other Occupants in Possession of the Premises Described,” which includes Defendant.
In any event, the Court concludes that Plaintiff properly pled its Complaint for unlawful detainer. To establish a cause of action for unlawful detainer after foreclosure, a plaintiff must only allege that: (1) it purchased the Subject Property at a trustee’s sale and duly perfected its title; (2) it served a three-day written notice to vacate the Subject Property to the occupants; and (3) the foreclosed trustor or other occupant(s) holds over and continues in possession of the subject property after expiration of that notice. (Code Civ. Proc., §1161a(b)(3); Dr. Leevil, LLC v. Westlake Health Care Center (2018) 6 Cal.5th 474, 479.) In the case of a purchaser at foreclosure, title is “duly perfected” by recording a Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale. (Dr. Leevil, LLC, 6 Cal.5th at 479.)
Here, the Complaint sufficiently alleges each of the three required elements as follows: First, Plaintiff obtained title to the subject property and duly perfected its title by recording a Corrective Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale on April 23, 2024. (Compl. ¶16). Second, Plaintiff served a notice to vacate to the occupants (i.e., Defendant) that contained all the requisite information. (Id. ¶¶ 17-19, Exs. 3-4.) It demanded in writing that Defendant pay $8,224.56 to Plaintiff at 18301 Von Karman Avenue, Suite 330, Irvine CA 92612, between the hours of 9:00 a.m. and 5:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, and provided its counsel’s telephone number. Third, Defendant has held over and wrongfully continues in possession of the Property after expiration of the notice to vacate. (Id. ¶22.) Given these allegations, the Complaint sufficiently alleges a cause of action for unlawful detainer.
After Plaintiff filed its unlawful detainer complaint, it thereafter obtained authorization from this Court to serve Defendant by posting and mailing on grounds that despite attempts on five consecutive days at different times of day and night, Plaintiff was unable to effect personal service on Defendant at the Subject Property. (See Court’s May 31, 2024 Order.) As such, Plaintiff’s service of the summons and complaint was proper. Moreover, by filing her demurrer, Plaintiff has waived any right to claim that the Court lacks personal jurisdiction.
Because all the necessary facts have been alleged in the Complaint and because the Court may not consider the extraneous facts outside the Complaint that are improperly raised by Defendant in her demurrer, the Court overrules the demurrer.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES Defendant’s demurrer to the Complaint.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
DATED: August 23, 2024 ___________________________
Edward B. Moreton, Jr.
Judge of the Superior Court