Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This case arises from a bus accident.  Plaintiff Sonik Babakhani-Darbroudy alleges Defendant Brandon Pinkney, was driving while intoxicated at the time of the accident which injured Plaintiff and 33 other bus passengers.  Pinkney was driving in the course and scope of his employment at Defendant Greyhound Lines, Inc.  Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against Greyhound on the ground it allegedly knew Pinkney was unfit to operate the bus.   

This hearing is on Greyhound’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.  Greyhound argues that Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged malice, oppression or fraud to support a claim for punitive damages.   

MEET AND CONFER 

Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5 requires that before the filing of a motion to strike, the moving party “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone” with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 435.5(a).)  The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc. §435.5(a)(2).)  Thereafter, the moving party shall file and serve a declaration detailing its meet and confer efforts.  (Code Civ. Proc. §435.5(a)(3).)   

Greyhound submits the Declaration of Po Waghalter which fails to show the parties met and conferred in person or by telephone and at least five days before the date of the responsive pleading.  Instead, defense counsel emailed Plaintiff’s counsel a letter on February 17, 2025, which requested counsel’s availability to meet and confer.  While Plaintiff’s counsel never responded, it does not appear Greyhound’s counsel attempted to call Plaintiff.  These efforts do not satisfy the meet and confer requirements of § 435.5.  Notwithstanding, the Court cannot deny a motion to strike based on an insufficient meet and confer.  (Code Civ. Proc. §435.5(a)(4).)  The Court cautions the parties, however, that any future failures to comply with their meet and confer obligations will result in the continuance of their motion.   

LEGAL STANDARD 

The court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a).)  The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (b).)  The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437.) 

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (Vaccaro v. Kaiman (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 761, 768 (“When the defect which justifies striking a complaint is capable of cure, the court should allow leave to amend.”).)  The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)  

DISCUSSION 

Greyhound moves to strike Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages.  It argues Plaintiff has only made conclusory allegations that she is entitled to punitive damages without stating facts supporting a finding of malice, oppression or fraud.  The Court agrees.    

“In order to survive a motion to strike an allegation of punitive damages, the ultimate facts showing an entitlement to such relief must be pled by a plaintiff.”  (Clauson v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.)  “The mere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages.  Not only must there be circumstances of oppression, fraud or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.”  (Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166 (citations omitted).)   

Allegations that merely plead the statutory phraseology are wholly insufficient to state a basis for recovery of punitive damages.  (Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1041.)  Conclusory characterizations of defendant’s conduct as willful, intentional or fraudulent is a patently insufficient statement of the necessary factual grounds for punitive damages.  (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.)     

Cal. Civ. Code section 3294 provides the basis upon which punitive damages can be recovered.  Punitive damages may only be sought where there is clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of malice, oppression or fraud: 

(c)(1) “Malice” means conduct which is intended to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. 

(c)(2) “Oppression” means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights. 

(c)(3) “Fraud” means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise 

causing injury.  

(Civ. Code, §3294.) 

Section 3294 was amended in 1987 to increase the burden of proof required in order to allege a punitive damages claim as well as to raise the level of misconduct necessary for an award of punitive damages.  The California Supreme Court has ruled that the insertion of the word “despicable” in section 3294 created a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.”  (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.)  “Despicable” means conduct that is “so vile, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.”  (Scott v. Phoenix Schools, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 702, 715.)  “Such conduct has been described as having the character of outrage frequently associated with [a] crime.”  (Id.) 

Punitive damages are disfavored by public policy and are allowed only under the most extreme circumstances and in the “clearest of cases.”  (Woolstrum v. Mailloux (1983) 141 Cal.App.3d Supp. 1, 9.)  “To contain the generosity and emotionality of juries, appellate courts have set the threshold high in defining situations in which punitive damages can be given.  Conduct which may be characterized as unreasonable, negligent, grossly negligent or reckless does not satisfy the highly culpable state of mind warranting punitive damages.  Conduct which warrants punitive damages must be of such severity or shocking character [as] warrants the same treatment as accorded willful misconduct – conduct in which defendant intends to cause harm.”  (Id. at 10 (internal quotations and citations omitted).)  

Here, Greyhound argues that Pinkney’s alleged driving while intoxicated does not constitute “despicable conduct” where there was no evidence of addiction, prior accidents, prior arrests and convictions, violated probation terms and additional pending criminal charges as was found in Taylor v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, a case involving intoxicated driving.  Ultimately, however, the Court need not consider this issue because to allege a claim for punitive damages against a corporate defendant, Plaintiff was required to allege that Greyhound had advance knowledge of Pinkney’s unfitness, authorized or ratified the wrongful conduct, or was personally culpable.  (Civil Code, § 3294(b).)   

 “A corporate employer may be liable only if the knowledge, authorization, ratification or act was on the part of an officer, director or managing agent of the corporation.” (Grieves v. Superior Court¿(1984) 157 Cal. App. 3d 159, 167.)  Managing agents exercise “substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determine corporate policy”.  (White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563, 573.) 

Here, Plaintiff conclusorily alleges that Greyhound had knowledge of Pinkney’s unfitness and ratified the conduct.  But Plaintiff does not name a single officer, director or managing agent of Greyhound that had such knowledge or ratified Pinkney’s conduct.  (Parvin J. v. Forward Beverly Hills, 2017 Cal.Super. LEXIS 77389 (May 9, 2017) (“Not one officer, director, or¿managing agent¿of FBH is¿named¿in plaintiff's complaint-let alone one who plaintiff has demonstrated had knowledge of Payne's allegedly malicious behavior.  Without such specificity, plaintiff's¿punitive damage¿request cannot stand.”) 

A plaintiff must allege specific facts for punitive damages.  Punitive damages may not be pleaded generally.  (Today’s IV, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Metropolitan Transit Authority (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 1137, 1193.)  Courts will strike punitive damages claims against employers that lack sufficient factual support.  (Grieves, 157 Cal.App.3d at 168 (“absent from the complaint is any assertion an officer, director or managing agent of Hospital was personally responsible for any of the acts allegedly performed by Hospital … the trial court should have granted real parties’ motions to strike.”).  It follows from these general principles that as to a corporate defendant, Plaintiff must name at least some of the officers, directors or managing agents of Greyhound who directly engaged in the wrongdoing, authorized the conduct, knew of the conduct, or ratified Pinkney’s conduct.   

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Greyhound’s motion to strike Plaintiff’s punitive damages allegations with 20 days’ leave to amend.   

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: April 2, 2025 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior C