Judge: Elaine Lu, Case: 20STCV30670, Date: 2025-03-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV30670    Hearing Date: March 21, 2025    Dept: 9

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Spring Street Courthouse, Department 9

Background

            This is a putative declaratory and injunctive relief class action. Plaintiffs Keshara Shaw, Alma Rosa Farias de Solano; Josue Ricardo Gastelum-Campista; Maritza Gonzalez; Ronnie Heard, Jr.; Deyanira Hooper; Judith Larson; Vincenta Martinez; and Akela Wroten, Jr. (collectively “Plaintiffs”) allege that in response to the COVID-19 pandemic, Defendants Los Angeles Unified School District (“LAUSD” or “District”), its superintendent Austin Beutner, and Relief Defendant United Teachers Los Angeles (“UTLA”) failed to implement a distance learning plan sufficient to meet the needs of LAUSD’s academically disadvantaged students during the 2020 spring semester. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendants’ plan for Fall 2020 distance learning remains inadequate to meet LAUSD students’ needs. Plaintiffs further allege that Defendants’ failures deprived Plaintiffs’ children and the putative class members of rights guaranteed to them by the Education Code and the California Constitution.

On September 24, 2020, Plaintiffs filed their class action complaint. On May 12, 2021, Plaintiffs filed their operative Second Amended Complaint. In the SAC, Plaintiffs asserted the following causes of action: (1) wealth discrimination in violation of the equal protection clauses of the California Constitution; (2) disparate racial discrimination in violation of the equal protection clauses of the California Constitution; (3) violation of the privileges and immunities clause of the California Constitution; (4) violation of Article IX, §§ 1 and 5 of the California Constitution; (5) violation of Government Code § 11135; (6) violation of Education Code § 43503; (7) declaratory relief; and (8) failure to provide basic educational equality in violation of the equal protection clauses of the California Constitution.

On September 14, 2021, the Court – presided by the Honorable Yvette M. Palazuelos – entered judgment in favor of Defendants LAUSD, Austin Beutner, and UTLA dismissing the action.  On January 12, 2024, the Court of Appeal issued its remittitur affirming the judgment of dismissal in part as to Austin Beutner and reversing the judgment of dismissal as to Defendants LAUSD and UTLA as to the first, second, and eighth causes of action – i.e., the constitutional claims.

            On February 20, 2025, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for appointment of a discovery referee.  On March 3, 2025, LAUSD and UTLA each filed their respective oppositions.  On March 7, 2025, Plaintiffs filed a reply.

Legal Standard

Code of Civil Procedure section 639, subdivision (a) provides that “[w]hen the parties do not consent, the court may, upon the written motion of any party, or of its own motion, appoint a referee” under certain circumstances, including “[w]hen the court in any pending action determines that it is necessary for the court to appoint a referee to hear and determine any and all discovery motions and disputes relevant to discovery in the action and to report findings and make a recommendation thereon.” (CCP § 639(a)(5) [italics added].)  All appointments of referees shall be by written order and shall include “[w]hen the referee is appointed pursuant to paragraph (5) of subdivision (a), the exceptional circumstances requiring the reference, which must be specific to the circumstances of the particular case.” (CCP § 639(d)(2).)

Discussion

            “Plaintiffs request that the Court: (1) find that the appointment of a discovery referee is necessary to preside over future disputes and issues relevant to discovery in the present action; and (2) set a schedule for the Parties to submit, jointly or separately, up to three proposed discovery referees as well as proposed orders for the appointment of a referee.”  (Motion at p.1:23-26.)

The Necessity of a Discovery Referee

            “Unless [all] parties have agreed to a reference, the court should not make blanket orders directing all discovery motions to a discovery referee except in the unusual case where a majority of factors favoring reference are present. These include: (1) there are multiple issues to be resolved; (2) there are multiple motions to be heard simultaneously; (3) the present motion is only one in a continuum of many; (4) the number of documents to be reviewed (especially in issues based on assertions of privilege) make the inquiry inordinately time-consuming.”  (Taggares v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 94, 105 [italics added].)  “Where one or more of the above factors unduly impact the court's time and/or limited resources, the court is clearly within its discretion to make an appropriate reference.”  (Id. at p.106.) 

            Here, exceptional circumstances may or may not exist warranting the appointment of a discovery referee.  On the one hand, the Court has already engaged in numerous informal discovery conferences.  (See e.g., Minute Orders 2/16/21, 2/17/21, 9/9/24, 11/4/24, 11/12/24, 11/14/24; Hillenbrand Decl. ¶¶ 21, 28.)  The most recent discovery motion involved at least eleven different discovery issues, multiple sets of joint statements, multiple reviews of the search terms for electronically stored information, and an exorbitated amount of judicial review.  (Minute Orders 1/30/25, 2/4/25, 3/6/25; Order 2/13/25.)  In addition, the Court of Appeal has instructed this Court to proceed in an expeditious manner in light of the education rights at issue.  (Hillenbrand Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. 3 [Second Appellate District’s February 5, 2025 Order denying Plaintiffs’ Petition for Writ of Mandate] [“The trial court and the parties are reminded to proceed expeditiously because, assuming plaintiffs prevail, educational rights for an untold number of students will have been irretrievably lost due to the sheer passage of time.”].)  The time that it took to hear and resolve the parties’ most recent discovery motion, involving a host of issues and a complex action, suggests that it is quite possible that future discovery motions may also take a significant amount of time to resolve.  Thus, if future discovery issues arise, there is a possibility that the action may not be able to proceed expeditiously, possibly jeopardizing educational rights for an untold number of students due to the passage of time. 

However, though the parties’ prior discovery disputes have required extensive litigation, Plaintiffs must demonstrate that there remain multiple issues to be resolved, multiple motions to be heard simultaneously, or a substantial volume of documents to be reviewed.  (Taggares v. Superior Court (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 94, 105 [italics added].)  As the Court has already addressed many discovery issues in its previous orders, it is unclear what specific discovery issues remain.  For example, UTLA claims that there are no pending discovery disputes between Plaintiffs and Defendants.  (Plank Decl. ¶ 2.)  Plaintiffs also do not identify what if any specific outstanding discovery disputes remain.  Indeed, the parties’ most recent joint statement filed while the instant motion has been pending stipulated to all search terms.  Thus, it is unclear whether any specific discovery disputes remain or why a discovery referee would be necessary.

Accordingly, the it is unclear whether exceptional circumstances exist warranting the appointment of a discovery referee.  Because Plaintiff has failed to identify a single remaining discovery dispute, a discovery referee may not be necessary.

Discovery Referee Costs

            Plaintiffs request that the cost of a discovery referee be split pro rata. 

            Under Code of Civil Procedure section 639(d)(6)(A), the Court must make a finding that “[e]ither a finding that no party has established an economic inability to pay a pro rata share of the referee's fee or a finding that one or more parties has established an economic inability to pay a pro rata share of the referee's fees and that another party has agreed voluntarily to pay that additional share of the referee's fee.”   (CCP § 639(d)(6)(A).)

            No party has presented any evidence of an economic inability to pay a pro rata share of a discovery referee cost.  Thus, a pro rata share of a discovery referee costs is warranted and required under the statute.

Missing Information

            Though a discovery referee may be warranted under the circumstances of this case, Plaintiffs’ motion for a discovery referee is missing key and vital information necessary for this Court to appoint a discovery referee.

            A discovery referee appointed to oversee discovery disputes without all parties’ consent requires a finding of exceptional circumstances requiring the reference, (CCP § 639(d)(2)), the subject matters included in the reference, (CCP § 639(d)(3), the contact information of the proposed discovery referee, (CCP § 639(d)(4)), the maximum hours and hourly rate of a discovery referee, (CCP § 639(d)(5)), and “[e]ither a finding that no party has established an economic inability to pay a pro rata share of the referee's fee or a finding that one or more parties has established an economic inability to pay a pro rata share of the referee's fees and that another party has agreed voluntarily to pay that additional share of the referee's fee[,]” (CCP § 639(d)(6)(A)). 

            Here, the Court has already addressed many discovery issues in its previous orders.  It is unclear what specific discovery disputes remain.  For example, UTLA claims that there are no pending discovery disputes between Plaintiffs and Defendants.  (Plank Decl. ¶ 2.)  Plaintiffs fail to identify what specific outstanding discovery remains.  The parties’ joint statement filed while this motion was pending stipulated to all search terms.  Thus, it is unclear what motion(s) or dispute(s) would be referred to a discovery referee.

The Court cannot issue a “blanket order[] directing all discovery motions to a discovery referee except in the unusual case where a majority of factors favoring reference are present.”  (Taggares v. Superior Court, 62 Cal.App.4th at 105.)  Any order must clearly identify the scope of disputes to be referred to the discovery referee.  There is not a single discovery motion pending.  Thus, there does not appear to be anything to refer to a discovery referee. 

If Plaintiff contends that discovery disputes still exist,  Plaintiff must file all discovery motions for which Plaintiff seeks a referral to the discovery referee so that the Court may identify (1) the necessity of a discovery referee and (2) what motions to refer to a discovery referee.

Further, no party has identified any potential discovery referees, the maximum hours of any potential discovery referee, or the hourly rate of any potential discovery referee.  Without such information, the Court cannot appoint a discovery referee.  (CCP § 639(d)(4)-(5).)

Accordingly, the instant motion must be CONTINUED for the parties to identify any outstanding discovery disputes and potential discovery referees. 

CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs Keshara Shaw, Alma Rosa Farias de Solano; Josue Ricardo Gastelum-Campista; Maritza Gonzalez; Ronnie Heard, Jr.; Deyanira Hooper; Judith Larson; Vincenta Martinez; and Akela Wroten, Jr.’s motion to appoint a discovery referee is CONTINUED to May 15, 2025 at 10:00 am.

Any motion that any party would like the Court to refer to a discovery referee must be filed and served by April 17, 2025.  By no later than April 17, 2025, Plaintiffs may file a supplemental brief (not to exceed 5 pages) further addressing the necessity of a discovery referee, identifying between three and five potential discovery referees (including the potential discovery referees’ maximum hours and hourly costs), and identifying the motions to be referred to the discovery referee.  By no later than May 1, 2025, Defendants may file their respective supplemental oppositions (not to exceed 5 pages each).  Defendants’ supplemental oppositions must also identify three to five potential discovery referees – including the potential discovery referees’ maximum hours and hourly costs.

Plaintiffs are ordered to download the instant signed order from the Court's website and to file proof of service of the instant order on all other parties within five (5) days.

DATED: March 21, 2025                                                       ___________________________

                                                                                          Elaine Lu

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court