Judge: Elaine Lu, Case: 21STCV06195, Date: 2023-10-27 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV06195 Hearing Date: October 27, 2023 Dept: 26
|
CITY OF
INGLEWOOD, Plaintiff, vs. DANFAR PCH, LLC; FARYAN ANDREW AFIFI; LEILA JANE AFIFI, et al. Defendants. |
Case No.:
21STCV06195 Consolidated
with Case Nos.: 21STCV06223, and 21STCV06249 Hearing Date: October 27, 2023 [TENTATIVE] order RE: plaintiff city of inglewood’s motion for determination of legal
issues regarding goodwill valuation |
Procedural
Background
On February 16, 2021, Plaintiff City
of Inglewood (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant three eminent domain actions
against (1) Defendants Danfar PCH, LLC, Faryan Andrew Afifi, and Leila Jane
Afifi, as Trustees of the Afifi Family Revocable Trust dated June 1, 2013
(collectively “Danfar Defendants”) in case numbers 21STCV06195 and 21STC06249,
and (2) Savine Investments, et al. in Case Number 21STCV06223. The actions seek to obtain certain real
property through eminent domain (Complaint, Ex. 2) for the Inglewood Basketball
and Entertainment Center (“IBEC”) Project pursuant to a Developer Agreement
between Plaintiff and Murphy’s Bowl, LLC (“Murphy’s Bowl”). (Complaint ¶ 2). Pursuant to Resolutions of Necessity,
Plaintiff “seeks to transfer the propert[ies] to Murphy’s Bowl, LLC for the
construction and development of the IBEC Project, and [Plaintiff asserts that
it] has ensured that there are adequate controls to preserve the public use of
the property in perpetuity[.]” (Complaint ¶ 9(E), Ex. 1.)
On March 1, 2021, Plaintiff filed
its motion for prejudgment possession and certification of taxes, which the
Court granted on June 28, 2021, and Plaintiff took possession of Defendants’
properties. (Minute Order 06/28/2021.)
On
April 15, 2021, the Court granted a notice of related cases that Plaintiff
filed. As a result, the instant actions (21STCV06195, 21STCV06223, and
21STCV06249) were deemed related to seven other eminent domain actions that
Plaintiff filed on February 16, 2021, including case numbers 21STCV06062,
21STCV06064, 21STCV06065, 21STCV06067, 21STCV06069, 21STCV06070, and
21STCV06251. (Minute Order 4/15/2021.)
On
April 20, 2021, Plaintiff filed a motion to bifurcate, which Defendants opposed
in part on May 13, 2021. At the May 26,
2021 hearing, the Court granted Plaintiff’s motion to bifurcate and bifurcated
the trial into two phases: phase I for right to take issues, and phase II for
valuation issues. (Minute Order 5/26/2021.)
On June
17, 2022, the Court issued its final statement of decision as to Phase I, finding
in favor of Plaintiff for the right to take.
(Final Statement of Decision 6/17/22.)
Trial for Phase II regarding valuation issues is set for November 27,
2023.
On September
27, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for a determination of legal and
evidentiary issues affecting the determination of compensation under Code of
Civil Procedure § 1260.040(a). On October
16, 2023, Defendant Global Restaurant Hospitality Group, LLC (“Global”) filed
an opposition. On October 20, 2023,
Plaintiff filed a reply.
Legal Standard
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure
section 1260.040(a), “[i]f there is a dispute between plaintiff and defendant
over an evidentiary or other legal issue affecting the determination of
compensation, either party may move the court for a ruling on the issue. The
motion shall be made not later than 60 days before commencement of trial on the
issue of compensation. The motion shall be heard by the judge assigned for
trial of the case.”
Discussion
Plaintiff seeks (1) a ruling
prohibiting Defendant Global from utilizing the contractual rental amount for
the Property in its calculation of alleged goodwill damages and (2) a ruling
that Global may not recover any bonus value it may possess in its leasehold
interest in the Property as part of its claim for goodwill damages.
Contractual Rental Amount
“Compensation for the loss of
goodwill under section 1263.510 involves a two-step process. First, the court
determines entitlement: that is, whether the party seeking compensation
has presented sufficient evidence of the conditions for compensation set forth
in subdivision (a)—causation, unavoidability, and no double recovery—such that
the party is entitled to some compensation. If the party meets this
burden, the matter proceeds to a second step, in which a jury (unless waived)
determines the amount of the loss.”
(People ex rel. Dept. of Transportation v. Presidio Performing Arts
Foundation (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 190, 201 (“Presidio”).) “For purposes of compensation under section
1263.510, ‘goodwill’ is explicitly defined by the statute. Subdivision (b) of
section 1263.510 states: ‘Within the meaning of this article, “goodwill”
consists of the benefits that accrue to a business as a result of its
location, reputation for dependability, skill or quality, and any other
circumstances resulting in probable retention of old or acquisition of new
patronage.’” (Id. at p.202.)
“Courts have long accepted that
goodwill may be measured by the capitalized value of the net income or profits
of a business or by some similar method of calculating the present value of
anticipated profits.” (People ex rel.
Dept. of Transportation v. Muller (1984) 36 Cal.3d 263, 271 (“Muller”).) “However, the courts have wisely maintained
that there is no single acceptable method of valuing goodwill. [Citation.]
Valuation methods will differ with the nature of the business or practice and
with the purpose for which the evaluation is conducted.” (Id. at p.271, Fn.7.)
In Muller, the Supreme
Court found that the loss of lower rent at the pre-taking location could be
used in determining good will. (Muller
at p.268, [“Section 1263.510 defines ‘goodwill’ as ‘the benefits that accrue to
a business as a result of its location, reputation for dependability, skill or
quality, and any other circumstances resulting in probable retention of old or
acquisition of new patronage.’ Dr. Muller has clearly lost a ‘benefit’ which
accrued to the practice as a result of its former ‘location.’ He has lost the
cheap rent in an older building which enabled his practice to show a
profit.”].) Similarly, in Presidio,
the Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s finding of loss of goodwill due
to an increase in rent at the new location.
(Presidio at p.202, [“The Foundation also demonstrated that after
the taking these characteristics had been compromised, due to the disadvantages
of the new location (such as higher rent and a lack of amenities) and an
operational disruption that tarnished its reputation. Furthermore, the
Foundation experienced a reduction in patronage and revenue. [¶] A reasonable
inference from this evidence is that the Foundation suffered some loss of the
benefit that had accrued to the Foundation as a result of the factors set forth
in the statutory definition of goodwill.”].)
Thus, the contractual rent amount is both relevant and permissible in
determining the value of lost goodwill.
Plaintiff’s reliance on New Haven
Unified School Dist. v. Taco Bell Corp. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 1473 (“Taco
Bell”) is misplaced. In Taco Bell,
the trial court awarded goodwill damages to the lessee Taco Bell based on Taco
Bell’s experts’ calculations. (Id.
at p.1477.) In relevant part, “[t]he
statement of decision did not assign a specific value to leasehold bonus value,
or even distinguish between goodwill and leasehold bonus value, but it clearly
reveals that the court included compensation for the loss of the favorable
terms of the original lease in the compensation for loss of goodwill.” (Id. at p.1478.) The plaintiff School District appealed
insisting that there needed to be a distinction between leasehold bonus value
and goodwill. (Ibid.) As the Court of Appeal noted in Taco Bell,
“[t]hough the distinction may be academic in some cases, it assumes practical
importance here because of a deleted provision of the 1975 lease referring to
‘bonus value.’ We will examine the distinction and then consider the lease
provision.” (Ibid.)
In relevant part the Court of Appeal
noted that the 1975 lease agreement between the parties predecessors in
interest originally gave the right for the lessee to recover the leasehold
bonus value. (Id. at
p.1480.) However, the predecessors in interest
deleted this phrase for bonus value and initialed this deletion. (Id. at p.1481.) Based on this deletion, the Court of Appeal
concluded that Taco Bell pursuant to the lease had waived the right to obtain
the leasehold bonus value. (Id.
at p.1483, [“Where the contract rental is
below market value, the lessor's right of recovery is limited by the
contractual rights of the lessee; by surrendering any right to recovery based
on these contractual rights, the lessee gives the lessor the full bundle of
rights in the event of condemnation and removes any impediment for the lessor
to recover the full market value.”].)
Accordingly, the Court of Appeal “conclude[d]
that the trial court erred in failing to deduct the amount of the leasehold
bonus value from the award of $525,000 as compensation for lost goodwill. While
the expert witness for School District put a value of $283,000 on the leasehold
bonus value, the court made no finding on this issue. The case therefore must
be remanded for the limited purpose of determining the amount of the bonus
value so that the judgment can be reduced accordingly.” (Ibid.)
In sum, Taco Bell presented a
unique situation where the deletion of a clause was found to have resulted in
the lessee’s waiver of leasehold bonus value in an eminent domain action. As the Court of Appeal noted in Taco Bell,
the distinction between goodwill and loss of leasehold bonus value is generally
academic, and the reason it was not so in Taco Bell was due only to the deletion
of clauses giving the lessee the bonus leasehold value from the lease.
Here, Plaintiff fails to point to
any similar circumstance in the instant action.
Thus, Taco Bell’s reasoning is not applicable as “ ‘[c]ases are
not authority for propositions not considered.’ ” (Los Angeles County
Metropolitan Transportation Authority v. Yum Yum Donut Shops, Inc. (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 662, 673.) Rather, the
Court is bound by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Muller noting that
contractual rent can be used to determine the valuation of goodwill.
Leasehold Bonus Value as Goodwill
Damages
As Taco Bell noted, the
distinction between goodwill and leasehold bonus damage is generally an
academic distinction absent the unique circumstances in Taco Bell. Defendant Global cannot obtain double damages
for the leasehold bonus value as both a separate compensation item under Code
of Civil Procedure section 1260.220(a) and as a loss of goodwill under Code of
Civil Procedure section 1263.510. The
Court agrees that a party generally cannot recover the same damages twice. (See e.g., Roby v. McKesson Corp.
(2009) 47 Cal.4th 686, 702.) However, Plaintiff
fails to show any issue of double recovery.
Plaintiff fails to show that Global is seeking leasehold bonus value as
both a separate compensation item under Code of Civil Procedure section
1260.220(a) and as a loss of goodwill under Code of Civil Procedure section
1263.510.
CONCLUSION
Based on foregoing, Plaintiff City of Inglewood’s motion
for determination of legal issues regarding goodwill valuation is DENIED. Specifically, Plaintiff’s motion (1) to
preclude defendant Global Restaurant Hospitality Group, LLC
("Global") from basing its claim for loss of goodwill on the contractual
rental amount for the property located at 3950 West Century Boulevard (aka
10004 Soutth Prairie Avenue), Inglewood, California (the "Property")
in its calculations of alleged goodwill damages and (2) to preclude Global from
recovering any leasehold bonus value is DENIED.
Moving Party is to give notice and file proof of service
of such.
DATED: October ___, 2023 ___________________________
Elaine
Lu
Judge
of the Superior Court