Judge: Edward B. Moreton, Jr, Case: 24SMCV03472, Date: 2024-10-22 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV03472    Hearing Date: October 22, 2024    Dept: 205

Superior Court of California

 

County of Los Angeles – West District 

 

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205

 

 

 

CHOTTO MATTE (BEVERLY HILLS), LLC, 

 

 

 

Plaintiff,

 

v.

 

 

 

CANON LUXURY BUILDINGS, LLC, et al.,  

 

 

 

Defendants.

 

 

 

  Case No.:  24SMCV03472 

 

  Hearing Date:  October 22, 2024

 

  [TENTATIVE] order RE:

 

  DEFENDANT canon luxury 

 

  buildings, llc’s demurrer to and 

 

  motion to strike complaint

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

 

BACKGROUND

 

Plaintiff Chotto Matte (Beverly Hills), LLC was a tenant in a commercial restaurant space owned by Defendant Canon Luxury Buildings, LLC.  The parties entered into a retail lease (“Lease”).  (Compl. ¶ 16.)

 

Before entering into the Lease, Plaintiff claims Defendant misrepresented that it had already secured a Conditional Use Permit (“CUP”), which was necessary for Plaintiff to operate a restaurant at that location.  (Id. ¶¶ 9, 11.)  In truth, Defendant only obtained a “resolution” from the City which had no effect because Defendant never paid the necessary fees and failed to ensure the Resolution was recorded.  (Id. ¶¶ 13-15.)  Plaintiff claims it relied on that misrepresentation to enter into the Lease.  (Id. ¶¶ 19, 20.)  

 

The Lease provides that Defendant would use its reasonable efforts to obtain a CUP from the City of Beverly Hills within 12 months following the effective date of the Lease.  (Id. ¶18.)  The parties also agreed that if Defendant failed to obtain the CUP within one year of the effective date, Plaintiff and Defendant each would have the right to terminate the Lease on written notice to the other.  (Id.)  

 

On these facts, Plaintiff alleges four claims for: (1) declaratory relief – termination of lease, (2) declaratory relief – frustration of purpose, (3) fraudulent inducement and (4) breach of contract.  

 

This hearing is on Defendant’s demurrer to and motion to strike the Complaint.  Defendant argues that (1) the claims for declaratory relief fail because the positions of the parties are now fixed, and the only issues to be adjudicated are whether either party breached the contract and if so, the amount of damages; (2) the claim for fraudulent inducement fails because the Complaint fails to state with adequate specificity the allegedly fraudulent statements; the element of detrimental reliance is controverted by the Lease, and damages have not been adequately alleged, and (3) the claim for breach of contract fails because it does not allege Plaintiff’s performance or excuse for nonperformance.  Defendant also moves to strike the claim for fraudulent inducement and references to the CUP as a “condition precedent” because both are controverted by the language of the Lease.    

 

LEGAL STANDARD

 

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable.  (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents).)  For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)     

 

Further, the court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (a).)  The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (b).)  The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc. § 437.)

 

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 (“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”).)  The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) 

 

MEET AND CONFER

 

Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41 and 435.5 requires that before the filing of a demurrer or motion to strike, the moving party “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone” with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer or motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer or motion to strike.  (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41(a), 435.5(a).)  The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41(a)(2), 435.5(a)(2).)  Thereafter, the moving party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41(a)(3), 435.5(a)(3).)  Defendant submits the Declaration of Hannah Salassi which attests the parties met and conferred by videoconference on September 9, 2024, more than five days before Defendant filed its demurrer and motion to strike on September 16, 2024.  This satisfies the meet and confer requirements of §§ 430.41 and 435.5.  

 

UNTIMELY OPPOSITION

 

Plaintiff served its opposition on October 11, 2024.  Under Code of Civil Procedure § 1005, opposition papers are due no later than 9 court days before the date of hearing – in this instance, by October 9, 2024.  Plaintiff offers no explanation for its late filing. The Court has broad discretion to reject late-filed papers, and its discretion to accept such papers should be exercised only if it finds that the offending party has either sought leave to file late or demonstrated good cause for failing to adhere to the applicable deadline.  (Rancho Mirage Country Club Homeowners Assn. v. Hazelbaker (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 252, 262.)  Plaintiff has done neither.  The Court exercises its discretion to reject Plaintiff’s late-filed opposition.  

 

DISCUSSION

 

Declaratory Relief

 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claims for declaratory relief fail because only past wrongs are involved.  The Court agrees.  

 

“Declaratory relief operates prospectively, serving to set controversies at rest. If there is a controversy that calls for a declaration of rights, it is no objection that¿past¿wrongs¿are also to be redressed; but there is no basis for¿declaratory¿relief¿where only¿past¿wrongs¿are involved. Hence, where there is an accrued cause of action for an actual breach of contract or other wrongful act,¿declaratory¿relief¿may¿be denied. (5 Witkin, Cal. Procedure (5th ed. 2008) Pleading, § 869, p. 284, italics added; see also Osseous Technologies of America, Inc. v. Discovery Ortho Partners LLC (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 357, 366.)

 

Here, only past wrongs are involved.  Plaintiff alleges it issued a termination notice to Defendant on June 27, 2024.  (Compl. ¶ 26.)  Plaintiff also alleges Defendant responded by giving notice that Plaintiff’s right to possession of the premises was terminated, and Defendant was entitled to recover rent for the full ten-year term.  (Id. ¶ 27.)  The positions of the parties are now fixed. The only issue that remains is whether either (or both) of the parties breached the Lease by their actions, and how much, if any, damages should be awarded.  

 

There are no allegations in the complaint that would suggest that declaratory relief will regulate future conduct by the parties.  (Watson v. Sansone (1971) 19 Cal.App.3d 1 (holding declaratory relief improper “where nothing remains to be done but the payment of money, and where no declaration of future rights and obligations is sought, necessary, or proper.”); Ermolieff v. R.K.O. Radio Pictures (1942) 19 Cal.2d 543, 545-549 (“[C]ourts may provide declaratory relief under section 1060 if the relief sought would also govern the future conduct of the parties.”)  

 

The parties have already done what declaratory relief is intended to avoid -- Plaintiff has repudiated its obligations under the contract; Defendant has invaded any right to possession, and both parties claim the other has committed wrongs.  (Travers v. Louden (1967) 254 Cal.App.2d 926, 931 (Declaratory relief “serves to set controversies at rest before they lead to repudiation of obligations, invasion of rights or commission of wrongs.”).)  Declaratory relief serves no purpose here – damages are the sole and complete remedy available to Plaintiff.  Accordingly, the Court sustains the demurrer to the first and second causes of action for declaratory relief.   

 

Fraudulent Inducement 

 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim for fraudulent inducement is subject to demurrer on three grounds:  First, Plaintiff fails to allege fraud with particularity.  Second, the misrepresentation specifically alleged is controverted by the CUP, which is incorporated by reference to the Complaint.  Third, the Complaint fails to adequately allege justifiable reliance and damages.  The Court agrees on the last ground.   

 

“The elements of a cause of action for fraud are misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure), scienter, intent to defraud, justifiable reliance, and resulting damage.”  (Olson v. Cohen (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 1209, 1217.)  Every element of a claim for fraud must be pled factually and specifically.  The policy of liberal construction of pleadings will not be invoked to sustain a defective pleading for fraud.  (Hill Transp. Co. v. Southwest Forest Industries, Inc. (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 702, 707.)  “The particularity requirement necessitates pleading facts which show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.”  (People ex rel. Allstate Insurance Company v. Discovery Radiology Physicians, P.C. (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 521, 548.) 

 

Here, Plaintiff alleges that a Mr. Bohbot said a CUP had been issued by the City of Beverly Hills on July 8, 2021.  (Compl. ¶ 11.)  Defendant argues that this misrepresentation is contradicted by Exhibit 2 to the Complaint which shows that a CUP was actually issued on July 8, 2021.  But Exhibit 2 to the Complaint is a resolution, not a CUP.  Exhibit 2 does not contradict the alleged misrepresentation.

 

Defendant also argues that Plaintiff has failed to allege an intent to defraud, i.e., 

 

Mr. Bohbot knew the statement was false when he made it.  Mr. Bohbot’s intent may be inferred from his actions.  He claimed a CUP had been issued on July 8, 2021, but Defendant had only secured a resolution, not a CUP.  It may be the case that Mr. Bohbot was confused about the distinction between a resolution and a CUP, but that is an argument for another day, and not proper for a demurrer.  

 

Notwithstanding, the Court agrees with Defendant that the Complaint fails to allege detrimental reliance.  The terms of the Lease expressly and unambiguously provide that Defendant was to acquire the CUP within twelve months.  (Ex. 3 to Compl., §2.1.)  If Plaintiff acted in reliance on Mr. Bohbot’s statement that the CUP had already been obtained, there would be no reason for a term giving Defendant twelve months to obtain one.  Plaintiff cannot have justifiably and reasonably relied on a representation that is countermanded by the Lease.

 

The Complaint also fails to allege damages with specificity.  Plaintiff has not alleged that it is otherwise ready to open for business, and the absence of a CUP is preventing it from doing so, resulting in a loss.  Moreover, Plaintiff has not alleged that if a CUP has not been properly obtained, one cannot be obtained prior to any expected date of opening.  “A plaintiff asserting fraud by misrepresentation is obliged to…establish a complete causal relationship between the alleged misrepresentations and the harm claimed to have resulted therefrom. This requires a plaintiff to allege specific facts not only showing he or she actually and justifiably relied on the defendant’s misrepresentations, but also how the actions he or she took in reliance on the defendant’s misrepresentations caused the alleged damages.”  (Rossberg v. Bank of America, N.A. (2013) 219 Cal.App.4th 1481, 1499.) 

 

For these reasons, the Court sustains the demurrer to Plaintiff’s third cause of action for fraudulent inducement.  

 

Breach of Contract 

 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s final claim for breach of contract is likewise subject to demurrer because Plaintiff has not alleged performance or excuse for nonperformance.  The Court agrees.  

 

In order to sufficiently allege a claim for breach of contract, Plaintiff much allege its performance or excuse from nonperformance.  (D’Arrigo Bros. of California v. United Farmworkers of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 790 799 (breach of contract claim requires (1) existence of the contract, (2) plaintiff’s performance or excuse from nonperformance, (3) defendant’s breach, and (4) the resulting damages to the plaintiff).) 

 

The Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff either performed its obligations under the contract (it paid the monthly rent due under the lease) or was excused from such performance (the absence of the CUP prevented it from operating its business).  Accordingly, the Court also sustains the demurrer to the breach of contract claim.  

 

CONCLUSION

 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court sustains the demurrer with 20 days’ leave to amend, and denies the motion to strike as moot.

 

IT IS SO ORDERED.

 

 

 

DATED: October 22, 2024                                                       ___________________________

 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr.

 

Judge of the Superior Court