Judge: Elaine Lu, Case: 22STCV06775, Date: 2024-01-02 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV06775    Hearing Date: January 2, 2024    Dept: 26

 

 

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 26

 

keoina ford,

                        Plaintiff,

            v.

 

General motors, llc, et al.,

                        Defendants.

 

  Case No.:  22STCV06775

 

  Hearing Date:  January 2, 2024

 

[TENTATIVE] order RE:

Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint

 

Procedural Background

On February 24, 2022, Plaintiff Keoina Ford (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action against Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”) arising out of the purchase of a 2019 Chevrolet Impala KIA.  The complaint asserts three causes of action for (1) Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Breach of Express Warranty, (2) Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Breach of Implied Warranty, and (3) Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Civil Code § 1793.2(b).

            On February 14, 2023, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication noticed to be heard September 27, 2023.

            On September 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for leave to amend the complaint.  At the hearing for Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on September 27, 2023, the Court continued Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and advanced the instant motion for leave to amend to January 2, 2024.  (Minute Order 9/27/23.) 

 

Allegations of the Operative Complaint

The complaint alleges as follows:

Defendant is “engaged in the manufacture, sale, distribution, and/or importing of Chevrolet motor vehicles and related equipment.”  (Complaint ¶ 2.)

On November 4, 2020, Plaintiff purchased a 2019 Chevrolet Impala, vehicle identification number 1G11Z5SA2KU123817 (“Subject Vehicle”).  (Id. ¶ 7.)  The purchase of the Subject Vehicle was accompanied by express warranties by which Defendant “undertook to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of Plaintiff’s vehicle or provide compensation if there was a failure in such utility or performance.”  (Ibid.) 

“The [Subject Vehicle] was delivered to Plaintiff with serious defects and nonconformities to warranty and developed other serious defects and nonconformities to warranty including, but not limited to the transmission and related systems, grinding noise, scoring on valve body, excessive debris on tcm screen, fluid pump damaged, torque converter damaged, clutch damaged and burned, pistons on housing leaking, transmission slipping, transmission jerking, vehicle making noise and not accelerating, vehicle not moving on drive, vehicle lacking power, check engine light on, excessive days out of service, and others.”  (Id. ¶ 8.)  Plaintiff delivered the Subject Vehicle to Defendant’ authorized repair facilities to repair these nonconformities, but Defendant denied warranty coverage for certain claims, and was unable to repair the defects in a reasonable time or after a reasonable number of attempts.  (Id. ¶¶ 14-17.) 

Thereafter, Defendant failed to replace the Subject Vehicle or make restitution.  (Id. ¶ 18.) 

 

Legal Standard

            Code of Civil Procedure § 473, subdivision (a)(1) states: “[t]he court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms, as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer.  The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.” 

            Code of Civil Procedure § 576 states that: “[a]ny judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.”

            Judicial policy favors resolution of all disputed matters between the parties, and therefore, courts have held that “there is a strong policy in favor of liberal allowance of amendments.” (Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 296-97; see also Ventura v. ABM Industries, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 268) [“Trial courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial where the adverse party will not be prejudiced.”].)

            Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a), a motion to amend must: (1) include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered; and (2) state what allegations are proposed to be deleted from or added to the previous pleading and where such allegations are located.  Rule 3.1324(b) requires a separate declaration that accompanies the motion, stating: “(1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reason why the request for amendment was not made earlier.” 

 

Discussion

Plaintiff seeks to amend the complaint to add a fourth cause of action for Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.  Plaintiff fails to identify when Plaintiff discovered the facts giving ride to this proposed fourth cause of action, as required.  (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324(b)(3).)  Rather, Plaintiff merely notes that the proposed fourth cause of action is based on the same underlying facts as the rest of the original complaint.  Further, Plaintiff has included a proposed first amended complaint including the proposed fourth cause of action.  (Mizrahi Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. B.)

In opposition, Defendant contends that the instant motion should be denied due to the delay in bringing the instant motion for leave.  The instant action has been pending for nearly two years, and there has undoubtedly been significant delay in bringing the instant motion.  Moreover, in violation of the Rules of Court, Plaintiff fails to identify when the facts necessary for this amendment arose.  However, absent prejudice, delay alone is insufficient to warrant denial.  (See Fair v. Bakhtiari (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1147, [“[W]here there is no prejudice to the adverse party, it may be an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.”]; Ventura v. ABM Industries, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 268) [“Trial courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial where the adverse party will not be prejudiced.”].)  For example, “[p]rejudice exists where the proposed amendment would require delaying the trial, resulting in added costs of preparation and increased discovery burdens.” (Miles v. City of Los Angeles (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 728, 739.) 

            Here, given that the proposed amendment is based on the same underlying facts, there should be no additional discovery costs incurred or need to delay trial for the instant action.  However, a ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend prior to a ruling on Defendant’s continued motion for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication would cause significant prejudice to Defendant because it would entirely moot Defendant’s continued motion for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication.  “Because there is but one complaint in a civil action [Citation], the filing of an amended complaint moots a motion directed to a prior complaint. [Citation.] Thus, once an amended complaint is filed, it is error to grant summary adjudication on a cause of action contained in a previous complaint.”  (State Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Court (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1131.)  Thus, Defendant’s pending motion for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication directed at the complaint would become moot upon the filing of Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint.  Defendant would clearly suffer prejudice in the mooting of its pending motion for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication and in being forced to file a new motion for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication directed at the proposed first amended complaint.

            On the other hand, there would be no such prejudice if the Court hears Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend after Defendant’s pending motion for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication.  To avoid the possibility of the instant motion for leave to amend becoming moot from a grant of summary judgment, the instant motion can be heard in conjunction with the summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication motion.  In Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, the plaintiff sought to amend the complaint in conjunction with the opposition to a motion for summary judgment.  (Id. at p.911.)  The trial court granted summary judgment and denied leave to amend.  (Id. at p.912.)  The Court of Appeal affirmed the summary judgment motion but found that leave to amend should have been granted.  (Id. at p.929.)  Thus, even if summary judgment is warranted on the original complaint, leave to amend can be granted at the same hearing.

            Therefore, to avoid unnecessary prejudice, the instant motion for leave to amend is continued to April 3, 2024 to be heard in conjunction with Defendant’s motion for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication.  The parties are to include in their briefing the applicability of the California Supreme Court’s opinion reviewing Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209 – when issued – on claims for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.  In addition, in supplemental briefing, Plaintiff is to identify when the facts necessary for this amendment arose as required by the Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324(b)(3).) 

 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

            Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Keoina Ford’s motion for leave to amend is CONTINUED to April 3, 2024 to be heard in conjunction with Defendant’s motion for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication. 

            The parties are to include in their supplemental briefings due March 15, 2023 the applicability of the California Supreme Court’s opinion reviewing Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 209 on claims for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

Moving Party is to give notice and filed proof of service of such.

 

DATED: January ___, 2024                                                   ___________________________

                                                                                          Elaine Lu

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court