Superior Court of California 

County of Los Angeles – West District  

Beverly Hills Courthouse / Department 205 

 

 

BACKGROUND 

This case arises from an alleged car accident.  The details of the accident including when and where it took place or why Plaintiff believes Defendant is liable are not contained in the Complaint.   

The Complaint was filed on December 26, 2024.  It alleges two claims for motor vehicle and general negligence.  Plaintiff personally served Defendant on December 28, 2024.  Defendant did not respond, and therefore, default was entered on February 27, 2025. 

This hearing is on Defendant’s motion to set aside default.  Defendant seeks to set aside the default based on Defendant’s inadvertence, mistake and excusable neglect.  Defendant claims she was not involved in the accident, and therefore, she did not know she needed to respond to the Complaint.  Defense counsel was retained on May 6, 2025 (by Defendant’s insurer).  Once counsel discovered his client’s mistake, he attempted to get Plaintiff to stipulate to set aside default.  But Plaintiff failed to respond, and defense counsel filed the instant motion on May 12, 2025.   

LEGAL STANDARD 

Code Civ. Proc. §473, subd. (b)¿provides for two distinct types of relief from a default -- commonly differentiated as “discretionary” and “mandatory.”  “Under the¿discretionary relief provision, on a showing of ‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or¿excusable neglect,” the court has discretion to allow relief from default.  Under the mandatory relief provision, on the other hand, upon a showing by attorney declaration of ‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect,’ the court must vacate any ‘resulting default judgment or dismissal entered.’”  (Leader v. Health Industries of America, Inc.¿(2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 603, 615-616.)¿  

Applications seeking relief under the mandatory provision of¿§473¿must be “accompanied by an attorney’s sworn affidavit attesting to his or her mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or neglect.” (Code Civ. Proc., §473, subd. (b).)  The mandatory provision further adds that “whenever relief is granted based on an attorney’s affidavit of fault [the court shall] direct the attorney to pay reasonable compensatory legal fees and costs to opposing counsel or parties.” (Id.)   

The application for relief must be made no more than six months after the judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.  (Id.)  And an application for discretionary relief must be “accompanied by a copy of the answer or other pleading proposed to be filed therein”.  (Id.) 

“It is settled that the law favors a trial on the¿merits. . . and therefore liberally construes¿section¿473.”  (Bonzer v. City of Huntington Park (1993) 20 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1477.)  “Doubts in applying¿section 473 are resolved in favor of the party seeking¿relief from¿default. . . and if that party has moved promptly for¿default relief,¿only slight evidence will justify an order granting such¿relief.”  (Id. at 1477-78.) 

DISCUSSION 

Defendant’s motion is timely.  Default was entered on February 27, 2025, and the instant motion was filed on May 12, 2025, which is less than six months.  The Court also concludes the motion was made within a “reasonable time.”  Defense counsel was retained on May 6, 2025, and filed the motion to set aside within six days of discovering that his client had failed to respond to the Complaint.   

However, the Court concludes that Defendant has not shown mistake, inadvertence or excusable neglect.  Defendant claims she did not respond because she was not involved in the accident.  But the summons (which she concedes was personally served on her) informed her that she needed to respond within 30 days or risk default.  A reasonable person under the same circumstances would not have assumed that no response was necessary simply because Defendant believed she had a meritorious defense to the Complaint.  (Ebersol v. Cowan (1983) 35 Cal.3d 427, 435 (excusable neglect is neglect which might have been the act or omission of a reasonably prudent person under the same or similar circumstances).)   

Ignorance of the law is not excusable neglect, mistake or inadvertence.  (Harrison v. County of Del Norte (1985) 168 Cal.App.3d 1, 9.)   The law does not entitle a party to proceed experimentally without counsel and then turn back the clock if the experiment yields an adverse result. One who voluntarily represents herself “is not, for that reason, entitled to any more (or less) consideration than a lawyer. Thus, any alleged ignorance of legal matters or failure to properly represent [herself] can hardly constitute ‘mistake, inadvertence, surprise or excusable neglect’ as those terms are used in section 473.” (Goodson v. The Bogerts, Inc. (1967) 252 Cal.App.2d 32, 40.)   

Rather, “when a litigant accepts the risks of proceeding without counsel, he or she is stuck with the outcome, and has no greater opportunity to cast off an unfavorable judgment than he or she would if represented by counsel.” (Burnete v. La Casa Dana Apartments (2007) 148 Cal.App.4th 1262, 1267.)  The “naïveté” of lay litigants in “rely[ing] on themselves to protect their substantial legal interests” does not afford a ground for relief from adverse results. (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 979.) 

CONCLUSION 

For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES the motion to vacate default.   

 

DATED:  May 30, 2025 ___________________________ 

Edward B. Moreton, Jr. 

Judge of the Superior Court