Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This action arises from alleged Labor Code violations.  Plaintiff Juliette Baldwin was employed as a hair stylist by Defendant Ulta Salon Cosmetics & Fragrance, Inc.  She alleges Defendant violated numerous Labor Code provisions including that Defendant failed to (1) provide employment records; (2) pay overtime and double time; (3) provide rest and meal periods; (4) pay a minimum wage; (5) keep accurate payroll records and provide itemized wage statements; (6) pay reporting time wages; (7) pay split shift wages; (8) pay all wages earned on time; (9) pay all wages earned upon discharge or resignation; (10) reimburse necessary, business-related expenses; and (11) provide notice of paid sick time and accrual.   

The operative complaint alleges a single claim under the Private Attorneys General Act (“PAGA”).  Plaintiff purports to represent the State of California and other “aggrieved employees” which are defined to include all non-exempt, hourly employees.     

Prior to Plaintiff’s action, another employee, Maria Bonezzi, filed a PAGA action against Defendant.  (Ex. A to Request for Judicial Notice (“RJN”).)  Like Plaintiff, Ms. Bonezzi worked as a non-exempt, hourly employee for Defendant, and like Plaintiff, Ms. Bonezzi filed a representative action under PAGA seeking to represent all non-exempt, hourly employees of Defendant.  Ms. Bonezzi’s action alleges the same violations of the Labor Code as Plaintiff’s action, although Plaintiff alleges two additional claims for failure to pay reporting time wages and split shift wages.  Also, Ms. Bonezzi’s action covers a broader group of aggrieved employees because it was filed before the instant action.   

This hearing is on Defendant’s special demurrer.  Defendant argues that the Court must stay Plaintiff’s duplicative action under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction.   

MEET AND CONFER 

Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41 requires that before the filing of a demurrer the moving party “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone” with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.  (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(a).)  The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(a)(2).)  Thereafter, the moving party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc. § 430.41(a)(3).)  Defendant submits the Declaration of Justin Jackson, which shows defense counsel attempted to meet and confer with Plaintiff on at least three occasions, but Plaintiff’s counsel never responded.  This satisfies the meet and confer requirements of § 430.41.         

REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE 

Defendant requests judicial notice of the complaint in Maria Bonezzi v. Ulta Cosmetics & Fragrance, Inc., in Case No. CV0004429, pending in Marin Superior Court.  The Court grants the request pursuant to Cal. Evid. Code §§ 452(d), 452(h) and 453.      

LEGAL STANDARD 

A demurrer brought on the grounds that a “complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action” is called a “general demurrer” while demurrers on other grounds are known as “special demurrers.” (Buss v. J. O. Martin Co. (1966) 241 Cal. App. 2d 123, 133 (1966).)  A special demurrer is appropriate when a defendant seeks relief under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction.  (People ex rel. Garamendi v. Am. Autoplan, Inc. (1993) 20 Cal. App. 4th 760, 771 (1993) (“Since the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction [is] mandatory and not discretionary judicial actions, [it] should be raised by demurrer[.]”).)  

DISCUSSION 

Defendant argues that the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction operates to stay Plaintiff’s PAGA action.  The Court agrees. 

Under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, “when two California superior courts have concurrent jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved in litigation, the first to assume jurisdiction has exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the subject matter and all parties involved until such time as all necessarily related matters have been resolved.”  (People ex rel. Garamendi, 20 Cal. App. 4th at 769-770 (internal quotation marks omitted).)  

The rule is established and enforced not “so much to protect the rights of parties as to protect the rights of Courts of co-ordinate jurisdiction to avoid conflict of jurisdiction, confusion and delay in the administration of justice.”  (Plant Insulation Co., 224 Cal. App. 3d at 787.) Therefore, if the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction applies, “the issuance of a stay order is a matter of right.”  (People ex rel. Garamendi, 20 Cal. App. 4th at 772 (“The rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, as mentioned previously, is mandatory.”)  “Where the exclusive concurrent jurisdiction rule applies, the second action should be stayed.” (Shaw v. Superior Ct. of Contra Costa Cnty. (2022) 78 Cal. App. 5th 245, 257). 

The applicability of the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is very broad because it does not require “absolute identity of parties, causes of action or remedies sought in the initial and subsequent actions.” (People ex rel. Garamendi, 20 Cal. App. 4th at 770.)  Instead, it merely requires the court exercising original jurisdiction to have “the power to bring before it all the necessary parties.” (Id.)  

The fact that “the parties in the second action are not identical does not preclude application of the rule.” (Id.)  In addition, the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction does not require “the remedies sought in the separate action” to be “precisely the same as long as the court exercising original jurisdiction has the power to litigate all the issues and grant all the relief to which any of the parties might be entitled under the pleadings.” (People ex rel. Garamendi, 20 Cal. App. 4th at 770.)  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s argument that the claims and parties are not entirely the same does not preclude application of the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction.   

Further, the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction applies to PAGA claims.  (Shaw, 78 Cal. App. 5th at 252.)  In Shaw, there were two PAGA actions with overlapping wage and hour claims against the same employer. The defendant employer “sought to stay the proceeding in [the later-filed] case under the doctrine of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction and under the court’s inherent authority.”  (Id. at 252.) The trial court granted the defendant’s motion and rejected the plaintiffs’ argument that “the doctrine does not apply in PAGA cases.” (Id.)  In affirming the trial court’s order and rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument, the California Court of Appeal held that PAGA “does not manifest a clear intent to abrogate the exclusive concurrent jurisdiction rule.” (Id. at 260.) The Court of Appeal further reasoned that “we do not discern an intent in PAGA to waste judicial resources, encourage a multiplicity of duplicative suits, and prohibit courts from staying suits that might otherwise lead to inconsistent results.”  (Id.) The Court of Appeal then concluded that “PAGA and the ‘exclusive concurrent jurisdiction rule’ can rationally coexist, and so they must.” (Id.) 

Here, as in Shaw, eleven of Plaintiff’s claims are wholly encompassed by the earlier-filed Bonezzi action.  While Plaintiff’s complaint contains two additional claims, the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction does not require exactly the same claims in both actions.  (See, e.g., Franklin & Franklin v. 7-Eleven Owners for Fair Franchising (2000) 85 Cal. App. 4th 1168, 1170 (affirming stay under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction; “exactitude is not required. The parties in the two actions and the remedies need not be precisely the same. It is sufficient that the issues in the two proceedings are substantially the same, and that individual suits might result in conflicting judgments”) (emphasis added); People ex rel. Garamendi, 20 Cal. App. 4th at 770 (concluding that the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction does not require “absolute identity of parties, causes of action or remedies sought in the initial and subsequent actions”).  Further, the earlier-filed Bonezzi action seeks to represent a broader group of aggrieved employees, and it therefore makes more sense to allow that case to proceed first.  Accordingly, under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction, the Court must stay this PAGA action pending the resolution of the Bonezzi action.       

Plaintiff cites to Julian v. Glenair, Inc. (2017) 17 Cal.App.5th 853.  In Julian, the Court held that “nothing in the PAGA statutory scheme forecloses separate but similar actions by different employees against the same employer.”¿(Id. at 867 (Tan v. GrubHub, Inc.¿(N.D.Cal. 2016) 171 F.Supp.3d 998, 1012–1013).)  While that may be true, the issue is not whether the PAGA statutory scheme requires a stay, but rather whether the rule of concurrent exclusive jurisdiction requires one.  As noted in Shaw, Julian did not address the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction.   

Likewise, Plaintiff relies on Tan v. Grubhub, Inc. (N.D. Cal. 2016) 171 F. Supp. 3d 998 to argue that PAGA actions are immune from the mandatory stay under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction. However, in Shaw, the California Court of Appeal already rejected this same argument and reasoned that Tan did not address the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction.  (Shaw, 78 Cal. App. 5th at 262 (emphasis added).)  

Plaintiff also relies on Canela v. Costco Wholesale Corp., 2018 WL 2331877 (N.D. Cal, May 23, 2018), for the same proposition. However, the federal decisions are inapplicable here because the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction is a state procedural rule, and not a federal procedural rule, so federal courts do not apply this California procedural rule under the Erie Doctrine.  In any event, this district court decision was later vacated by the Ninth Circuit. See Canela v. Costco Wholesale Corp. (9th Cir. 2020) 971 F.3d 845, 848 (“Because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction at the time of removal, we vacate the district court's summary judgment with instructions to remand the case to state court.”). 

Plaintiff also attempts to distinguish Shaw on the ground Shaw involved identical claims.  But that is not correct.  The two actions in Shaw did not involve identical claims.  The earlier filed representative action in Shaw involved broader claims than the ones filed by the plaintiff in Shaw.  In any event, as set forth in the cases above, the law does not require “exactitude.”  The parties in the two actions and the remedies need not be precisely the same. It is sufficient that the issues in the two proceedings are substantially the same, and that individual suits might result in conflicting judgments.  (Plant Insulation Co. v. Fibreboard Corp. (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 781, 788; Stearns¿v.¿Los Angeles City School Dist. (1966) 244 Cal.App.2d 696, 708.) 

Last, Plaintiff argues that a stay would frustrate the purpose of PAGA, which seeks prompt enforcement of California’s labor laws.  But if the Court were to accept Plaintiff’s argument, then it could never stay a PAGA action under the rule of exclusive concurrent jurisdiction.  That would be contrary to the holding in Shaw which expressly held that the rule of concurrent exclusive jurisdiction applies to PAGA claims.  In any event, the Court does not see how staying Plaintiff’s action, while the earlier-filed action is allowed to proceed, would frustrate the enforcement of California’s labor laws.  The laws would still be enforced, just with a different plaintiff.   

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS Defendant’s special demurrer to stay Plaintiff’s action.   

 

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED: February 20, 2025 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court