Judge Elaine Lu, Case Number: 22STCV16994, Date: 2023-08-22 Tentative Ruling

On May 23, 2022, Plaintiffs Ebrahim A. Arshadnia (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant lemon law action against Defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”) arising from the purchase of a 2019 Cadillac Escalade (“Subject Vehicle”). The Complaint asserts three causes of action for (1) Violation of Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty, (2) Violation of Song-Beverly Act -Breach of Implied Warranty, and (3) Violation of the Song-Beverly Act Section 1793.2.

On July 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set Two (“RPDs”). On August 9, 2023, Defendant filed an opposition. No timely reply has been filed.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply:

(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.

(1) The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.

(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.

Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant’s further response to the entirety of the second set of RPDs – i.e., RPDs No. 1-50.

A party making a motion to compel further responses must do so within 45 days of service of the verified response unless the parties agree in writing and specify a later date. (CCP § 2031.310(c).) The 45-day limit is jurisdictional as the Court has no authority to grant late-filed papers. (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1410.) However, “the 45-day clock runs only upon service of verified responses, and responses consisting of both factual responses and objections must be verified[.]” (Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v. Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 136.) Moreover, this 45-day limit is extended if served by mail, overnight delivery, fax, or electronically. (See CCP §§ 1010.6(a)(4), 1013.)

On May 23, 2023, Plaintiff served the RPDs at issue on Defendant. (Yowarski Decl. ¶ 20, Exh. 3.) On June 22, 2023, Defendant served its response to the RPDs at issue. (Yowarski Decl. ¶ 21.)[1] Thus, Plaintiff had at least until August 7, 2023 to timely file the instant motion. Accordingly, the instant motion filed on July 25, 2023 is timely.

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310(b)(2) a motion to compel further responses to a request for production “shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (CCP § 2031.310(b)(2).) “A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (CCP § 2016.040.) “The level of effort at informal resolution which satisfies the ‘reasonable and good faith attempt’ standard depends upon the circumstances. In a larger, more complex discovery context, a greater effort at informal resolution may be warranted. In a simpler, or more narrowly focused case, a more modest effort may suffice. The history of the litigation, the nature of the interaction between counsel, the nature of the issues, the type and scope of discovery requested, the prospects for success and other similar factors can be relevant.” (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)

Here, the sole meet and confer effort Plaintiff made was to send a meet and confer letter on June 26, 2023. (Yowarski Decl. ¶ 24-25, Exh. 5.) On June 27, 2023, Defendant served a response to the meet and confer letter standing by the objections but offering to participate in an informal discovery conference to resolve these disputes. (Yowarski Decl. ¶ 26, Exh. 6.) No further meet and confer attempt was made to meet and confer. Given the numerous requests at issue and that Defendant did agree to further participate in an informal discovery conference, Plaintiff’s singular letter is insufficient to satisfy the meet and confer requirement. To sufficiently meet and confer, Plaintiff was required to make a genuine effort to resolve the discovery dispute. A single letter without any further meet and confer attempts does not meet this requirement. While the Court will consider the merits of the instant motion, future failure may result in denial of the respective motion.

In RPDs Nos. 3, 4, 8, 19, 30, and 41 Plaintiff requests copies of (i) documents between Defendant and its call center representatives and authorized dealers (RPD No. 3), (ii) documents in Defendant’s Customer Relations Center regarding the Subject Vehicle (RPD No. 4), and (iii) documents which evidence Technical Service Bulletins (TSBs) and recalls for 2019 Cadillac Escalade vehicles, (RPDs No. 8, 19, 30, and 41).

Defendant claims that there is nothing to compel as Defendant has “produced available responsive documents within its possession, custody and control and further directed Plaintiff to specific documents among its production (e.g., the Global Warranty History Report, incidentally-obtained repair orders, Repair Order Details, any Service Request Activity Report(s) and any corresponding Case Assessment, sales brochures for the 2019 Cadillac Escalade, and a list of TSBs and ISBs applicable to 2019 Cadillac Escalade vehicles, etc.), and where appropriate [Defendant responded that there were no relevant responsive documents (i.e. there are no recalls applicable to the Subject Vehicle).” (Response Separate Statement at p.12:19-25.) The Court disagrees. A response to an RPD consists of both a code complaint written response verifying any produced documents and the produced documents themselves. Thus, the mere fact that Defendant has provided the responsive documents does not mean that the responses verifying the document production are proper.

Here, the responses to each of the requests include boilerplate objections and a substantive response. For example, at to RPD No. 3, Defendant responds stating that “[Defendant] objects to this Request on grounds it is overbroad, unduly burdensome, oppressive, and seeks documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as it is not limited to the issues in this action. GM also objects to the extent this Request seeks confidential, proprietary and trade secret information. GM further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product doctrine. Subject to and without waiving its objections, GM will comply in part and refers Plaintiff to any Service Request Activity Report(s) and the Global Warranty History Report(s) that GM already produced in response to Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Production of Documents. No additional documents will be produced.” (Response to RPD No. 3.) The opposition essentially concedes that these objections are unwarranted because Defendant claims that it has produced all responsive documents in its possession, custody, or control regardless of the objections. Regardless, the substantive responses are not code compliant. In the substantive responses to RPDs No. 3 and 4, Defendant denotes that Defendant is only producing “in part.” As such, Defendant was required to identify the documents being withheld and the basis for the withholding. (See CCP § 2031.240(b)(1-2), [“b) If the responding party objects to the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of an item or category of item, the response shall do both of the following: (1) Identify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made. (2) Set forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection. If an objection is based on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege invoked shall be stated. If an objection is based on a claim that the information sought is protected work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010), that claim shall be expressly asserted.”] [Italics added.].) If all responsive documents are being produced the response must clearly identify as such stating that Defendant has produced all responsive documents in its possession, custody, or control and identify the responsive documents.

Similarly, if there are no responsive documents, the response should clearly and unequivocally state as such. The substantive responses to RPDs Nos. 8, 19, 30, and 41, state “Subject to and without waiving these objections, GM will comply in part refers Plaintiff to the list of technical service bulletins (TSBs) issued for vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE, produced in response to Plaintiff’s First Set of Requests for Production of Documents. GM states that the SUBJECT VEHICLE has no current record of field actions, including recalls, as shown in the following image from the Global Warranty History Report: [an image indicating no field actions is included below the response.]” (Response to RPDs No. 8, 19, 30, and 41.) As with the responses to RPDs No. 3 and 4, the substantive responses indicate that some documents are being withheld without identifying them. Further, if there are no responsive documents, the response should clearly state as such and state why no responsive documents exist such as there was no recall. Accordingly, as the responses to RPDs No. 3, 4, 8, 19, 30, and 41 are not code compliant and a further response is required.

“All DOCUMENTS referencing, evidencing, and/or relating to YOUR policies, procedures, or guidelines for determining whether a vehicle is eligible for a vehicle repurchase under the Song Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.” (RPD No. 1.)

“All DOCUMENTS that YOU use, since 2016, to evaluate consumers’ requests for repurchases pursuant to the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.” (RPD No. 6.)

“[Defendant] also objects to this Request on grounds it is overbroad, unduly burdensome, oppressive, and not relevant to the subject matter of this action or reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as it is not limited to the SUBJECT VEHICLE at issue in this action. [Defendant] also objects to this Request on grounds it is burdensome and oppressive, and that compliance would be unreasonably difficult and expensive considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. This is a simple, individual lemon law case with limited issues and this Request also violates Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 567. Specifically, whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is entirely unrelated and incommensurate to the scope and breadth of this Request. [Defendant] also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks confidential, proprietary, and trade secret information in the form of [Defendant]’s internal policies and procedures. GM further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product doctrine. No documents will be produced.” (Responses to RPD No. 1, 5-6.)[2]

“In general, when a party asserts the attorney-client privilege, that party has the burden of showing the preliminary facts necessary to support the privilege.” (Venture Law Group v. Superior Court (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 96, 102.) “The party asserting the privilege need only present facts which ‘support a prima facie claim of privilege.” (OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 874, 894.) “After this burden is met, or where there is no dispute concerning the preliminary facts, the burden shifts to the party opposing the privilege to show either the claimed privilege does not apply, an exception exists, or there has been an express or implied waiver.” (Venture Law Group, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p.102.)

Here, the requests do appear to include documents that could be protected by attorney client privilege – i.e., communications with previous counsel about prior lemon law actions. However, Defendant has failed to provide any privilege log identifying what if any responsive documents Defendant is withholding on the basis of attorney client privilege/work product. Though Defendant may have properly raised attorney client privilege, there are undoubtedly responsive documents to at least some of these requests that are not privileged. Moreover, to the extent that there are privileged documents, Defendant has not indicated which specific document are privileged. Defendant’s blanket assertion of privilege is insufficient. Defendant must produce a privilege log identifying what documents Defendant is withholding and enough factual information to support a prima facie claim of privilege. (See CCP § 2031.240(b)(1-2), [“b) If the responding party objects to the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of an item or category of item, the response shall do both of the following: (1) Identify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made. (2) Set forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection. If an objection is based on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege invoked shall be stated. If an objection is based on a claim that the information sought is protected work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010), that claim shall be expressly asserted.”] [Italics added.].)

Accordingly, Defendant must provide a privilege log identifying which if any documents Defendant is withholding and enough information to demonstrate that the attorney client privilege/work product protects the document(s) identified.

Evidence Code section 1060 provides that “the owner of a trade secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret, and to prevent another from disclosing it, if the allowance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice.” A trade secret is defined as “information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.” (Civ. Code, § 3426.1(d).) In setting forth whether a trade secret privilege applies, the Court of Appeal has stated that:

[T]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of establishing its existence. [Citations.] Thereafter, the party seeking discovery must make a prima facie, particularized showing that the information sought is relevant and necessary to the proof of, or defense against, a material element of one or more causes of action presented in the case, and that it is reasonable to conclude that the information sought is essential to a fair resolution of the lawsuit. It is then up to the holder of the privilege to demonstrate any claimed disadvantages of a protective order. Either party may propose or oppose less intrusive alternatives to disclosure of the trade secret, but the burden is upon the trade secret claimant to demonstrate that an alternative to disclosure will not be unduly burdensome to the opposing side and that it will maintain the same fair balance in the litigation that would have been achieved by disclosure.

(Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1393.)

Here, Defendant fails to substantiate the claim that the evidence sought is trade secret information. Nor does Defendant provide authority demonstrating that a denial of discovery is warranted. To the extent that Defendant contends that a protective order is necessary, the Court refers the parties to the standard LASC Stipulation and Protective Order – Confidential Designation.

As to the overbreadth objection, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matters, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (CCP § 2017.010.) “[A]n implicit waiver of a party's constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff's claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842.) However, discovery should not be denied if the information sought has any relevance to the subject matter. Thus, while relevancy is a possible ground for an objection, it is difficult to adequately justify it. (See generally Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 217.) “These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery, and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases.” (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546 [internal citation omitted].)

Under the Song-Beverly Act, “[i]f the buyer establishes that the failure to comply was willful,” the buyer may be entitled to receive a civil penalty, up to two times the amount of actual damages. (Civ. Code § 1794(c).) A defendant that did not replace or refund a vehicle under a “good faith and reasonable belief that the facts imposing the statutory obligation were not present” is not willful. (Lukather v. General Motors, LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1051.) Nor does willfulness require a showing of malice or wrongdoing towards the other party. (Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 878, 894.) Rather, willful “amounts to nothing more than this: that the defendant knows what it is doing and intends to do what it is doing.” (Bishop v. Hyundai Motor America (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 750, 759.) “Whether a manufacturer willfully violated its obligation to repair the car or refund the purchase price is a factual question for the jury[.]” (Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1104.)

As to burden, “burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required” and “to support an objection of oppression there must be some showing either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.” (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) Moreover, even if [discovery requests] are found to be “burdensome and oppressive,” the Court should not simply sustain the objection and thereby excuse any answer. Rather, the Court should limit the question to a reasonable scope. (Borse v. Superior Court (Southern Pac. Co.) (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 286, 289.)

Here, as to burden objection, Defendant fails to substantiate the quantum of work it would take to respond to these requests in either the responses or the opposition. Further, the requests are relevant as to whether the policies show that Defendant is intentionally violating its Song-Beverly obligations or that Defendant deviated from policy with regards to Plaintiff’s claims showing that Defendant willfully did not comply with its Song-Beverly obligations.

However, the requests are overbroad as the only time period would be when Plaintiff’s issues with the vehicle arose. As noted by Plaintiff’s Counsel declaration, Plaintiff’s issues with the vehicle did not arise until November 25, 2020. (Yowarski Decl. ¶ 8, Exh. 1.) As such only the internal policies applicable from November 25, 2020 onward would be applicable. As the objections are unsupported a further response is required; however, as the requests are slightly overbroad, RPDs No. 1, and 5-6 are temporarily limited to documents from November 25, 2020 onward.

Each of these requests seeks documents regarding defects involving other vehicles. In near identical response to each of these requests that:

“[Defendant] also objects to this Request on grounds it improperly assumes that there are alleged defects with respect to the SUBJECT VEHICLE, or CADILLAC VEHICLES, generally. GM also objects to this Request on grounds it is overbroad and seeks documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as it is not limited to the SUBJECT VEHICLE at issue in this action. [Defendant] also objects to this Request on grounds it is burdensome and oppressive, and that compliance would be unreasonably difficult and expensive considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. This is a simple, individual lemon law case with limited issues and this Request violates Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 567. Specifically, whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is entirely unrelated and incommensurate to the scope and breadth of this Request. [Defendant] also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks confidential, proprietary and trade secret information. [Defendant] further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product doctrine. No documents will be produced.” (Response to RPDs No. 2, 7, 9-18, 20-29, 31-40, and 42-50.)

As with the objections above, the claims for attorney client privilege and work product privilege require a privilege log identifying documents being withheld as none of the requests on their face clearly and solely seek attorney client privileged documents. Similarly, the claim for trade privilege while a basis for a protective order or for an evidentiary privilege is not itself a basis to completely deny responding to a discovery request. As to burden, no evidence of the quantum of work has been shown. Without such evidence, the Court cannot conclude that the burden in responding is so high as to warrant limiting discovery.

Further, the requests are relevant in part. As noted above, under the Song-Beverly Act, “[i]f the buyer establishes that the failure to comply was willful,” the buyer may be entitled to receive a civil penalty, up to two times the amount of actual damages. (Civ. Code § 1794(c).) A defendant that did not replace or refund a vehicle under a “good faith and reasonable belief that the facts imposing the statutory obligation were not present” is not willful. (Lukather, supra, 181 Cal.App.4th at p.1051.) Nor does willfulness require a showing of malice or wrongdoing towards the other party. (Ibrahim, supra, 214 Cal.App.3d at p.894.) Rather, willful “amounts to nothing more than this: that the defendant knows what it is doing and intends to do what it is doing.” (Bishop, supra, 44 Cal.App.4th at p.759.) “Whether a manufacturer willfully violated its obligation to repair the car or refund the purchase price is a factual question for the jury[.]” (Oregel, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th at p.1104.) Accordingly, “information regarding whether the same defects were reported to [Defendant] in other cars of the same make, model, and year as Plaintiff's subject vehicle could conceivably be relevant to whether [Defendant] acted reasonably in denying Plaintiff's warranty claim. A fact finder may find [Defendant]'s knowledge or lack of knowledge about the same defects to be a consideration in deciding whether [Defendant] acted in good faith as to Plaintiff's specific case.” (Jensen v. BMW of North America, LLC (S.D. Cal. 2019) 328 F.R.D. 557, 562–563, [italics added]; see also Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 540, 555 [“Evidence of prior accidents is admissible to prove a defective condition, knowledge, or the cause of an accident, provided that the circumstances of the other accidents are similar and not too remote.”].)

However, Plaintiff’s requests are not limited to the “same defect”. The complaint fails to identify any specific defects but merely states that there were serious defects “not limited to, transmission, structural, electrical, engine, and emission system defects.” (Complaint ¶ 18.) This vague allegation merely lists any possible defect that could exist and thus is unhelpful in determining the scope of relevant discovery. The discovery request is similarly unhelpful as the requests seek “alleged defects,” (See RPD No. 2), or to the defined terms “TRANSMISSION DEFECTS”, “STRUCTURAL DEFECTS”, “ELECTRICAL DEFECTS”, and “ENGINE DEFECTS”. However, as defined these terms are similarly overbroad as seen in the definitions below:

“TRANSMISSION DEFECTS” shall be understood to mean such defects which result in symptoms including: defects resulting in vehicle jerking/slamming into gears when accelerating; defects causing hard shift in gears, and/or other similar concerns identified in the repair history for the SUBJECT VEHICLE.

“STRUCTURAL DEFECTS” shall be understood to mean such defects which result in symptoms including: defects resulting in chrome peeling from center console; defects leading to front floor console compartment bezel being replaced, and/or other similar concerns identified in the repair history for the SUBJECT VEHICLE.

“ELECTRICAL DEFECTS” shall be understood to mean such defects which result in symptoms including: defects resulting in air conditioner not blowing cold air from time to time; defects leading to intermittent compressor disengagement; defects resulting in compressor clutch not being fully secured; defects causing vehicle to stall and to not turn on; defects causing cue screen to go blank; defects contributing to slow cranks in vehicle; defects leading to battery replacement, and/or other similar concerns identified in the repair history for the SUBJECT VEHICLE.

“ENGINE DEFECTS” shall be understood to mean such defects which result in symptoms including: defects causing check engine light to come on; defects contributing to vehicle to shake; defects leading to temperature sensor replacement; defects resulting in abnormal noises when the vehicle shifts into gears; defects involving water outlet heater hose leaking and having to be replaced; and/or other similar concerns identified in the repair history for the SUBJECT VEHICLE.

However, many of these issues are not clearly alleged nor identified in the pertinent repair history. Thus, Plaintiff improperly seeks plainly irrelevant documents involving defects Plaintiff did not experience. As noted in Plaintiff’s Counsel’s declaration, the Subject Vehicle suffered “the vehicle feeling like it is jerking/slamming into gear”, “the chrome trim on the center console was peeling”, “check engine light going on and that the Subject Vehicle would constantly start shaking”, “the vehicle stalled out on the road and would not turn on”, “the check engine light being on and how the Subject Vehicle would make a weird noise when in gear”, “the water outlet heater hose was leaking”, “the check engine light being on and that the car stalled when in operation”, “the cue screen turning black”, “difficult[ly] putting the gear shifter into the appropriate gear”, and “the vehicle making slow cranks after being stationary for a few minutes.” (Yowarski Decl. ¶¶ 7-12, Exh. 1.) As such requests beyond these defects such as the “air conditioner not blowing” are plainly irrelevant as that defect was not suffered by the Subject Vehicle.

Accordingly, as the requests are slightly overbroad, the requests are limited to the same year and model as the Subject Vehicle – i.e., 2019 Cadillac Escalade – geographically limited to California, and limited to complaints/defects involving “the vehicle feeling like it is jerking/slamming into gear”, “the chrome trim on the center console was peeling”, “check engine light going on and that the Subject Vehicle would constantly start shaking”, “the vehicle stalled out on the road and would not turn on”, “the check engine light being on and how the Subject Vehicle would make a weird noise when in gear”, “the water outlet heater hose was leaking”, “the check engine light being on and that the car stalled when in operation”, “the cue screen turning black”, “difficult[ly] putting the gear shifter into the appropriate gear”, and “the vehicle making slow cranks after being stationary for a few minutes.” Therefore, a further response as limited above is required.

Sanctions were not requested in the notice. Therefore, no sanctions can be awarded. (CCP § 2023.040, [“A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought.”].)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Ebrahim A. Arshadnia’s motion to compel further responses to the Request for Production of Documents, Set Two from Defendant General Motors, LLC is GRANTED.

Defendant General Motors, LLC is to provide a further code compliant response to Request for Production, Set Two No. 1-50 without objection except as to attorney-client/work product privilege within 10 days of notice of this order. As to Requests No. 2, 7, 9-18, 20-29, 31-40, and 42-50, the requests are limited to the same year and model as the Subject Vehicle – i.e., 2019 Cadillac Escalade – geographically limited to California, and limited to complaints/defects involving “the vehicle feeling like it is jerking/slamming into gear”, “the chrome trim on the center console was peeling”, “check engine light going on and that the Subject Vehicle would constantly start shaking”, “the vehicle stalled out on the road and would not turn on”, “the check engine light being on and how the Subject Vehicle would make a weird noise when in gear”, “the water outlet heater hose was leaking”, “the check engine light being on and that the car stalled when in operation”, “the cue screen turning black”, “difficult[ly] putting the gear shifter into the appropriate gear”, and “the vehicle making slow cranks after being stationary for a few minutes.”

Defendant is to provide responsive documents – compliant with the further responses – and any applicable privilege log within 15 days of notice of this order.

[1] The cited exhibit no. 4 is not Defendant’s response to the RPDs at issue but appears to be Defendant’s response to discovery in a completely unrelated action.

[2] The only differences in the responses are the specific terms that Defendant contends are vague and ambiguous.

County of Los Angeles

Department 26