Judge: Elaine Lu, Case: 21STCV21191, Date: 2022-12-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21STCV21191    Hearing Date: December 13, 2022    Dept: 26

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 26

Procedural Background

            On June 4, 2021, Plaintiffs Vanessa Johnson Ibarra and Edwin Ibarra (jointly “Plaintiffs”) filed the instant action regarding a 2013 Kia Sorrento (“Subject Vehicle”) against Defendants Kia America, Inc. (“KA”), Ryan Cars, LLC, Pomona Kia.  The complaint asserts three causes of action for (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty, (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty, and (3) Negligent Repair. 

            On April 13, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to compel Defendant KA’s further responses to Request for Admissions, Set One (“RFAs”).  On November 30, 2022, Defendant KA filed an opposition.  On December 6, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a reply.

Legal Standard

Requests for Admissions

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.290:

(a) On receipt of a response to requests for admissions, the party requesting admissions may move for an order compelling a further response if that party deems that either or both of the following apply:

(1) An answer to a particular request is evasive or incomplete.

(2) An objection to a particular request is without merit or too general.

(b)(1) A motion under subdivision (a) shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.

(CCP § 2033.290(a)-(b)(1).)

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2033.220:

(a) Each answer in a response to requests for admission shall be as complete and straightforward as the information reasonably available to the responding party permits.

(b) Each answer shall:

(1) Admit so much of the matter involved in the request as is true, either as expressed in the request itself or as reasonably and clearly qualified by the responding party.

(2) Deny so much of the matter involved in the request as is untrue.

(3) Specify so much of the matter involved in the request as to the truth of which the responding party lacks sufficient information or knowledge.

(c) If a responding party gives lack of information or knowledge as a reason for a failure to admit all or part of a request for admission, that party shall state in the answer that a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable that party to admit the matter.

(CCP § 2033.220.)

Discussion

            Plaintiffs seek to compel a further response to RFAs Nos. 36-60 from Defendant KA.

Time to File a Motion

A party making a motion to compel further responses must do so within 45 days of service of the verified response unless the parties agree in writing and specify a later date. (See CCP § 2033.290(c).)  The 45-day limit is jurisdictional as the Court has no authority to grant late-filed papers.  (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)  However, this 45-day limit is extended if served by mail, overnight delivery, fax, or electronically.  (See CCP §§ 1010.6(a)(4), 1013.)

            On August 17, 2021, Plaintiffs served the RFAs at issue on Defendant KA.  (Rotman Decl. ¶ 2, Exh. A.)  On October 4, 2021, Defendant KA served its response to the RFAs at issue by electronic service.  (Rotman Decl. ¶ 3, Exh. B.)  On December 13, 2021, Defendant KA served its verification to the RFAs.  (Rotman Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. C.)  Throughout the parties meet and confer efforts the parties continued the deadline to file a motion to compel further responses to April 13, 2022.  (Rotman Decl. ¶ 9, Exh. H.)  Accordingly, the instant motion filed on April 13, 2022 is timely.

Meet and Confer

A motion to compel further responses “shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.”  (CCP § 2030.300(b)(1); CCP § 2033.290(b)(1).)  “A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.”  (CCP § 2016.040.) 

Here, the Court notes that Plaintiffs have sufficiently met and conferred with Defendant KA.  (Rotman Decl. ¶¶ 5-8, Exhs. D-G.)

Request for Admission No. 36-38, 40, 42-44, 45, 47-50, 53, 57, and 59

            RFAs, numbers 36-38, 40, 42-44, 45, 47-50, 53, 55, 57, and 59 ask KA to admit that certain repair orders from its authorized repair facilities detail Plaintiffs’ presentations of the Subject Vehicle. For example, RFA numbers 38 states:

            “Admit that Repair Order No. 6012471 details Plaintiffs’ presentation of the SUBJECT VEHICLE to YOUR authorized repair facility Covina Valley Kia on July 10, 2014.”  (RFA No. 38.) 

            In response to RFAs numbers 36-38, 40, 42-44, 45, 47-50, 53, 55, 57, and 59, Defendant KA responds identically stating that:

KA objects to this request on the following grounds: KA objects to this request on the

grounds it is vague, ambiguous, overly broad and not reasonably calculated to lead to the

discovery of admissible evidence. The term “authorized repair facility” calls for a legal conclusion rather than a factual admission. KA also objects to this request to the extent it calls for the premature disclosure of expert opinion. Subject to and without waiving any objection, KA responds as follows: KA lacks sufficient information to either admit or deny this request because it has not yet deposed Plaintiffs, dealer technicians, or experts, nor has it been afforded an opportunity to inspect the subject vehicle. KA's investigation and discovery are continuing.

(Response to RFAs No. 36-38, 40, 42-44, 45, 47-50, 53, 55, 57, and 59.)

Defendant KA’s Objections are Without Merit

            As to the overbroad objection, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matters, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  (CCP § 2017.010.)  “[A]n implicit waiver of a party's constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff's claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.”  (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842.)  However, discovery should not be denied if the information sought has any relevance to the subject matter. Thus, while relevancy is a possible ground for an objection, it is difficult to adequately justify it.  (See generally Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 217.)  “These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery, and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases.”  (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546 [internal citation omitted].) 

            Here, these RFAs are clearly relevant and not overbroad.  These RFAs relate directly to the Subject Vehicle and whether Plaintiffs presented the Subject Vehicle for Defendants to repair.  Moreover, the RFAs are narrow as they each relate to a specific repair incident for the Subject Vehicle.  Further, contrary to Defendant KA’s claim, the term “authorized repair facility” is a factual assumption as to whether Covina Valley Kia was authorized by Defendant KA to serve as a repair facility for warranty repairs.  In sum, the objections are without merit.

The Substantive Response is Improper

            “Requests for admissions, …, are primarily aimed at setting at rest a triable issue so that it will not have to be tried. Thus, such requests, in a most definite manner, are aimed at expediting the trial. For this reason, the fact that the request is for the admission of a controversial matter, or one involving complex facts, or calls for an opinion, is of no moment. If the litigant is able to make the admission, the time for making it is during discovery procedures, and not at the trial.”  (Cembrook v. Superior Court In and For City and County of San Francisco (1961) 56 Cal.2d 423, 429.)  Thus, “a party may request from the opposing party the truth of any facts or the genuineness of any documents that is relevant to the subject matter of the action or reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence.”  (Smith v. Circle P Ranch Co. (1978) 87 Cal.App.3d 267, 273.)  “[S]ince requests for admissions are not limited to matters within personal knowledge of the responding party, that party has a duty to make a reasonable investigation of the facts before answering items which do not fall within his personal knowledge.”  (Ibid.) 
            A party can respond to a request by admitting so much of the matter is true, (CCP § 2033.220(b)(1)), deny as so much of the matter requested is untrue, (CCP § 2033.220(b)(2)), or “[s]pecify so much of the matter involved in the request as to the truth of which the responding party lacks sufficient information or knowledge.”  (CCP § 2033.220(b)(3).)  “If a responding party gives lack of information or knowledge as a reason for a failure to admit all or part of a request for admission, that party shall state in the answer that a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable that party to admit the matter.”  (CCP § 2033.220(b)(2).)

            Here, the substantive response states that “KA lacks sufficient information to either admit or deny this request because it has not yet deposed Plaintiffs, dealer technicians, or experts, nor has it been afforded an opportunity to inspect the subject vehicle. KA's investigation and discovery are continuing.”  (Response to RFAs No. 36-38, 40, 42-44, 45, 47-50, 53, 55, 57, and 59.)  This is not a proper representation that KA lacks sufficient information to admit or deny.  Defendant KA must also state in the answer “that a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable that party to admit the matter.”  (CCP § 2033.220(b)(c).)  Defendant KA has not done so.  Rather, KA concedes that KA has not done any investigation and needs to do so.  Accordingly, a further response specifying that a reasonable inquiry has been made and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable KA to admit.

            Moreover, the requests are plainly within Defendant KA’s knowledge such as to enable KA to admit or deny.  Defendant KA should have or should be able to obtain such knowledge to affirm or deny these requests these documents as Defendant KA itself produced the repair orders mentioned to Plaintiffs’ requests for admission.  (Rotman Decl. ¶ 10, Exhs. I-J.)  As noted above, “requests for admissions are not limited to matters within personal knowledge of the responding party”.  (Smith, supra, 87 Cal.App.3d at p.273.)  Thus, claiming that the knowledge is within expert’s or dealer technician’s knowledge is plainly inappropriate as Defendant must make some effort in attempting to answer these requests.

            Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses as to RFAs No. 36-38, 40, 42-44, 45, 47-50, 53, 55, 57, and 59 is GRANTED.

Requests for Admissions No. 39, 41, 46, 51, 52, 54, 56, 58, and 60

            RFAs Nos. 39, 41, 46, 51, 52, 54, 56, 58, and 60 ask KA to admit whether repair items in certain repair orders are covered by warranty.  For example, RFA No. 51 provides that:

            “Admit that, regarding Repair Order No. 6098692, the repairs associated with Job #1 performed by Covina Valley Kia was covered by YOUR warranty.”  (RFA No. 51.)

            In response to RFAs Nos. 39, 41, 46, 51, 52, 54, 56, 58, and 60, Defendant KA responded identically as follows:

KA objects to this request on the grounds that it is vague, overly broad, unintelligible and ambiguous insofar as Plaintiffs have failed to identify their concerns with the subject vehicle. KA further objects to this request on the grounds that it is not full and complete in and of itself, and is a compound, conjunctive, and/or disjunctive request with subparts. KA further objects to this request as it has not yet deposed Plaintiffs or inspected the subject vehicle. Subject to and without waiving any objection, KA admits this request relative only to repair work performed by an independent authorized Kia dealership during the applicable warranty period that was covered under the terms of KA’s New Vehicle Limited Warranty. As to the other aspects of this request, KA lacks sufficient information to either admit or deny this request because it has not yet deposed Plaintiffs, dealer technicians, or experts, nor has it been afforded an opportunity to inspect the subject vehicle.

(Response to RFAs Nos. 39, 41, 46, 51, 52, 54, 56, 58, and 60.)

            As with the RFAs above, the objections regarding relevance, broadness, etc. are without merit as discussed above.  With regard to Defendant KA’s objection on the grounds of compound questions, the court finds that this objection too is unsupported.  “No request for admission shall contain subparts, or a compound, conjunctive, or disjunctive question” (CCP § 2033.060(f).)  Since any question using an ‘and’ or ‘or’ could be compound and conjunctive this “‘rule should probably apply only where more than a single subject is covered by the question.’” (Clement v. Alegre, (2009) 177 Cal. App. 4th 1277, 1291) [quoting Weil & Brown, Cal. Practice Guide: Civil Procedure Before Trial, supra, ¶ 8:978.1, p. 8F–21] [emphasis in original].)  Here, each of the requests at issue involves a single subject and is thus not a compound question.  Accordingly, the compound objections are similarly meritless.

            As to the substantive response, the portion claiming that KA lacks sufficient information to admit or deny as Defendant KA must also state in the answer “that a reasonable inquiry concerning the matter in the particular request has been made, and that the information known or readily obtainable is insufficient to enable that party to admit the matter.”  (CCP § 2033.220(b)(c).)  Here, the response merely notes that KA has not conducted discovery into the instant action.  Claiming that ones’ own experts would know the answers is not a valid response to a RFA.  (Bloxham v. Saldinger (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 729, 751 [“A party to an action may not necessarily avoid responding to a request for admission on the ground that the request calls for expert opinion and the party does not know the answer.”].)  It is immaterial whether the request calls for legal conclusions because an RFA is meant to put matters to rest, “the fact that the request is for the admission of a controversial matter, or one involving complex facts, or calls for an opinion, is of no moment. If the litigant is able to make the admission, the time for making it is during discovery procedures, and not at the trial.”  (Cembrook, supra, 56 Cal.2d at p.429.)

            Accordingly, a further response is required.  Therefore, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses as to RFAs No. 39, 41, 46, 51, 52, 54, 56, 58, and 60 is GRANTED.

Sanctions

            Plaintiffs request sanctions of $3,560.00 against Defendant KA and Defense Counsel.  Plaintiffs seek reimbursement for $3,500.00 in attorneys’ fees consisting of 3 hours drafting the instant motion, 3 hours reviewing the opposition and preparing a reply, and one hour appearing at the hearing at a claimed billing rate of $500 per hour.  (Rotman Decl. ¶ 11.)  Plaintiffs also seek reimbursement of $60.00 in filing costs.

For a motion to compel further responses, “[t]he court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a [further response], unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”  (CCP § 2033.290(d) [italics added].) Accordingly, sanctions are mandatory unless the circumstances make the imposition of sanctions unjust.

Here, the imposition of sanctions would not be unjust.  Defendant KA has made meritless objections and declined to do any reasonable inquiry into the RFAs at issue.  Accordingly, sanctions are warranted.  However, the total amount of sanctions requested - $3,560.00 – is slightly excessive in view of the totality of the circumstances.  Specifically, Plaintiffs claimed 3 hours in reviewing the opposition and drafting a four-page reply is a bit excessive.  Based on the totality of the circumstances including the relative simplicity of the instant motion, the Court finds that $2,560.00 reasonably compensates Plaintiffs for the attorney’s fees incurred in bringing this motion.

Defendant Kia America, Inc. and its counsel of record, Lehrman, Villegas, Chinery & Douglas, LLP, are jointly and severally liable and ordered to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,560.00 to Plaintiffs Vanessa Johnson Ibarra and Edwin Ibarra by and through counsel, within thirty (30) days of notice of this order. 

Conclusion and ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs Vanessa Johnson Ibarra and Edwin Ibarra motion to compel Defendant Kia America’s further responses to Request for Admissions, Set One, Inc. is GRANTED.

Defendant Kia America, Inc. is ordered to serve verified, further code compliant responses without objection to Request for Admissions, Set One Numbers 36-60 within twenty (20) days of notice of this order.

Plaintiffs request for sanctions is GRANTED AS MODIFIED.

Defendant Kia America, Inc. and its counsel of record, Lehrman, Villegas, Chinery & Douglas, LLP, are jointly and severally liable and ordered to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $2,560.00 to Plaintiffs Vanessa Johnson Ibarra and Edwin Ibarra by and through counsel, within thirty (30) days of notice of this order.

Moving Party is ordered to give notice and file proof of service of such.

DATED:  December 13, 2022                                                ___________________________

Elaine Lu

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court