Judge: Elaine Lu, Case: 19STCV05329, Date: 2022-07-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 19STCV05329    Hearing Date: July 25, 2022    Dept: 26

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 26

Background

On February 13, 2019, Plaintiff Elliot Peaks (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action against General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”) asserting causes of action under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act arising out of Plaintiff’s purchase of a 2013 Chevrolet Camaro.  The complaint alleges three causes of action for (1) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(d), (2) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(b), and (3) Violation of Civil Code section 1793.2(a)(3).  

            On October 26, 2021, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement.  On October 28, 2021, the Court entered judgment pursuant to the accepted Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer, with attorneys’ fees to be decided by a later motion and the Court retaining jurisdiction under Code of Civil Procedure section 664.6.

            On January 26, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for attorneys’ fees and cost.  On July 12, 2022, Defendant filed an opposition.  On July 18, 2022, Plaintiff filed a reply.

Legal Standard

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10)(A), attorney fees when authorized by contract or statute are allowable as costs and may be awarded upon a noticed motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (c)(5).

In determining what fees are reasonable, California courts apply the “lodestar” approach. (See, e.g., Holguin v. DISH Network LLC (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1332.)  This inquiry “begins with the ‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the reasonable hourly rate.” (See PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.)  From there, the “[t]he lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the legal services provided.” (Ibid.)  Relevant factors include: “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)

Discussion

Right to Recover

A prevailing buyer in an action under the Song-Beverly Act “shall be allowed by the court to recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended, determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794(d).)  “[W]hen ‘prevailing party’ is undefined by the statute, ‘a court may base its attorney fees decision on a pragmatic definition of the extent to which each party has realized its litigation objectives, whether by judgment, settlement or otherwise. [Citations.] In assessing litigation success, Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th 863, 877, ... instructs: ‘[C]ourts should respect substance rather than form, and to this extent should be guided by “equitable considerations.”’”  (MacQuiddy v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1048.)

            In the instant case, Plaintiff accepted Defendants section 998 offer on October 20, 2021.  (Sarbaz Decl. ¶ 13, Exh. J.)  Pursuant to the terms of the section 998 offer, “Plaintiff’s attorney's fees, expenses and costs that have been reasonably incurred pursuant to California Civil Code § 1794(d) may be determined by the Court via noticed motion. For purposes of any such motion, GM will agree that Plaintiff is the prevailing party.”  (Sarbaz Decl. ¶ 13, Exh. J.)  Accordingly, pursuant to the accepted Code of Civil Procedure section 998 offer, Plaintiff is the prevailing party and entitled to reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs. 

Reasonableness of Attorney’s Fees

Plaintiffs seek attorney fees and costs in the amount of $41,680.47 consisting of $39,610.00 in attorneys’ fees of which $2,000 is in anticipated attorneys’ fees for the reply and attending the hearing and $2,070.47 in costs.  (Shahian Decl. ¶¶ 16-17, Exh. A.; Halbert Decl. ¶¶ 33-34, Exh. D.)

The trial court has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee. (PLCM Group, Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The party bears the burden of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5, subd. (c)(5).) The party seeking fees has the burden of documenting the appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (City of Colton v. Singletary (2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.) This burden requires competent evidence as to the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.)

An attorney's testimony as to the number of hours worked is sufficient evidence to support an award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records or billing statements, and there is no requirement that such records or statements be offered in evidence. (Steiny & Co., Inc. v. California Electric Supply Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 293.)  Ascertaining the fee amount is left to the trial court’s sound discretion. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)  Moreover, “[t]here is ‘no mathematical rule requiring proportionality between compensatory damages and attorney's fees awards’, [Citation], and courts have awarded attorney's fees where plaintiffs recovered only nominal or minimal damages.”  (Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 407, 421.)

            Here, Plaintiff’s Counsel Ramtin Shahian has over eleven years of experience as an attorney in consumer warranty case, founded Plaintiff’s Counsel Benchmark Legal, P.C., and is the managing firm partner of Benchmark Legal, P.C.  Shahian worked 5.8 hours at $575 per hour in 2019, 2.4 hours at $600 per hour in 2020, and 5.6 hours at $625 per hour in 2021 on the instant action.  (Shahian Decl. ¶¶ 3-8, Exh. A.)  Plaintiff’s Counsel Aryan Sarbaz is a partner at Benchmark Legal, P.C. and has been an attorney for nine years with significant experience in civil litigation, including complex litigation and consumer warranty litigation.  Sarbaz worked 36.3 hours at $425 per hour on the instant action.  (Shahian Decl. ¶ 10, Exh. A.)  Plaintiff’s Counsel Shawn Halbert has been an attorney for approximately five years specializing in law and motion and started his own legal firm specializing in law and motion practice. Halbert worked 25 hours at $325 per hour on the instant action. (Halbert Decl. ¶¶ 31-33, Exh. D.)

            Attorney Eli Banayan, a former associate with Benchmark Legal, P.C., was admitted into the California Bar in 2018.  Banayan worked 5.2 hours at $325 per hour on the instant action in 2019.  (Shahian Decl. ¶ 13, Exh. A.)  Attorney Michelle Yang, a former associate with Benchmark Legal, P.C., was admitted into the California Bar in 2019.  Yang worked 1.8 hours at $250 per hour on the instant action in 2019.  (Shahian Decl. ¶ 14, Exh. A.)

            Ayizuola Nazhaer a certified paralegal for Benchmark Legal P.C. worked 15.5 hours at $200 per hour on the instant action.  (Shahian Decl. ¶ 11, Exh. A.)  Michael Rahimian, a legal assistant for Benchmark Legal P.C., worked 1.4 hours at $125 per hour on the instant action.  (Shahian Decl. ¶ 12, Exh. A.)

In opposition, Defendant contends that the hourly rates claimed are unreasonable. 

However, Defendant fails to present any evidence that the hourly rates are unreasonable. 

Moreover, hourly rates of between $325 and $625 are well withing the range of reasonable hourly rates for attorneys in Los Angeles for the period 2019 to 2021, depending on the level of experience.  Plaintiffs provide ample evidence to support the reasonableness of their hourly rates (with one exception noted below), such as multiple other court orders finding Plaintiff’s counsel’s attorney’s fees rates in lemon law actions to be reasonable.  (Shahian Decl. ¶ 8.)  Moreover, based on the stated experience of Plaintiff’s attorneys, the Court finds that most of the claimed hourly rates are not unreasonable. 

            However, the hourly rate claimed for Attorney Eli Banayan is not supported.  Attorney Eli Banayan had only been an attorney for one year when he billed hours for the instant action at $325 per hour which Plaintiff notes “is the reasonable hourly rate for a 5-year associate practicing in the Los Angeles area”.  (Shahian Decl. ¶ 13.)  Attorney Eli Banayan was not a five-year associate at the time he purported to bill at this rate.  Nor has Plaintiff provided any basis for the Court to award Banayan the same hourly rate as a five-year associate when he was a one-year associate.  Thus, the Court finds that an hourly rate of $250 for a new associate is reasonable for Attorney Eli Banayan’s stated experience. 

            As to the fees by paralegals and legal assistants, the Court notes that case law has indicated what has been considered a reasonable hourly rate for paralegals in the greater Los Angeles area.  For example, in Cruz ex rel. Cruz v. Alhambra School Dist. (C.D. Cal. 2009) 601 F.Supp.2d 1183, the Central District Court concluded over 13 years ago that $125 per hour was in line with prevailing market rates for law clerks and paralegals.  (Id. at p.1195.)  An increase of $75 hourly increase more than a decade later for a certified paralegal and the same rate for a legal assistant is in line with the findings in Cruz ex rel. Cruz.  Given the claimed skill and experience by Plaintiff’s Counsel, the rate is not unreasonable.  Accordingly, the Court finds that the hourly rates claimed by Plaintiff’s counsel – with the exception of attorney Eli Banayan – for attorneys, paralegals, and legal assistants are reasonable. 

            However, given the experience, skill, and expertise claimed by Plaintiffs’ Counsel commensurate with their hourly rates, the Court finds that the claimed hours billed are unreasonable, and the Court finds that a slight reduction in hours incurred is warranted. 

The number of attorney’s and paralegals/legal assistants working on the instant action was slightly unreasonable, resulting in some inefficiencies. “Plainly, it is appropriate for a trial court to reduce a fee award based on its reasonable determination that a routine, non-complex case was overstaffed to a degree that significant inefficiencies and inflated fees resulted.”  (Morris v. Hyundai Motor America (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 24, 39.)  Here, the instant action did not involve any complicated issues.  Rather, the instant action was simple and routine.  Yet, five separate attorneys, one certified paralegal, and one legal assistant worked on the instant action.  Significantly, only three of the attorneys and one paralegals worked over 10 hours on the instant action, with the most involved attorney working 36.3 hours.  Given the routine and straightforward nature of the instant action, assigning five different attorneys reflects some minor inefficiencies in the time incurred by Plaintiff’s Counsel.  In addition, the Court notes that Plaintiff’s counsel claimed an excessive amount of time on the instant motion and on straight forward discovery motions.  Further, as noted in reply, Plaintiff’s only worked 3.2 hours on the reply at $350 an hour, less than the anticipated amount.

Accordingly, a slight reduction is warranted.  Utilizing a lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that the total and reasonable amount of attorney’s fees incurred is $30,970.00.

Costs

To support Plaintiffs’ claim for costs, Plaintiff’s provide a billing of costs claiming a total of $2,070.47 in costs.  (Shahian Decl. ¶ 17, Exh. A.)  Under Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5 and Civil Code section 1794(d) the costs sought are allowable.  Defendant contends that the courtesy copies and the filing fees for discovery motions that were not heard are not reasonable.

Filing fees are expressly allowable as costs, (CCP §1033.5(a)(1)).  Thus, the burden is on Defendant to show that the filing costs were not necessary for the litigation.  Defendant fails to do so.  As to the courtesy copies, the Court finds that the costs were reasonably incurred.  Accordingly, the costs of $2,070.47 are granted.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Elliott Peaks’ motion for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses is GRANTED in the total amount of $33,040.47, broken down as $30,970.00 of attorney’s fees and $2,070.47 of costs. 

Moving Party is ordered to provide notice of this order and file proof of service of such.

DATED: July 25, 2022                                                           ___________________________

                                                                                    Elaine Lu

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court