Judge: Edward B. Moreton, Jr, Case: 24SMCV03074, Date: 2025-04-07 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV03074    Hearing Date: April 7, 2025    Dept: 205

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – West District

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205

BACKGROUND

This case arises from alleged violations of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh”) and Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”).  Plaintiff Shonna Counter has spinal muscular atrophy, a rare, degenerative neuromuscular disorder. This condition weakens her muscle strength, significantly limiting or impairing her ability to walk. She uses a powered wheelchair for mobility.

Plaintiff was a customer of Defendants Nono’s Enterprises, Inc., Nono’s Smog Centers, Inc. and Smogs! Just Smogs, Inc.  She visited Defendants to get her tires repaired, her air conditioner checked and to get a smog check.  On the days of her visits, she claims there were no readily accessible disabled parking spaces.  Although an accessible parking space is present, Defendants allegedly did not enforce exclusive use of the accessible parking space.  According to Plaintiff, unauthorized vehicles are regularly parked in the parking space and/or in front of the parking space and access aisle, preventing their use.  

Specifically, vehicles brought for repair are parked in the only accessible space while waiting to be repaired or sold.  Also, vehicles brought for repair are parked in such a way as to prevent entrance and exit from the only ostensibly accessible space. 

This hearing is on Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys fees.  Plaintiff argues she is the prevailing party because she obtained a judgment on her claims via an offer of judgment, stipulating to liability under the Unruh Act.  As the prevailing party, she argues she is entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs, which total $17,303.21.

LEGAL STANDARD

            Plaintiff’s complaint alleged violations of federal and California law. Plaintiff’s federal claim arose under the ADA, while his state law claims arose under the California’s Unruh Act, Cal. Civ. Code § 51.

Section 12205 of the ADA authorizes a court, in its discretion, to “allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney’s fee, including litigation expenses, and costs. . . .”  (42 U.S.C. § 12205.)  A prevailing plaintiff “should recover an attorney’s fee unless special circumstances would render such an award unjust.”  (Hensley v. Eckerhart (1976) 461 U.S. 424, 429.) 

Section 55 of the Unruh Act provides that “the prevailing party in the action shall be entitled to recover reasonable attorney’s fees.”  (Cal. Civ. Code § 55.)  The Unruh Act requires a finding of liability to entitle the prevailing party to attorneys fees.  (Doran v. North State Grocery, Inc. (2006) 137 Cal.App. 484, 491.)

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.”  (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623-624.) 

The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily “begins with the ‘lodestar’ [method], i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.”  (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 154.)  The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.  (See Serrano v. Priest (1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49 (discussing factors relevant to proper attorneys’ fees award).) 

The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, and (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.”  (Mountjoy v. Bank of Am. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 266, 271.)  

In challenging attorneys’ fees as excessive because too many hours of work are claimed, it is the burden of the challenging party to point to the specific items challenged, with a sufficient argument and citations to the evidence.  (Premier Medical Management Systems, Inc. v. California Ins. Guaranty Assoc. (2008) 163 Cal.App.4th 550, 564.)  General arguments that fees claimed are excessive, duplicative, or unrelated do not suffice.  (Ibid.) 

ANALYSIS

Plaintiff moves for an award of attorney fees and costs following a settlement with Defendants Nono’s Enterprises, Inc., Nono’s Smog Centers, Inc., and Smogs! Just Smogs, Inc. under an accepted Offer of Judgment that admitted liability under the Unruh Civil Rights Act. Plaintiff argues that she is entitled to fees as the prevailing party under the statutory framework, asserting that the settlement conclusively established liability.

In opposition, Defendants contend that Plaintiff’s request for attorney fees is excessive and unjustified, citing their own legal expenses totaling under $2,000. They argue that the lawsuit was one of many ADA cases filed by Plaintiff, suggesting she was a serial litigant pursuing monetary gain. Defendants also challenged the validity of the settlement under Code of Civil Procedure section 998, asserting it was improper because their attorney did not sign the offer and the offer required acceptance by all parties. They further claimed the matter should have been filed in limited jurisdiction due to the settlement amount and that Plaintiff failed to file a memorandum of costs, disqualifying her from recovering expenses.

In reply, Plaintiff refutes Defendants’ attempt to challenge the settlement’s validity, pointing out that the Offer of Judgment was signed by Defendants’ principals and circulated through their counsel. Further, she argues that procedural objections regarding the absence of a memorandum of costs by Defendants are misplaced because all costs were sought in conjunction with the fee motion, as permitted under the Rules of Court. Plaintiff emphasizes that her litigation history does not bar recovery, and that any claim of “litigiousness” was irrelevant and improper.

The Court find that Plaintiff is the prevailing party under the Unruh Civil Rights Act, as liability was admitted in the signed and accepted Offer of Judgment. Defendants’ objections to the validity of the 998 offer are without merit. The document was circulated through counsel and properly executed by Defendants’ principals. Judicial estoppel bars Defendants from now disputing the terms of an agreement they accepted and relied upon in seeking to vacate proceedings.

Defendants’ argument regarding Plaintiff’s litigation history is not a valid defense to statutory fee entitlement. The Court does not find any evidence of bad faith on Plaintiff’s part. Defendants fail to raise any persuasive legal or factual challenge.

To determine the reasonable amount of fees to be awarded, the Court begins with the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.  Plaintiff’s counsel bills at an hourly rate of $650.  (Price Decl. ¶ 8.)  He is a founding partner of Seabock Price, a firm focused on ADA plaintiff litigation and appellate practice.  (Id.)  He has practiced in the area of ADA litigation for more than ten years.  (Id.)  He is recognized as one of the most knowledgeable attorneys in this area of law.  (Id.; Goldsmith Decl. ¶¶ 14-15.)  His appellate reputation has resulted in cases being referred to him by other ADA firms, as occurred in this case.  (Price Decl. ¶ 8.)  He has been involved in a number of appeals with favorable results for his clients.  (Id.)  His rate has been found to be reasonable in several cases filed by his firm, in both contested and uncontested awards.  (Id. ¶ 9; Ex. 7.)

His rate tracks market rates for similar work by similarly situated attorneys in Los Angeles. (See Margolin v. Regional Planning Com. (1982) 134 Cal.App.3d 999, 1004 (“The reasonable hourly rate is that prevailing in the community for similar work.”).)  In fact, awards in the Los Angeles legal market to attorneys of comparable experience are frequently higher than Mr. Price’s rate. (Goldsmith Decl. ¶16; Motion at 6-7.)

The reasonableness of Mr. Price’s rate is also supported by the 2023 Real Rate Report: The 2023 Real Rate Report identifies attorney rates based on the actual bills clients received from nearly 18,000 lawyers from the third quarter of 2022 through the second quarter of 2023.

The Real Rate Report is a useful guidepost to assess the reasonableness of hourly rates because it “provides data-driven benchmarking for attorney hourly rates. . . . The information provided by the Real Rate Report is persuasive because, rather than using self-reported rates aggregated across all practice areas throughout the country, as appear in other surveys, it reflects actual legal billing through paid and processed invoices disaggregated for location, experience, firm size, areas of expertise, industry, and practice areas.” (RG Abrams Ins. v. Law Offices of C.R. Abrams (C.D. Cal. 2022) 342 F.R.D. 461, 524 fn.13.)  The Real Rate Report “is based on actual legal billing, matter information, and paid and processed invoices from more than 90 companies — not just on posted or advertised rates.” (Vogel v. MS Food Servs. (C.D. Cal. Dec. 26, 2018) No. 16-cv-8433 DSF, 2018 WL 11027947, at *3.)

The Real Rate Report shows the median partner rate for the Los Angeles legal market in 2022 and 2023 was $840 per hour, while the mean was $867 per hour. (Ex. 3.) Los Angeles litigation partners in the third quartile earned $1,159 per hour. (Id.)  Plaintiff’s counsel’s rate is within the range of what other litigation partners earned in 2022 and 2023.  As such, the Court concludes that Mr. Price’s hourly rate of $650 is reasonable. 

As to the reasonableness of the hours work, Plaintiff’s counsel was retained on a contingency fee basis.  (Price Decl. ¶ 3.)  Accordingly, counsel was incentivized to litigate the case efficiently.  As the Ninth Circuit recognized, “lawyers are not likely to spend unnecessary time on contingency fee cases in the hope of inflating their fees. The payoff is too uncertain, as to both the result and the amount of the fee. It would therefore be the highly atypical [fee-shifting contingency] case where [the contingent] lawyer engages in churning.” (Moreno v. City of Sacramento (9th Cir. 2008) 534 F.3d 1106, 1112.)

Plaintiff’s counsel’s time is also supported by detailed time records.  (Ex. 1.) These records are more than adequate to meet the documentation requirements in California courts. (Concepcion v. Amscan Holdings, Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 1309, 1324 (“It is not necessary to provide detailed billing timesheets to support an award of attorney fees under the lodestar method. . . . Declarations of counsel setting forth the reasonable hourly rate, the number of hours worked and the tasks performed are sufficient.”).)

 Plaintiff also seeks $2,122.41 in costs such as service and filing fees and investigation costs.  Section 505 of the ADA authorizes reasonable attorney’s fees, including litigation expenses and costs.  This includes all costs normally associated with a litigation including investigation costs.  The Court concludes that the costs Plaintiff seeks are reasonable and necessary to her claim.   

CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees in the amount of $17,303.21. 

DATED: April 7, 2025                                                           ___________________________

Edward B. Moreton, Jr.

Judge of the Superior Court