Judge: Edward B. Moreton, Jr, Case: 24SMCV04841, Date: 2025-01-06 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV04841    Hearing Date: January 6, 2025    Dept: 205

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles – West District

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205

BACKGROUND

This is an unlawful detainer action.  The real property at issue is located at 911 Loma Vista Drive, Beverly Hills, California 90210 (commonly referred to as “917 Loma Vista Drive, Beverly Hills, California 90210”) (the “Property”). 

In May 2006, third party borrower Gennady Moshkovich (“Borrower”) obtained a $5,325,000.00 loan (“Loan”), which was secured by a Deed of Trust that was recorded against the Property; the Deed of Trust designated third party Horizon Mortgage Bankers (“Horizon”) as “Beneficiary” of the Deed of Trust.  (Separate Statement of Undisputed Facts “SSUF” Nos. 1 – 2.) 

In May 2020, Horizon assigned its beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust (and the underlying loan) to CSMC 2018-SP3 Trust (“CSMC”).  (SSUF No. 3.)  In May 2022, CSMC assigned its beneficial interest in the Deed of Trust (and the underlying loan) to Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, not in its individual capacity but solely as Owner Trustee of CSMC 2018-SP3 Trust (“Wilmington”).  (SSUF No. 4.)  In October 2022, Wilmington substituted in Quality Loan Service Corporation (“Quality”) as the Trustee of the Deed of Trust.  (SSUF No. 5.)

As of November 13, 2023, Borrower was in default on the Loan; thus, Quality recorded a Notice of Default against the Property.  (SSUF No. 6.)  As of February 13, 2024, Borrower remained in default on the loan; thus, Quality recorded a Notice of Trustee’s Sale against the Property.  (SSUF No. 7.) Ultimately, on April 9, 2024, Quality held a trustee’s sale of the Property.  (SSUF No. 8.)  Plaintiff was the winning bidder at that sale.  (SSUF No. 9.) Quality subsequently issued a Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale to Plaintiff, which was recorded on June 28, 2024—which perfected Plaintiff’s title to the Property.  (SSUF No. 10.)

Defendant claims that, at the time of the sale, he possessed the Subject Property pursuant to a “month-to-month” lease with the former owner of the Property. Specifically, he claims to have entered into a lease dated July 10, 2021, which had an end date of November 10, 2021. (SSUF No. 11.)  Despite the November 10, 2021 termination date for the lease, Defendant claims he continued to make monthly payments to the prior owner of the Property, at least through July 2024.  (SSUF No. 12.)  If true, this created a “month-to-month” tenancy with the former owner of the Property, at least through July 2024.  (SSUF No. 13.) 

Plaintiff caused a 90-Day Notice to Quit to be served on Defendant via a registered process server. (SSUF No. 14.) Plaintiff’s process server subsequently executed an Amended Proof of Service, attesting to the aforementioned service of the 90-Day Notice to Quit.  (SSUF No. 15.)  Despite the passage of 90 days, Defendant failed to deliver possession of the Property to Plaintiff.  (SSUF No. 16.)  This action was filed thereafter.

This hearing is on Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.  Plaintiff argues that there is no undisputed facts as to all elements of his unlawful detainer claim because Defendant cannot dispute: (1) the sale to Plaintiff was conducted in compliance with Civil Code section 2924, et seq.; (2) a notice to quit was properly served on Defendant; and (3) Defendant failed to vacate the Property within the time prescribed in the notice to quit.

LEGAL STANDARD    

The function of a motion for summary judgment or adjudication is to allow a determination as to whether an opposing party cannot show evidentiary support for a pleading or claim and to enable an order of summary dismissal without the need for trial.  (Aguilar v. Atlantic Ritchfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)  Code Civ. Proc. §437c(c) “requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Minor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.)  “The function of the pleadings in a motion for summary judgment is to delimit the scope of the issues; the function of the affidavits or declarations is to disclose whether there is any triable issue of fact within the issues delimited by the pleadings.”  (Juge v. County of Sacramento (1993) 12 Cal.App.4th 59, 67). 

As to each claim as framed by the complaint, the plaintiff moving for summary judgment must satisfy the initial burden of proof by presenting facts to establish each essential element of the claim.  (Code Civ. Proc. §437c(p)(2); Scalf v. D.B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1520.)  Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support of the party opposing summary judgment and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of that party.”  (Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389.)

Once the plaintiff has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to that cause of action or a defense thereto.  To establish a triable issue of material fact, the party opposing the motion must produce substantial responsive evidence.  (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 166.)

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE

Plaintiff requests judicial notice of (1) “Deed of Trust” in favor of Horizon Mortgage Bankers (ending in -732), securing a loan obtained by Gennady Moshkovich, which was recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County on or about May 9, 2006; (2) “Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust,” assigning the Deed of Trust to CSMC 2018-SP3 Trust, which was recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County on or about May 13, 2020; (3) “Corporate Assignment of Deed of Trust,” assigning the Deed of Trust to Wilmington Savings Fund Society, FSB, not in its individual capacity but solely as Owner Trustee of CSMC 2018-SP3 Trust, which was recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County on or about May 10, 2022; (4) “Substitution of Trustee,” designating Quality Loan Service Corp. as the Trustee of the Deed of Trust, which was recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County on or about October 5, 2022; (5) “Notice of Default Election to Sell Under Deed of Trust” recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County on or about November 13, 2023; (6) “Notice of Trustee’s Sale” recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County on or about February 13, 2024; (7) “Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale,” executed by Quality Loan Service Corporation, conveying real property to Sam Ostayan, which was recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County on or about June 28, 2024; (8) “First Amended Complaint” filed by Plaintiff in this Court, and in this action, on or about October 31, 2024; (9) “Answer” filed by Defendant in this Court, and in this action, on or about December 3, 2024; (10) “Demurrer to First Amended Complaint” filed by Defendant in this Court, and in this action, on or about December 3, 2024; and (11) “Notice of Ruling” filed by Plaintiff in this Court, and in this action, on or about November 21, 2024.  

The Court grants the request for judicial notice as to (1)-(8) pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code § 452 subd. (h) as “[f]acts and propositions that are not reasonably subject to dispute and are capable of immediate and accurate determination by resort to sources of reasonably indisputable accuracy”.  Further, the Court grants the request pursuant to § 453 which requires the court to take judicial notice of any matter specified in § 452 if a party requests it, and “(a) Gives each adverse party sufficient notice of the request, through the pleadings or otherwise, to enable such adverse party to prepare to meet the request; and (b) Furnishes the court with sufficient information to enable it to take judicial notice of the matter.”

The Court denies the request as to (9)-(11).  It is unnecessary to ask the Court to take judicial notice of materials previously filed in this case. “[A]ll that is necessary is to call the court's attention to such papers.”  (Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial (The Rutter Group 2016) ¶ 9:53.1a.)

DISCUSSION

The elements of an action for unlawful detainer based upon sale of real property at a trustee’s sale are set forth in Code Civ. Proc. § 1161a.  Section 1161a provides that any party who purchases property at a trustee’s sale is entitled to immediate possession of the property via the unlawful detainer procedure as long as they can show: (1) the sale was conducted in compliance with Civil Code § 2924, et seq.; (2) proper service of a notice to quit; and (3) the defendant’s failure to vacate the subject property within the time prescribed in the notice to quit.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 1161a, subd. (b) and (c).)

As to the first element, the undisputed facts show that the trustee’s sale of the Property to Plaintiff was conducted in accordance with Civil Code section 2924 et seq.  Defendant concedes he does not have “sufficient information or belief” to refute that fact.  (SSUF Nos. 19-22.)

There is a common law presumption that a foreclosure sale has been conducted regularly and fairly.  (See Royal Thrift and Loan Co. v. County Escrow, Inc. (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 24, 32.)  Moreover, there is a statutory presumption that a foreclosure sale has been conducted regularly and fairly.  (Civ. Code § 2924, subd. (c).)

A recital in the trustee’s deed upon sale of compliance with all of the requirements of Civil Code section 2924, et seq., regarding the mailing of copies of notices, or the publication of a copy of the notice of default, or the personal delivery of the copy of the notice of default, or the posting of copies of the notice of sale or the publication of a copy thereof shall constitute prima facie evidence of compliance with these requirements and shall be conclusive evidence of the propriety of the sale.  (Civ. Code § 2924, subd. (c).)

Further, an express provision in a deed of trust may provide that such recitals in a trustee’s deed may be prima facie proof of the regularity of the sale, and that no further evidence is necessary to establish title and right to possession of the purchaser.  (Sorensen v. Hall (1934) 219 Cal. 680, 682 – 83 (“This provision . . . must be taken as conclusive in a case involving only the legal title, such as the case at bar”); Pacific States Savings & Loan Co. v. O’Neill (1936) 7 Cal.2d 596, 599.)

Here, in May 2006, Borrower executed a Deed of Trust to secure the $5,325,000.00 loan provided to him by Horizon; the Deed of Trust contained a provision wherein Borrower agreed that, in the event of a default and sale of the Subject Property, the recitals contained in any trustee’s deed would be “prima facie evidence” of same.  (SSUF No. 17.) 

The Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale (“TDUS”) issued by Quality to Plaintiff contains a recital of compliance with Civil Code § 2924, et seq., as well as the provisions of the Deed of Trust.  (SSUF No. 18.)  This recital in the TDUS is prima facie evidence of compliance with all of the requirements of Civil Code § 2924, et seq., and the Deed of Trust, and is conclusive evidence of the propriety of the sale.  (Civ. Code § 2924, subd. (c).)  As such, no further evidence is needed to establish Plaintiff’s title and right to possession of the Property. 

Defendant has conceded that he is not aware of any facts that would refute the above. In his verified complaint, Plaintiff alleged he is the “legal owner” of the Property (SSUF No. 19), the foreclosure sale was “properly noticed and conducted” (SSUF No. 20); Plaintiff “perfected its title to the Subject Property, as reflected in the duly recorded Trustee’s Deed Upon Sale in its favor” (SSUF No. 21). Defendant conceded he does not have “sufficient information or belief” to tender any response to any of these allegations. (SSUF No. 22.)  

Defendant argues that complicated issues of title preclude the granting of summary judgment.  But the Opposition never fully explains what those “complicated issues” are.  The Opposition argues “[t]he claim of defendant herein which are being made in the civil action emanate from the requirements of Civil Code, Section 2924m, subparts (a)(2)(A)-(E), (a)(3)(A); also see: 4 Witkin, Summary 11th Sec Trans--Real§ 170A (2024)).”  There is no further discussion as to how Defendant meets any of the requirements of § 2924m.  

Notably, Defendant did not deny Plaintiff’s allegations that Plaintiff perfected its title to the Property and conceded that he is not aware of any facts that would refute Plaintiff’s allegations, which removes this issue from being in dispute.  (SSUF Nos. 19 – 22.)  This, in addition to the conclusive presumption of a properly noticed sale, establishes there is no triable issue as to whether Plaintiff has title to the Property. (Civ. Code §2924(c).)

As to the second element of an unlawful detainer action, the undisputed facts establish that Defendant was served with a 90-Day Notice to Quit in compliance with applicable law. Code Civ. Proc. § 1161b provides that a “tenant or subtenant in possession of a rental housing unit under a month-to-month lease or periodic tenancy at the time the property is sold in foreclosure shall be given 90 days’ written notice to quit pursuant to Section 1162 before the tenant or subtenant may be removed from the property.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 1161b(a).)

Code Civ. Proc. § 1162 sets forth the requirements for service of a notice to quit and provides that such notices may be served: (1) by personally delivering a copy to the tenant; or (2) if the tenant is absent from the residence, and from their place of business, by leaving a copy with a person of suitable age at either place, and sending a copy through the mail to the tenant at their place of residence; or (3) if the place of residence and business cannot be ascertained, or a person of suitable age cannot be found, then by affixing a copy in a conspicuous place on the property, and delivering a copy to a person there residing, if such person can be found, and also sending a copy through the mail to the tenant at the place where the property is situated. (Code Civ. Proc. § 1162.)

Here, Defendant claims that, at the time of the trustee’s sale, he possessed the Property pursuant to a “month-to month” lease with the former owner of the Property. Specifically, he claims to have entered into a lease dated July 10, 2021, which had an end date of November 10, 2021.  (SSUF No. 11.)  Defendant then claims he continued to make monthly payments to the prior owner of the Property, at least through July 2024.  (SSUF No. 12.)  If true, this created a “month-to-month” lease with the former owner of the Property, at least through July 2024.  (SSUF No. 13.)

Pursuant to Code Civ. Proc. §§ 1161a, and 1161b(a), Plaintiff caused to be served on Defendant a 90-Day Notice to Quit in compliance with Code Civ. Proc. § 1162.  (SSUF No. 14.)  The notice was served on Defendant via posting and mailing by a registered process server, who subsequently executed an Amended Proof of Service, attesting to the service of the 90-Day Notice to Quit.  (SSUF Nos. 14 – 15.)

This Amended Proof of Service creates a presumption of proper service of the 90 Day Notice to Quit on Defendant.  (Evid. Code § 647 (the return of a registered process server upon process or notice “establishes a presumption, affecting the burden of producing evidence, of the facts stated in the return”).)  Defendant cannot rebut that presumption or produce any evidence that he was not served with the 90-Day Notice to Quit. 

Defendant’s answer denied Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the service of the 90-Day Notice to Quit.  In discovery, Defendant was asked to state all facts supporting his denial of Plaintiff’s allegations regarding the service of the 90-Day Notice to Quit.  (SSUF No. 23.) Rather than denying that he was ever served with the 90-Day Notice to Quit, Defendant only attempted to justify his denial by claiming that the Amended Proof of Service contained a reference to a “Zip Code in Inglewood.”  (SSUF No. 24.) Defendant raised this same issue in his demurrers to the First Amended Complaint.  (SSUF No. 25.)

However, the Court overruled these demurrers. (SSUF No. 26.)  This ruling was based on the fact that the zip code referred to by Defendant appears in a section of the Amended Proof of Service labeled “Personal Service.”  But that box was unchecked since Defendant was not served via “Personal Service” (thus, the zip code reference was irrelevant). Rather, he was served by posting and mailing. And Plaintiff’s process server checked the box indicating such service, and properly referenced the Property (not the Inglewood zip code) as being the address where Defendant was served with a copy of the 90-Day Notice to Quit.  In sum, the Court has rejected the only basis for Defendant’s denial of Plaintiff’s allegation regarding service of the 90-Day Notice to Quit. This leaves Defendant without any basis for challenging service.

Defendant attests there was no proper service because he was not personally served.  This portion of Defendant’s declaration contradicts his discovery responses, where he swore under penalty of perjury that he had no factual grounds for disputing service.  (SSUF Nos. 23 – 26.)  On summary judgment, a party cannot submit a declaration that contradicts its prior discovery responses.  (D’Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 21-22.)  In any event, Plaintiff served the Notice to Quit under Code Civ. Proc. § 1162(a)(3).  As set forth in the declaration of registered process server, the notice was served by posting and mailing.  (Id.)  This service satisfies § 1162(a)(3); there was no additional requirement for personal service, as Defendant suggests.  As such, it is undisputed that service of the 90-Day Notice to Quit was properly completed.

Defendant next argues that the 90-Day Notice to Quit’s contents did not comply with Civ. Code § 1946.2.  Specifically, Defendant argues that, since he, allegedly, continuously and lawfully occupied the Property for 12 months, Plaintiff could not evict him without “just cause.” (Opp. at 7:17 – 9:13.)  He further argues that such “just cause” was required to be specifically stated in the 90-Day Notice to Quit, which it was not.  (Id.) 

However, § 1946.2 does not apply here. Section 1946.2(e) makes it clear that section 1946.2 does not apply to “Residential real property . . . provided that both of the following apply”: (1) the owner is not a real estate investment trust, corporation, or limited liability company in which at least one member is a corporation, or management of a mobile home park; and (2) the tenants have been provided written notice that the property is exempt from this section (with certain language specified by statute).  (Civ. Code § 1946.2(e)(8).)  

Here, both of these criterion are met, exempting this eviction from § 1946.2. First, Plaintiff is clearly not a real estate investment trust, corporation, or limited liability company in which at least one member is a corporation, or management of a mobile home park. Rather, Plaintiff is an individual.  Second, Defendant was given “written notice that the residential property is exempt from” § 1946.2.  Section 1946.2 requires that specific language be provided to give the tenant notice of the applicable exemption. (Civ. Code § 1946.2(e)(8)(B)(i).)  This language is contained in the “Rent Cap and Just Cause Addendum” given to Defendant.  (Ex. 2 to Jumaiah Decl.)  It is contained in a separately-outlined box, where another box, titled “Notice of Exemption” is bolded and checked, alerting Defendant to the exemption.  (Id.) Thus, it cannot be disputed that Defendant was served with a proper 90-Day Notice to Quit.

As a throw-away argument, Defendant also claims that the notice was not served by a registered process server.  There is no evidence to support this claim.  In his Declaration, Defendant states he “believes” Plaintiff’s process server is not registered.  But Defendant has not stated any facts to support this claim.  He lacks personal knowledge or foundation to make this averment.

As to the third element, the undisputed facts show that Defendant failed to vacate the Subject Property, as demanded in the 90-Day Notice to Quit.  (SSUF No. 16.)  Defendant’s opposition does not argue otherwise. 

As Defendant has remained in possession of the Property despite service— and expiration—of the 90-Day Notice to Quit, Plaintiff is entitled to damages.  For post-foreclosure unlawful detainer actions such as this one, the property owner’s damages are the “reasonable rental value that plaintiff might have realized had plaintiff not been denied possession unlawfully.”  (MCA, Inc. v. Universal Diversified Enterprises Corp. (1972) 27 Cal.App.3d 170, 179.)

Plaintiff’s verified complaint alleged that the Subject Property has a minimum daily rental value of $1,600.00 per day ($48,000.00/month).  (SSUF No. 27.)  Defendant concedes that he does not have “sufficient information or belief” to refute this allegation.  (SSUF No. 28.)  As a result of the above, in addition to restitution of possession, Plaintiff is entitled to monetary damages at a rate of $1,600.00 per day ($48,000.00/month) from the expiration of the 90-Day Notice to Quit through entry of judgment.

Defendant argues there was a prior lease agreement between Defendant and the prior owner of the Property that was $3,000.00 less per month, which he claims creates a triable issue on the rental value of the Property. (Opp. at 4:22 – 27.)  But this contradicts his sworn response to the complaint—to which he is bound as a judicial admission. Walker v. Dorn (1966) 240 Cal.App.2d 118, 120 (“A judicial admission in a pleading (either by affirmative allegation or by failure to deny an allegation) . . . is not merely evidence of a fact; it is a conclusive concession of the truth of a matter which has the effect of removing it from the issues . . .”). Defendant’s answer stated he did “not have sufficient information or belief” to respond to Plaintiff’s allegation that the Property has a daily rental value of at least $1,600.00 per day ($48,000.00/month).  (SSUF No. 28.)  

Defendant also did not deny the allegation that the Property has a minimum daily rental value of $1,600.00 per day ($48,000.00/month); rather, he tendered no admission or denial on this issue.  (Id.)  This is an admission of the daily rental value of $1,600.00 per day ($48,000.00/month), as a matter of law. (Code Civ. Proc. § 431.20(a) (“Every material allegation of the complaint or cross-complaint, not controverted by the answer, shall, for the purposes of the action, be taken as true”).)  Indeed, “where allegations contained in a pleading are not denied, the matters therein alleged must be deemed admitted.”  (In re Estate of Dolley (1968) 265 Cal.App.2d 63, 69; Doll v. Good (1869) 38 Cal. 287, 290 (“The rules of pleading, under our system, are intended to prevent evasion, and to require a denial of every specific averment in a sworn complaint, in substance and in spirit, and not merely a denial of its literal truth, and whenever the defendant fails to make such denial he admits the averment”); Blankman v. Vallejo (1860) 15 Cal. 638, 644 (“the defendant is held to an admission whenever he fails to make such denial”).  

By having not denied Plaintiff’s allegation regarding the daily rental value, Defendant has conceded that this is not a triable issue of fact in this case, which relieves Plaintiff of any obligation to separately prove up this fact.  (See Code Civ. Proc. §§¿431.30(b), 590; Fuentes v. Tucker (1947) 31 Cal.2d 1, 4 – 5, 7 (“If facts alleged in the complaint are not controverted by the answer, they are not in issue, and no evidence need be offered to prove their existence”); Carlton v. Sup. Ct. (1968) 261 Cal.App.2d 282, 289.) 

Defendant claims that by stating he had no information or belief to refute this allegation, he, by implication, was denying this fact.  But Defendant simply said he had no information or belief.  He did not say he was denying the fact based on a lack of information or belief.  By failing to deny the fact, he admitted it.  There is no authority cited to support Defendant’s claim that a statement of no information or belief constitutes a denial. 

Even if the Court were to ignore Defendant’s admission in the answer, Defendant has not cited any evidence in support of his challenge to the daily rental value.  Defendant’s argument is that: (1) in 2021, he entered into a lease agreement with the former owner of the Subject Property, wherein he agreed to pay $45,000.00 per month in rent; and (2) that the rental amount stated in a lease creates a triable issue as to the proper rental value.  (Opp. at 5:1 – 6).

However, the $45,000.00 stems from a lease entered into in 2021.  Plaintiff is seeking rental damages as of October 2024 onward. Defendant provides no rental estimates for this time period. Rather, his proffered valuation comes from 2021—which is 3 years earlier than the time period at issue in this case. 

Defendant’s opposition attempts to raise a new affirmative defense by arguing that Plaintiff purportedly failed to comply with Civ. Code § 1962.  However, this purported defense was not pled in Defendant’s answer and, thus, cannot be considered in ruling on this motion.  The failure to assert this affirmative defense in the answer means it cannot be put at issue in opposition to a motion for summary judgment and is waived. (Cal. Concrete Co. v. Beverly Hills Sav. & Loan Assn. (1989) 215 Cal.App.3d 260, 272; Code Civ. Proc., § 430.80(a); Dept. of Finance v. City of Merced (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 286, 294 (“A party who fails to plead affirmative defenses waives them”).)

In any event, this section has no applicability to this case.  Defendant argues that Civ. Code § 1962 requires that a “successor owner” must provide a notice of “change of ownership” to tenants. He further argues that Plaintiff allegedly failed to do so in this case and that this “gives rise to either waiver or estoppel, both of which concepts involve questions of fact.” (Opp. at 6:24–7:16.)  But § 1962 only applies to properties referenced in Civ. Code § 1961, which only applies to “every dwelling structure containing one or more units offered to the public for rent or for lease for residential purposes.” (Civ. Code § 1961.)  Here, Defendant failed to produce any evidence that the Property was “offered to the public for rent or for lease for residential purposes,” as was his burden.  

Even if there was non-compliance with § 1962, that would not affect Plaintiff’s claim for unlawful detainer under Code Civ. Proc. § 1161a(b)(3). Indeed, as § 1962 makes clear, the only consequence for a violation of section 1962 is that the “successor owner or manager” cannot “evict a tenant for nonpayment of rent that accrued during the period of noncompliance . . . .” (Civ. Code § 1962(c) (emphasis added).)  Here, Plaintiff is not attempting to evict Defendant nor is he raising any cause of action for unlawful detainer based on “nonpayment of rent that accrued.”  Rather, Plaintiff is pursuing his claim for unlawful detainer based on Defendant holding over in possession of the Property following Plaintiff acquiring the Property at a non-judicial foreclosure.

In sum, there are no triable issues of liability or damages, and the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment.   

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DATED: January 6, 2025                                                      ___________________________

Edward B. Moreton, Jr.

Judge of the Superior Court