Judge: Elaine Lu, Case: 20STCV37853, Date: 2023-04-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20STCV37853    Hearing Date: April 20, 2023    Dept: 26

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 26

Procedural Background

On October 1, 2020, Plaintiff Johnny C. Gedney, as Trustee of the Gedney Family 1978 Trust (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action for negligence and breach of contract against Defendant Inter Valley Escrow, Inc. (“IVE”).  On February 16, 2021, Plaintiff filed the First Amended Complaint against IVE.  On September 23, 2021, Plaintiff named Old Republic Title Company (“ORTC”) as Doe 1.  On October 12, 2021, the Court sustained Defendant IVE’s demurrer to the First Amended Complaint with leave to amend.

On October 27, 2021, Plaintiff filed the Second Amended Complaint against Defendants IVE and ORTC asserting five causes of action for (1) Negligence, (2) Breach of Contract, (3) Breach of Fiduciary Duty, (4) Fraud, and (5) Negligent Misrepresentation.  On September 8, 2022, the Court sustained Defendant IVE’s demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint as to the second and third causes of action without leave to amend, sustained the demurrer as to the fourth and fifth causes of action with leave to amend, and overruled the demurrer as to the first cause of action. 

On October 13, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative Third Amended Complaint against Defendants IVE and ORTC asserting four causes of action for (1) Negligence against IVE, (2) Breach of Contract against ORTC, (3) Fraud against IVE, and (4) Negligent Misrepresentation against IVE. 

On December 9, 2022, Defendant IVE filed the instant demurrer to the TAC.  On April 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition.  No reply has been filed.

Allegations of the Operative Complaint

The TAC alleges as follows:

            Plaintiff is trustee for The Gedney Family 1978 Trust, which was the owner of three commercial properties in Orange County (“Properties”).  (TAC ¶¶ 1, 9.)  “On or about March 13, 2017, IVE contracted with Plaintiff as the Escrow Holder for the sale of the Properties.”  (SAC ¶ 11, Exh. A.)  “IVE contracted with [ORTC] to issue title insurance, prepare and record instruments and act as the Sub-Escrow Holder during escrow for the benefit of [Plaintiff] and the Trust.”  (SAC ¶ 12.) 

            On March 13, 2017, ORTC prepared a grant deed to unify the Properties’ ownership interest between The Gedney Family 1978 Trust and related ByPass and Surviving Spouse's Trusts in favor of Johnny C. Gedney, as Successor Trustee of the Trust and Bypass Trust.  (TAC ¶ 15.)  “The unification of the Properties’ interests facilitated the conveyance of the Properties to the third-party purchaser as contemplated by the escrow and the contract between IVE and ORTC to facilitate the transfer of the Properties.”  (TAC ¶ 15.) 

            On July 21, 2017, Plaintiff executed the grant deed and deposited the grant deed with IVE.  (TAC ¶ 16, Exh. B.)  However, the grant deed did not indicate where to mail the grant deed when recorded.  (TAC ¶ 16, Exh. B.)  “The Escrow Instructions provide that IVE ‘may insert dates and terms on the instruments, if incomplete when executed by a party.’”  (TAC ¶ 17.) 

            Defendants inserted “Johnny C. Gedney, c/o Intervalley Escrow, 140 S. Lake Ave #265, Pasadena, CA 91101” as the address to which the recorded grant deed was to be mailed.  (TAC ¶ 19, Exh. C.)  However, this address placed on the grant deed is IVE’s address -- not Plaintiff’s address.  (TAC ¶ 19.)  “Plaintiff is informed and believes that the standard of practice in the community is to insert the address of the grantee in the section of a grant deed calling for where the grant deed should be mailed after recording[,]” which would be Plaintiff.  (TAC ¶ 20.)  In addition, Defendants did not insert Plaintiff’s information in the section asking for where tax statements should be mailed.  (TAC ¶ 21.)  Accordingly, as no party was shown in the section where tax statement should be mailed, the grant deed indicated that the tax statements were to be mailed to the address where the recorded deed was to be sent.  (TAC ¶ 21.)

            On July 25, 2017, the grant deed was recorded, and the Properties were conveyed to a third party, and escrow closed.  (TAC ¶ 22.)

            Between the notices mailed to IVE on April 9, 2018, April 23, 2018, and May 3, 2018, IVE received twenty-seven notices from the Orange County Tax Collector involving taxes for the tax periods between 2014-2018.  (TAC ¶¶ 23-25, Exh. D.)  On November 13, 2018, the Orange County Tax Collector mailed a “Notice of Filing of Tax Lien”.  (TAC ¶ 26.)  “IVE promptly forwarded this November 13, 2018 notice on or about November 21, 2018.”  (TAC ¶ 26, Exh. E.)  “Plaintiff is informed and believes that IVE’s correspondence dated November 21, 2018 constitutes the first time IVE contacted Plaintiff regarding its receipt of a notice from the County of Orange concerning the Properties since the close of escrow on July 25, 2017.”  (TAC ¶ 26.) 

            “On November 26,2018, [Plaintiff], by and through his paralegal, Elizabeth Ladiana, called IVE telephonically from Oxnard, California to inquire if IVE had received the Notices in April and May of 2018. Ms. Ladiana spoke with IVE representative Sophia Quezada. Ms. Quezada told Ms. Ladiana that IVE had not received any other tax notices from the County of Orange beside the Notification of Filing of Tax Lien dated November 13, 2018 which IVE forwarded to [Plaintiff] in its November 21, 2018 letter. IVE representative Sophia Quezada unequivocally denied that IVE had received the Notices.”  (TAC ¶ 27.) 

            Plaintiff relied on this representation, resulting in Plaintiff incurring additional litigation costs and attorneys’ fees in appealing the County’s tax assessment on the grounds of improper notice.  (TAC ¶¶ 28-33.) During the appeal hearing on August 6, 2019, the County provided Plaintiff with evidence showing that the notices had been sent to IVE.  (TAC ¶ 32.)

Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant IVE requests that the Court take judicial notice of:

A.    The Complaint filed in the instant action on October 1, 2020

As the Court may take judicial notice of its own records and records of the State, (See Evid. Code, § 452(c)(d)), Defendant IVE’s unopposed request for judicial notice is granted.  However, the Court does not take judicial notice of the truth of assertions within. (See Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.)

Legal Standard

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal 3d 311, 318.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no “speaking demurrers”). (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.)  When considering demurrers, courts read the allegations liberally and in context.  (Taylor v. City of Los Angeles Dep’t of Water & Power (2006) 144 Cal. App. 4th 1216, 1228.)  In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice.  (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 968, 994.)  “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters.  Therefore, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.”  (SKF Farms v. Superior Ct. (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.)  “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.”  (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.) 

Meet and Confer Requirement

Code of Civil Procedure § 430.41, subdivision (a) requires that “[b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer¿in person or by telephone¿with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due, and if they are unable to meet, the demurring party shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension.  (CCP § 430.41(a)(2).)  The demurring party must also file and serve a declaration detailing the meet and confer efforts.  (Id.¿at (a)(3).)¿ If an amended pleading is filed, the parties must meet and confer again before a demurrer may be filed to the amended pleading.  (Id.¿at (a).)

Here, Defendant IVE has fulfilled the meet and confer requirement. (Davis Decl. ¶¶ 2-6.)

Discussion

Entire Complaint: Statute of Limitations

            Defendant IVE contends that the first, third, and fourth causes of action against it are barred based on the contractually limited statute of limitations.

“A demurrer based on a statute of limitations will not lie where the action may be, but is not necessarily, barred.  In order for the bar ... to be raised by demurrer, the defect must clearly and affirmatively appear on the face of the complaint; it is not enough that the complaint shows that the action may be barred.”  (Committee for Green Foothills v. Santa Clara County Bd. of Supervisors (2010) 48 Cal.4th 32, 42, [internal citations omitted].) 

“Under California law parties may agree to a provision shortening the statute of limitations, ‘qualified, however, by the requirement that the period fixed is not in itself unreasonable or is not so unreasonable as to show imposition or undue advantage.’”  (Charnay v. Cobert (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 170, 183 [internal citations omitted].) “When, as in this case, defendants have demurred to the complaint based on a contractual limitations period, ‘the real question to be determined here is whether the allegations of the complaint show that the limitation is unreasonable.... The question is one of law, namely, is the period of limitation, in itself, unreasonable.’”  (Ibid., [internal citations omitted].)

“The statute of limitations usually commences when a cause of action ‘accrues,’ and it is generally said that ‘an action accrues on the date of injury.’”  (Vaca v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 737, 743, [internal citations omitted].) 

“An important exception to the general rule of accrual is the “discovery rule,” which postpones accrual of a cause of action until the plaintiff discovers, or has reason to discover, the cause of action.”  (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 807.)  “The discovery rule only delays accrual until the plaintiff has, or should have, inquiry notice of the cause of action. The discovery rule does not encourage dilatory tactics because plaintiffs are charged with presumptive knowledge of an injury if they have ‘information of circumstances to put [them] on inquiry’ or if they have ‘the opportunity to obtain knowledge from sources open to [their] investigation.’ [Citation.] In other words, plaintiffs are required to conduct a reasonable investigation after becoming aware of an injury, and are charged with knowledge of the information that would have been revealed by such an investigation.”  (Id. at pp.807–808 [internal citations omitted].)  However, “[i]n order to rely on the discovery rule for delayed accrual of a cause of action, ‘[a] plaintiff whose complaint shows on its face that his claim would be barred without the benefit of the discovery rule must specifically plead facts to show (1) the time and manner of discovery and (2) the inability to have made earlier discovery despite reasonable diligence.’  In assessing the sufficiency of the allegations of delayed discovery, the court places the burden on the plaintiff to ‘show diligence’; ‘conclusory allegations will not withstand demurrer.’”  (Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 808 [internal citations omitted].)

Here, the attached escrow agreement to the TAC states in the choice of law provision at paragraph 26 that:

NO ACTION SHALL LIE AGAINST ESCROW HOLDER FOR ANY CLAIM, LOSS, LIABILITY OR ALLEGED CAUSE OF ACTION OF ANY KIND OR NATURE WHATSOEVER, HOWEVER CAUSED OR OCCURRED, UNDER THIS ESCROW OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE HANDLING OR PROCESSING OF THIS ESCROW, UNLESS BROUGHT WITHIN TWELVE (12) MONTHS AFTER THE CLOSE OF ESCROW OR ANY CANCELLATION OR TERMINATION OF ESCROW FOR ANY REASON WHATSOEVER.

(TAC, Exh. A at ¶ 26.)

            A one-year statute of limitations is not unreasonable or unfair on its face.  (See e.g., Fageol Truck & Coach Co. v. Pacific Indem. Co. (1941) 18 Cal.2d 748, 753 [“One year was not an unfair period of limitation.”].)

As to the first cause of action, Plaintiff alleges that IVE owed a duty to promptly forward Plaintiff the notices from Orange County regarding the Properties because IVE “exercised [its] authority under the Instructions to insert, cause the insertion or allow the insertion of terms into the Instrument that caused the Notices to be mailed to the IVE address.”  (TAC ¶ 43.)  As the duty to provide the notice from the County arose from IVE’s handling of the escrow, the contractual one-year statute of limitations would apply.

            The third and fourth causes of action for fraud and negligent misrepresentation arise from allegations that on November 26, 2018, IVE represented to Plaintiff that they had only received a single piece of mail regarding the tax liens on November 13, 2018 and no others.  (TAC ¶¶ 56, 62.)  This representation was false because IVE “knew that this representation was false because said defendants (l) knew the IVE address was on the Instrument, (2) knew IVE had received up to twenty-seven separate pieces of mail regarding the Properties during April and May of 2018, (3) and/or knew they had an obligation to notify [Plaintiff] promptly regarding the Notices it received after the close of Escrow but failed to do so in April and May of 2018.”  (TAC ¶¶ 57, 62.)  Accordingly, Plaintiff alleges that the knowledge of the falsity for the fraud claims arose from IVE’s handling of the escrow and from IVE’s placement of IVE’s address on the instrument.  Thus, pursuant to the escrow agreement, the fourth and fifth causes of action would also be subject to the one-year statute of limitations.

            As to each of these causes of action, Plaintiff alleges that he was unaware of the prior notices of tax lien sent to IVE until August 6, 2019 “when the County, during the appeal hearing, produced the evidence it had mailed the Notices to IVE.”  (TAC ¶ 34.) 

            In the moving papers, Defendant IVE contends that the 27 pieces of mail purportedly sent to IVE’s address in March and April 2018 were unnecessary to impart notice to Plaintiff because they were notices of proposed assessments and an intention to enroll an escape assessment whereas the November 13, 2018 Notification of Filing of Tax Lien attached as Exhibit E to the TAC made clear that a lien had already been recorded against Plaintiff and thus placed Plaintiff on notice that Plaintiff had already suffered actual damages.  Defendant contends that Plaintiff had all the facts necessary to place a reasonable person on notice of the negligence claim as of November 21, 2018 when Defendant forwarded the November 13, 2018 Notification of Filing of Tax Lien to Plaintiff.  The Court respectfully disagrees. 

            The basis of the negligence cause of action against IVE is not just the placement of an erroneous address on the grant deed, but rather, the failure “to promptly forward [Plaintiff] notices they received from the County of Orange regarding the Properties,” i.e., the 27 pieces of mail that Defendant received and failed to forward to Plaintiff.  (TAC ¶ 43.)  Though the November 13, 2018 Notification of Filing of Tax Lien on its face bore an incorrect address for Plaintiff (listing instead Defendant IVE’s address), it does not make reference to the prior (March and April 2018) mailings.  Nor is there anything else in the November 13, 2018 Notification of Filing of Tax Lien that should have alerted Plaintiff to the existence of any prior notices mailed from The Orange County Assessor.  Thus, neither the TAC nor the attachments thereto establish that as a matter of law Plaintiff should have been on inquiry notice that Defendant had failed to forward any notices that pre-dated the November 13, 2018 Notification of Filing of Tax Lien. 

            Based on the allegations of the TAC and prior to the onset of the COVID-pandemic, Plaintiff would have had until August 6, 2020 to timely file the claims for negligence and fraud.  However, due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the statute of limitations for civil actions were further extended.  “Notwithstanding any other law, the statutes of limitations and repose for civil causes of action that exceed 180 days are tolled from April 6, 2020, until October 1, 2020.” (Emergency rule 9(a); See Judicial Council of Cal., Advisory Com. com., Emergency rule 9 [“Emergency rule 9 is intended to apply broadly to toll any statute of limitations on the filing of a pleading in court asserting a civil cause of action”].)  As a result of this six-month tolling, Plaintiff had until January 31, 2021 to timely file the claims for negligence and fraud.  Plaintiff filed the instant action on October 1, 2020 – prior to January 31, 2021 – and thus, Plaintiff’s claims for negligence, fraud and negligent misrepresentation are not time-barred.

First Cause of Action: Negligence

            Defendant IVE also contends that the first cause of action fails due to a lack of duty.

            “‘The elements of a negligence cause of action are the existence of a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, and proximate cause resulting in injury.’ [Citations.]”  (McIntyre v. The Colonies-Pacific, LLC (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 664, 671.)   “Duty is not universal; not every defendant owes every plaintiff a duty of care. A duty exists only if ‘ “the plaintiff's interests are entitled to legal protection against the defendant's conduct.” ’ [Citations.]”  (Brown v. USA Taekwondo (2021) 11 Cal.5th 204, 213.)  “Whether a duty exists is a question of law to be resolved by the court.”  (Ibid.)

            “An escrow holder is an agent and fiduciary of the parties to the escrow. [Citations.] The agency created by the escrow is limited—limited to the obligation of the escrow holder to carry out the instructions of each of the parties to the escrow.”  (Summit Financial Holdings, Ltd. v. Continental Lawyers Title Co. (2002) 27 Cal.4th 705, 711.)  “Upon the escrow holder's breach of an instruction that it has contracted to perform or of an implied promise arising out of the agreement with the buyer or seller, the injured party acquires a cause of action for breach of contract. [Citations.] Similarly, if the escrow holder acts negligently, ‘it would ordinarily be liable for any loss occasioned by its breach of duty.’ [Citations.]”  (Amen v. Merced County Title Co. (1962) 58 Cal.2d 528, 532.)

            Here, “[t]he Escrow Instructions provide that IVE ‘may insert dates and terms on the instruments, if incomplete when executed by a party.’”  (TAC ¶ 17.)  The TAC alleges that Defendant IVE exercised this authority under the Escrow instructions and inserted their address as to where the recorded grant deed was to be mailed contrary to standard practice of listing the grantee’s – i.e., Plaintiff – address.  (TAC ¶¶ 19-20, Exh. C.)  As a result of inputting the incorrect address, Defendant IVE had a special duty to act imposed on it by creating the harm in inputting the incorrect address and owed a duty to “promptly forward [Plaintiff] notices they received from the County of Orange regarding the Properties[.]”  (TAC ¶ 43; McHenry v. Asylum Entertainment Delaware, LLC (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 469, 485 [“a special relationship creating a duty to act can arise from one party's conduct in creating the very peril that necessitates aid and intervention.”].)

            Accordingly, the TAC sufficiently alleges the existence of a duty for Defendant IVE to promptly notify Plaintiff of notices received from the County arising from IVE’s negligent placement of their address as to where the recorded grant deed was to be mailed.  Therefore, Defendant IVE’s demurrer to the first cause of action for lack of duty is OVERRULED.

Third and Fourth Causes of Action for Fraud and Negligent Misrepresentation

            In addition, Defendant IVE contends that the fourth and fifth causes of action for negligent misrepresentation lack sufficient specificity.

“The elements of fraud are (a) a misrepresentation (false representation, concealment, or nondisclosure); (b) scienter or knowledge of its falsity; (c) intent to induce reliance; (d) justifiable reliance; and (e) resulting damage.”  (Hinesley v. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)  

            “The elements of negligent misrepresentation are similar to intentional fraud except for the requirement of scienter; in a claim for negligent misrepresentation, the plaintiff need not allege that the defendant made an intentionally false statement, but simply one as to which he or she lacked any reasonable ground for believing the statement to be true.” (Bains v. Moores (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th 445, 454 [internal citations omitted].)  “Under California law, negligent misrepresentation is a species of actual fraud and a form of deceit.”  (Wong v. Stoler (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 1375, 1388.)  Both a claim for intentional misrepresentation and a claim for negligent misrepresentation must be pleaded with specificity rather than with general and conclusory allegations.  (Small v. Fritz Companies, Inc. (2003) 30 Cal.4th 167, 184.) 

“Fraud allegations ‘involve a serious attack on character’ and therefore are pleaded with specificity.  [Citation.]  General and conclusory allegations are insufficient.  [Citation.]  The particularity requirement demands that a plaintiff plead facts which ‘‘‘show how, when, where, to whom, and by what means the representations were tendered.’’’  [Citation.]”  (Cansino v. Bank of America (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1462, 1469.)  “[E]ach element must be pleaded with specificity.  [Citations.]”  (Daniels v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1150, 1166 disapproved of on other grounds by Sheen v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (2022) 12 Cal.5th 905.)  However, “[a]s one court has aptly observed, “it is harder to apply [the requirement of specificity] to a case of simple nondisclosure.  ‘How does one show “how” and “by what means” something didn’t happen, or “when” it never happened, or “where” it never happened?’ ”  (Jones v. ConocoPhillips Co. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1199 [citing Alfaro v. Community Housing Improvement System & Planning Assn., Inc. (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1356, 1384 and Committee on Children's Television, Inc. v. General Foods Corp. (1983) 35 Cal.3d 197, 217, [“ ‘[e]ven under the strict rules of common law pleading, one of the canons was that less particularity is required when the facts lie more in the knowledge of the opposite party ...’ ”].)

Here, TAC alleges in relevant part that between on April 9, 2018, and May 3, 2018, IVE received twenty-seven notices from the Orange County Tax Collector involving taxes for the tax periods between 2014-2018 for the Properties.  (TAC ¶¶ 23-25, Exh. D.)  On November 13, 2018, the Orange County Tax Collector mailed a “Notice of Filing of Tax Lien”.  (TAC ¶ 26.)  “IVE promptly forwarded this November 13, 2018 notice on or about November 21, 2018.”  (TAC ¶ 26, Exh. E.)

            “On November 26,2018, [Plaintiff], by and through his paralegal, Elizabeth Ladiana, called IVE telephonically from Oxnard, California to inquire if IVE had received the Notices in April and May of 2018. Ms. Ladiana spoke with IVE representative Sophia Quezada. Ms. Quezada told Ms. Ladiana that IVE had not received any other tax notices from the County of Orange beside the Notification of Filing of Tax Lien dated November 13, 2018 which IVE forwarded to [Plaintiff] in its November 21, 2018 letter. IVE representative Sophia Quezada unequivocally denied that IVE had received the Notices.”  (TAC ¶ 27.)  This representation by IVE representative Sophia Quezada was false because IVE knew that IVE had received 27 pieces of mail regarding the tax lien.  (TAC ¶ 57.)  IVE “intended to induce [Plaintiff]'s reliance on the representation because said defendants intended to avoid liability for their wrongful conduct, including failing to forward the Notices to Gedney in April and May 2018.”  (TAC ¶ 58.)  “[Plaintiff] justifiably and reasonably relied on said defendants' representation because he reasonably assumed that said defendants (1) were telling the truth and (2) would have had promptly forwarded the Notices in the same, timely manner it had forwarded the November 13, 2018 Notification of Filing of Tax Lien if the Notices (twenty-seven separate pieces of mail) had been received in April and May of 2018.”  (SAC ¶¶ 28, 59.)  This caused Plaintiff to unnecessarily incur litigation costs and attorneys’ fees in appealing the tax assessment on the grounds that the County failed to give proper notice.  (TAC ¶¶ 31, 60.)

            Plaintiff has added clear and specific allegations indicating who made the misrepresentation, how the misrepresentation was made, and the date of the misrepresentation.  Defendant IVE contends that these allegations are insufficient because the TAC fails to specify as to what authority Sophia Quezada had to speak on behalf of IVE – i.e., that Sophia Quezada was an agent and authorized to make such representation.  However, the source of Sophia Quezada’s authority is beyond the scope of this demurrer as the TAC includes “a pleading of agency an averment of ultimate fact.”  (Skopp v. Weaver (1976) 16 Cal.3d 432, 437.)  Accordingly, Defendant IVE’s demurrer to the third and fourth causes of action for lack of specificity is overruled.

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Defendant Inter Valley Escrow, Inc.’s demurrer to the Third Amended Complaint is OVERRULED.

Defendant is to file an answer within thirty (30) days of today – no later than May 22, 2023.

The case management conference is continued to May 24, 2023 at 8:30 am.

Moving Party is to give notice and file proof of service of such.

DATED: April 20, 2023                                                         ___________________________

                                                                                    Elaine Lu

                                                                                    Judge of the Superior Court