Judge: Elaine Lu, Case: 22STCV17842, Date: 2023-02-28 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV17842 Hearing Date: February 28, 2023 Dept: 26
|
OSCAR CRUZ, Plaintiff, v. SAN FERNANDO MOTOR COMPANY dba
RYDELL AUTOMOTIVE GROUP; GENERAL MOTORS, LLC; et al., Defendants. |
Case No.: 22STCV17842 Hearing Date: February 28, 2023 [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION TO COMPEL DEFENDANT GENERAL MOTORS, LLC’S FURTHER RESPONSE TO REQUEST
FOR PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, SET ONE |
Procedural
Background
On January 19, 2022, Plaintiff Oscar Cruz (“Plaintiff”) filed the
instant action against Defendants General Motors, LLC (“GM”) and San Fernando
Motor Company dba Rydell Automotive Group (jointly “Defendants”) arising from
the purchase of a 2020 Chevrolet Colorado.
The complaint asserts three causes of action for (1) Violation of
Song-Beverly Act – Breach of Express Warranty, (2) Violation of Song-Beverly
Act -Breach of Implied Warranty, and (3) Negligent Repair.
On September 19, 2022, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel
Defendant GM’s further response to Request for Production of Documents, Set One
(“RPDs”). On February 14, 2023,
Defendant filed an opposition. On
February 21, 2023, Plaintiff filed a reply.
Legal Standard
Requests for Production of
Documents
Code of Civil
Procedure section 2031.310 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) On
receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or
sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response
to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply:
(1) A
statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.
(2) A
representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.
(3) An
objection in the response is without merit or too general.
(b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall
comply with both of the following:
(1) The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause
justifying the discovery sought by the demand.
(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer
declaration under Section 2016.040.
Code
Complaint Response
A
code-compliant response to a request for production consists of any of the
following: (1) a statement that the party will comply, (2) a representation
that the party lacks the ability to comply, or (3) an objection. (CCP §§ 2031.210.) A statement that the party
will comply must state that the Request for Production (“RPD”) “will be allowed
either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded
category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to
which no objection is being made will be included in the production.” (CCP § 2031.220.) “If only part of an item or category of
item in a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is
objectionable, the response shall contain a statement of compliance, or a representation
of inability to comply with respect to the remainder of that item or
category.” (CCP § 2031.240(a).) If an objection is made the responding party
must “[i]dentify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or
electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the
demand to which an objection is being made.”
(CCP § 2031.240(b)(1).)
Discussion
Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant GM’s further response
to RPDs nos. 16, 18-43, and 45-46
Time to File a Motion
A party making
a motion to compel further responses must do so within 45 days of service of
the verified response unless the parties agree in writing and specify a later
date. (CCP § 2031.310(c).) The 45-day
limit is jurisdictional as the Court has no authority to grant late-filed
papers. (Sexton v. Superior Court (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 1403,
1410.) However, “the 45-day clock runs
only upon service of verified responses, and responses consisting of both
factual responses and objections must be verified[.]” (Golf & Tennis Pro Shop, Inc. v.
Superior Court (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 127, 136.) Moreover, this 45-day limit is extended if
served by mail, overnight delivery, fax, or electronically. (See CCP §§ 1010.6(a)(4), 1013.)
On July 6,
2022, Plaintiff served the RPDs at issue on Defendant. (Powell Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. A.) On August 2, 2022, Defendant GM served its unverified
response to the RPDs at issue by electronic service. (Powell Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. B.) On September 8, 2022, Defendant GM
electronically served its verification.
(Powell Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. C.) Accordingly,
Plaintiff had until October 25, 2022 to timely file the instant motion. The instant motion filed on September 19,
2022 is timely.
Meet and Confer
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section
2031.310(b)(2) a motion to compel further responses to a request for production
“shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section
2016.040.” (CCP § 2031.310(b)(2).) “A meet
and confer declaration in support of a motion shall state facts showing a
reasonable and good faith attempt at an informal resolution of each issue
presented by the motion.” (CCP §
2016.040.) “The level of effort at
informal resolution which satisfies the ‘reasonable and good faith attempt’
standard depends upon the circumstances. In a larger, more complex discovery
context, a greater effort at informal resolution may be warranted. In a
simpler, or more narrowly focused case, a more modest effort may suffice. The
history of the litigation, the nature of the interaction between counsel, the
nature of the issues, the type and scope of discovery requested, the prospects
for success and other similar factors can be relevant.” (Obregon v. Superior Court (1998)
67 Cal.App.4th 424, 431.)
Here, Plaintiff’s Counsel sent a meet and confer letter on
September 13, 2022 to Defendant GM regarding all written discovery
responses. (Powell Decl. ¶ 8, Exh. D.) While the letter did discuss Defendant’s response
to RPDs nos. 16, 18-29, and 33-41, there was no discussion or attempt to meet
and confer as to RPDs nos. 30-32, 42-43, and 45-46. (Powell Decl. ¶ 8, Exh. D.) Plaintiff requested a response to the letter
by September 20, 2022. (Powell Decl. ¶
8, Exh. D.) Plaintiff’s Counsel emailed
Defense Counsel regarding the further meeting and conferring or extending the
deadline. Defense Counsel responded that
the attorney handling the case was out and would give a response by September
20, 2022. (Powell Decl. ¶ 9, Exh.
E.)
Here, the meet and confer efforts were clearly insufficient. Plaintiff merely sent a meet and confer
letter requesting a response by September 20, 2022 only addressing some of the
RPDs at issue. (Powell Decl. ¶ 8, Exh.
D.) Defense Counsel noted in email that
they would respond by the date specified in the meet and confer letter. (Powell Decl. ¶ 9, Exh. E.) However, Plaintiff decided to file the
instant motion before the deadline on September 19, 2022 without providing
Defendant GM the opportunity to respond as requested in the only meet and
confer effort. Thus, the meet and confer
efforts were insufficient as Plaintiff failed to provide any opportunity for
the parties to meet and confer.
As Plaintiffs made no effort to meet and confer with
regard to RPDs nos. 30-32, 42-43, and 45-46, Plaintiff’s motion to compel these
responses is DENIED for lack of meet and confer. As to RPDs No. 16, 18-29, and 33-41, while
the meet and confer was insufficient, Plaintiff made at least some minimal effort
to meet and confer, and thus, the Court will consider the merits of Plaintiff’s
motion to compel further responses to RPDs No. 16, 18-29, and 33-41.
RPDs No. 16, and 19-29
“All of YOUR warranty claims policy and procedure
manual(s) from 2020 to the present.”
(RPD No. 16.)
“All DOCUMENTS which describe the procedures used by YOU
for evaluating and responding to complaints by California consumers regarding
vehicles YOU manufactured or distributed since 2020.” (RPD No. 19.)
“All DOCUMENTS which describe policies, procedures and/or
instructions since 2020 that YOUR employees or agents should follow when
evaluating a customer request for a refund of their money paid towards or owed
on a motor vehicle manufactured or distributed by YOU.” (RPD No. 20.)
“All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies, procedures, or
guidelines for determining whether a vehicle is eligible for a vehicle
repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2020.” (RPD No. 21.)
“All training materials regarding the handling of
consumer requests for a vehicle repurchase in California since 2020.” (RPD No. 22.)
“All training materials for YOUR employees or agents
tasked with determining whether a vehicle is eligible or [sic] a vehicle
repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2020.” (RPD No. 23.)
“All scripts and flow charts that YOU utilize in handling
California consumer requests for a vehicle repurchase or replacement since 2020.” (RPD No. 24.)
“All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies, procedures, and
parameters for determining what constitutes a repair presentation to determine
eligibility for a vehicle repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since
2020.” (RPD No. 25.)
“All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies, procedures, and
parameters for determining what constitutes a ‘non-conformity’ to determine
eligibility for a vehicle repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since
2020.” (RPD No. 26.)
“All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies, procedures, and
parameters for determining what constitutes a ‘substantial impairment’ of a
vehicle’s use, value, or safety to determine eligibility for a vehicle
repurchase pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2020.” (RPD No. 27.)
“All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies, procedures, and
parameters for defining what constitutes a “reasonable number of repair
attempts” to determine eligibility for a vehicle repurchase pursuant to the
Song-Beverly Act since 2020.” (RPD No.
28.)
“All DOCUMENTS describing YOUR policies, procedures, and
parameters for establishing the turnaround time to respond to a vehicle
repurchase request pursuant to the Song-Beverly Act since 2020.” (RPD No. 29.)
In a near identical response to each RPD, Defendant GM states that:
“GM objects to this Request on grounds the term ‘describe’ is
overbroad, vague and ambiguous. GM also objects to this Request on grounds it
is overbroad and seeks documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably
calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, as it is not
limited in scope to the SUBJECT VEHICLE at issue in this action. GM also
objects to this Request on grounds it is burdensome and oppressive, and that
compliance would be unreasonably difficult and expensive considering the needs
of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation. This is a simple, individual lemon law case with
limited issues and this Request violates Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 567. Specifically,
whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act is entirely unrelated and incommensurate to the scope and breadth
of this Request. GM also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks
confidential, proprietary and trade secret information in the form of GM’s
internal policies and procedures. GM further objects to this Request to the
extent it seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or
work-product doctrine. No documents will be produced.” (Response RPD No. 19; see also Response to
RPD Nos. 16, 20-29.) [1]
Attorney Client Privilege/Work Product Privilege
“In
general, when a party asserts the attorney-client privilege, that party has the
burden of showing the preliminary facts necessary to support the
privilege.” (Venture Law Group v.
Superior Court (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 96, 102.) “The party asserting the privilege need only
present facts which ‘support a prima facie claim of privilege.” (OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior
Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 874, 894.)
“After this burden is met, or where there is no dispute concerning the
preliminary facts, the burden shifts to the party opposing the privilege to
show either the claimed privilege does not apply, an exception exists, or there
has been an express or implied waiver.”
(Venture Law Group, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p.102.)
Here, the requests do appear to include documents that
may be protected by attorney client privilege – i.e., communications
with previous counsel about prior lemon law actions. However, no privilege log has been provided
identifying what if any documents that are responsive are being withheld based
on attorney client privilege/work product.
While Defendant has properly raised attorney client privilege there are undoubtedly
responsive documents to at least some of these requests that are not
privileged. Moreover, to the extent that
there are privileged documents, Defendant has not indicated which specific
document are privileged. This is
insufficient as a privilege log must identify what documents are being withheld
and enough factual information to support a prima facie claim of privilege. (See
CCP § 2031.240(b)(1-2), [“b) If the responding party objects to the demand for
inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of an item or category of item, the
response shall do both of the following: (1) Identify with particularity any
document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information
falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is
being made. (2) Set forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for,
the objection. If an objection is based on a claim of privilege, the particular
privilege invoked shall be stated. If an objection is based on a claim that the
information sought is protected work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with
Section 2018.010), that claim shall be expressly asserted.”] [Italics
added.].)
Accordingly, Defendant GM must provide a privilege log
identifying any which documents are being withheld if any and sufficient information
to set forth that the document is protected by attorney client privilege/work
product.
Trade
Secret Objection
Evidence Code section 1060 provides that “the owner of a
trade secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret, and to prevent
another from disclosing it, if the allowance of the privilege will not tend to
conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice.”
A trade secret is defined as “information, including a formula, pattern,
compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) Derives
independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known
to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its
disclosure or use; and (2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under
the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”
(Civ. Code, § 3426.1(d).) In
applying whether a trade secret privilege applies the Court of Appeal stated
that:
[T]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of
establishing its existence. [Citations.] Thereafter, the party seeking
discovery must make a prima facie, particularized showing that the information
sought is relevant and necessary to the proof of, or defense against, a
material element of one or more causes of action presented in the case, and
that it is reasonable to conclude that the information sought is essential to a
fair resolution of the lawsuit. It is then up to the holder of the privilege to
demonstrate any claimed disadvantages of a protective order. Either party may
propose or oppose less intrusive alternatives to disclosure of the trade
secret, but the burden is upon the trade secret claimant to demonstrate that an
alternative to disclosure will not be unduly burdensome
to the opposing side and that it will maintain the same fair balance in the
litigation that would have been achieved by disclosure.
(Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 7
Cal.App.4th 1384, 1393.)
Here, Defendant GM fails to substantiate its claim that
the evidence sought is trade secret information. Nor does Defendant GM provide authority
warranting that a denial of discovery is warranted. To the extent that Defendant GM contends that
a protective order is necessary, the parties may simply stipulate and enter
into the standard LASC Stipulation and Protective Order – Confidential
Designation.
Relevance, Vague, Burdensome,
Overbroad, Oppressive
As to the
overbroad objection “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matters, not
privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter
either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (CCP § 2017.010.)
“[A]n implicit waiver of a party's constitutional rights encompasses only
discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff's claim and essential to the fair
resolution of the lawsuit.” (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43
Cal.3d 833, 842.) However, discovery should not be denied if the
information sought has any relevance to the subject matter. Thus,
while relevancy is a possible ground for an objection, it is difficult to
adequately justify it. (See generally Coy v. Superior Court of
Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 217.) “These rules are applied liberally in favor
of discovery, and (contrary to popular
belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some
cases.” (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th
1539, 1546 [internal citation omitted].)
As to burden, “burden must be
sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required” and “to support an
objection of oppression there must be some showing either of an intent to
create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is
incommensurate with the result sought.”
(West Pico Furniture Co. of Los
Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d
407, 417.) Moreover, even if [discovery
requests] are found to be “burdensome and oppressive,” the Court should not
simply sustain the objection and thereby excuse any answer. Rather, the Court
should limit the question to a reasonable scope. (Borse v. Superior Court
(Southern Pac. Co.) (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 286, 289.)
The objections based on overbroad,
vague, ambiguous, irrelevance, and burden are without merit. The objections fail to indicate what burden
Defendant GM would have to undergo to properly respond to these requests. Further, the processes for how claims are
dealt with are relevant to the claim for civil penalties. (Complaint ¶ 26.) Under Song-Beverly, “[i]f the buyer
establishes that the failure to comply was willful,” the buyer may be entitled
to receive a civil penalty, up to two times the amount of actual damages. (Civ. Code § 1794(c).) A defendant that did not replace or refund a
vehicle under a “good faith and reasonable belief that the facts imposing the
statutory obligation were not present” is not willful. (Lukather v.
General Motors, LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1051.) Nor does willful require a showing of malice
or wrongdoing towards the other party. (Ibrahim
v. Ford Motor Co. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 878, 894.) Rather, willful “amounts to nothing more than
this: that the defendant knows what it is doing and intends to do what it is
doing.” (Bishop v. Hyundai Motor
America (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 750, 759.) “Whether a manufacturer willfully violated
its obligation to repair the car or refund the purchase price is a factual
question for the jury[.]” (Oregel v.
American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1104.)
The procedure of how Song-Beverly
Act claims are handled may indicate that Defendant GM may have been predisposed
to improperly reject requests based on its procedure in handling claims.
Accordingly, the requests as to RPDs
Nos. 16, 19-29 are granted.
RPDs
No. 33-41
“All Technical Service Bulletins
which have been issued for the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT
VEHICLE.” (RPD No. 33.)
“All Recalls which have been issued
for vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE.” (RPD No. 34.)
“All Field Service Actions which
have been issued for the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT
VEHICLE.” (RPD No. 35.)
“All Special Service Messages that
have been issued for the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT
VEHICLE.” (RPD No. 36.)
“DOCUMENTS sufficient to identify
all of YOUR OBDII codes for the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT
VEHICLE.” (RPD No. 37.)
“DOCUMENTS sufficient to show all of
YOUR vehicle symptom codes for the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT
VEHICLE.” (RPD No. 38.)
“DOCUMENTS sufficient to show all of
YOUR vehicle component repair codes for the same year, make, and model as the
SUBJECT VEHICLE.” (RPD No. 39.)
“DOCUMENTS sufficient to show all of
YOUR customer complaint codes from 2020 to present.” (RPD No. 40.)
“DOCUMENTS sufficient to show all labor
operation codes provided by YOU to YOUR authorized dealerships from 2020 to
present.” (RPD No. 41.)
In
substantively identical responses Defendant GM states:
“GM objects to this Request on
grounds it is overbroad and seeks documents that are irrelevant and not
reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence, as it is
not limited in scope to the SUBJECT VEHICLE or issues in this action. GM also
objects to this Request on grounds it is burdensome and oppressive, and that
compliance would be unreasonably difficult and expensive considering the needs
of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at
stake in the litigation. This is a simple, individual lemon law case with
limited issues and this Request violates Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 567. Specifically,
whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer
Warranty Act is entirely unrelated and incommensurate to the scope and breadth
of this Request.
Subject to and without waiving these
objections, GM will comply in part and produce the following documents in its
possession, custody and control: a list of technical service bulletins (“TSBs”)
for vehicles of the same year, make and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE. After it
has produced a list of TSBs, GM will – at Plaintiff’s request – search for and
produce, if located, copies of a reasonable number of TSBs, if any, that
Plaintiff has identified as relevant to the conditions alleged in Plaintiff’s
complaint. GM also will produce the following documents in its possession,
custody and control: copies of the bulletins for every field action, including
any recalls, it issued for the SUBJECT VEHICLE as identified in the Global
Warranty History Report.” (Responses to
RPDs No. 33-41.)
Trade Secret
As per the discussion above,
Defendant GM fails to substantiate any basis to deny discovery based on a trade
secret claim.
Relevance,
Vague, Burdensome, Overbroad, Oppressive
As to the
overbroad objection “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matters, not
privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending
action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter
either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” (CCP § 2017.010.)
“[A]n implicit waiver of a party's constitutional rights encompasses only
discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff's claim and essential to the fair
resolution of the lawsuit.” (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43
Cal.3d 833, 842.) However, discovery should not be denied if the
information sought has any relevance to the subject matter. Thus,
while relevancy is a possible ground for an objection, it is difficult to
adequately justify it. (See generally Coy v. Superior Court of
Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 217.) “These rules are applied liberally in favor
of discovery, and (contrary to popular
belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some
cases.” (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th
1539, 1546 [internal citation omitted].)
As to burden, “burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum
of work required” and “to support an objection of oppression there must be some
showing either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the
ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.” (West
Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles
County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.)
Moreover, even if [discovery requests] are found to be “burdensome and
oppressive,” the Court should not simply sustain the objection and thereby
excuse any answer. Rather, the Court should limit the question to a reasonable
scope. (Borse v. Superior Court (Southern Pac. Co.) (1970) 7
Cal.App.3d 286, 289.)
The objections based on overbroad, vague, ambiguous, irrelevance, and
burden are without merit. The objections
fail to indicate what burden Defendant would have to undergo to properly
respond to these requests. Further, the
requests are limited to the same year of the subject vehicle and are clearly
relevant to the claim of for civil penalties.
(Complaint ¶ 26.) Under
Song-Beverly, “[i]f the buyer establishes that the failure to comply was
willful,” the buyer may be entitled to receive a civil penalty, up to two times
the amount of actual damages. (Civ. Code
§ 1794(c).) A defendant that did not
replace or refund a vehicle under a “good faith and reasonable belief that the
facts imposing the statutory obligation were not present” is not
willful. (Lukather v. General Motors, LLC (2010) 181
Cal.App.4th 1041, 1051.) Nor does
willful require a showing of malice or wrongdoing towards the other party. (Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co. (1989)
214 Cal.App.3d 878, 894.) Rather,
willful “amounts to nothing more than this: that the defendant knows what it is
doing and intends to do what it is doing.”
(Bishop v. Hyundai Motor America (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 750,
759.) “Whether a manufacturer willfully
violated its obligation to repair the car or refund the purchase price is a
factual question for the jury[.]” (Oregel
v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1104.)
Accordingly, “information regarding whether the same defects were
reported to [Defendant] in other cars of the same make, model, and year as Plaintiff's
subject vehicle could conceivably be relevant to whether [Defendant] acted
reasonably in denying Plaintiff's warranty claim. A fact finder may find
[Defendant]'s knowledge or lack of knowledge about the same defects to be
a consideration in deciding whether [Defendant] acted in good faith as to
Plaintiff's specific case.” (Jensen
v. BMW of North America, LLC (S.D. Cal. 2019) 328 F.R.D. 557, 562–563;
see also Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 540, 555
[“Evidence of prior accidents is admissible to prove a defective condition,
knowledge, or the cause of an accident, provided that the circumstances of the
other accidents are similar and not too remote.”]. However, these requests are
overbroad as they are not geographically limited to California or limited to
the same make, model and year.
Accordingly, the requests as to RPDs No. 33-41 are granted with that
limitation.
RPD
No. 18
“The operative Franchise Agreement,
if any, on the date of sale of the SUBJECT VEHICLE between YOU and the
dealership that sold the SUBJECT VEHICLE to Plaintiff.” (RPD No. 18.)
“GM objects to this Request on
grounds the term ‘operative Franchise Agreement’ is vague and ambiguous. The
contract between GM and the independently owned and operated GM-authorized
dealerships who may have performed repairs on the SUBJECT VEHICLE under
Warranty is irrelevant to the pending claims and defenses. No documents will be
produced.” (Response to RPD No. 18.)
Relevance
Here, Plaintiff failed to explain in
the moving papers or separate statement why the franchise agreement is relevant
to the instant action. Similarly, the
complaint fails to allege any basis as to why the franchise agreement would be
relevant to the instant. Absent such
information, the Court cannot conclude that this request has any merit or even
potentially seeks relevant information.
Accordingly, as to RPD no. 18, the request is denied.
Sanctions
Plaintiff requests sanctions against Defendant and Defense Counsel for $2,685.00
to compensate Plaintiff for bringing the instant motion.
For a motion to compel further responses,
“[t]he court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or
attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a
response to [request for production], unless it finds that the one subject
to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other
circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.” (CCP § 2031.300(c), [italics added].) Further, it is an abuse of discovery to make
an evasive response or make unsubstantiated objections to discovery. (CCP § 2023.010(e)-(f).)
As a preliminary matter, the amount requested
is utterly unsupported on its face. The
instant motion is clearly copied and pasted with little to no effort in even
attempting to describe the basis for bringing the instant motion. Moreover, Plaintiff failed to sufficiently meet and
confer which is itself
sanctionable. (CCP § 2023.020.) Further, Plaintiff fails to explain why all
the at issue requests are relevant such that there was good cause in bringing
the instant motion. Accordingly, the
Court finds that the imposition of sanction against Defendant GM would be
unjust. Accordingly,
Plaintiff’s request for monetary sanctions is DENIED.
CONCLUSION AND ORDER
Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Julio
Chavez’s motion to compel further responses to Request for Production, Set One
from Defendant Nissan North America, Inc. is GRANTED as to requests 16, 19-29,
33-41 but otherwise DENIED.
Defendant General Motors, LLC is to
provide further code compliant responses to requests 16, 19-29, 33-41 without objection
– except attorney client privilege/work product – with the geographical limit
of California and limited as to the same make, model, and year as Plaintiff’s
vehicle within 30 days of notice of this order.
Defendant is to simultaneously provide a privilege log identifying any
documents withheld based on attorney client privilege/work product.
Plaintiff’s
request for sanctions is DENIED.
Moving Party is to give notice and
file proof of service of such.
DATED: February 28, 2023 _____________________________
Elaine
Lu
Judge
of the Superior Court
[1]
The only difference in the responses is the specific terms that Defendant
contends are vague and ambiguous.