Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This is an unlawful detainer action.  Plaintiff Barrington Pacific, LLC owns the property located at 11734 Wilshire Blvd., #C1012, Los Angeles, CA 90025. (the “Premises”).  Plaintiff entered into a lease with Defendant Christopher Flocos for the Premises.  Plaintiff claims Flocos failed to pay rent, and after Plaintiff served a 3 day notice to pay or quit, Flocos failed to pay the rent due or vacate the Premises.   

This hearing is on Defendant’s motion to transfer venue pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §§ 396b and 397.  Defendant argues this case involves the same parties, the same property, and the same core issues as two other cases pending in the Santa Monica Courthouse: Barrington Pacific LLC v. Christopher Flocos (Case No. 23SMUD03074) and Barrington Plaza Tenant Association v. Barrington Pacific LLC, Douglas Emmett Inc. (Case No. 23STCV13323).  Accordingly, Defendant asks this Court to transfer the instant action to the Santa Monica Courthouse which he claims will prevent substantial duplication of judicial resources, as that courthouse has already handled the related matters and is familiar with the factual and legal background.   

LEGAL STANDARD 

There is a presumption that the county in which the plaintiff chose to file the action is the proper county.¿ (Bechtel Corp. v. Superior Court¿(1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 405, 407, fn. 1.)¿The burden is on the moving party to establish the facts needed to justify transfer that usually requires declarations containing admissible evidence.  (Weil & Brown et al.,¿Cal. Prac. Guide: Civ. Pro. Before Trial¿(The Rutter Group, 2019 Update) § 3:573.)  The declaration cannot consist of hearsay or conclusions.  (California Practice Guide, Civil Procedure Before Trial, ¶3:576.1 (The Rutter Group 2020) (referencing¿Lieppman v. Lieber¿(1986) 180 Cal.App.3d 914, 919;¿Tutor-Saliba-Perini Joint Venture v. Sup.Ct. (San Diego Unified Port Dist.)¿(1991) 233 Cal.App.3d 736, 744). 

Defendant is seeking transfer pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §§ 396b and 397.  Section 396b provides that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided in Section 396a, if an action or proceeding is commenced in a court having jurisdiction of the subject matter thereof, other than the court designated as the proper court for the trial thereof, under this title, the action may, notwithstanding, be tried in the court where commenced, unless the defendant, at the time he or she answers, demurs, or moves to strike, or, at his or her option, without answering, demurring, or moving to strike and within the time otherwise allowed to respond to the complaint, files with the clerk, a notice of¿motion for an order transferring the action or proceeding to the proper court, together with proof of service, upon the adverse party, of a copy of those papers.” 

Code Civ. Proc. §397 provides that:  

“The court may, on motion, change the place of trial in the following cases: 

 

(a)¿When the court designated in the complaint is not the proper court. 

(b)¿When there is reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had therein. 

(c)¿When the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change. 

(d)¿When from any cause there is no judge of the court qualified to act. 

(e)¿When a proceeding for dissolution of marriage has been filed in the county in which the petitioner has been a resident for three months next preceding the commencement of the proceeding, and the respondent at the time of the commencement of the proceeding is a resident of another county in this state, to the county of the respondent’s residence when the ends of justice would be promoted by the change. If a motion to change the place of trial is made pursuant to this paragraph, the court may, prior to the determination of such motion, consider and determine motions for allowance of temporary spousal support, support of children, temporary restraining orders, attorneys’ fees, and costs, and make all necessary and proper orders in connection therewith.” 

¿ 

Section 396b requires that the motion to transfer be filed before a responsive pleading is filed while Section 397 contains no similar time limitation.  However, the 397 motion must still be filed within a “reasonable time after the answer is filed.”  (Rycz v. Superior Court (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 824, 837.)  What constitutes a “reasonable” time rests largely in the trial court’s discretion. (California Practice Guide, Civil Procedure Before Trial, 113:563 (The Rutter Group 2020) (referencing¿Cooney v. Cooney¿(1944) 25 Cal.2d 202, 208).)  The court’s determination as to whether delay in making the motion bars relief will usually be upheld.¿(Willingham v. Pecora¿(1941) 44 Cal.App.2d 289, 295; California Practice Guide, Civil Procedure Before Trial, ¶3:568 (The Rutter Group 2020).) 

DISCUSSION 

To the extent Defendant is moving to transfer pursuant to Section 396b, his motion is untimely.  Defendant filed an answer on December 19, 2024, and he filed the motion to transfer on April 3, 2025.  Accordingly, he failed to move to transfer “at the time he or she answers, demurs, or moves to strike, or, at his or her option, without answering, demurring, or moving to strike and within the time otherwise allowed to respond to the complaint.” 

To the extent Defendant is moving to transfer pursuant to Section 397, his motion was not filed within a “reasonable time” after the answer is filed.  Defendant did not move to transfer until four months after he filed his answer, and after trial has already been set, and he provides no reasonable explanation (indeed no explanation at all) as to why he waited that long to file his §397 motion to transfer. 

Even if the Court were to consider Defendant’s motion on its merits, Defendant has not supported the motion with a proper declaration and admissible evidence.  Defendant filed a “declaration” but it is not signed under penalty of perjury, and the declaration does not attach admissible evidence.   

Further, the only possible basis for Defendant to seek transfer under section 397b is under subdivision (c)¿which allows for transfer “[w]hen the convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice would be promoted by the change.”  But Defendant has not identified any witnesses or explained why it is more convenient for them to testify in the Santa Monica Courthouse, versus the Beverly Hills Courthouse.   

Where a transfer motion is based on the “convenience of witnesses and the ends of justice”, the declarations must show: 

• The¿names¿of each witness expected to testify for¿both¿parties; 

• The¿substance of their expected testimony, 

• Whether the witness has been deposed or has given a statement regarding the facts of the case (and if so, the date of the deposition or statement); 

• The¿reasons¿why it would be “inconvenient” for the witnesses to appear locally; and 

• The¿reasons¿why the “ends of justice” would be promoted by transfer to a different county (e.g., to permit view of the scene or make other material evidence available). 

(Juneau v. Juneau¿(1941) 45 Cal.App.2d 14, 16.)  Here, in addition to being unsigned under penalty of perjury, Defendant’s “declaration” fails to provide the above required information.   

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court DENIES Defendant’s motion to transfer.   

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: May 21, 2025 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court