Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This case arises from a dispute over an allegedly defective car.  Plaintiff Howard Wu leased a new 2023 Jeep Wagoneer from Defendant Santa Monica CDJR Inc. for a total price of $77,500.00.  (Saeedian Decl. ¶ 17.)  The car came with an express warranty from Defendant FCA US, LLC.   

Within the first year, Plaintiff took the car for five repair visits for defects relating to check engine light, engine, transmission and other serious non-conformities, all of which took place during the first day or nine miles.  (Id. ¶ 10.)  FCA failed to promptly replace the car or make restitution to Plaintiff.  (Id. ¶ 17.)   

The operative complaint alleges four claims for (1) breach of express warranty; (2) breach of implied warranty; (3) violation of subdivision (b) of Civil Code § 1793.2, and (4) violation of Civ. Code § 1796.5. 

After the commencement of this action and extensive discovery, Defendants offered to settle Plaintiff’s case for a total of $77,500.  (Id. ¶ 20.)  In the settlement agreement, the parties agreed that Plaintiff is the prevailing party for purposes of a fees motion.  The parties also agreed that FCA will pay Plaintiff’s reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses in an amount to be determined by the Court, by noticed motion, unless the parties agree on the amount.  The parties could not agree on a proper amount.     

This hearing is on Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs.  Plaintiff seeks $24,623 in fees and $878.38 in costs.  There was no opposition filed as of the posting of this tentative ruling.   

LEGAL STANDARD 

Parties to litigation must generally bear their own attorney’s fees, unless they otherwise agree or a statute provides otherwise. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1021.)  Here, the Song-Beverly Act (“SBA”) provides for the award of attorneys’ fees to prevailing plaintiffs as follows:¿ 

If the buyer prevails in an action under this section, the buyer shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.¿ 

 

(Civ. Code § 1794, subd. (d).)¿ 

 

California courts have consistently “rejected the motion that the fee award must be proportionate to the amount of damages recovered.”  (Niederer v. Ferreira (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1485, 1508 (1987).)   An attorneys’ fee award is to be based upon actual time expended rather than being tied to any percentage of the recovery.  (Drouin v. Fleetwood Enterprises (1985) 163 Cal.App.3d 486, 493.)  Because Plaintiff is suing under the SBA, the legislative policies are in favor of recovery of all attorney fees reasonably expended without limiting the fees to a proportion of the actual recovery.  (Graciano v. Robinson Ford Sales, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 140, 164.) 

The fee setting inquiry in California ordinarily begins with the “lodestar” method, i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.  Such an approach anchors the trial court’s analysis to an objective determination of the value of the attorney’s services, ensuring that the amount awarded is not arbitrary. (Id. at 48, n.23.)   

The lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.  (Serrano v. Priest¿(1977) 20 Cal.3d 25, 49.)¿¿¿The factors considered in determining the modification of the lodestar include the nature and difficulty of the litigation, the amount of money involved, the skill required and employed to handle the case, the attention given, the success or failure,¿and other circumstances in the case. (EnPalm, LLC v.¿Teitler¿Family Trust¿(2008) 162 Cal. App. 4th 770, 774 (emphasis in original).)   

A negative modifier is appropriate when duplicative work has been performed. (Thayer v. Wells Fargo Bank,¿N.A.¿(2001) 92 Cal.App.4th 819.)  On the other hand, a positive multiplier may be applied to compensate the attorney for the prevailing party at a rate reflecting the risk of nonpayment in contingency cases.  (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1138.)    

“It is well established that the determination of what constitutes reasonable attorney fees is committed to the discretion of the trial court, whose decision cannot be reversed in the absence of an abuse of discretion.”¿ (Melnyk v. Robledo (1976) 64 Cal.App.3d 618, 623.)¿  

DISCUSSION   

There is no dispute that Plaintiff is the prevailing party, and under the SBA, he is entitled to “attorneys’ fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred.”  (Civ. Code § 1794.) 

In calculating the attorneys’ fees, the Court starts with the lodestar which is the reasonable hourly rate multiplied by the reasonable hours expended.  There are four Plaintiff’s attorneys who billed on this matter.   

The lead attorney, Michael Saeedian, has been practicing for 16 years, specializing in lemon law cases.  (Saeedian Decl. ¶2.)  He is a graduate of Loyola Law School.  (Id.)  He is listed in the National Trial Lawyers: Top 40 under 40 List and the National Trial Lawyers: Top 1000 Trial Lawyers.  (Id. ¶3.)  He is the founding partner of The Lemon Pros, LLP.  His hourly billing rate is $695.  (Id.) 

The “managing attorney”, Christopher Urner, is a 2016 graduate of Southwestern Law School.  He has been practicing for nine years.  He has litigated hundreds of lemon law cases and has participated in the trial preparation of several “high profile” lemon law cases that have resulted in significant jury awards.  His hourly billing rate is $525.  (Id. ¶ 4.) 

The “primary assigned attorney,” Jorge Acosta is a partner at The Lemon Pros, LLP.  He attended law school at Pacific Coast University School of Law and graduated in 2022.  He passed the bar in February 2023.  Before joining The Lemon Pros, LLP, Acosta worked as a “law clerk” on behalf of vehicle manufacturers including Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc. and Mazda Motor America, Inc. in defense of Song-Beverly litigation.  (Id. ¶ 5.)   He was promoted to Partner in July 2024.  His hourly billing rate is $350 before July 2024 and $450 thereafter.  (Id.) 

Evelyn Ghazarian is a paralegal.  She recently received her law degree from Southwestern Law School, and she is scheduled to take the California bar exam in February 2025.  She helps draft discovery, communicates with clients about responses to discovery, reviews motions to create summaries for the handling attorney, assists with drafting motions and oppositions, and manages the calendar.  She is billed at an hourly rate of $250.  (Id. ¶ 6.) 

Mary Zazueta is a paralegal.  She has worked in the legal field for over 6 years, with substantial experience handling consumer litigation cases.  She is responsible for assisting with case management, calendaring deadlines, preparing initial discovery, drafting routine legal documents and supporting attorneys throughout all phases of the litigation.  She is billed at an hourly rate of $150.  (Id. ¶ 7.)    

The rates of counsel’s firm has been approved in other cases.  (Id. ¶ 16.)  These rates are supported by the California of the United States Consumer Law Attorney Fee Survey Report from 2017-2018, after adjusting for inflation for today’s rates.  (Id. ¶ 14.)  This report has been cited as evidence of prevailing hourly rates in prior California opinions.  (See, e.g., Warren v. Kia Motors Am. Inc. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th 24, 33.)   

FCA has not timely opposed the motion, and therefore, concedes that these rates are reasonable.  The failure to challenge a contention in a brief results in the concession of that argument. (DuPont Merck Pharmaceutical Co. v. Sup. Ct. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 562, 566¿(“By failing to argue the contrary, plaintiffs concede this issue.”);¿Westside Center Associates v. Safeway Stores 23, Inc.¿(1996) 42 Cal.App.4th 507, 529¿(“failure to address the threshold question¿...¿effectively concedes that issue and renders its remaining arguments moot”);¿Glendale Redevelopment Agency v. Parks¿(1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 1409, 1424¿(issue is impliedly conceded by failing to address it).)¿ 

Next, the Court looks at the time expended by counsel.  Counsel has spent 66 hours in prosecuting this case.  Counsel has submitted a detailed time record which supports the time expended.  Under California law, this evidence is entitled to a¿presumption¿of credibility. (Horsford v. Board of Trustees of California State University (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 359, 396.) And FCA has not submitted an opposition to challenge any portion of the hours claimed.  Also, a prevailing party is entitled to fees for time spent preparing and litigating its attorneys’ fees motion. Thus, the Court includes an additional award for fees and costs incurred in drafting the instant Motion. (Estate of Trynin (1989) 49 Ca1.3d 868;¿M.C. & D. Capital Corp. v. Gilmaker (1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 671.)  Thus, the Court will award fees for all the hours reflected in the billing records, which total $24,623.00. 

Additionally, under the Song-Beverly Act, a prevailing buyer is entitled to recover his costs and expenses.  (See, Civ. Code § 1794(d) [emphasis added].) The California Legislature intended the word “expenses” to cover outlays not included in the detailed statutory definition of “costs,” and the Song-Beverly Act’s legislative history demonstrates the Legislature exercised its power to permit recovery of a host of litigation expenditures beyond those permitted by Code of Civil Procedure § 1033.5. (Jensen v. BMW of North America, Inc. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 112, 137-138.)  A verified memorandum of costs generally satisfies the moving party’s burden of establishing costs necessarily incurred (Hadley v. Krepel (1985) 167 Cal.App.3d 677, 682). The burden shifts to Defendants to properly rebut the claimed costs. A delay or failure to challenge a costs bill waives any objection to the costs claimed. (Douglas v. Willis (1994) 27 Cal.App.4th 287, 288.) Plaintiff filed memorandum of costs concurrently with this Motion and requests reimbursement of $878.38 in costs and expenses.  FCA has not challenged the amount of costs and expenses, and therefore, concedes its reasonableness.  Accordingly, the Court will award the entire amount of costs and expenses sought by Plaintiff, which total $878.38. 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees, costs and expenses.  The Court awards fees and costs in the amount of $25,501.38.   

 

DATED: May 27, 2025 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court