Judge Elaine Lu, Case 22STCV17498 2023-05-09 Tentative Ruling

On May 27, 2022, Plaintiffs Manuel Maravilla and Juliana Anaya (jointly “Plaintiffs”) filed the instant action against Defendant Nissan North America, Inc. (“Defendant”) arising from the purchase of a 2021 Nissan Kicks. The complaint asserts three causes of action for (1) Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Breach of Express Warranty, (2) Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Breach of Implied Warranty, and (3) Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act – Civil Code § 1793.2(b).

On November 28, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the instant motion to compel Defendant’s further response to Special Interrogatories, Set One (“SROGs”). On April 11, 2023, the Court ordered the parties to further meet and confer regarding the SROGs at issue. (Minute Order 4/11/23.) On April 21, Plaintiff filed a declaration regarding the meet and confer efforts. On May 2, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a notice of non-opposition. On May 5, 2023, Defendant filed a non-opposition.

Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300 provides that “[o]n receipt of a response to interrogatories, the propounding party may move for an order compelling a further response if the propounding party deems that any of the following apply: (1) An answer to a particular interrogatory is evasive or incomplete; [or] (2) An exercise of the option to produce documents under Section 2030.230 is unwarranted or the required specification of those documents is inadequate; [or] (3) An objection to an interrogatory is without merit or too general.” (CCP § 2030.300(a).)

Notice of the motion must be given within 45 days of service of the verified response, or upon a later date agreed to in writing. Otherwise, the propounding party waives any right to compel a further response. (CCP § 2031.310(c).) The motion must also be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration. (CCP § 2031.310(b)(2).)

The burden is on the responding part to justify any objection or failure fully to answer the interrogatories. (Fairmont Ins. Co. v. Superior Court (Stendell) (2000) 22 Cal. 4th 245, 255.)

Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2030.300(b)(1) a motion to compel further responses to interrogatories “shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.” (CCP § 2030.300(b)(1).) “A meet and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue presented by the motion.” (CCP § 2016.040.)

On July 8, 2022, Plaintiffs served the instant SROGs at issue. (Bohloul 11/23/22 Decl. ¶ 10, Exh. F.) On August 23, 2022, Defendant served an unverified response.[1] (Bohloul 11/23/22 Decl. ¶ 11, Exh. H.) On August 29, 2022 and September 7, 2022, Plaintiffs’ Counsel sent meet and confer letters. (Bohloul 11/23/22 Decl. ¶¶ 12-13, Exhs. I-J.) On September 12, 2022, Defense Counsel responded to the meet and confer letter reasserting the various objections. (Bohloul 11/23/22 Decl. ¶ 14, Exh. K.) On November 2, 2022, Plaintiffs’ Counsel sent a follow up meet and confer letter but did not receive a response before Plaintiffs filed the instant motion. (Bohloul 11/23/22 Decl. ¶¶ 16-17, Exh. L.)

As noted above, on April 11, 2023, the Court ordered the parties to further meet and confer. (Minute Order 4/11/23.) Plaintiffs’ Counsel states that on April 19, 2023, the parties met and conferred, and Defendant agreed to provide the names of the individuals at issue by May 19, 2023 and agreed to continue the instant hearing, but the parties could not agree to a specific date. (Bohloul 4/21/23 Decl. ¶¶ 4-5.) In Defendant’s Non-Opposition, Defense Counsel expresses Defendant’s belief that all the issues have been resolved and that the instant motion to compel further is unnecessary because Defendant will provide supplemental responses within 45 days. (Yu Decl. ¶¶ 5-6.)

Though Defendant contends the instant motion is moot because Defendant has agreed to supplement their response, no response has yet been served. Moreover, Plaintiffs have not conceded that the instant motion is now moot. Accordingly, the Court turns to the merits of the instant motion. Here, Plaintiffs seek to compel Defendant’s further response to SROGs Nos. 14, 20, 39, and 43.

“IDENTIFY all PERSONS who performed warranty repairs upon the SUBJECT VEHICLE.” (SROG No. 14

“Nissan objects to this Interrogatory to the extent it calls for premature expert disclosure and/or attorney work product information. Nissan further objects to this Interrogatory insofar as it seeks to invade the privacy rights of third persons and/or seeks the disclosure of confidential information pertaining to third persons. (See Hoffman Corp. v. Superior Court (1985) 172 Cal.App.3d 357, 362; Olympic Club v. Superior Court (1991) 229 Cal.App.3d 358, 363.) Nissan objects to this Interrogatory on the grounds that it is vague, ambiguous, overbroad, unduly burdensome and calling for a compilation. The interrogatory seeks information that is not relevant to nor likely to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.

Subject to and without waiving any objections, Nissan North America, Inc. did not perform any repairs on Plaintiff’s vehicle. Nissan is aware of one dealership who serviced the vehicle: Downey Nissan and Nissan of Downtown Los Angeles. Nissan refers Plaintiff to the Downey Nissan and Nissan of Downtown Los Angeles service records and the Vehicle Information and Service History which provides the technician number for each service.” (Response to SROG No. 14.)

“IDENTIFY all PERSONS who inspected or tested the SUBJECT VEHICLE during the RELEVANT PERIOD.” (SROG No. 20.)

Nissan refers Plaintiff to the Downey Nissan and Nissan of Downtown Los Angeles service records and the Vehicle Information and Service History which provides the technician number for each service.” (Response to SROG No. 20.)

“Identify the individual(s) whose responsibility it is to supervise to ensure that YOU are properly determining whether a vehicle should be repurchased or replaced pursuant to The Song-Beverly Warranty Act.” (SROG No. 39.)

“Nissan North America, Inc. objects to this interrogatory as vague and overly broad. Nissan North America, Inc. further objects on the grounds that this request is argumentative. In addition, Nissan objects to Plaintiff’s proposed definition of “YOU” as overly broad, harassing, unduly burdensome, and improperly calling for information from third parties over whom Nissan has no control, against whom this lawsuit has not been filed, for whom Nissan is not liable, and over whom this court has no jurisdiction. Nissan also objects to Plaintiff’s definition of YOU to the extent that it seeks information that is subject to the attorney-client or work product privilege. Without waiving these objections Nissan North America, Inc. will identify the individual upon receipt of a deposition notice for its corporate witness pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2025.230.” (Response to SROG No. 39.)

“Identify all individuals responsible for YOUR decision to not repurchase or replace the Subject Vehicle.” (SROG No. 40.)

“Nissan North America, Inc. objects to this interrogatory as vague and overly broad. Nissan North America, Inc. further objects on the grounds that this request is argumentative. Nissan objects to Plaintiff’s proposed definition of “YOUR” as overly broad, harassing, unduly burdensome, and improperly calling for information from third parties over whom Nissan has no control, against whom this lawsuit has not been filed, for whom Nissan is not liable, and over whom this court has no jurisdiction. Nissan also objects to Plaintiff’s definition of YOUR to the extent that it seeks information that is subject to the attorney-client or work product privilege.” (Response to SROG No. 40.)

As to the overbroad objection “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matters, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (CCP § 2017.010.) “[A]n implicit waiver of a party's constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff's claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.” (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842.) However, discovery should not be denied if the information sought has any relevance to the subject matter. Thus, while relevancy is a possible ground for an objection, it is difficult to adequately justify it. (See generally Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 217.) “These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery, and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases.” (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546 [internal citation omitted].)

As to burden, “burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required” and “to support an objection of oppression there must be some showing either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.” (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.) Moreover, even if [discovery requests] are found to be “burdensome and oppressive,” the Court should not simply sustain the objection and thereby excuse any answer. Rather, the Court should limit the question to a reasonable scope. (Borse v. Superior Court (Southern Pac. Co.) (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 286, 289.)

Here, each of the requests is clearly relevant as they seek the identity of witnesses and potential tortfeasors. In fact,

“‘[t]he disclosure of the names and addresses of potential witnesses is a routine and essential part of pretrial discovery.’ [Citation.]” (Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1249–1250.) Thus, the identity of witnesses who performed warranty repairs or who made the decision to not repurchase or replace is clearly relevant.

“In general, when a party asserts the attorney-client privilege, that party has the burden of showing the preliminary facts necessary to support the privilege.” (Venture Law Group v. Superior Court (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 96, 102.) “The party asserting the privilege need only present facts which ‘support a prima facie claim of privilege.” (OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 874, 894.) “After this burden is met, or where there is no dispute concerning the preliminary facts, the burden shifts to the party opposing the privilege to show either the claimed privilege does not apply, an exception exists, or there has been an express or implied waiver.” (Venture Law Group, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p.102.) Moreover, “the identity and location of witnesses is discoverable regardless of attorney work that went into locating them. (See Aerojet-General Corp. v. Transport Indemnity Insurance (1993) 18 Cal.App.4th 996, 1004.)

Here, the requests seek the identification of witnesses. Accordingly, the objections as to work product and attorney client privilege are unsupported.

The right of privacy in the California Constitution (art. I, § 1), “protects the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy against a serious invasion.” (Puerto v. Superior Court (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1250 [italics in original]; See Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [“In Hill, we established a framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a threatened intrusion that is serious. The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A court must then balance these competing considerations.”].)

As the Supreme Court has “previously observed, the right of privacy extends to sexual relations (Vinson v. Superior Court, supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 841, 239) and medical records (Hill v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 41.).” (John B. v. Superior Court (2006) 38 Cal.4th 1177, 1198.) Similarly, the constitutional right to freedom of association requires protection of a person’s membership in associations, whether they pertain to religious, political, economic, or even purely social matters. (Britt v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 844, 852; see also Pacific-Union Club v. Superior Court (1991) 232 Cal.App.3d 60, 71.) Further, “‘Courts have frequently recognized that individuals have a substantial interest in the privacy of their home.’ [Citation.]” (Puerto, supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p.1252.)

In establishing a privacy interest “the burden [is] on the party asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and the seriousness of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the countervailing interests the opposing party identifies, as Hill requires.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th 531, 557.) “Only obvious invasions of interests fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling interest.” (Ibid.)

Here, Defendant has failed to substantiate any objection based on privacy. While there may be some third-party privacy interest, there is no indication that the mere identity or contact information of a direct witness would be serious enough to warrant a complete denial of discovery.

In sum, Defendant’s objections are unsubstantiated. Moreover, Defendant’s substantive responses are improper. As explained in Deyo v. Kilbourne (1978) 84 Cal.App.3d 771, “[a]nswers must be complete and responsive. Thus, it is not proper to answer by stating, ‘See my deposition,’ ‘See my pleading,’ or ‘See the financial statement.’ Indeed, if a question does require the responding party to make reference to a pleading or document, the pleading or document should be identified and summarized so the answer is fully responsive to the question.” (Id. at pp.783–784, [italics added].) Accordingly, further responses are required.

Sanctions were not requested in the notice. Therefore, no sanctions can be awarded. (CCP § 2023.040, [“A request for a sanction shall, in the notice of motion, identify every person, party, and attorney against whom the sanction is sought, and specify the type of sanction sought.”].)

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiffs Manuel Maravilla and Juliana Anaya’s motion to compel Defendant Nissan North America, Inc.’s further response to Special Interrogatories, Set One is GRANTED.

Defendant is to provide a further code complaint response to Special Interrogatories 14, 20, 39, and 43 within 45 days of notice of this order without objection.

Moving Parties are to give notice of this order to all parties and file proof of service of such.

[1] The lack of verification for the response did not result in a waiver of objections. Unverified responses “are tantamount to no responses at all.” (Appleton v. Superior Court (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 632, 636.) However, when objections and fact-specific responses are made “[t]he omission of the verification in the portion of the response containing fact-specific responses merely renders that portion of the response untimely and therefore only creates a right to move for orders and sanctions … as to those responses but does not result in a waiver of the objections made.” (Food 4 Less Supermarkets, Inc. v. Superior Court (1995) 40 Cal.App.4th 651, 657–658.)

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 26