Judge: Elaine Lu, Case: 20STCV02732, Date: 2023-10-03 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 20STCV02732 Hearing Date: October 3, 2023 Dept: 26
|
hedgefog
research, inc., Plaintiff, v. precision
ocular metrology, et al., Defendants. |
Case No.: 20STCV02732 Hearing Date: October 3, 2023 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: Plaintiff’s Renewed motion FOR appointment of a post-judgment
reciever |
Background
On January 22, 2020, Plaintiff Hedgefog
Research, Inc. (“Plaintiff”) filed the complaint in this action against Defendant
Precision Ocular Metrology, LLC (“Defendant”) for (1) Breach of Contract, (2)
Fraud, (3) Negligent Misrepresentation, (4) Common Counts for Goods Sold and
Received, and (5) Unjust Enrichment.
These causes of action arise out of the purchase by Judgment Debtor of
eight sMap3d devices. On July 27, 2020, the
Court entered a default judgment against Defendant and in favor of Plaintiff in the total amount of $124,314.17.
On September 11, 2020, Plaintiff filed an
ex parte application for an appointment of a receiver which the Court denied on
September 16, 2020. (Minute Order
9/16/20.) On September 17, 2020,
Plaintiff filed a notice motion for an appointment of a receiver which the
Court denied on October 13, 2020. (Minute
Order 10/13/20.) On February 8, 2021,
Plaintiff again filed a motion for appointment of receiver which the Court
again denied on March 19, 2021. (Minute
Order 3/19/21.) On June 25, 2021,
Plaintiff filed a motion for an assignment order which the Court granted on January
24, 2022. (Order 1/24/22.)
On August 31, 2023, Plaintiff filed the
instant renewed motion for an appointment of a receiver. No opposition has been filed.
Discussion
Plaintiff seeks
an appointment of a receiver to enforce the monetary judgment against
Defendant.
As a preliminary
matter, while entitled a motion for an appointment of receivership, “the name of the motion is not controlling.
The requirements for a motion for reconsideration ‘apply to any motion that
asks the judge to decide the same matter previously ruled on.’” (R & B Auto Center, Inc. v. Farmers Group, Inc. (2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 327, 373.) The Supreme Court is clear in that “a party
may not file a written motion to reconsider that has procedural
significance if it does not satisfy the requirements of section 437c,
subdivision (f)(2), or 1008. The court need not rule on any suggestion
that it should reconsider a previous ruling and, without more, another party
would not be expected to respond to such a suggestion.” (Le Francois v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th
1094, 1108.) Therefore, “[u]nless the requirements of
section 437c, subdivision (f)(2), or 1008 are satisfied, any action to
reconsider a prior interim order must formally begin with the court on its
own motion.” (Ibid.)
Here, Plaintiff has previously requested an appointment
of a receivership three times which the Court has denied three times. (Minute Orders 9/16/20, 10/13/20, 3/19/21.) As Plaintiff seeks the same relief that has
been previously denied, the requirements for a renewed motion must be
fulfilled. (Le Francois, supra, 35
Cal.4th at p.1108.) Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1008(b),
“A party who originally made an application for an order which was refused … may
make a subsequent application for the same order upon new or different facts,
circumstances, or law, in which case it shall be shown by affidavit what application was
made before, when and to what judge, what order or decisions were made, and
what new or different facts, circumstances, or law are claimed to be shown.” (Ibid., [Italics added].) “A motion for reconsideration must be based
on new or different facts, circumstances or law [Citation], and facts of
which the party seeking reconsideration was aware at the time of the original
ruling are not ‘new or different.’” (In
re Marriage of Herr (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 1463, 1468.)
Here, the only new facts that Plaintiff raises are that Plaintiff
has made some other attempts at enforcing the judgment. As detailed below, these attempts are
insufficient to warrant the appointment of a receivership.
“By statute, a court ‘may’ appoint a receiver ‘[a]fter
judgment’ ‘pursuant to the Enforcement of Judgments Law’ (§ 564, subd. (b)(4)),
and the Enforcement of Judgments Law (§ 680.010 et seq.) empowers a court to
appoint a receiver ‘to enforce the judgment where the judgment creditor shows
that, considering the interests of both the judgment creditor and the judgment
debtor, the appointment of a receiver is a reasonable method to obtain the fair
and orderly satisfaction of the judgment’ (§ 708.620).” (Medipro Medical Staffing LLC v. Certified
Nursing Registry, Inc. (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 622, 627.) However, “the appointment of a receiver is a
very ‘drastic,’ ‘harsh,’ and costly remedy that is to be ‘exercised sparingly
and with caution.’ [Citations.] Due to
the ‘extraordinary’ nature of this remedy and the special costs it imposes,
courts are strongly discouraged—although not strictly prohibited—from
appointing a receiver unless the more intrusive oversight of a receiver is a ‘necessity’
because other, less intrusive remedies are either ‘ “inadequate or unavailable.”
’[Citations.]” (Id. at p.628.)
In light of the sheer number of enforcement
mechanisms for collecting money judgments under the Enforcement of Judgments
Law (which range from levies to liens to wage garnishment (§§ 695.010 et seq.,
697.010 et seq., 699.010 et seq., 699.510 et seq., 706.020 et seq.); accord, Tucker, supra, 70 Cal.App.2d at p. 773, [“ordinarily a
judgment creditor is able to collect money ... by way of garnishment or levy of
execution”]), appointment of a receiver is rarely a “necessity” and, as a
consequence, “may not ordinarily be used for the enforcement of a simple money
judgment.” (Jackson, supra, 253 Cal.App.2d at p.
1040; accord, White v. White (1900) 130 Cal. 597,
599, [receiver may not be appointed to collect a money judgment under section
564, subdivision (b)(3)].) Instead, the appointment of a receiver to enforce a
money judgment is reserved for “exceptional” circumstances where the judgment
creditor's conduct makes a receiver necessary—and hence “proper.” (Jackson, at p. 1041; Olsan v. Comora (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 642, 647; Daley, supra, 16 Cal.App.4th at p. 744.) This occurs when
the judgment debtor has frustrated the judgment creditor's collection efforts
through obfuscation or through otherwise contumacious conduct that has rendered
feckless the panoply of less intrusive mechanisms for enforcing a money
judgment.
(Medipro Medical Staffing
LLC, supra, 60 Cal.App.5th at p.628.)
Here, the Court has entered a simple money judgment against
Defendant, and the evidence Plaintiff presents fail to demonstrate exceptional
circumstances supporting the drastic and extreme remedy Plaintiff seeks. Here, the primary steps Plaintiff has taken
to enforce the judgment have been three consecutive motions to appoint a
receivership, which the Court has denied.
(Minute Orders 9/16/20, 10/13/20, 3/19/21.) Plaintiff’s Counsel claims that he has served
written discovery to Defendant, which Defendant ignored. (Friedman Decl. ¶ 3.) Plaintiff’s Counsel was able to obtain $23,240.00
to partially satisfy the judgment from a third party through a writ of
execution. (Friedman Decl. ¶ 4.) Plaintiff’s Counsel claims that he is unable
to conduct a judgment debtor examination because Defendant and all of its relevant
personnel reside more than 150 miles from this courthouse. (Friedman Decl. ¶ 3.)
In its memorandum, Plaintiff further claims that the
assignment order “was entirely ineffective as [Defendant] has and continues to
move his income via different business entities and
never resulted in any payments.” (Motion
at p.2:25-27, [italics added].) Notably,
Defendant is an entity and not an individual.
Thus, it is unclear who Plaintiff is referring to by the term “his.” Moreover, Plaintiff has failed to present any
evidence to support this claim; a memorandum is not evidence, and “the court
must disregard ‘facts’ contained in an unverified statement.” (Smith, Smith & Kring v. Superior
Court (Oliver) (1997) 60 Cal.App.4th 573, 578.)
These alleged facts do not show exceptional circumstances
warranting the appointment of a receiver to enforce the money judgment. As Plaintiff’s evidence demonstrates,
Defendant is no longer active.
(Mikaelian Decl. ¶ 2.) A defunct,
inactive company’s failure to respond to written discovery does not evidence an
intentional act to frustrate Plaintiff’s attempts to enforce the judgment.
Similarly, Plaintiff’s failure to obtain a judgment
debtor examination based on distance is not an exceptional circumstance
warranting the appointment of a receiver.
Since the inception of the instant action, Plaintiff has known that
Defendant is a New Mexico limited liability company with a principle place of
business in New Mexico. (Complaint ¶
2.) Therefore, Plaintiff should have
been aware that Plaintiff would likely need to enforce any money judgment by
enforcing the judgment in New Mexico – where the principle place of business
and presumably Defendant’s relevant personnel would be. The final determinations by the courts of one
state are entitled to full faith and credit in the courts of its sister states. (U.S. Const.
art. IV, § 1.) “New Mexico courts have
long given full faith and credit to judgments of sister states, unless the
judgment is void.” (Jordan v. Hall
(N.M. Ct. App. 1993) 115 N.M. 775, 777.)
In
light of the enforceability of the instant judgment in New Mexico where
Defendant and Defendant’s relevant personnel presumable are, it is enigmatic
why Plaintiff has not attempted to enforce the judgment in that jurisdiction.
Rather, Plaintiff has repeatedly attempted to invoke the extreme measure
of a receivership in the instant Court to collect on a simple money
judgment.
In sum, Plaintiff fails to present the necessary
exceptional circumstances for the extreme remedy Plaintiff seeks. Accordingly, the instant motion is DENIED.
CONCLUSION AND
ORDER
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff/Judgment
Creditor Hedgefog Research, Inc.’s renewed motion for the appointment of a receivership
is DENIED.
Moving Party to give notice and file proof
of service of such.
DATED: October ___, 2023 ___________________________
Elaine
Lu
Judge
of the Superior Court