Judge Elaine Lu, Case Number: 22STCV15543, Date: 2024-03-07 Tentative Ruling

On May 10, 2022, Plaintiffs Alejandro Sanchez, Sr., Individually, As Successor-In-Interest to Brianna Sanchez, decedent, and as Guardian Ad Litem for E. Sanchez, a minor, and Araceli Hernandez (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed the instant wrongful death action against Defendant Ford Motor Company (“Ford”), Paccar, Inc. dba Kenworth, Tutor Perini Corporation, Zachry Construction Corporation, Parsons Corporation, Deudiel Juarez Ramirez, and H & M Trucking And Equipment Rental of Dinuba.[1]

The complaint asserts twenty four causes of action for (1) Wrongful Death based on Strict Product Liability (CCP § 377.60) by Plaintiff Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. individually against Ford; (2) Survival based on Strict Product Liability (CCP § 377.20, § 377.34) by Plaintiff Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. as the Successor-In-Interest to Brianna Sanchez against Ford; (3) Bystander Liability based on Strict Product Liability by Plaintiffs Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. (Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for E. Sanchez), and Araceli Hernandez against Ford; (4) Strict Product Liability by Plaintiffs Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. (Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for E. Sanchez), and Araceli Hernandez against Ford; (5) Wrongful Death based on Strict Product Liability (CCP § 377.60) by Plaintiff Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. individually against Paccar, Inc. dba Kenworth; (6) Survival based on Strict Product Liability (CCP § 377.20, § 377.34) by Plaintiff Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. as the Successor-In-Interest to Brianna Sanchez against Paccar, Inc. dba Kenworth; (7) Bystander Liability based on Strict Product Liability by Plaintiffs Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. (Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for E. Sanchez), and Araceli Hernandez against Paccar, Inc. dba Kenworth; (8) Strict Product Liability by Plaintiffs Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. (Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for E. Sanchez), and Araceli Hernandez against Paccar, Inc. dba Kenworth; (9) Wrongful Death based Negligence by Plaintiffs Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. against Ford; (10) Survival based on Negligence by Plaintiff Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. as the Successor-In-Interest to Brianna Sanchez against Ford; (11) Bystander Liability based on Negligence by Plaintiffs Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. (Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for E. Sanchez), and Araceli Hernandez against Ford; (12) Negligence by Plaintiffs Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. (Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for E. Sanchez), and Araceli Hernandez against Ford; (13) Wrongful Death based Negligence by Plaintiffs Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. against Paccar, Inc. dba Kenworth; (14) Survival based on Negligence by Plaintiff Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. as the Successor-In-Interest to Brianna Sanchez against Paccar, Inc. dba Kenworth; (15) Bystander Liability based on Negligence by Plaintiffs Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. (Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for E. Sanchez), and Araceli Hernandez against Paccar, Inc. dba Kenworth; (16) Negligence by Plaintiffs Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. (Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for E. Sanchez), and Araceli Hernandez against Paccar, Inc. dba Kenworth; (17) Wrongful Death based Negligence by Plaintiffs Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. against Tutor Perini Corporation, Zachry Construction Corporation, Parsons Corporation; (18) Survival based on Negligence by Plaintiff Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. as the Successor-In-Interest to Brianna Sanchez against Tutor Perini Corporation, Zachry Construction Corporation, Parsons Corporation; (19) Bystander Liability based on Negligence by Plaintiffs Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. (Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for E. Sanchez), and Araceli Hernandez against Tutor Perini Corporation, Zachry Construction Corporation, Parsons Corporation; (20) Negligence by Plaintiffs Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. (Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for E. Sanchez), and Araceli Hernandez against Tutor Perini Corporation, Zachry Construction Corporation, Parsons Corporation; (21) Wrongful Death based Negligence by Plaintiffs Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. against Deudiel Juarez Ramirez, and H & M Trucking And Equipment Rental of Dinuba; (22) Survival based on Negligence by Plaintiff Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. as the Successor-In-Interest to Brianna Sanchez against Deudiel Juarez Ramirez, and H & M Trucking And Equipment Rental of Dinuba; (23) Bystander Liability based on Negligence by Plaintiffs Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. (Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for E. Sanchez), and Araceli Hernandez against Deudiel Juarez Ramirez, and H & M Trucking And Equipment Rental of Dinuba; and (24) Negligence by Plaintiffs Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. (Individually and as Guardian Ad Litem for E. Sanchez), and Araceli Hernandez against Deudiel Juarez Ramirez, and H & M Trucking And Equipment Rental of Dinuba.

On December 22, 2023, Defendant Ford filed the instant demurrer and motion to strike portions of the complaint. On January 11, 2024, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On January 18, 2024, Defendant Ford filed a reply. On January 23, 2024, the instant action was deemed a complicated personal injury matter and was reassigned to the current department. (Minute Order 1/23/24.) On February 22, 2024, Defendant Ford gave notice of rescheduling the instant motion to March 7, 2024 in the instant department.

On May 10, 2020, Plaintiffs Alejandro Sanchez, Sr., Araceli Hernandez, and their minor son E. Sanchez, and their minor daughter Brianna Sanchez were owners, operators and/or occupants of a 2004 Lincoln Navigator “stopped in traffic northbound on State Route 99 near a construction zone (hereinafter referred to as the "HSRA Construction Zone") south of Mountain View Avenue in an unincorporated area of Fresno County, California.” (Complaint ¶ 13.)

“At all relevant times, the 2004 Lincoln Navigator was designed, manufactured, sold, distributed and otherwise provided by [Ford], as a defective product, including without limitation a defective fuel line, defective gasoline tank, defective seat belts, defective ingress and egress, defective design, lack of warnings, and other defects according to proof at trial.” (Id. ¶ 15.)

“On May 10, 2020, defendants, Ramirez and H & M Trucking, operated a motor vehicle, a Kenworth Truck Tractor (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Kenworth’), northbound on State Route 99 approaching the HSRA Construction Zone. At said time and place, Ramirez and H & M Trucking collided their Kenworth into the rear end of the 2004 Lincoln Navigator. Due to the above described defects in the 2004 Lincoln Navigator, plaintiffs' Lincoln Navigator exploded into fire. Further, the above described defects in the 2004 Lincoln Navigator prevented Brianna Sanchez to escape or be rescued from the flaming 2004 Lincoln Navigator; she was burned alive, and died in the fire.” (Id. ¶ 16.)

A demurrer can be used only to challenge defects that appear on the face of the pleading under attack; or from matters outside the pleading that are judicially noticeable. (Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal 3d 311, 318.) No other extrinsic evidence can be considered (i.e., no “speaking demurrers”). (Ion Equipment Corp. v. Nelson (1980) 110 Cal.App.3d 868, 881.)

A demurrer for sufficiency tests whether the complaint states a cause of action. (Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal. App. 4th 740, 747.) When considering demurrers, courts “give the complaint a reasonable interpretation, and read it in context.” (Schifando v. City of Los Angeles (2003) 31 Cal.4th 1074, 1081.) In a demurrer proceeding, the defects must be apparent on the face of the pleading or via proper judicial notice. (Donabedian v. Mercury Ins. Co. (2004) 116 Cal. App. 4th 968, 994.) “A demurrer tests the pleadings alone and not the evidence or other extrinsic matters. Therefor’e, it lies only where the defects appear on the face of the pleading or are judicially noticed.” (SKF Farms v. Superior Ct. (1984) 153 Cal. App. 3d 902, 905.) “The only issue involved in a demurrer hearing is whether the complaint, as it stands, unconnected with extraneous matters, states a cause of action.” (Hahn, supra, 147 Cal.App.4th at 747.)

Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by demurrer (i.e., words, phrases, prayer for damages, etc.). (See CCP §§ 435-437.) A party may file a motion to strike in whole or in part within the time allowed to respond to a pleading. However, if a party serves and files a motion to strike without demurring to the complaint, the time to answer is extended. (CCP §§ 435(b)(1), 435(c).)

A motion to strike lies only where the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (CCP § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleadings or by way of judicial notice. (CCP § 437.)

Code of Civil Procedure § 430.41, subdivision (a) requires that “[b]efore filing a demurrer pursuant to this chapter, the demurring party shall meet and confer¿in person or by telephone¿with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to demurrer for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the demurrer.” The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due and if they are unable to meet the demurring party shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension. (CCP § 430.41(a)(2).) The demurring party must also file and serve a declaration detailing the meet and confer efforts. (Id.¿at (a)(3).)¿ If an amended pleading is filed, the parties must meet and confer again before a demurrer may be filed to the amended pleading. (Id.¿at (a).) There is a similar meet and confer requirement for motions to strike. (CCP § 435.5.)

Defendant Ford has fulfilled the meet and confer requirement. (Solorio Decl. ¶¶ 2-6, Exhs. A-C.)[2]

Defendant Ford contends that the ninth, tenth, eleventh, and twelfth causes of action against it – i.e., the negligence claims against Ford – fail because Plaintiffs fail to allege a duty of care owed to Plaintiffs by Ford.

“In any action for wrongful death resulting from negligence, the complaint must contain allegations as to all the elements of actionable negligence.” (Jacoves v. United Merchandising Corp. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 88, 105.) Therefore, “[P]laintiff[s] must allege (1) the defendant owed the plaintiff[s] a duty of care, (2) the defendant breached that duty, and (3) the breach proximately caused the plaintiff[‘s] damages or injuries.” (Lueras v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 49, 62.) “Negligence involves the violation of a legal duty imposed by statute, contract or otherwise, by the defendant to the person injured, e.g., the deceased in a wrongful death action.” (Jacoves, supra, 9 Cal.App.4th at p.105.)

Here, the complaint alleges that the 2004 Lincoln Navigator was designed, manufactured, sold, distributed and otherwise provided by Ford and had a “defective fuel line, defective gasoline tank, defective seat belts, defective ingress and egress, defective design, [and] lack of warnings[.]” (Complaint ¶ 15.) “[Ford] failed to exercise reasonable skill and care and were otherwise negligent in the manufacture, sale, distribution, retail and other provision of the 2004 Lincoln Navigator, including without limitation the design, ingress and egress, fuel line, gasoline tank, seat belts, warnings, and other parts, components, representations and omissions according to proof at trial.” (Id. ¶ 69.) Ford’s failure to exercise reasonable care resulted in the car exploding into fire and the death of decedent Brianna Sanchez who was an occupant of the 2004 Lincoln Navigator. (Id. ¶¶ 13, 16, 70.)

Though the allegations are sparse, nothing further is required to state a claim as California follows a notice pleading standard, (See e.g., Morris v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2022) 78 Cal.App.5th 279, 305, Fn. 14), and the pleadings are generally liberally construed. (CCP § 452, [“In the construction of a pleading, for the purpose of determining its effect, its allegations must be liberally construed, with a view to substantial justice between the parties.”].)

Moreover, the complaint does set forth sufficient facts indicating a duty owed to the decedent, Brianna Sanchez. Plaintiff alleges that Defendant Ford manufactured the 2004 Lincoln Navigator. (Complaint ¶ 15.) As such, Ford owed a duty to provide consumers such as Plaintiffs with a defect-free product. (Ford v. Polaris Industries, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 755, 768 [“[U]nquestionably a manufacturer has a duty to provide consumers with defect-free products[.]”].)

Accordingly, Defendant Ford’s demurrer to the negligence claims for failure to allege a duty owed is OVERRULED.

Second and Tenth Causes of Action – Survival Causes of Action as Successor-in-Interest

Defendant Ford asserts that Plaintiff Alejandro Sanchez, Sr. fails to file the required affidavit under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.32 to bring a successor-in-interest claim.

“Under [Code of Civil Procedure] section 377.30, a ‘cause of action that survives the death of the person entitled to commence an action or proceeding passes to the decedent's successor in interest, ... and an action may be commenced by the decedent's personal representative or, if none, by the decedent's successor in interest.’” (Aghaian v. Minassian (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 603, 614.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 377.32 requires the ‘person who seeks to commence an action or proceeding or to continue a pending action or proceeding as the decedent's successor in interest’ to file an affidavit stating, among other things, that ‘ “No proceeding is now pending in California for administration of the decedent's estate” ’ and ‘[i]f the decedent's estate was administered, a copy of the final order showing the distribution of the decedent's cause of action to the successor in interest.’ Literally, this provision does not require that the affidavit be filed as a condition precedent to commencing or continuing the action. However, failure to file the affidavit could possibly subject the action to a plea in abatement.” (Parsons v. Tickner (1995) 31 Cal.App.4th 1513, 1523–1524.)

The failure to file the required affidavit under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.32 does not render the complaint a nullity or otherwise render the complaint insufficient. (Aghaian, supra, 64 Cal.App.5th at p.614.) Rather, “at most, ‘failure to file the affidavit could possibly subject the action to a plea in abatement.’[Citation.]” (Ibid.) Therefore, the failure to file the required affidavit does not support the demurrer to the complaint.

Moreover, in opposition, Plaintiffs have filed the required affidavit pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 377.32. (See Brown Decl. attached to Opposition.) Thus, any plea in abatement that Defendant Ford might wish to bring is no longer be warranted.

Accordingly, Defendant Ford’s demurrer to the second and tenth causes of action is OVERRULED.

California Civil Code section 3294, subdivision (a), provides: “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice, the plaintiff, in addition to the actual damages, may recover damages for the sake of example and by way of punishing the defendant.” “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id. at (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id. at (c)(2).) “‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id. at (c)(3).) Punitive damages thus require more than the mere commission of a tort. (See Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-95.)

Moreover, a demand for punitive damages for the commission of any tort requires more than the mere conclusory allegations of “oppression, fraud, and malice.” (Civ. Code § 3294; see Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 1, 6-7.) “[A] punitive damages award may properly be entered in a strict products liability suit.” ( Loomis v. Amazon.com LLC (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 466, 475, Fn. 4.)

Here, the complaint alleges that “[a]t all times relevant, [Ford] knew or had reason to know that the 2004 Lincoln Navigator was designed, manufactured, sold, distributed and otherwise provided by [Ford] as a defective product, including without limitation a defective fuel line, defective gasoline tank, defective seat belts, defective ingress and egress, defective design, lack of warnings, and other defects according to proof at trial. Such acts and omissions of defendants, and each of them, were committed in a deliberate, cold, callous, malicious, fraudulent, willful and intentional manner with a conscious disregard of the safety of occupants of the 2004 Lincoln Navigator, including without limitation Brianna Sanchez. Plaintiff seeks punitive damages against defendants in an amount appropriate to punish or set an example of them.” (Complaint ¶ 23.) This allegation is more than mere conclusory allegations of “oppression, fraud, and malice[.]” (Perkins, supra, 117 Cal. App.3d at pp.6-7.)

Thus, the complaint alleges that Ford knew or should have known of serious life-threatening defects such as a defective fuel line that could have and did result in a fire killing decedent, and Ford did not take action to remedy the defect. Though these allegations do not include any facts as to how Ford knew or should have known about the defect in the 2004 Lincoln Navigator, a complaint is not required to set forth every fact that may ultimately be proved but such ultimate facts must be clearly alleged. (Rutherford Holdings, LLC, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at p.236, [“Defendants argue that Rutherford failed to allege specific facts to support an alter ego theory, but Rutherford was required to allege only ‘ultimate rather than evidentiary facts.’”].)

Plaintiff has filed proof of service of the Summons and Complaint as to certain defendants who have not responded though the time for them to file a responsive pleading has lapsed. Specifically, Plaintiff filed a proof of service of the summons and complaint on Paccar Inc. on July 24, 2023, but Paccar Inc. has not responded. Plaintiff has failed to file and serve a statement of damages. Plaintiff has also failed to seek Paccar Inc.'s default.

4/12/24 at 8:30 am - OSC re sanctions for entry of default. Plaintiff’s Counsel is ordered to appear on 4/12/24 at 8:30 am and explain why sanctions (including monetary sanctions of at least $500 and/or dismissal) should not be imposed for failure to cause entry of default as to all served defendants who have not responded.

If defaults have not all been entered at that time, then no later than five days before the OSC hearing, Plaintiff’s Counsel is also to file a declaration explaining the failure to obtain entry of defaults as to all served defendants who have not responded and explaining any and all efforts undertaken to seek their defaults.

Moving Party Ford is to give notice of this order and file proof of service of such.

[1] On August 18, 2023, Plaintiffs dismissed the complaint as to Defendants Tutor Perini Corporation, Zachry Construction Corporation, and Parsons Corporation.

[2] The meet and confer declarations in support of the demurrer and motion to strike are substantially identical.

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 26