Judge: Elaine Lu, Case: 21STCV07830, Date: 2024-02-05 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV07830    Hearing Date: February 5, 2024    Dept: 26

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 26

Procedural Background

            On March 1, 2021, Plaintiffs Yongquan Hu and Jinghua Ren (jointly “Plaintiffs”) filed the instant products liability action against Defendants Daimler Trucks North America, LLC (“DTNA”); XPO Logistics, LLC (“XPO”); American Alliance Logistics, Inc.; POPO Trucking, Inc.; GC Global Trucking, Inc.; Action Logistics, Inc.; Liang Ye; Dong Yang[1]; and Ran Gao.  The complaint asserts four causes of action for (1) Strict Product Liability, (2) Negligent Product Liability, (3) Negligence, and (4) Negligent Hiring, Supervision, or Training of Employee.

            On March 8, 2021, Defendant DTNA filed a notice of removal to federal court.  On  March 30, 2021, Plaintiffs filed a notice of remand from federal court.

            On April 2, 2021, Defendant DTNA filed a motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction.  On September 17, 2021, the instant action was deemed a complex personal injury action and transferred to an independent calendar court.  (Minute Order 9/17/21.)  On October 28, 2021, the Court – presided by the Honorable Curtis A. Kin – denied Defendant DTNA’s motion to quash service of summons for lack of personal jurisdiction.  (Minute Order 10/28/21.)  On November 9, 2021, Defendant DTNA filed notice of a petition of a writ of mandate with the Court of Appeal regarding the denial of DTNA’s motion to quash.

            On January 27, 2022, Fleet Truck Sales, Inc. and Werner Enterprises, Inc. were named as Does 1 and 2 respectively.  On July 12, 2022, the Court granted non-Party National Continental Insurance Company’s motion for leave to intervene on behalf of Defendant POPO Trucking, Inc.  (Minute Order 7/12/22.) 

            On October 20, 2022, the Court of Appeal issued its remittitur affirming the denial of Defendant DTNA’s motion to quash.  (See Daimler Trucks North America LLC v. Superior Court (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 946, as modified (July 22, 2022), review denied (Oct. 12, 2022), cert. denied sub nom. Daimler Trucks North America LLC v. Superior Court of California (2023) 143 S.Ct. 1780.)

            On August 7, 2023, the instant action was reassigned to the Honorable Joseph Lipner.  On August 14, 2023, pursuant to a preemptory challenge, the instant action was reassigned to the current department.  (Minute Order 8/14/23.)

            On January 8, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion for leave to file a first amended complaint.  On January 23, 2024, Defendant DTNA filed an opposition.  On January 24, 2024, Defendant XPO filed an opposition.  On January 29, 2024, Plaintiffs filed a reply.

Oversized Opposition

            “Except in a summary judgment or summary adjudication motion, no opening or responding memorandum may exceed 15 pages.”  (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1113(d).)  Further, “[n]o reply or closing memorandum may exceed 10 pages.”  (Ibid.)  An oversized paper is considered the same as a late-filed paper.  (Id. at (g).)  However, a party may apply for leave to file a longer memorandum.  (Id. at (e).)  “A memorandum that exceeds 10 pages must include a table of contents and a table of authorities. A memorandum that exceeds 15 pages must also include an opening summary of argument.”  (Id. at (f).)  The Court may refuse to consider a late-filed paper.  (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1300(d).) 

            Here, the Defendant XPO’s opposition is twenty (20) pages long and thus oversized.  While the Court – in its discretion – will consider the oversized opposition, the Court will only consider the first 15 pages.

Legal Standard

            Code of Civil Procedure § 473, subdivision (a)(1) states: “[t]he court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms, as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer.  The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.” 

            Code of Civil Procedure § 576 states that: “[a]ny judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.”

            Judicial policy favors resolution of all disputed matters between the parties, and therefore, courts have held that “there is a strong policy in favor of liberal allowance of amendments.” (Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 296-97; see also Ventura v. ABM Industries, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 268) [“Trial courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial where the adverse party will not be prejudiced.”].)

            Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a), a motion to amend must: (1) include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered; and (2) state what allegations are proposed to be deleted from or added to the previous pleading and where such allegations are located.  Rule 3.1324(b) requires a separate declaration that accompanies the motion, stating: “(1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reason why the request for amendment was not made earlier.” 

Discussion

            Plaintiffs seek to file a first amended complaint to add further information and detail regarding Plaintiffs’ claim for products liability.  (Lugo Decl. ¶ 16.)  Plaintiffs’ Counsel states that “[t]hese amendments are necessary to allow PLAINTIFFS to fully explain the product that was defective in this Case. These amendments are crucial towards the arguments made regarding the products defects allegations.”  (Lugo Decl. ¶ 17.)  Plaintiffs’ Counsel states that the fact necessitating these amendments were learned following the Subject Vehicle Inspection and the deposition of Christopher Rieflin.  (Lugo Decl. ¶ 18.)

            The proposed amendments seek to (1) remove Dong Yang – who has been dismissed – and add Defendants Fleet Truck Sales, Inc. and Werner Enterprises, Inc. who were named as Does 1 and 2 respectively, (2) allegations that Product Defendants had inadequate safety devices by only including a “tent style bunk restraint” which provided insufficient safety for the sleeper compartment in a crash, (3) alter ego allegations regarding Defendant XPO and the Alliance Defendants, and (4) other minor changes.  Plaintiffs have filed a proposed copy of the First Amended Complaint and have denoted each specific change between the complaint and proposed first amended complaint.  (Lugo Decl., Exhs. 3-4.) 

            In opposition, Defendant DTNA contends that the Court should deny the instant motion in light of Plaintiffs’ delay in bringing the instant motion.  Defendant XPO contends that the Court should deny the instant motion because the amendment naming XPO an alter ego of the Alliance Defendants fails on the merits, and because Plaintiff delayed in bringing the instant motion.

            Whether the proposed first amended complaint is deficient is beyond the scope of a motion for leave to amend.  In general, there is no requirement that a critical inquiry be made into the merits of the amendment on a request for leave to amend.  (See Ruiz v. Santa Barbara Gas & Elec. Co. (1912) 164 Cal. 188, 196 [ “The usual and orderly way to test the sufficiency of an amended complaint is, in the first instance, by demurrer, after the same has been filed, when the questions presented in regard thereto may be considered and determined, and leave given to the pleader to amend if the pleading be held insufficient and the court deem it proper that the party should have such leave.”].)  Rather, Defendants can challenge such deficiency in a motion challenging the claim such as a demurrer or motion for summary adjudication.  

            Moreover, regardless of any delay in bringing the instant motion, “trial courts are to liberally permit such amendments, at any stage of the proceeding[.]”  (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 488–489.)  Rather, to justify a denial of a motion for leave to amend, the delay must have caused prejudice to the adverse parties.  (See Fair v. Bakhtiari (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1147, [“[W]here there is no prejudice to the adverse party, it may be an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.”].) 

            Here, neither DTNA nor XPO has shown any prejudice from the proposed amendments that would warrant denial.  DTNA filed an answer to the complaint only a little over a year ago on October 31, 2022 -- after the issuance of the remitter.  Subsequently, DTNA filed a writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court on January 9, 2023, which was denied on April 24, 2023.  (Supp. Lugo Decl. ¶¶ 11-12.)  During the pendency of the appeals, DTNA and XPO refused to produce witnesses except as to jurisdictional discovery.  (Supp. Lugo Decl. ¶ 13.)  It was not until September 20, 2023 that Plaintiff was even able to take the deposition of Defendant DTNA’s person most knowledgeable regarding Design and Testing.  (Supp. Lugo Decl. ¶ 14.)  In light of DTNA’s only recent participation in discovery, there appears to be minimal delay in the amendment, and the delay in extra costs in discovery would be minimal given the minimal discovery that has occurred. 

            Similarly, as to XPO, due to the appeals, Plaintiff notes that only two depositions with XPO employees have occurred in July and August of 2023.  (Supp. Lugo Decl. ¶¶ 13, 17.)  Thus, again, the delay in amendment is minimal.  Further, Defendant XPO fails to demonstrate how it would be prejudiced by the addition of what it claims are futile alter ego allegations.  As noted above, the Court may decline at this juncture to delve into a critical inquiry into the merits of the sufficiency of the proposed alter ego allegations on a request for leave to amend.  (See Ruiz v. Santa Barbara Gas & Elec. Co. (1912) 164 Cal. 188, 196 [ “The usual and orderly way to test the sufficiency of an amended complaint is, in the first instance, by demurrer, after the same has been filed, when the questions presented in regard thereto may be considered and determined, and leave given to the pleader to amend if the pleading be held insufficient and the court deem it proper that the party should have such leave.”].)  XPO refers to the prejudice caused by a pending summary judgment motion being moot.  (Pavlik Decl. ¶ 21.)  However, there is no summary judgment motion that has been filed in the instant action by any party.  Similarly, Plaintiffs have not received any motion for summary judgment from any defendant.  (Supp. Lugo Decl. ¶ 18.)  In sum, XPO fails to show any prejudice from the proposed first amended complaint.

            As there is no prejudice from the proposed first amended complaint, it would be an abuse of discretion to deny.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is GRANTED.

Conclusion and ORDER

            Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs Yongquan Hu and Jinghua Ren’s motion for leave to file a first amended complaint is GRANTED.

            Plaintiff is to file the proposed First Amended Complaint and file proof of service of such within five (5) days of notice of this order.  An OSC re entry of default on the FAC is set for April 12, 2024 at 8:30 am.

            Moving Party is to provide notice of this order and file proof of service of such.

DATED: February ___, 2024                                                 ___________________________

                                                                                          Elaine Lu

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court