Judge: Elaine Lu, Case: 22STCV06775, Date: 2024-01-02 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV06775 Hearing Date: January 2, 2024 Dept: 26
Superior Court of
California
|
keoina
ford, Plaintiff, v. General
motors, llc, et al., Defendants. |
Case No.:
22STCV06775 Hearing Date: January 2, 2024 [TENTATIVE] order RE: Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend the complaint |
Procedural
Background
On February 24, 2022, Plaintiff Keoina Ford (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant
action against Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”) arising out of the purchase
of a 2019 Chevrolet Impala KIA. The
complaint asserts three causes of action for (1) Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Breach of Express Warranty,
(2) Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Breach of Implied Warranty, and (3)
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Civil Code § 1793.2(b).
On February
14, 2023, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment or in the alternative
summary adjudication noticed to be heard September 27, 2023.
On
September 20, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for leave to amend the
complaint. At the hearing for
Defendant’s motion for summary judgment on September 27, 2023, the Court
continued Defendant’s motion for summary judgment and advanced the instant
motion for leave to amend to January 2, 2024.
(Minute Order 9/27/23.)
Allegations of the
Operative Complaint
The complaint alleges
as follows:
Defendant is
“engaged in the manufacture, sale, distribution, and/or importing of Chevrolet
motor vehicles and related equipment.” (Complaint
¶ 2.)
On November 4,
2020, Plaintiff purchased a 2019 Chevrolet Impala, vehicle identification
number 1G11Z5SA2KU123817 (“Subject Vehicle”).
(Id. ¶ 7.) The purchase of
the Subject Vehicle was accompanied by express warranties by which Defendant “undertook
to preserve or maintain the utility or performance of Plaintiff’s vehicle or
provide compensation if there was a failure in such utility or
performance.” (Ibid.)
“The [Subject
Vehicle] was delivered to Plaintiff with serious defects and nonconformities to
warranty and developed other serious defects and nonconformities to warranty
including, but not limited to the transmission and related systems, grinding
noise, scoring on valve body, excessive debris on tcm screen, fluid pump
damaged, torque converter damaged, clutch damaged and burned, pistons on
housing leaking, transmission slipping, transmission jerking, vehicle making
noise and not accelerating, vehicle not moving on drive, vehicle lacking power,
check engine light on, excessive days out of service, and others.” (Id. ¶ 8.) Plaintiff delivered the Subject Vehicle to
Defendant’ authorized repair facilities to repair these nonconformities, but
Defendant denied warranty coverage for certain claims, and was unable to repair
the defects in a reasonable time or after a reasonable number of attempts. (Id. ¶¶ 14-17.)
Thereafter, Defendant
failed to replace the Subject Vehicle or make restitution. (Id. ¶ 18.)
Legal Standard
Code
of Civil Procedure § 473, subdivision (a)(1) states: “[t]he court may, in
furtherance of justice, and on any terms, as may be proper, allow a party to
amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any
party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any
other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or
demurrer. The court may likewise, in its
discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be
just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may
upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this
code.”
Code
of Civil Procedure § 576 states that: “[a]ny judge, at any time before or after
commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as
may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference
order.”
Judicial
policy favors resolution of all disputed matters between the parties, and
therefore, courts have held that “there is a strong
policy in favor of liberal allowance of amendments.” (Mesler v. Bragg
Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 296-97; see also Ventura v. ABM
Industries, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 268) [“Trial courts are bound
to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint
at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial where the adverse
party will not be prejudiced.”].)
Pursuant
to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a), a
motion to amend must: (1) include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended
pleading, which must be serially numbered; and (2) state what allegations are
proposed to be deleted from or added to the previous pleading and where such
allegations are located. Rule 3.1324(b)
requires a separate declaration that accompanies the motion, stating: “(1) the
effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3)
when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4)
the reason why the request for amendment was not made earlier.”
Discussion
Plaintiff seeks
to amend the complaint to add a fourth cause of action for Violation of the
Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act. Plaintiff
fails to identify when Plaintiff discovered the facts giving ride to this
proposed fourth cause of action, as required.
(Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1324(b)(3).) Rather, Plaintiff merely notes that the proposed
fourth cause of action is based on the same underlying facts as the rest of the
original complaint. Further, Plaintiff
has included a proposed first amended complaint including the proposed fourth
cause of action. (Mizrahi Decl. ¶ 4,
Exh. B.)
In opposition, Defendant
contends that the instant motion should be denied due to the delay in bringing
the instant motion for leave. The
instant action has been pending for nearly two years, and there has undoubtedly
been significant delay in bringing the instant motion. Moreover, in violation of the Rules of Court,
Plaintiff fails to identify when the facts necessary for this amendment arose. However, absent prejudice, delay alone is
insufficient to warrant denial. (See Fair
v. Bakhtiari (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1147, [“[W]here there is no
prejudice to the adverse party, it may be an abuse of discretion to deny leave
to amend.”]; Ventura v. ABM Industries,
Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 268) [“Trial courts are bound to apply a
policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any
stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial where the adverse party
will not be prejudiced.”].) For example,
“[p]rejudice exists where the proposed
amendment would require delaying the trial, resulting in added costs of
preparation and increased discovery burdens.” (Miles v. City of Los
Angeles (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 728, 739.)
Here, given that the proposed
amendment is based on the same underlying facts, there should be no additional
discovery costs incurred or need to delay trial for the instant action. However, a ruling on Plaintiff’s motion for
leave to amend prior to a ruling on Defendant’s continued motion for summary
judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication would cause significant prejudice
to Defendant because it would entirely moot Defendant’s continued motion for
summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication. “Because there is but one complaint in a
civil action [Citation], the filing of an amended complaint moots a motion
directed to a prior complaint. [Citation.] Thus, once an amended complaint is
filed, it is error to grant summary adjudication on a cause of action contained
in a previous complaint.” (State
Compensation Ins. Fund v. Superior Court (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1124, 1131.) Thus, Defendant’s pending motion for summary
judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication directed at the complaint would
become moot upon the filing of Plaintiff’s proposed amended complaint. Defendant would clearly suffer prejudice in the
mooting of its pending motion for summary judgment or in the alternative
summary adjudication and in being forced to file a new motion for summary
judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication directed at the proposed
first amended complaint.
On the other hand, there would be no
such prejudice if the Court hears Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend after Defendant’s
pending motion for summary judgment or in the alternative summary adjudication. To avoid the possibility of the instant
motion for leave to amend becoming moot from a grant of summary judgment, the
instant motion can be heard in conjunction with the summary judgment or in the
alternative summary adjudication motion.
In Dagher v. Ford Motor Co. (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 905, the plaintiff
sought to amend the complaint in conjunction with the opposition to a motion
for summary judgment. (Id. at
p.911.) The trial court granted summary
judgment and denied leave to amend. (Id.
at p.912.) The Court of Appeal affirmed
the summary judgment motion but found that leave to amend should have been
granted. (Id. at p.929.) Thus, even if summary judgment is warranted
on the original complaint, leave to amend can be granted at the same hearing.
Therefore, to avoid unnecessary
prejudice, the instant motion for leave to amend is continued to April 3, 2024
to be heard in conjunction with Defendant’s motion for summary judgment or in
the alternative summary adjudication.
The parties are to include in their briefing the applicability of the
California Supreme Court’s opinion reviewing Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 209 – when issued – on claims for violation of the Magnuson-Moss
Warranty Act. In addition, in
supplemental briefing, Plaintiff is to identify when the facts necessary for
this amendment arose as required by the Rules of Court. (Cal. Rules of Court,
Rule 3.1324(b)(3).)
CONCLUSION
AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Keoina
Ford’s motion for leave to amend is CONTINUED to April 3, 2024 to be heard in
conjunction with Defendant’s motion for summary judgment or in the alternative
summary adjudication.
The parties are to include in their
supplemental briefings due March 15, 2023 the applicability of the California
Supreme Court’s opinion reviewing Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2022) 77
Cal.App.5th 209 on claims for violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.
Moving Party is to give notice and filed
proof of service of such.
DATED: January ___, 2024 ___________________________
Elaine
Lu
Judge
of the Superior Court