Judge: Elaine Lu, Case: 22STCV02571, Date: 2022-12-14 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22STCV02571 Hearing Date: December 14, 2022 Dept: 26
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YOLANDA SUJEY
PINA RAMIREZ; YONATHAN EFRAIN RODRIGUEZ PINA, a minor, by and through his
Guardian ad litem, YOLANDA SUJEY PINA RAMIREZ; JACQUELINE RODRIGUEZ PINA, a minor,
by and through her Guardian ad Litem, YOLANDA SUJEY PINA RAMIREZ; JOSE
GUADALUPE RODRIGUEZ MEDEROS; LUPITA RODRIGUEZ-PINA; SUJEY RODRIGUEZ PINA;
SAUL ALEXANDER LOPEZ MORALES; INGRID JEANNETH LUNA RAMIREZ; JERRY ESTUARDO
LOPEZ LUNA, a minor, by and through his Guardian ad Litem, INGRID JEANNETH
LUNA RAMIREZ; and ALEXIS YAHIR LOPEZ LUNA, a minor, by and through his
Guardian ad Litem, INGRID JEANNETH LUNA RAMIREZ, Plaintiffs, v. LORENA GAMBOA, et al. Defendants. |
Case No.: 22STCV02571 Hearing Date: December 14, 2022 [TENTATIVE] order RE: Defendant’s motion to strike portions of
the complaint |
Background
On January 21, 2022, Plaintiffs Yolanda Sujey
Pina Ramirez; Yonathan Efrain Rodriguez Pina, a minor, by and through his
guardian ad litem, Yolanda Sujey Pina Ramirez; Jacqueline Rodriguez Pina, a
minor, by and through her guardian ad litem, Yolanda Sujey Pina Ramirez; Jose Guadalupe
Rodriguez Mederos; Lupita Rodriguez-Pina; Sujey Rodriguez Pina; Saul Alexander Lopez
Morales; Ingrid Jeanneth Luna Ramirez; Jerry Estuardo Lopez Luna, a minor, by
and through his guardian ad litem, Ingrid Jeanneth Luna Ramirez; and Alexis Yahir
Lopez Luna, a minor, by and through his guardian ad litem, Ingrid Jeanneth Luna
Ramirez (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed the instant breach of habitability
action against Defendant Lorena Gamboa (“Defendant”).
On
November 16, 2022, Defendant filed the instant motion to strike portions of the
complaint. On November 30, 2022,
Plaintiffs filed an opposition. No reply
has been filed.
Allegations
of the Operative Complaint
The complaint alleges that:
Plaintiffs each suffered “. . .
uninhabitable, substandard housing conditions in the building and within their
rental unit, including structural deficiencies, defective plumbing, flooring
and weather proofing, and infestations.”
(Complaint ¶¶ 3-4.)
“Each Plaintiff resided as a tenant
in an apartment at The Subject Property during the period in which Defendants
owned, managed and exercised possession and control of the premises. During
their tenancies, Plaintiffs were and are exposed to the following substandard
conditions, which also exist or existed all throughout the Subject Property: [¶]
a. Cockroach and bed bug infestation; [¶] b. inoperable windows; [¶] c.
inoperable and/or malfunctioning household appliances; [¶] d. deteriorated and
worn walls and ceilings; e. faulty and leaking pipes; [¶] f. lack of/faulty
proper electrical wiring; [¶] g. unsanitary and unsafe common areas; and [¶] h.
inadequate security.” (Id. ¶ 17.)
“Each adult Plaintiff notified the
Defendants and their agents about the habitability violations but Defendants
have failed to correct the habitability conditions.” (Id. ¶ 21.) “The Defendants have been cited repeatedly
for the same conditions at the Subject Property for more than eight years. In
fact, the Health Department ordered Defendants to abate the infestations of
cockroaches in every unit on August 26, 2014. Thereafter, the Health Department
specifically ordered Defendants to abate the infestation of cockroaches and
other vermin at the Subject Property on June 22, 2016, May 25, 2017, December
26,2018, July 25, 2019, July 30,2019, October 30, 2020, December 16,2020,
February 16, 2021 , February 25, 2021 , and March 18, 2021. In spite of
numerous Notices and Orders to Comply from government entities, Defendants have
failed to correct the cited deficiencies throughout the Subject Property.
Instead of taking corrective actions, Defendants have attempted to circumvent
the consequences of the Housing Department's and Health Department's
enforcement procedures by retaliating against Plaintiffs, harassing the
Plaintiffs by abusing the right of entry into their units, and/or entering Plaintiffs'
units repeatedly and for prolonged periods of time without making any repairs.” (Id. ¶ 22.)
Legal
Standard
Motions to strike are used to reach
defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by demurrer
(i.e., words, phrases, prayer for damages, etc.). (See
CCP §§ 435-437.) A party may file a
motion to strike in whole or in part within the time allowed to respond to a
pleading, however, if a party serves and files a motion to strike without
demurring to the complaint, the time to answer is extended. (CCP §§ 435(b)(1), 435(c).)
A motion to strike lies only where the
pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or
filed in conformity with laws. (CCP §
436.) The grounds for moving to strike
must appear on the face of the pleadings or by way of judicial notice. (CCP § 437.)
Meet
and Confer Requirement
Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5,
subdivision (a) requires that “[b]efore filing a motion to strike pursuant
to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer¿in person or by
telephone¿with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion
to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached
that would resolve the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” The
parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the
responsive pleading is due and if they are unable to meet the demurring party
shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension. (Code Civ. Proc., §
435.5(a)(2).) The moving party must also file and serve a declaration
detailing the meet and confer efforts. (Id.¿at (a)(3).)¿ If an amended pleading is filed, the parties must
meet and confer again before a motion to strike may be filed to the amended
pleading. (Id.¿at (a).)
Here, no declaration has been submitted
showing that Defendant even attempted to meet and confer with regard to the
instant motion to strike. While the meet
and confer requirement is mandatory, “[a] determination by the court that the
meet and confer process was
insufficient shall not be grounds to grant or deny the
motion to strike.” (Code Civ. Proc., §
435.5(a)(4).) Therefore, the Court will
turn to the merits of the motion.
However, any future failure to meet and confer for a motion that
requires a meet and confer effort will result in the motion being taken off
calendar.
Discussion
Defendant seeks to strike the prayer
for punitive damages from the complaint.
Defendant contends that Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently allege fraud.
California Civil Code section 3294
authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases where “the
defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code,
§ 3294(a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause
injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the
defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others.” (Id. at (c)(1).)
“‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and
unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id. at (c)(2).) “‘Fraud’ means an
intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known
to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby
depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id. at (c)(3).) Punitive damages thus
require more than the mere commission of a tort. (See Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-895.)
Moreover, a demand
for punitive damages for the commission of any tort requires more than the mere
conclusory allegations of “oppression, fraud, and malice.” (Civ. Code § 3294; see Perkins v. Superior
Court (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 1, 6-7.)
Rather, “[t]here must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such
as spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of Defendant, or
such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interest of others that its
conduct may be called willful or wanton.” (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d
at pp.894-895, [italics added].)
The complaint
alleges in relevant part that Defendant has been aware of the infestation of
coach roaches and other vermin since 2014 due to complaints from Plaintiffs and
the Health Department. (Complaint ¶¶ 21,
22.) Instead of taking corrective
actions, Defendant has “harass[ed] the Plaintiffs by abusing the right of entry
into their units, and/or entering Plaintiffs' units repeatedly and for prolonged
periods of time without making any repairs.”
(Id. ¶ 22.) Defendant did
so to “forc[e] Plaintiffs to abandon their legal recourses by vacating their
rent controlled apartments and/or accepting substandard premises without
further complaints.”
These allegations
are sufficient to state a prayer for punitive damages. While “mere negligence, which—even if gross,
or reckless—cannot justify punitive damages[,]” (Krusi v. Bear, Stearns
& Co. (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 664, 679), the allegations here amount
to more than just mere negligence. These
added allegations – if proven true – would show that Defendant had been aware
of the various hazardous infestations plaguing Plaintiffs for years but failed
to take any action. Coupled with the
allegations that the Defendant was the owner, manager, and/or controller of the
rented property since June 23, 2011, (Complaint ¶ 6), this is sufficient to
allege that Defendant not only knew about the hazardous harm to Plaintiffs for
years but willfully failed to take any action to remedy such harm. This sufficiently alleges a conscious
disregard of Plaintiffs harm for up to four years that if true would support a
prayer for punitive damages. (Penner
v. Falk (1984) 153 Cal.App.3d 858, 867 [“The pleadings also set out
that respondents knew of [harmful] conditions for up to two years, had power to
make changes, but failed to take corrective and curative measures. If proven,
these allegations would support an award of punitive damages.”].) Further, these allegations are more than mere
conclusory allegations of “oppression, fraud, and malice[,]” (Perkins, supra, 117 Cal. App.3d at
pp.6-7), as clear specific facts to support the prayer have been alleged.
Accordingly, Defendant’s
motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages is DENIED.
Conclusion and ORDER
Based on the foregoing, Defendant Lorena Gamboa’s motion to strike
the prayer for punitive damages in the complaint is DENIED.
Defendant
is to file an answer within thirty (30) days of notice of this order.
Moving
Party is to
provide notice of this order and file proof of service of such.
DATED: December 14, 2022 ___________________________
Elaine Lu
Judge of the Superior Court