Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This case arises from a car accident.  Plaintiff Michelle Garza alleges Defendant Natalya Vaynerov entered into the intersection of Sunset Blvd and San Vicente Blvd, on a red light for her direction of travel, illegally crossed the intersection and then made an illegal left turn, colliding with Plaintiff’s car.  Defendant then allegedly fled the scene of the accident.   

The operative complaint alleges four claims for (1) motor vehicle negligence, (2) general negligence, (3) violation of Vehicle Code § 20001(a) - misdemeanor hit and run, and (4) intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”).   

This hearing is on Defendant’s demurrer and motion to strike.  Defendant argues that (1) Plaintiff’s third cause of action fails because there is no private right of action under Vehicle Code § 20001(a), and to the extent the claim is asserting negligence per se, it is duplicative of Plaintiff’s claim for general negligence; (2) Plaintiff’s IIED claim fails because Plaintiff has not alleged extreme and outrageous conduct or facts to support an allegation that she suffered severe emotional distress; and (3) Plaintiff’s punitive damages allegations should be stricken because Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support a finding of malice, oppression or fraud. 

LEGAL STANDARD 

“[A] demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the allegations in a complaint.” (Lewis v. Safeway, Inc. (2015) 235 Cal.App.4th 385, 388.)  A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable.  (See Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994 (in ruling on a demurrer, a court may not consider declarations, matters not subject to judicial notice, or documents not accepted for the truth of their contents).)  For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, all facts pleaded in a complaint are assumed to be true, but the reviewing court does not assume the truth of conclusions of law. (Aubry v. Tri-City Hosp. Dist. (1992) 2 Cal.4th 962, 967.)  

Further, the court may, upon motion, or at any time in its discretion, and upon terms it deems proper, strike any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.  (Code Civ. Proc., § 436, subd. (a).)  The court may also strike all or any part of any pleading not drawn or filed in conformity with the laws of this state, a court rule, or an order of the court. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436, subd. (b).)  The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleading or by way of judicial notice. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437.) 

Leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment. (See Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 349 (court shall not “sustain a demurrer without leave to amend if there is any reasonable possibility that the defect can be cured by amendment”); Kong v. City of Hawaiian Gardens Redevelopment Agency (2002) 108 Cal.App.4th 1028, 1037 (“A demurrer should not be sustained without leave to amend if the complaint, liberally construed, can state a cause of action under any theory or if there is a reasonable possibility the defect can be cured by amendment.”).)  The burden is on the complainant to show the Court that a pleading can be amended successfully. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318.)  

MEET AND CONFER 

Code Civ. Proc. §§ 430.41 and 435.5 requires that before the filing of a demurrer or motion to strike, the moving party “shall meet and confer in person or by telephone” with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer or motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer or motion to strike.  (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41(a), 435.5(a).)  The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41(a)(2), 435.5(a)(2).)  Thereafter, the moving party shall file and serve a declaration detailing their meet and confer efforts. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41(a)(3), 435.5(a)(3).)  Defendant submits the Declaration of Christopher Babadjanian who attests he tried to meet and confer with Plaintiff’s counsel on the motion to strike, but counsel would not respond to his meet and confer requests.  As to the demurrer, Mr. Babdjanian attests he spoke with counsel for Plaintiff, but the parties could not reach an agreement.  This satisfies the meet and confer requirements of Code Civ. Proc., §§430.41 and 435.5.) 

DISCUSSION 

Hit and Run Claim 

Defendant demurrers to the hit and run claim on the ground that Vehicle Code §20001 does not provide a private right of action.  The Court agrees in part. 

Several courts have concluded that Vehicle Code §20001 does not create a private right of action.¿ (Sansevero v. Machado (April 21, 2017)¿2017 Cal. Super. LEXIS 62401 at *4-*5; Guy v. Mora (July 31, 2018)¿2018 Cal. Super. LEXIS 55520 at *1.)  But that does not fully address the question of whether there is a cause of action for hit and run.   

In Brooks v. E.J. Willig Truck Transp. Co. (1953) 40 Cal.2d 669, 679, the court concluded that a hit and run cannot give rise to a tort unless the fact of the hit and run caused additional damages above and beyond the accident itself.  Brooks implies there is a cause of action for hit and run, but it can only be stated if there are additional damages caused by the hit and run itself.  Here, Plaintiff does not allege any damage caused solely by the hit and run.         

Accordingly, the Court sustains the demurrer to Plaintiff’s third cause of action with 20 days’ leave to amend. 

IIED Claim 

Defendant demurrers to the IIED claim on the ground that a hit and run is not extreme and outrageous conduct, and Plaintiff has not alleged facts to support the conclusory claim that she has suffered severe emotional distress.  The Court agrees.   

To state an IIED claim, the plaintiff must allege facts showing: “(1) extreme and¿outrageous¿conduct by the defendant with the intention of causing, or reckless disregard of the probability of causing, emotional distress; (2) the plaintiff’s suffering severe or extreme emotional distress; and (3) actual and proximate causation of the emotional distress by the defendant's¿outrageous¿conduct.” (Christensen v. Superior Court¿(1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 903.)  

For conduct to be outrageous it must be “so extreme as to exceed all bounds of that usually tolerated¿in a civilized community.” (Ess v. Eskaton Properties, Inc. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 120, 130.)¿ Liability does not extend to mere insults, indignities, threats, annoyances, petty oppressions, or other trivialities.¿(Hughes v. Pair (2009) 46 Cal.4th 1035, 1051.)¿  

“[I]t is not enough that the defendant has acted with an intent which is tortious or even criminal, or that he has intended to inflict emotional distress, or even that his conduct has been characterized by ‘malice,’ or a degree of aggravation which would entitle the plaintiff to punitive damages for another tort.” (Cochran v. Cochran (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 488, 496.)¿“Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and utterly intolerable in a civilized community.” (Id.) While there is no bright-line as to what constitutes outrageous conduct and thus this involves a case-by-case analysis, courts can determine whether conduct was sufficiently outrageous at the demurrer stage.¿(Id. at 494.) 

Here, Plaintiff alleges two things: (1) that Defendant made an illegal left turn, and (2) that Defendant fled the scene.  As to the first, it is a simple act of negligence which cannot be said to constitute extreme and outrageous conduct.  As to the other, it also does not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct without the allegation of more facts. For example, if a plaintiff is struck and is seriously bleeding following the accident and the defendant flees knowing that his failure to render aid could cause death, then the defendant’s conduct may conceivably be said to be extreme and outrageous.  But there are no such allegations here.  (Lebron v. Moran (2022) 2022 Cal. Super. LEXIS 83963 (allegations of a hit and run, without more, does not constitute extreme and outrageous conduct).) 

In addition, Plaintiff’s bare-bones allegation that she “suffered severe emotional distress” is entirely conclusory.  With respect to the requirement that a plaintiff show¿severe emotional distress, the California Supreme Court has set a¿high bar. “Severe emotional distress¿means emotional distress of such substantial quality or enduring quality that no reasonable [person] in civilized society should be expected to endure it.” (Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,¿ 6 Cal.4th at 1004.)  The complaint must plead¿specific¿facts¿that establish that severe emotional distress resulting from defendant’s conduct.¿(Michaelian v. State Comp. Ins. Fund¿(1996) 50 Cal. App. 4th 1093, 1114.)  Conclusory allegations are insufficient. ¿(See e.g.,¿Pittman v. City of Oakland (1988) 197 Cal.App.3d 1037, 1047¿(mere allegation that plaintiff suffered shame, humiliation and embarrassment without further factual explanation fails to state claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress).) 

Accordingly, the Court sustains the demurrer to the IIED claim with 20 days’ leave to amend.  

Punitive Damages Allegations 

Defendant argues that Plaintiff’s claim for punitive damages fails because Plaintiff has not sufficiently alleged malice, oppression or fraud.  Because the Court has dismissed Plaintiff’s intentional tort claims and Plaintiff’s only remaining claims are for negligence, which cannot support a claim for punitive damages, the Court grants Defendant’s motion to strike the punitive damages allegations, with 20 days’ leave to amend.  (Ebaugh v. Rabkin (1972) 22 Cal.App.3d 891, 893 (“Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify an award of punitive damages.”).)  

CONCLUSION 

Based on the foregoing, the Court SUSTAINS the demurrer with 20 days’ leave to amend and GRANTS the motion to strike with 20 days’ leave to amend.   

 

IT IS SO ORDERED. 

 

DATED:  February 11, 2025 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court