Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This case arises from a boundary line dispute between neighbors.  Plaintiff Andonia Katsaros has owned 9018 Vista Grande Ave., West Hollywood, California since 1986. (Compl. ¶5.)  Plaintiff claims that when she purchased her property, she received from the prior owners “a survey conducted on July 22, 1985” which provided that the existing wooden fence was on the property line. (Id. ¶¶ 7-8.)  Plaintiff admits that the location of each property is as described by the legal description and Assessor’s Parcel number (“APN”).  (Id. ¶¶5-6.)  

On or about November 2, 2020, Defendants Jeff Collins, individually and as Trustee of the HJC Family Trust dated January 20, 2012, acquired title to 9022 Vista Grande Ave., West Hollywood, California 90069 (“Property”) by way of a grant deed.  (Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Exhibit 2.)  In or about May 2024, Defendants gave notice that they would be dismantling the existing wooden fence along the parties’ property line because the fence was on Defendants’ side of the Property by approximately 12 inches based on Defendants’ survey (“Disputed Area”).  (Id. ¶10.)  As a result, Plaintiff commenced the instant action claiming there is a dispute regarding the true boundary line. (Id. ¶13.) 

This hearing is on Defendants’ motion for judgment on the pleadings.  Defendants argue there is no factual basis for Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory and injunctive relief because Plaintiff’s judicial admissions establish there is no boundary line issue.   

LEGAL STANDARD 

A defendant may move for judgment on the pleadings when the “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action against that defendant.”  (Code Civ. Proc. §438(b)(1) and (c)(1)(B)(ii).)  “A motion for judgment on the pleadings may be made at any time either prior to the trial or at the trial itself. [Citation.]”  (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 877.)  

“A motion for judgment on the pleadings performs the same function as a general demurrer, and hence attacks only defects disclosed on the face of the pleadings or by matters that can be judicially noticed.  Presentation of extrinsic evidence is therefore not proper on a motion for judgment on the pleadings.”  (Cloud v. Northrop Grumman Corp. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 995, 999 (citations omitted).)   

The standard for ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings is essentially the same as that applicable to a general demurrer, that is, under the state of the pleadings, together with matters that may be judicially noticed, it appears that a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  (Bezirdjian v. O'Reilly (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 316, 321-322 (citing Schabarum v. California Legislature (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 1205, 1216).)   

Like a demurrer, a motion for judgment on the pleadings may be addressed to the pleading as a whole or to separate counts.  If addressed to the pleading as a whole, the motion must be denied if even one count is good.  (Lora v. Garland (1946) 27 Cal.2d 840, 850; Heredia v. Farmers Ins. Exch. (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 1345, 1358.)  If addressed to separate counts, the motion may be granted as to some counts and denied as to others.  (Steiner v. Rowley (1950) 35 Cal.2d 713, 720; Heredia, 228 Cal.App.3d at 1358.) 

MEET AND CONFER 

A party moving for¿judgment on the pleadings must¿meet and confer in person or telephonically with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to determine if an agreement can be reached regarding the claims raised in the motion. (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a).)  The moving party must file a declaration detailing the¿meet and confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 439, subd. (a)(3).)  Defendants submit the Declaration of Nicole S. Dunn which attests that she asked Plaintiff’s counsel for a time to meet and confer, and counsel did not provide a time to meet and confer, but provided Plaintiff’s position by email, and refused to respond to further emails from Ms. Dunn.  This satisfies the meet and confer requirements of Code Civ. Proc. § 439.   

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

Defendants request judicial notice of (1) a Grant Deed recorded on October 22, 1986, in the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office bearing Document Number 86-1421876; and (2) a Grant Deed recorded on December 4, 2020, in the Los Angeles County Recorder’s Office bearing Document Number 20201581655.  The Court grants judicial notice of the documents.   

The Court may take judicial notice of recorded deeds pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code § 452(c) as official acts of the executive department of any state of the United States.  (Evans v. California Trailer Court, Inc. (1994) 28 Cal.App.4th 540, 549 (citing Maryland Casualty Co. v Reeder (1990) 221 Cal.App.3d 961, 977); see also Poseidon Development, Inc. v. Woodland Lane Estates, LLC (2007) 152 Cal.App.4th 1106, 1116 (trial court took judicial notice of various recorded documents related to the deed of trust securing the Note).)  

Also, pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code § 452(h), the Court may take judicial notice of deeds as “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy.” 

Further, pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code § 453, the Court must take judicial notice of any matter specified in Section 452 if a party requests it and “(a) gives each adverse party sufficient notice of the request, through the pleadings or otherwise, to enable such adverse party to prepare to meet the request; and (b) furnishes the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter.” 

MOTION FOR JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS 

Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show that there is a boundary line dispute because the Complaint concedes the boundary line is as described in the maps in the Office of the County Recorder and the APNs.  (Compl. ¶¶ 5-6.)  The Court agrees. 

In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, a court may take judicial notice of admissions or inconsistent statements by Plaintiff in the complaint.  (See Del E. Webb Corp. v. Structural Materials Co. (1981) 123 Cal.App.3d 593, 604.)  Here, Plaintiff admits the location of each property is as described by the legal description and APNs.  (Id.)  The legal descriptions and APNs are also contained in the respective Grant Deeds.  (RJN Exhs. 1, 2.)  Accordingly, there is no boundary line dispute as the lines are determined by the legal descriptions and APNs, and not by a 1985 survey or a fence. 

The Opposition alleges a new theory not raised in the Complaint. It is alleged that the fence was built on its current location based upon an agreement between the prior owners of each property “that the current fence represents the agreed upon boundary as opposed to the location of the former fence.”  (Opp. at 5:16-19.)  In Bryant v. Blevins (1994) 9 Cal.4th 47, the California Supreme Court held that “although the agreed-boundary doctrine is well established in California, our case law has recognized that the doctrine properly may be invoked only under carefully specified circumstances.” (Id. at 55.) To establish a new boundary under the doctrine, it is required that Plaintiff establish “1) an uncertainty as to the true boundary line, 2) an agreement between the coterminous owners fixing the line, and 3) acceptance and acquiescence in the line so fixed for a period equal to the statute of limitations or under such circumstances that substantial loss would be causes by a change of its position.” (Id.)   

It was made clear in Bryant that legal descriptions, as set forth in recorded documents, must be given greater weight than the ignorance of the individual owners. “When existing legal records provide a basis for fixing the boundary, there is no justification for inferring, without additional evidence, that the prior owners were uncertain as to the location of the true boundary or that they agreed to fix their common boundary at the location of the fence.” (Id. at 58.)  “A boundary is not uncertain if it can be ascertained from an accurate survey.”  (Martin v. Van Bergen (2012) 209 Cal.App.4th 84, 90.)   

While the Supreme Court declined to limit the application of the agreed upon boundary doctrine “to instances in which legal records are inadequate to settle a boundary dispute”. (Bryant, 9 Cal.4th at 54.)  This was, in the Court’s view, because property owners may have agreed upon another boundary “that might, for any one of several reasons, be at variance with legal property descriptions or survey results.” (Id.)  However, the Court did not identify any of those instances.   

Notably, in his dissent, Justice Mosk stated “[b]y requiring direct evidence of uncertainty and agreement in cases in which some document purports to describe the true boundary, the majority are ensuring that in most cases an agreed boundary will not prevail.” (Id. at 62.) Justice Mosk knew well that the instances in which a legal description was in fact ascertainable from a deed, but where the agreed upon boundary doctrine would somehow still apply, would be nearly zero due to the holding in Bryant.  Indeed, there appear to be no California case--published or unpublished--in the 20 years since Bryant was decided that have found the doctrine applicable despite a sufficient legal description in the parties’ deeds.  

The Complaint and the Opposition both fail to set forth sufficient uncertainty.  The Complaint has no facts explaining any purported uncertainty regarding the true location of the boundary line.  It is clear from Bryant, and the cases that have followed it that this is insufficient to invoke the agreed upon boundary doctrine.  

Plaintiff argues that the relevant dispute is whether the fence is on the property line, not whether the fence establishes the property line.  But that is contrary to the allegations of the Complaint.  The Complaint alleges “[t]here exists a true and actual controversy as to the location of the property line between the Plaintiff’s property and the Defendant’s property. The Plaintiff is seeking declaratory relief and for a determination as to the true and correct location of the property line between the respective parcels of the parties as described hereinabove.”  (Compl. ¶¶ 13-14.) 

Plaintiff also argues that the issue of whether she has a prescriptive easement is a question of fact and cannot be decided on demurrer.  There appears to be no dispute that Plaintiff cannot establish an exclusive prescriptive easement.  The law does not allow an exclusive prescriptive easement for residential boundary disputes.  (Mehdizadeh v. Mincer (1996) 46 Cal. App. 4th 1296, 1305-1307; Silacci v. Abramson (1996) 45 Cal. App. 4th 558, 564.) 

Instead, Plaintiff seeks an equitable easement.  There are three requirements for an equitable easement:  the trespasser must show that (1) her trespass was “innocent” rather than “willful or negligent,” (2) the public or the property owner will not be “irreparabl[y] injur[ed]” by the easement, and (3) the hardship to the trespasser from having to cease the trespass is “greatly disproportionate to the hardship caused [the owner] by the continuance of the encroachment.” [Citations.] Unless all three prerequisites are established, a court lacks the discretion to grant an equitable easement.” (Shoen v. Zacarias (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 16, 19.)  Courts “resolve all doubts against the[] issuance” of an equitable easement.  (Id. at 21.) 

While the Complaint alleges that Plaintiff’s trespass was innocent as she had a survey from the prior owner showing that the fence was on the boundary line (Compl. ¶¶ 7-8), the Complaint does not allege facts showing that Defendants will not be irreparably injured by the easement, or that the hardship on Plaintiff to cease the trespass is “greatly disproportionate” to the hardship suffered by Defendants.  Accordingly, the allegations in the Complaint are insufficient to support the issuance of an equitable easement.   

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS the motion for judgment on the pleadings with 20 days leave to amend. 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED:   January 8, 2025                            ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court