Judge: Elaine Lu, Case: 22STCV09655, Date: 2023-04-25 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22STCV09655    Hearing Date: April 25, 2023    Dept: 26

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 26

Background   

             On March 21, 2022, Plaintiffs Jessica Urquiza and Albino Urquiza Patlan (jointly “Plaintiffs”) filed the instant action against Defendant General Motors LLC (“Defendant”) arising out of Plaintiffs’ purchase of a 2017 Chevrolet Silverado.   The complaint asserts three causes of action for (1) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty, (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty, and (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2.

            On October 26, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to compel Defendant’s further response to Request for Production of Documents, Set One (“RPDs”).  On March 15, 2023, the parties filed a joint statement regarding the RPDs at issue.  On April 12, 2023, Defendant filed an opposition.  On April 18, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a reply. 

Legal Standard

Requests for Production of Documents

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply:

(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.

(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.

(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.

(b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall comply with both of the following:

(1) The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.

(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.

Code Complaint Response

A code-compliant response to a request for production consists of any of the following: (1) a statement that the party will comply, (2) a representation that the party lacks the ability to comply, or (3) an objection.  (CCP §§ 2031.210.)  A statement that the party will comply must state that the Request for Production (“RPD”) “will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.”  (CCP § 2031.220.)  “If only part of an item or category of item in a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is objectionable, the response shall contain a statement of compliance, or a representation of inability to comply with respect to the remainder of that item or category.”  (CCP § 2031.240(a).)  If an objection is made the responding party must “[i]dentify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made.”  (CCP § 2031.240(b)(1).)

Discussion

            Plaintiffs seek to compel Defendant’s further responses to RPDs nos. 16-33, 37-41 and 45-46.

Time to File a Motion

A party bringing  a motion to compel further responses must do so within 45 days of service of the verified response unless the parties agree in writing and specify a later date. (CCP § 2031.310(c).)  The 45-day limit is jurisdictional.  The Court has no authority to grant late-filed papers.  (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.)  However, “the 45-day clock runs only upon service of verified responses, and responses consisting of both factual responses and objections must be verified[.]”  (Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 136.)  Moreover, this 45-day limit is extended if served by mail, overnight delivery, fax, or electronically.  (See CCP §§ 1010.6(a)(4), 1013.)

On June 15, 2022, Plaintiffs served the RPDs at issue on Defendant.  (Bissman Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. A.)  On July 15, 2022, Defendant served its responses to the RPDs at issue by electronic service.  (Bissman Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. B.)  Accordingly, the deadline for Plaintiffs to bring a timely motion to compel further was August 31, 2023.  However, Plaintiffs assert that the parties agreed to extend the deadline to October 26, 2022.  (Bissman Decl. ¶ 13.)  Defendant does not dispute this contention.  Therefore, the Court concludes that the instant motion is timely.

Meet and Confer

            Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310(b)(2), a motion to compel further responses to a request for production “shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.”  (CCP § 2031.310(b)(2).) “A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.”  (CCP § 2016.040.)  “The level of effort at informal resolution which satisfies the ‘reasonable and good faith attempt’ standard depends upon the circumstances. In a larger, more complex discovery context, a greater effort at informal resolution may be warranted. In a simpler, or more narrowly focused case, a more modest effort may suffice. The history of the litigation, the nature of the interaction between counsel, the nature of the issues, the type and scope of discovery requested, the prospects for success and other similar factors can be relevant.”  (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)

            Here, Plaintiff’s Counsel sent a meet and confer letter on August 22, 2022 asserting that the responses to RPDs 16-18, 19-32, 37-43, 45-46 were insufficient and requesting a response by August 29, 2022.  (Bissman Decl. ¶ 9, Exh. C.)  On August 29, 2022, Defense Counsel sent a response letter responding to the August 22, 2022 letter agreeing to supplement the document production after a protective order had been entered.  (Bissman Decl. ¶ 10, Exh. D.)  On October 4, 2022, Plaintiff’s Counsel sent another letter stating that it was willing to agree to the entry of a protective order and requesting further responses and documents as to RPDs 16-18, 19-32, 33-36, 37-41, 42-43, 45-46 and a response by October 11, 2022.  (Bissman Decl. ¶ 11, Exh. E.)  On March 14, 2023, after the protective order was entered, Defendant produced additional documents responsive to the request.  (Major Decl. ¶ 7.)

The Production of Documents Does Not Moot the Instant Motion

            Defendant contends that the production of responsive documents has mooted the instant motion except as to RPDs No. 37-41.  The Court disagrees.

            Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310, “[o]n receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand[.]”  (CCP 2031.310(a), [italics added].) 

            Here, though Defendant has produced documents that may be responsive to RPDs nos. 16-33, and 45-46 since the filing of the instant motion, Defendant does not claim to have served a further response authenticating and verifying the production of such documents.  Merely producing unauthenticated and unverified documents does not address whether Defendant’s original, verified responses to the requests were code-compliant and proper.  As Defendant has not served further response to the RPDs at issue since the filing of this motion, the instant motion is not moot.

No Separate Statement as to RPD No. 32

            A separate statement is required as to “[t]he text of each response, answer, or objection, and any further responses or answers[.]”  (Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 3.1345(C)(1); see also CCP § 2031.310(b)(3).)  Here, Plaintiffs have failed to provide a separate statement as to RPD No. 32.  Nor has the Court allowed for a concise outline. (CCP § 2031.310(b)(3).)

            Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ motion is DENIED as to RPD 32

RPDs No. 16 and 19-30

            “All of YOUR warranty claims policy and procedure manual(s) from 2019 to the present.”  (RPD No. 16.)

            “All DOCUMENTS which describe the procedures used by YOU for evaluating and responding to complaints by California consumers regarding vehicles YOU manufactured or distributed since 2019.”  (RPD No. 19.)

            “All DOCUMENTS which describe policies, procedures and/or instructions since 2019 that YOUR employees or agents should follow when evaluating a customer request for a refund of their money paid towards or owed on a motor vehicle manufactured or distributed by YOU.”  (RPD No. 20.)

            “All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies, procedures, or guidelines for determining whether a vehicle is eligible for a vehicle repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2019.”  (RPD No. 21.)

            “All training materials regarding the handling of consumer requests for a vehicle repurchase in California since 2019.”  (RPD No. 22.)

            “All training materials for YOUR employees or agents tasked with determining whether a vehicle is eligible or [sic] a vehicle repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2019.”  (RPD No. 23.)

            “All scripts and flow charts that YOU utilize in handling California consumer requests for a vehicle repurchase or replacement since 2019.”  (RPD No. 24.)

            “All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies, procedures, and parameters for determining what constitutes a repair presentation to determine eligibility for a vehicle repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2019.”  (RPD No. 25.)

            “All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies, procedures, and parameters for determining what constitutes a ‘non-conformity’ to determine eligibility for a vehicle repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2019.”  (RPD No. 26.)

            “All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies, procedures, and parameters for determining what constitutes a ‘substantial impairment’ of a vehicle’s use, value, or safety to determine eligibility for a vehicle repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2019.”  (RPD No. 27.)

            “All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies, procedures, and parameters for defining what constitutes a “reasonable number of repair attempts” to determine eligibility for a vehicle repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2019.”  (RPD No. 28.)

            “All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies, procedures, and parameters for establishing the turnaround time to respond to a vehicle repurchase request pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2019.”  (RPD No. 29.)

            “All DOCUMENTS that YOU utilize to determine whether a vehicle is eligible for a repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2019.”  (RPD No. 30.)

            “All DOCUMENTS which evidence or describe YOUR policies, procedures and/or instructions since 2019 which YOUR authorized repair facilities should follow regarding customer requests for a refund of the price paid for a vehicle pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act.”  (RPD No. 31.)

In a near identical response to each RPD, Defendant states that:

            “GM objects to this Request on grounds the term ‘describe’ is overbroad, vague and ambiguous. GM also objects to this Request on grounds it is overbroad and seeks documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, as it is not limited in scope to the SUBJECT VEHICLE at issue in this action. GM also objects to this Request on grounds it is burdensome and oppressive, and that compliance would be unreasonably difficult and expensive considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. This is a simple, individual lemon law case with limited issues and this Request violates Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 567. Specifically, whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is entirely unrelated and incommensurate to the scope and breadth of this Request. GM also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks confidential, proprietary and trade secret information in the form of GM’s internal policies and procedures. GM further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product doctrine. No documents will be produced.”  (Response RPD No. 19; see also Response to RPD Nos. 16, 20-31.) ^[1]

            Attorney Client Privilege/Work Product Privilege

            “In general, when a party asserts the attorney-client privilege, that party has the burden of showing the preliminary facts necessary to support the privilege.”  (Venture Law Group v. Superior Court (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 96, 102.)  “The party asserting the privilege need only present facts which ‘support a prima facie claim of privilege.”  (OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 874, 894.)  “After this burden is met, or where there is no dispute concerning the preliminary facts, the burden shifts to the party opposing the privilege to show either the claimed privilege does not apply, an exception exists, or there has been an express or implied waiver.”  (Venture Law Group, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p.102.)

            Here, the requests do appear to include documents that may be protected by attorney client privilege – i.e., communications with previous counsel about prior lemon law actions.  However, Defendant has failed to provide any privilege log identifying what if any responsive documents Defendant is withholding based on attorney client privilege/work product.  Though Defendant has properly raised attorney client privilege, there are undoubtedly responsive documents to at least some of these requests that are not privileged.  Moreover, to the extent that there are privileged documents, Defendant has not indicated which specific documents are privileged.  This is insufficient as a privilege log must identify what documents are being withheld and enough factual information to support a prima facie claim of privilege. (See CCP § 2031.240(b)(1-2), [“b) If the responding party objects to the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of an item or category of item, the response shall do both of the following: (1) Identify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made. (2) Set forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection. If an objection is based on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege invoked shall be stated. If an objection is based on a claim that the information sought is protected work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010), that claim shall be expressly asserted.”] [Italics added.].) 

            Accordingly, Defendant must provide a privilege log identifying which if any documents Defendants are withholding and sufficient information to set forth that the document is protected by attorney client privilege/work product.

            Trade Secret Objection

            Evidence Code section 1060 provides that “the owner of a trade secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret, and to prevent another from disclosing it, if the allowance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice.”  A trade secret is defined as “information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”  (Civ. Code, § 3426.1(d).)  In applying whether a trade secret privilege applies the Court of Appeal has stated that:

[T]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of establishing its existence. [Citations.] Thereafter, the party seeking discovery must make a prima facie, particularized showing that the information sought is relevant and necessary to the proof of, or defense against, a material element of one or more causes of action presented in the case, and that it is reasonable to conclude that the information sought is essential to a fair resolution of the lawsuit. It is then up to the holder of the privilege to demonstrate any claimed disadvantages of a protective order. Either party may propose or oppose less intrusive alternatives to disclosure of the trade secret, but the burden is upon the trade secret claimant to demonstrate that an alternative to disclosure will not be unduly burdensome to the opposing side and that it will maintain the same fair balance in the litigation that would have been achieved by disclosure. 

(Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1393.)

            Here, Defendant fails to substantiate its claim that the evidence sought is trade secret information.  Nor does Defendant provide authority warranting that a denial of discovery is warranted.  To the extent that Defendant contends that a protective order is necessary, the parties may simply stipulate and enter into the standard LASC Stipulation and Protective Order – Confidential Designation.

Objections on Grounds of Relevance, Vague, Burdensome, Overbroad, and Oppressive

            As to Defendant’s objection on grounds of overbreadth, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matters, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  (CCP § 2017.010.)  “[A]n implicit waiver of a party's constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff's claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.”  (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842.)  However, discovery should not be denied if the information sought has any relevance to the subject matter. Thus, while relevancy is a possible ground for an objection, it is difficult to adequately justify it.  (See generally Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 217.)  “These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery, and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases.”  (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546 [internal citation omitted].) 

            As to burden, “burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required” and “to support an objection of oppression there must be some showing either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”  (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.)  Moreover, even if [discovery requests] are found to be “burdensome and oppressive,” the Court should not simply sustain the objection and thereby excuse any answer. Rather, the Court should limit the question to a reasonable scope. (Borse v. Superior Court (Southern Pac. Co.) (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 286, 289.)

            Defendant’s objections that RPDs 16 and 19-30 are overbroad, vague, ambiguous, irrelevant, and burdensome are without merit.  The objections fail to indicate what burden Defendant would have to undergo to properly respond to these requests.  The processes Defendant uses to evaluate claims are relevant to the claim for civil penalties.  (Complaint ¶ 26.)  Under Song-Beverly, “[i]f the buyer establishes that the failure to comply was willful,” the buyer may be entitled to receive a civil penalty, up to two times the amount of actual damages.  (Civ. Code § 1794(c).)  A defendant that did not replace or refund a vehicle under a “good faith and reasonable belief that the facts imposing the statutory obligation were not present” is not willful. (Lukather v. General Motors, LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1051.)  Nor does willfulness require a showing of malice or wrongdoing towards the other party.  (Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 878, 894.)  Rather, willful “amounts to nothing more than this: that the defendant knows what it is doing and intends to do what it is doing.”  (Bishop v. Hyundai Motor America (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 750, 759.)  “Whether a manufacturer willfully violated its obligation to repair the car or refund the purchase price is a factual question for the jury[.]”  (Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1104.)

            The procedure by which Defendant handles Song-Beverly Act claims may indicate that Defendant may have been predisposed to improperly reject requests based on its procedure in handling claims.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses to RPDs Nos. 16, 19-31 are granted with the limitations stated above.

RPD No. 17

            “YOUR workshop manual(s) for the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”  (RPD No. 17.)

            “GM responds that shop manuals for various model years and vehicles are equally available to all parties, and can be obtained by writing to: Helm, Incorporated, Publications Division, Post Office Box 07150, Detroit, Michigan 48207, toll-free telephone (800) 782-4356. No documents will be produced.”  (Response to RPD No. 17.)

            The Response is Code Compliant

            “Where the information sought is equally available to the propounder of the [discovery request], the burden and expense of any research which may be required should be borne by the party seeking the information.”  (Pantzalas v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 499, 503.)

            Here, Defendant’s response clearly indicates that the workshop manuals are equally available to Plaintiffs.  Defendant has provided the contact information for how Plaintiffs can obtain the information.  Plaintiffs do not provide any reason as to why they cannot themselves obtain this information from the identified corporation.  In fact, the separate statement includes the same boilerplate reasoning as to every request without providing any reason or response as to why the response is deficient. 

            The case law is clear.  Plaintiffs seek the discovery that is equally available to them as it is to Defendants.  Plaintiff must bear he burden and costs of obtaining this discovery.  Accordingly, as to RPD No. 17, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel a further response is denied.

RPD No. 18

            “The operative Franchise Agreement, if any, on the date of sale of the SUBJECT VEHICLE between YOU and the dealership that sold the SUBJECT VEHICLE to Plaintiff.”  (RPD No. 18.)

            “GM objects to this Request on grounds the term ‘operative Franchise Agreement’ is vague and ambiguous. The contract between GM and the independently owned and operated GM-authorized dealerships who may have performed repairs on the SUBJECT VEHICLE under Warranty is irrelevant to the pending claims and defenses. No documents will be produced.”  (Response to RPD No. 18.)

            The Request is Not Relevant

            Plaintiffs have failed to explain in the moving papers or separate statement why the franchise agreement is relevant to the instant action.  Similarly, the complaint fails to allege any basis as to why the franchise agreement would be relevant to the instant.  Absent such information, the Court cannot conclude that this request has any merit or even potentially seeks information reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.  Accordingly, as to RPD no. 18, the request is denied.

RPDs Nos. 33, 45-46

            “All Technical Service Bulletins which have been issued for the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”  (RPD No. 33.)

            “All DOCUMENTS evidencing complaints by owners of 2017 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 vehicles regarding any of the complaints that the SUBJECT VEHICLE was presented to YOUR or YOUR authorized repair facilities for repair during the warranty period.”  (RPD No. 45.)

            “All DOCUMENTS evidencing warranty repairs to 2017 Chevrolet Silverado 1500 vehicles regarding any of the components that YOU or YOUR authorized repair facilities performed repairs on under warranty.”  (RPD No. 46.)

            “GM objects to this Request on grounds it is overbroad and seeks documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, as it is not limited in scope to the SUBJECT VEHICLE or issues in this action. GM also objects to this Request on grounds it is burdensome and oppressive, and that compliance would be unreasonably difficult and expensive considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. This is a simple, individual lemon law case with limited issues and this Request violates Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 567. Specifically, whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is entirely unrelated and incommensurate to the scope and breadth of this Request.

            Subject to and without waiving these objections, GM will comply in part and produce the following documents in its possession, custody and control: a list of technical service bulletins (“TSBs”) for vehicles of the same year, make and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE. After it has produced a list of TSBs, GM will – at Plaintiff’s request – search for and produce, if located, copies of a reasonable number of TSBs, if any, that Plaintiff has identified as relevant to the conditions alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint.”  (Response to RPD No. 33.)

            “GM objects to this Request on grounds the terms “evidencing,” “complaints” and “presented” are overbroad, vague and ambiguous. GM also objects to this Request on grounds it is unduly burdensome, oppressive, and seeks documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, as it is not limited in scope to the SUBJECT VEHICLE at issue in this action. GM also objects to this Request on grounds it is burdensome and oppressive, and that compliance would be unreasonably difficult and expensive considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. This is a simple, individual lemon law case with limited issues and this request violates Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 567. Specifically, whether Plaintiffs are entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is entirely unrelated and incommensurate to the scope and breadth of this Request. No documents will be produced.”  (Response to RPDs Nos. 45-46.)

            Attorney Client Privilege/Work Product Privilege

            As per the discussion above as to RPDs No. 16, 19-31, Defendant fails to provide a privilege log specifically identifying any document that Defendant is withholding on the basis of attorney client privilege or work product privilege.

            Trade Secret

            As per the discussion above as to RPDs No. 16, 19-31, Defendant fails to substantiate any basis to deny on the basis of trade secret.

Relevance, Vague, Burdensome, Overbroad, Oppressive

            As to the overbreadth objection, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matters, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  (CCP § 2017.010.)  “[A]n implicit waiver of a party's constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff's claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.”  (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842.)  However, discovery should not be denied if the information sought has any relevance to the subject matter. Thus, while relevancy is a possible ground for an objection, it is difficult to adequately justify it.  (See generally Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 217.)  “These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery, and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases.”  (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546 [internal citation omitted].) 

As to burden, “burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required” and “to support an objection of oppression there must be some showing either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”  (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.)  Moreover, even if [discovery requests] are found to be “burdensome and oppressive,” the Court should not simply sustain the objection and thereby excuse any answer. Rather, the Court should limit the question to a reasonable scope. (Borse v. Superior Court (Southern Pac. Co.) (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 286, 289.)

As to burden, Defendant’s objections fail to indicate what burden Defendant would have to undergo to properly respond to these requests.  Further – in general – requests that are limited to the same year, make, and model of the subject vehicle and would be relevant to the claim of for civil penalties.  (Complaint ¶ 26.)  Under Song-Beverly, “[i]f the buyer establishes that the failure to comply was willful,” the buyer may be entitled to receive a civil penalty, up to two times the amount of actual damages.  (Civ. Code § 1794(c).)  A failure to replace or refund a vehicle under a “good faith and reasonable belief that the facts imposing the statutory obligation were not present” is not willful. (Lukather v. General Motors, LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1051.)  Nor does willfulness require a showing of malice or wrongdoing towards the other party.  (Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 878, 894.)  Rather, willfulness “amounts to nothing more than this: that the defendant knows what it is doing and intends to do what it is doing.”  (Bishop v. Hyundai Motor America (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 750, 759.)  “Whether a manufacturer willfully violated its obligation to repair the car or refund the purchase price is a factual question for the jury[.]”  (Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1104.)

Accordingly, “information regarding whether the same defects were reported to [Defendant] in other cars of the same make, model, and year as Plaintiff's subject vehicle could conceivably be relevant to whether [Defendant] acted reasonably in denying Plaintiff's warranty claim. A fact finder may find [Defendant]'s knowledge or lack of knowledge about the same defects to be a consideration in deciding whether [Defendant] acted in good faith as to Plaintiff's specific case.”  (Jensen v. BMW of North America, LLC (S.D. Cal. 2019) 328 F.R.D. 557, 562–563, [italics added]; see also Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 540, 555 [“Evidence of prior accidents is admissible to prove a defective condition, knowledge, or the cause of an accident, provided that the circumstances of the other accidents are similar and not too remote.”].

However, the record before the Court does not provide a readily discernible way to determine what these “same defects” would be or what the relevant technical service bulletins would be.  These RPDs fail to specify the specific defects that the Subject Vehicle suffered. Moreover, the complaint broadly alleges that “[d]efects and nonconformities to warranty manifested themselves within the applicable express warranty period, including but not limited to transmission.”  (Complaint ¶ 16.)  The only defect that the complaint has identified relates to the transmission of the Subject Vehicle.  As a result, Plaintiff’s RPDs are unclear as to what unspecified complaints beyond the transmission the Subject Vehicle experienced.  Therefore, the Court finds that Plaintiff’s requests must be narrowed to the sole defects expressly identified – defects with the transmission. RPDs 45 and 46 are also overbroad in that they are not limited geographically to California.  Accordingly, as to RPDs No. 45-46, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses is granted with the limitation of only transmission defects in vehicles of the same year, make, and model, and geographically limited to California.

As to RPD 33, Defendant’s response clearly specified that it would produce documents a list of technical service bulletins for vehicles of the same year, make and model as the Subject Vehicle.  Defendant reasonably requested that Plaintiff identify a reasonable number which Defendant would copy and provide.  Plaintiffs failed to respond to this response.  In light of the lack of clarity of the RPD and the complaint as to what the defect is, such a response is proper.  Accordingly, as to RPDs No. 33, Plaintiffs’ motion to compel further responses is denied.

RPDs No. 37-41

            “DOCUMENTS sufficient to identify all of YOUR OBDII codes for the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”  (RPD No. 37.)

            “DOCUMENTS sufficient to show all of YOUR vehicle symptom codes for the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”  (RPD No. 38.)

            “DOCUMENTS sufficient to show all of YOUR vehicle component repair codes for the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”  (RPD No. 39.)

            “DOCUMENTS sufficient to show all of YOUR customer complaint codes from 2019 to present.”  (RPD No. 40.)

            “DOCUMENTS sufficient to show all labor operation codes provided by YOU to YOUR authorized dealerships from 2019 to present.”  (RPD No. 41.)

In substantively identical responses Defendant states:

            “GM objects to this Request on grounds the terms ‘sufficient to identify’ and ‘OBDII codes’ are overbroad, vague and ambiguous. GM objects to this Request on grounds it is overbroad and seeks documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, as it is not limited in scope to the SUBJECT VEHICLE or issues in this action. GM also objects to this Request on grounds it is burdensome and oppressive, and that compliance would be unreasonably difficult and expensive considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. This is a simple, individual lemon law case with limited issues and this request violates Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 567. Specifically, whether Plaintiff are entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is entirely unrelated and incommensurate to the scope and breadth of this Request. GM also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks confidential, proprietary and trade secret information. No documents will be produced.”  (Response to RPD No. 37; see also Responses to RPDs No. 38-41.)

            Attorney Client Privilege/Work Product Privilege

            As per the discussion above as to RPDs No. 16, 19-31, Defendant fails to provide a privilege log specifically identifying any document Defendant is withholding on the basis of attorney client privilege or work product privilege.

            Trade Secret

            As per the discussion above as to RPDs No. 16, 19-31, Defendant fails to substantiate any basis to deny discovery based on a trade secret claim.

            The Requests are Overbroad and Irrelevant

            Here, the Court agrees that RPDs 37-41 are overbroad and do not appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.  The internal repair codes for vehicles of the same make and model as the Subject Vehicle are irrelevant to whether Defendant complied under the Song-Beverly Act with its obligations to promptly repair, provide a replacement, or repurchase the Subject Vehicle after a reasonable number of repair attempts.  Nor are these internal codes relevant to Plaintiff’s claim for civil penalties.  (Complaint ¶ 26.) 

            Under Song-Beverly, “[i]f the buyer establishes that the failure to comply was willful,” the buyer may be entitled to receive a civil penalty, up to two times the amount of actual damages.  (Civ. Code § 1794(c).)  A defendant that did not replace or refund a vehicle under a “good faith and reasonable belief that the facts imposing the statutory obligation were not present” is not willful. (Lukather v. General Motors, LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1051.)  Nor does willfulness require a showing of malice or wrongdoing towards the other party.  (Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 878, 894.)  Rather, willfulness “amounts to nothing more than this: that the defendant knows what it is doing and intends to do what it is doing.”  (Bishop v. Hyundai Motor America (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 750, 759.)  “Whether a manufacturer willfully violated its obligation to repair the car or refund the purchase price is a factual question for the jury[.]”  (Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1104.)

            Defendant’s internal repair codes are unrelated to whether Defendant willfully failed to replace or refund the Subject Vehicle.  Nor do RPDs 37-41 appear reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.  Plaintiff fails to identify any reason in the moving papers or reply papers as to why RPDs 37-41 are relevant or would lead to the discovery of relevant documents.  Rather, the only reason Plaintiff has articulated is that Plaintiff wishes to see how Defendant went about searching for customer complaints in order to make sure that Defendant has performed a thorough and diligent search for all customer complaints.  RPDs 37-41 are not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as they do not relate to Plaintiff’s claims or as to whether Defendant’s failure to replace or repurchase the Subject Vehicle was willful.  Notably, Defendant has already agreed to produce the customer complaints themselves – all customer complaints of the same defect as alleged in the complaint for other vehicles of the same year, make, and model.  (See RPDs No. 45-46.) 

            Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion to compel further responses is DENIED as to RPDs. No. 37-41.

Sanctions

Plaintiffs request sanctions against Defendant and Defense Counsel for $2,685.00 to compensate Plaintiff for bringing the instant motion.

For a motion to compel further responses, “[t]he court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to [request for production], unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”  (CCP § 2031.300(c), [italics added].)  Further, it is an abuse of discovery to make an evasive response or make unsubstantiated objections to discovery.  (CCP § 2023.010(e)-(f).)

As a preliminary matter, the amount requested is unsupported on its face.  It appears that preparation of the instant motion involved primarily copying and pasting with little additional work.  Moreover, Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently meet and confer.  (CCP § 2023.020.)  Plaintiffs fail to explain why all of the requests at issue are relevant such as to demonstrate good cause in bringing the instant motion.  Accordingly, the Court finds that the imposition of sanction against Defendant would be unjust.  Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.

CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER

Based on the forgoing, Plaintiffs Jessica Urquiza and Albino Urquiza Patlan’s motion to compel further responses to Request for Production, Set One from Defendant General Motors, LLC is GRANTED as to RPDs 16, 19-31, 45 (as modified above) and 46 (as modified above) but otherwise DENIED.

Within 20 days, Defendant General Motors, LLC is to serve further, code compliant, verified responses to RPDs 16, 19-31, 45 (as modified above) and 46 (as modified above) without objection – except attorney client privilege/work product.  Defendant is to simultaneously provide a privilege log identifying any documents withheld based on attorney client privilege/work product.

Moving Parties are ordered to provide notice of this order and file proof of service of such.

DATED: April 25, 2023                                                         ___________________________

                                                                                          Elaine Lu

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court