Judge: Elaine Lu, Case: 22STCV14566, Date: 2024-01-29 Tentative Ruling
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Case Number: 22STCV14566 Hearing Date: January 29, 2024 Dept: 26
|
raymond
parungao, Plaintiff, v. volkswagen
groupd of america, inc.; AUDI WEST COVINA; et al., Defendants. |
Case No.: 22STCV14566 Hearing Date: January 29, 2024 [TENTATIVE]
order RE: Plaintiff’s motion for attorneys’ fees and costs |
Procedural
Background
On May 2, 2022, Plaintiff Raymond
Parungao (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action against Defendant Volkswagen
Group of America, Inc. and Audi West Covina (jointly “Defendants”). The Complaint asserted three causes of action
for (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty, (2)
Violation of the Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Implied Warranty, and (3)
Violation of the Song-Beverly Act section 1793.2(b).
On September
5, 2023, Plaintiff filed a notice of settlement as to the entire action.
On December 22, 2023, Plaintiff
filed the instant motion for attorneys’ fees and costs. On January 16, 2024, Defendants filed an
opposition. On January 22, 2024,
Plaintiff filed a reply.
Legal
Standard
Pursuant to
Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5, subdivision (a)(10)(A), attorney fees
when authorized by contract or statute are allowable as costs and may be
awarded upon a noticed motion pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
1033.5, subdivision (c)(5).
In determining
what fees are reasonable, California courts apply the “lodestar” approach.
(See, e.g., Holguin v. DISH Network LLC (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 1310,
1332.) This inquiry “begins with the
‘lodestar,’ i.e., the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by the
reasonable hourly rate.” (See PLCM Group v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th
1084, 1095.) From there, the “[t]he
lodestar figure may then be adjusted, based on consideration of factors
specific to the case, in order to fix the fee at the fair market value for the
legal services provided.” (Ibid.)
Relevant factors include: “(1) the novelty and difficulty of the
questions involved, (2) the skill displayed in presenting them, (3) the extent
to which the nature of the litigation precluded other employment by the
attorneys, [and] (4) the contingent nature of the fee award.” (Ketchum v.
Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.)
Discussion
Right to Recover
A prevailing
buyer in an action under the Song-Beverly Act “shall be allowed by the court to
recover as part of the judgment a sum equal to the aggregate amount of costs
and expenses, including attorney's fees based on actual time expended,
determined by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in
connection with the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, §
1794(d).) “[W]hen ‘prevailing party’ is
undefined by the statute, ‘a court may base its attorney fees decision on a pragmatic
definition of the extent to which each party has realized its litigation
objectives, whether by judgment, settlement or otherwise. [Citations.] In
assessing litigation success, Hsu v. Abbara (1995) 9 Cal.4th
863, 877, ... instructs: ‘[C]ourts should respect substance rather than form,
and to this extent should be guided by “equitable considerations.”’” (MacQuiddy v. Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC (2015)
233 Cal.App.4th 1036, 1048.)
On September 5, 2023, the parties
settled the instant action. (Saeedian
Decl. ¶¶ 16-18.) As part of this
settlement, Plaintiff was established as the prevailing party for purposes of
attorneys’ fees and costs under Civil Code section 1794(d). (Saeedian Decl. ¶ 19.) Moreover, no party disputes that Plaintiff is
entitled to attorney’s fees and expenses as the prevailing party.
Reasonableness of Attorneys’ Fees
Plaintiff seeks
attorney’s fees and costs totaling $45,113.99 consisting of $42,652.00 in
attorneys’ fees and $2,461.99 in costs.
The trial court
has broad authority to determine the amount of a reasonable fee. (PLCM Group,
Inc. v. Drexler (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1084, 1095.) The party bears the burden
of proof as to “reasonableness” of any fee claim. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1033.5,
subd. (c)(5).) The party seeking fees has the burden of documenting the
appropriate hours expended and hourly rates. (City of Colton v. Singletary
(2012) 206 Cal.App.4th 751, 784.) This burden requires competent evidence as to
the nature and value of the services rendered. (Martino v. Denevi (1986)
182 Cal.App.3d 553, 559.)
An attorney's
testimony as to the number of hours worked is sufficient evidence to support an
award of attorney fees, even in the absence of detailed time records or billing
statements, and there is no requirement that such records or statements be
offered in evidence. (Steiny & Co., Inc. v. California Electric Supply
Co. (2000) 79 Cal.App.4th 285, 293.)
Ascertaining the fee amount is left to the trial court’s sound
discretion. (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132.) Moreover, “[t]here is ‘no mathematical rule
requiring proportionality between compensatory damages and attorney's fees
awards’, [Citation], and courts have awarded attorney's fees where plaintiffs
recovered only nominal or minimal damages.”
(Harman v. City and County of San Francisco (2007) 158
Cal.App.4th 407, 421.)
The court has
broad discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee
award, which will not be overturned absent a “manifest abuse of discretion, a
prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by substantial
evidence.” (Bernardi v. County of Monterey (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th
1379, 1393-1394.) The court need not explain its calculation of the
amount of attorney’s fees awarded in detail; identifying the factors considered
in arriving at the amount will suffice. (Ventura v. ABM Indus. Inc.
(2012) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 274-275.)
Attorney Michael
Saeedian, Esq. is the lead attorney for the instant action and a partner at The
Lemon Pros, LLP. (Saeedian Decl. ¶
1.) Saeedian has been a practicing
attorney since 2009 in California. In
addition to his work at The Lemon Pros, LLP, Saeedian founded the Saeedian Law
Group. (Saeedian Decl. ¶ 2.) Saeedian has served as lead counsel in
numerous cases, is a member of multiple attorney associations, and has received
multiple awards. (Saeedian Decl. ¶¶
2-3.) Saeedian claims an hourly rate of
$695 per hour. (Saeedian Decl. ¶ 3.)
Attorney
Christopher Urner is the managing attorney for The Lemon Pros, LLP since May
2022. (Saeedian Decl. ¶ 4.) Urner has been a practicing attorney since 2016
and has extensive experience in lemon law litigation, including participating
in several high-profile lemon law cases.
(Saeedian Decl. ¶ 4.) Urner
claims an hourly rate of $525 per hour.
(Saeedian Decl. ¶ 4.)
Jorge Acosta is
a certified law clerk who has spent five years in the legal industry as a
certified law clerk and recently passed the February 2023 bar examination. (Saeedian Decl. ¶ 5.) Acosta claims an hourly rate of $250 per
hour. (Saeedian Decl. ¶ 5.)
“The trial court [i]s entitled to rely on
[an attorney’s own] declaration[] to determine the reasonable rates for
experienced attorneys in Los Angeles County.”
(Pasternack v. McCullough (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 1050, 1059.) The Court finds these hourly rates to be reasonable
based on Counsel’s and the law clerk’s experience. (Nishiki v. Danko Meredith, APC (2018)
25 Cal.App.5th 883, 899 [“trial court has its own expertise in the value of
legal services performed in a case [Citations] and it may rely on its own
familiarity with the local legal market in setting the hourly rate[.]”].)
However, in
light of Plaintiff’s Counsel firm’s expertise in lemon law actions, as
reflected in Counsel’s relatively high hourly rates, the Court finds the hours
claimed are somewhat excessive – especially given that little to no active
litigation occurred in the instant action.
For example, Plaintiff’s Counsel claimed .2 hours for drafting a request for entry of default but no
default was ever requested. (Saeedian
Decl., Exh. A.) Similarly, in light of
Plaintiff’s Counsel’s firm’s expertise in lemon law matters and in light of the
availability of templates from other lemon law actions that Plaintiffs’
Counsel’s firm has handled in the past, propounding and responding to discovery
and reviewing Defendants’ motions in limine (which were not atypical of motions
in limine in other lemon law cases) are routine matters that should have
required only a fraction of the hours that Plaintiff’s Counsel billed. Accordingly, given these factors, a reduction
is warranted.
Considering the
totality of these factors, the Court concludes based on the claimed experience
of Plaintiff’s Counsel, as reflected in his hourly rate, a reduction is
warranted. Utilizing a lodestar approach, and in view of the totality of the
circumstances, the Court finds that the total and reasonable amount of
attorney’s fees incurred is $32,000.00.
Costs
As to costs, the claimed costs of $2,461.99
are uncontested and do appear to be reasonably incurred with the instant
action. (CCP § 1033.5.) Moreover, “the Legislature amended section
1794 to provide for the recovery of “costs and expenses.” The
legislative history indicates the Legislature exercised its power to permit the
recovery of expert witness fees by prevailing buyers under the Act[.]” (Ibid.) “[T]he Legislature intended the phrase ‘costs
and expenses’ to cover items not included in ‘the detailed statutory definition
of “costs” ’ set forth in Code of Civil Procedure section 1033.5.” (Warren v. Kia Motors America, Inc. (2018)
30 Cal.App.5th 24, 42.) Therefore, a
prevailing buyer is entitled to “costs and expenses” that have been “determined
by the court to have been reasonably incurred by the buyer in connection with
the commencement and prosecution of such action.” (Civ. Code, § 1794(d).)
Accordingly, the requested costs are granted
in full.
CONCLUSIONS AND
ORDER
Based on the forgoing, Plaintiff Raymond
Parungao’s motion for attorneys’ fees
and costs is granted in the total amount of $34,461.99 consisting of $32,000.00 in Attorneys’ Fees and $2,461.99 in Costs.
Moving Party is ordered to provide
notice of this order and file proof of service of such.
DATED:
January ___, 2024 ___________________________
Elaine
Lu
Judge
of the Superior Court