Judge: Elaine Lu, Case: 21STCV28718, Date: 2023-08-23 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 21STCV28718 Hearing Date: October 23, 2023 Dept: 26
Defendants Los Angeles Community
College District and Los Angeles Southwest College’s motion to compel Plaintiff
Daniel Ortega’s initial responses to Request for Production of Documents (Set
Two); Form Interrogatories – Employment (Set Two); Special Interrogatories (Set
Two); Supplemental Interrogatory (Set One); and Supplemental Request for
Production of Documents (Set One) is GRANTED.
All objections are deemed waived.
Plaintiff Daniel Ortega is ordered
to serve verified, code compliant responses, without objections, to Form
Interrogatories – Employment (Set Two); Special Interrogatories (Set Two); and Supplemental
Interrogatory (Set One) within 2 days of notice of this order.
Plaintiff Daniel Ortega is ordered
to serve verified, code compliant responses, without objections, to Request for
Production of Documents (Set Two) and Supplemental Request for Production of
Documents (Set One) within 1 day and to produce all responsive documents within
2 days of notice of this order.
Plaintiff Daniel Ortega and his attorney
of record – Numeriano Paulino Inumerable – jointly and severally, are ordered
to pay sanctions to Defendants Los Angeles Community College District and Los
Angeles Southwest College, by and through counsel of record, in the amount of
$2,062.50, within 30 days of notice of this order.
Defendants’ further request for
terminating sanctions is DENIED.
“The trial court may order a
terminating sanction for discovery abuse ‘after considering the totality of the
circumstances: [the] conduct of the party to determine if the actions were
willful; the detriment to the propounding party; and the number of formal and
informal attempts to obtain the discovery.’”
(Los Defensores, Inc. v. Gomez (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 377, 390
[quoting Lang v. Hochman (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1246].) “Generally, ‘[a] decision to order
terminating sanctions should not be made lightly. But where a violation is willful, preceded by
a history of abuse, and the evidence shows that less severe sanctions would not
produce compliance with the discovery rules, the trial court is justified in
imposing the ultimate sanction.’” (Los
Defensores, supra, 223
Cal.App.4th at p. 390 [citation omitted].)
“Under this standard, trial courts
have properly imposed terminating sanctions when parties have willfully
disobeyed one or more discovery orders.”
(Ibid. [citing Lang, supra, 77 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1244-1246); see, e.g., Collisson & Kaplan v. Hartunian (1994) 21
Cal.App.4th 1611, 1617-1622 (terminating sanctions imposed after defendants
failed to comply with one court order to produce discovery); Laguna Auto
Body v. Farmers Ins. Exchange (1991) 231 Cal.App.3d 481, 491 disapproved on
other grounds in Garcia v. McCutchen (1997) 16 Cal.4th 469, 478, fn.4,
[terminating sanctions imposed against the plaintiff for failing to comply with
a discovery order and for violating various discovery statutes].)
However, nonmonetary sanctions may
be warranted absent a prior order compelling discovery where such an order
would be futile. (Do It Urself Moving
& Storage, Inc. v. Brown, Leifer, Slatkin & Berns (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 27, 36 superseded by statute on other grounds.) In Do It Urself Moving & Storage, Inc.,
on the eve of trial the parties stipulated to continue trial so that the
plaintiff could conduct an audit of the plaintiff’s and defendant’s records in
order to prove liability. (Id. at
pp.31-32.) Pursuant to the stipulation,
the plaintiff was to provide the audit to the defendant. (Id. at p.32.) Well past the stipulated deadline to provide
the audit report to the defendant and following numerous unsuccessful requests
for the audit report, the defendant moved to exclude the evidence from trial
which the trial court granted. (Id.
at pp.32-33.) The Court of Appeal
concluded that the imposing of evidentiary sanctions absent a prior order to
compel the audit report was proper on the basis that “it is conceded that plaintiffs are
unable to provide the promised items of discovery. Under the circumstances of
this case, a warning to plaintiffs, in the form of a formal order to comply,
would have been futile.” (Id. at
p.36.)
Similarly, in Vallbona v.
Springer (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1525, it was found that a motion to compel
response would have been futile because the defendants claimed that the
requested documents had been stolen, and
thus, when the defendants attempted to introduce the documents at trial, a
prior order compelling discovery was not required before imposing evidence and
issue sanctions. (Id. at
pp.1545-146.)
In sum, “[d]ecisions such as Vallbona
v. Springer (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 1525, 1544–1549, 51 Cal.Rptr.2d 311 (Vallbona
), and Do It Urself Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Brown, Leifer, Slatkin
& Berns (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 27, 35, (Do It Urself ) have held
that a violation of a discovery order is not a prerequisite to issue and
evidentiary sanctions when the offending party has engaged in a pattern of
willful discovery abuse that causes the unavailability of evidence.” (Karlsson v. Ford Motor Co. (2006) 140
Cal.App.4th 1202, 1214–1215.)
Here, Plaintiff has repeatedly failed
to timely respond to discovery requests.
(See e.g., Minute Order 6/2/23; Minute Order 9/28/23.) However, even presuming that the failure to
timely respond or meet and confer was willful, terminating sanctions would be
extreme and unwarranted under the circumstances. “Discovery sanctions must be
tailored in order to remedy the offending party's discovery abuse, should not
give the aggrieved party more than what it is entitled to, and should not be
used to punish the offending party.” (Karlsson,
supra, 140 Cal.App.4th at p.1217.)
As noted above, in cases involving
the imposition of nonmonetary sanctions without a prior court order compelling
compliance, motions to compel were futile, and the discovery abuses caused the
evidence to be unavailable. Moreover,
even in those circumstances, the court did not impose terminating sanctions but
rather only issue or evidentiary sanctions.
Here, there is no indication that
a motion to compel would be necessarily futile.
In fact, Plaintiff has previously served the relevant responses immediately
before the hearing. (See e.g.,
Minute Order 6/2/23; Minute Order 9/28/23.)
Moreover, Defendants have failed to show the unavailability of evidence. Thus, Defendants fail to show any basis for
terminating sanctions. The Court finds
that the imposition of the monetary sanctions above suffices.
Defendants to give notice to all
parties.