Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

Plaintiff Edmond Niknam sues Defendant Volkswagen Credit Inc. (“VCI”) over alleged inaccurate information VCI reported to credit bureaus in violation of the Credit Reporting Agencies Act (“CRAA”) and California’s Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”).   

Plaintiff’s allegations are premised on two automobile lease accounts with VCI.  (Compl. ¶¶ 10-12).  According to Plaintiff, the first account in question relates to an individual 36-month automobile lease with VCI opened on May 1, 2016 (the “2016 Lease”) and closed in June 2019 with a past due amount of $11,520 as of December 4, 2020.  (Id. ¶¶ 12-13.) The second account relates to a joint 36-month lease with VCI opened on December 27, 2015 (the “2015 Lease”) which is also closed with an outstanding balance of $3,615 as of December 3, 2020.  (Id. ¶ 14.) 

Both lease accounts were the subject of a nearly identical verified complaint filed by Amin-Ghazaei against VCI on July 27, 2020 in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles, Case No. 20VECV00810 (the “Prior Action”).  (Id. ¶ 11; Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”), Exs. A.)  Amin-Ghazaei subsequently filed a verified amended complaint on February 24, 2021 (“2021 FAC”).  (RJN, Ex. B.)  

In the Prior Action, Amin-Ghazaei alleged VCI furnished inaccurate credit information related to the same two accounts referenced in Plaintiff’s operative complaint. Compare Compl. ¶¶ 12-14 with RJN Ex. B (2021 FAC), ¶¶ 12-14.) Substantively, the allegations in the Prior Action relate to the purported inaccurate credit reporting which are nearly verbatim to the allegations Plaintiff now alleges in his complaint. (See, e.g., RJN Ex. B (2021 FAC), ¶ 14(a) (“Defendant claimed there were 13 Late Payments based on the false claim that one payment was made late.”); Compl. ¶ 14(a) (“Defendant claimed there were 13 Late Payments based on the false claim that one payment was made late.”).)  

Amin-Ghazaei brought two causes of action against VCI for violations of the CRAA and UCL, the same two causes of action that Plaintiff now brings against VCI.  (RJN Ex. B (2021 FAC), ¶¶ 31-44; Compl. ¶¶ 31-44.)  Ultimately, Amin-Ghazaei and VCI resolved the Prior Action and the court entered a dismissal with prejudice on April 19, 2021.  (RJN Ex. C (April 19, 2021 Request for Dismissal).)  

On August 1, 2024, over four years after Amin-Ghazaei filed the Prior Action against VCI, Plaintiff filed his verified complaint against VCI bringing two causes of action for violations of the CRAA and UCL. (Compl. ¶¶ 31-44.) Plaintiff alleges that on or about April 26, 2024, he learned that VCI furnished “adverse, incomplete, and inaccurate information to credit bureaus, even though [Plaintiff] had previously advised [VCI] the furnished information was inaccurate and incomplete.” (Id. ¶ 10.) In support of Plaintiff’s theory of credit reporting inaccuracies, he refers to the allegations previously made against VCI, related to the same two accounts, as set forth in the Prior Action.  (Id. ¶ 11.)  

With respect to the 2016 Lease, Plaintiff alleges “flaws” with VCI’s credit reporting, including that (i) VCI did not report information from May through November 2020, (ii) VCI did not “reference [] the lawsuit which was filed on 07/27/2020 [the Prior Action],” (iii) VCI inaccurately reported twelve charge-offs, and (iv) VCI inaccurately reported a balance of $11,520 as of December 4, 2020, which he claims is a “drastic difference” from the original loan of $6,568.  (Id. ¶ 13.)  

As to the 2015 Lease, Plaintiff alleges the following inaccuracies: (i) thirteen unspecified late payments, including reporting late payments for January and February 2018 as 30 and 60 days late, which according to Plaintiff is “mathematically...NOT possible,” (ii) VCI received more than the original loan amount, and (iii) the payoff balance should have been $5,173.  (Id. ¶ 14.)  Plaintiff further alleges VCI falsely claimed his credit reporting disputes did not exist and had been resolved.  (Id. ¶¶ 19, 25.) 

This hearing is on VCI’s demurrer to the verified complaint.  VCI argues that (1) as to the CRAA claim, Plaintiff fails to allege sufficient facts showing VCI furnished incomplete and inaccurate information in violation of CCRA, and Plaintiff cannot allege any actual damages VCI caused because the alleged accounts were delinquent with an outstanding balance; and (2) on his UCL claim, Plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to demonstrate he has standing to assert such a claim given he does not allege VCI caused him to incur any injury-in-fact; additionally, as a basis for his UCL claim, Plaintiff alleges a violation of the CRAA, FCRA, in addition to unsupported claims for wire fraud, 18 U.S.C. § 1343, but Plaintiff fails to allege specific facts supporting these violations.  

MEET AND CONFER 

Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41 requires that before the filing of a demurrer the moving party “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone” with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a).)  The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(2).)  Thereafter, the moving party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.41(a)(3).)  VCI has not filed any meet and confer declaration.  The demurrer references a declaration by Corey Pederson but the declaration is not attached to VCI’s papers.  Notwithstanding, the demurrer states that VCI’s counsel contacted Plaintiff in an effort to meet and confer by telephone to determine whether an agreement can be reached to resolve the issues raised in the demurrer but Plaintiff did not respond to this request to meet and confer.  Based on this representation, the Court concludes VCI has met its meet and confer obligations.   

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

VCI requests judicial notice of (1) verified complaint filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles (Case No. 20VECV00810) on July 27, 2020 by Amin-Ghazaei; (2) first amended verified complaint filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles (Case No. 20VECV00810) on February 24, 2021 by Amin-Ghazaei, and (3) request for dismissal filed in the Superior Court of the State of California, County of Los Angeles (Case No. 20VECV00810) on April 19, 2021.  The Court grants the request pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code §§ 452(d), 452(h) and 453. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

A demurrer to a complaint may be general or special.  A general demurrer challenges the legal sufficiency of the complaint on the ground it fails to state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (e); Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  A special demurrer challenges other defects in the complaint, including whether a pleading is uncertain. (Code Civ. Proc., § 430.10, subd. (f).)  The term uncertain refers to whether the pleading is “ambiguous and unintelligible.”  (Id.)  A demurrer for uncertainty should be sustained if the complaint is drafted in such a manner that the defendant cannot reasonably respond, i.e., the defendant cannot determine what issues must be admitted or denied, or what counts are directed against the defendant. (Khoury v. Maly's of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616.) 

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable.  (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents).)  For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)  

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 (“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”).)  The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully.  (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.) 

ANALYSIS 

No opposition¿was filed.¿Thus, Plaintiff effectively¿concedes¿all arguments made in the demurrer. The failure to challenge a contention in a brief results in the concession of that argument.¿(DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Sup. Ct.¿(2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 562, 566¿(“By failing to argue the contrary, plaintiffs concede this issue”);¿Westside Center Associates v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc.¿(1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 507, 529¿(“failure to address the threshold question ... effectively concedes that issue and renders its remaining arguments moot”);¿Glendale Redevelopment Agency v. Parks¿(1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1424¿(issue is impliedly conceded by failing to address it).)  Accordingly, the Court sustains the demurrer.  Additionally, because no opposition was filed, Plaintiff has not met his burden of showing that he could successfully amend the complaint to cure the defects raised in the demurrer, and therefore, the Court sustains the demurrer without leave to amend. 

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS VCI’s demurrer without leave to amend.   

 

DATED:  November 12, 2024 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court