Judge: Elaine Lu, Case: 22STCV18757, Date: 2023-08-08 Tentative Ruling





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Case Number: 22STCV18757    Hearing Date: January 24, 2024    Dept: 26

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 26

 

BARBARA MCGEE,

                        Plaintiffs,

            v.

 

general motors, llc, et al.

                        Defendants.

 

  Case No.:  22STCV18757

 

  Hearing Date:  January 24, 2024

 

[TENTATIVE] order RE:

Plaintiff’s motion to compel defendant’s further responses to request for production, set one

 

Procedural Background

            On June 7, 2022, Plaintiff Barbara McGee (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant action against Defendant General Motors, LLC (“Defendant”) arising from the purchase of a 2015 Cadillac ATS (“Subject Vehicle”).  The complaint asserts five causes of action for (1) Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(d), (2) Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(b), (3) Violation of Civil Code § 1793.2(a)(3), (4) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Merchantability, and (5) Violation of the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act.

            On June 30, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant motion to compel Defendant’s further responses to Request for Production of Documents, Set One (“RPDs”).  On October 18, 2023, the Court ordered the parties to further meet and confer and file a joint statement as to any remaining RPDs at issue.  On January 10, 2024, Defendant filed an opposition.  On January 16, 2024, the parties filed a joint statement.  On January 18, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply.

 

Evidentiary Objections

            Plaintiff has submitted various objections to the declaration in support of the opposition to the instant motion.  However, these objections are unnecessary because the Court, when reviewing the evidence is presumed to ignore material it knows is incompetent, irrelevant, or inadmissible.  (In re Marriage of Davenport (2011) 194 Cal. App. 4th 1507, 1526.)  Courts are presumed to know and apply the correct statutory and case law and to be able to distinguish admissible from inadmissible evidence, relevant from irrelevant facts, and to recognize those facts which properly may be considered in the judicial decision-making process.  (People v. Coddington (2000) 23 Cal.4th 529, 644.)  Moreover, there is no statutory basis for evidentiary objections in connection with the instant motion.

 

Legal Standard

Requests for Production of Documents

Code of Civil Procedure section 2031.310 provides, in pertinent part, as follows:

(a) On receipt of a response to a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling, the demanding party may move for an order compelling further response to the demand if the demanding party deems that any of the following apply:

(1) A statement of compliance with the demand is incomplete.

(2) A representation of inability to comply is inadequate, incomplete, or evasive.

(3) An objection in the response is without merit or too general.

(b) A motion under subdivision (a) shall comply with both of the following:

(1) The motion shall set forth specific facts showing good cause justifying the discovery sought by the demand.

(2) The motion shall be accompanied by a meet and confer declaration under Section 2016.040.

 

Code Complaint Response

A code-compliant response to a request for production consists of any of the following: (1) a statement that the party will comply, (2) a representation that the party lacks the ability to comply, or (3) an objection.  (CCP §§ 2031.210.)  A statement that the party will comply must state that the Request for Production (“RPD”) “will be allowed either in whole or in part, and that all documents or things in the demanded category that are in the possession, custody, or control of that party and to which no objection is being made will be included in the production.”  (CCP § 2031.220.)  “If only part of an item or category of item in a demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling is objectionable, the response shall contain a statement of compliance, or a representation of inability to comply with respect to the remainder of that item or category.”  (CCP § 2031.240(a).)  If an objection is made the responding party must “[i]dentify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made.”  (CCP § 2031.240(b)(1).)

 

Discussion

            Pursuant to the joint statement, Plaintiff seeks to compel Defendant’s further response to RPDs No. 3, 7, 9, 12, 17, 21, 22, 25, 27, 31, 33, 34, 36, 41, 42, 43, 51, 68, 72, 76, 78, 79, and 82.

 

RPDs No. 12, 17, 21, 22, 25, 27, 31, 33, 34, 41, 42, 43, 51, 68, 72, 78, 79, and 82

            “All pre-sale or pre-purchase DOCUMENTS that YOU made available to purchasers or lessees concerning the disclosure of a problem, failures, malfunctions, or defect(s) regarding the COOLING SYSTEM DEFECT(S) in CADILLAC Vehicles equipped with the cooling system like the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”  (RPD No. 12.)

            “All DOCUMENTS, including e-mails, concerning any internal analysis or investigations by YOU or on YOUR behalf regarding COOLING SYSTEM DEFECT(S) in CADILLAC VEHICLES equipped with the cooling system like the SUBJECT VEHICLE. [This request shall be interpreted to include any prerelease or post-release investigation and analysis to determine the root cause of such COOLING SYSTEM DEFECT(S), any such investigation for implementing a countermeasure or permanent repair procedure for such COOLING SYSTEM DEFECT(S), any such investigation into the failure rates of parts associated with such COOLING SYSTEM DEFECT(S), any cost analysis for implementing a proposed repair procedure, any savings analysis for not implementing proposed repair procedures, etc. Further, this Request requires Defendant to produce all associated DOCUMENTS, including metadata where applicable, by the Custodian’s name, job title, and job description.]”  (RPD No. 17.)

            “All DOCUMENTS, including ESI and emails, regarding any internal investigation regarding root cause efforts, problem-solving efforts, or efforts to identify any actual or potential problems, failures, malfunctions, conditions, and/or defects regarding the cooling system in the CADILLAC VEHICLESES.”  (RPD No. 21.)

            “All DOCUMENTS, including ESI and emails, regarding any communications with other entities involved in root cause efforts, problem-solving efforts or efforts to identify any actual or potential problem(s), failure(s), malfunction(s), condition(s) and/or defect(s) regarding the cooling system in CADILLAC, including with YOUR parent corporation, any subsidiary, any supplier, or any other third party.”  (RPD No. 22.)

            “All DOCUMENTS, including ESI and emails, regarding when any member of YOUR Recall committee or task force or their equivalent first learned, became aware of, or was notified about, COOLING SYSTEM DEFECT(S) in CADILLAC VEHICLES, or problems or potential problems with the cooling system in CADILLAC VEHICLES. [This Request requires Defendant to produce all associated DOCUMENTS where applicable by the Custodian’s name, job title, and job description.]”  (RPD No. 25.)

            “All DOCUMENTS, including ESI and emails to or from YOUR agents, representatives, engineers, employees or part suppliers concerning common parts failures for the cooling system in CADILLAC VEHICLES.”  (RPD No. 27.)

            “All Failure Mode and Effects Analysis reports (or comparable analyses) regarding the COOLING SYSTEM DEFECT(S) in CADILLAC VEHICLES equipped with the cooling system like the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”  (RPD No. 31.)

            “All vehicle warranty history reports for CADILLAC VEHICLES that YOU repurchased or replaced with two (2) or more warranty repair attempts to the cooling system.”  (RPD No. 33.)

            “All vehicle warranty history reports for CADILLAC VEHICLES that YOU repurchased or replaced that you were unable to repair within 30 days for concerns regarding the cooling system.”  (RPD No. 34.)

            “All DOCUMENTS regarding the COOLING SYSTEM DEFECT(S) in CADILLAC VEHICLES equipped with the cooling system like the SUBJECT VEHICLE. [This request requires Defendant to search and produce monthly, quarterly or annual reports compiled from all company sources (e.g., quality, engineering, warrant database, dealer contacts, customer complaints, parts returned, etc.). This request further requires Defendant to produce the DOCUMENTS in an organized manner that identifies the databases from which this information was retrieved and in a chronological order with a description of all the various columns, codes, nomenclatures, etc.]”  (RPD No. 41.)

            “All DOCUMENTS, including ESI and emails, concerning any fixes for the COOLING SYSTEM DEFECT(S) in CADILLAC VEHICLES equipped with the cooling system like the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”  (RPD No. 42.)

            “All DOCUMENTS, including power points, memoranda, reports, warnings, investigations, assessments, lessons learned summaries or reports, quality information reports, engineering reviews, summaries, executive reviews, executive reports, or any equivalent thereof, that were prepared by any of YOUR engineers or suppliers, concerning the COOLING SYSTEM DEFECT(S) in CADILLAC VEHICLES equipped with the cooling system like the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”  (RPD No. 43.)

            “All DOCUMENTS, including emails, regarding software release notes for all software released for the COOLING SYSTEM DEFECT(S) in CADILLAC VEHICLES equipped with the cooling system like the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”  (RPD No. 51.)

            “All LEMON LAW DOCUMENTS published by YOU and provided to YOUR employees, agents, and representatives.”  (RPD No. 68.)

            “All point-of-sale training materials that you provided to your authorized dealers regarding the sale of CADILLAC Vehicles equipped with the cooling system from one year prior to Plaintiff purchasing the subject vehicle until the date of purchase.”  (RPD No. 72.)

            “All DOCUMENTS, including ESI and emails, regarding any communications between YOU and any government agency or entity (e.g., the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (‘NHTSA’), the Environmental Protection Agency (‘EPA’), or any other similar government agency) regarding COOLING SYSTEM DEFECT(S) in CADILLAC VEHICLES.”  (RPD No. 76.)

            “All Transportation Recall Enhancement, Accountability, and Documentation (‘TREAD’) reports YOU submitted concerning CADILLAC VEHICLES.”  (RPD No. 79.)

            “All DOCUMENTS, including analyses and reports, that YOU provided to or received from part suppliers concerning the COOLING SYSTEM DEFECT(S) in CADILLAC VEHICLES equipped with the cooling system like the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”  (RPD No. 82.)

 

In a near identical response, Defendant states that:

GM objects to this Request on grounds the terms ‘made available,’ ‘reflecting or referring to,’ ‘problem,’ ‘failures,’ ‘malfunctions,’ and ‘defect(s)’ are vague and ambiguous. GM also objects to this Request on grounds it improperly assumes that there are alleged defects with respect to the SUBJECT VEHICLE, or GMC VEHICLES, generally. GM also objects to this Request on grounds it is overbroad and seeks documents that are irrelevant and not reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence as it is not limited in scope to Plaintiff’s alleged concerns with the SUBJECT VEHICLE at issue in this action. GM also objects to this Request on grounds it is burdensome and oppressive, and that compliance would be unreasonably difficult and expensive considering the needs of the case, the amount in controversy, and the importance of the issues at stake in the litigation. This is a simple, individual lemon law case with limited issues and this Request violates Calcor Space Facility, Inc. v. Superior Court (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 216, 61 Cal.Rptr.2d 567. Specifically, whether Plaintiff is entitled to relief under the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act is entirely unrelated and incommensurate to the scope and breadth of this Request. GM also objects to this Request to the extent it seeks confidential, proprietary and trade secret information. GM further objects to this Request to the extent it seeks information protected by the attorney-client privilege and/or work-product doctrine. No documents will be produced.”  (Response to RPD No. 12.)[1]

 

            Attorney Client Privilege/Work Product Privilege

“In general, when a party asserts the attorney-client privilege, that party has the burden of showing the preliminary facts necessary to support the privilege.”  (Venture Law Group v. Superior Court (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 96, 102.)  “The party asserting the privilege need only present facts which ‘support a prima facie claim of privilege.”  (OXY Resources California LLC v. Superior Court (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 874, 894.)  “After this burden is met, or where there is no dispute concerning the preliminary facts, the burden shifts to the party opposing the privilege to show either the claimed privilege does not apply, an exception exists, or there has been an express or implied waiver.”  (Venture Law Group, supra, 118 Cal.App.4th at p.102.)

Here, the requests do appear to include documents that could be protected by attorney client privilege such as communications with previous counsel about prior lemon law actions.  However, Defendant has failed to provide any privilege log identifying what if any responsive documents Defendant is withholding on the basis of attorney client privilege/work product.  Though Defendant may have properly raised attorney client privilege, there are undoubtedly responsive documents to at least some of these requests that are not privileged.  Moreover, to the extent that there are privileged documents, Defendant has not indicated which specific documents are being withheld on the basis that they are privileged.  Defendant’s blanket assertion of privilege is insufficient.  Defendant must produce a privilege log identifying what documents Defendant is withholding and enough factual information to support a prima facie claim of privilege. (See CCP § 2031.240(b)(1-2), [“b) If the responding party objects to the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of an item or category of item, the response shall do both of the following: (1) Identify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made. (2) Set forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection. If an objection is based on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege invoked shall be stated. If an objection is based on a claim that the information sought is protected work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010), that claim shall be expressly asserted.”] [Italics added.].) 

Accordingly, Defendant must provide a privilege log identifying which, if any, documents Defendant is withholding and enough information to demonstrate that the attorney client privilege/work product protects the document(s) identified.

 

Trade Secret Objection

Evidence Code section 1060 provides that “the owner of a trade secret has a privilege to refuse to disclose the secret, and to prevent another from disclosing it, if the allowance of the privilege will not tend to conceal fraud or otherwise work injustice.”  A trade secret is defined as “information, including a formula, pattern, compilation, program, device, method, technique, or process, that: (1) Derives independent economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to the public or to other persons who can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use; and (2) Is the subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.”  (Civ. Code, § 3426.1(d).)  In setting forth whether a trade secret privilege applies, the Court of Appeal has stated that:

 

[T]he party claiming the privilege has the burden of establishing its existence. [Citations.] Thereafter, the party seeking discovery must make a prima facie, particularized showing that the information sought is relevant and necessary to the proof of, or defense against, a material element of one or more causes of action presented in the case, and that it is reasonable to conclude that the information sought is essential to a fair resolution of the lawsuit. It is then up to the holder of the privilege to demonstrate any claimed disadvantages of a protective order. Either party may propose or oppose less intrusive alternatives to disclosure of the trade secret, but the burden is upon the trade secret claimant to demonstrate that an alternative to disclosure will not be unduly burdensome to the opposing side and that it will maintain the same fair balance in the litigation that would have been achieved by disclosure. 

(Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc. v. Superior Court (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1384, 1393.)

Here, Defendant fails to substantiate the claim that the evidence sought is trade secret information.  Nor does Defendant provide authority demonstrating that a denial of discovery is warranted.  To the extent that Defendant contends that a protective order is necessary, the parties may simply stipulate and enter into the standard LASC Stipulation and Protective Order – Confidential Designation.

 

Relevance, Vague, Burdensome, Overbroad, Oppressive

            As to the overbreadth objection, “any party may obtain discovery regarding any matters, not privileged, that is relevant to the subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”  (CCP § 2017.010.)  “[A]n implicit waiver of a party's constitutional rights encompasses only discovery directly relevant to the plaintiff's claim and essential to the fair resolution of the lawsuit.”  (Vinson v. Superior Court (1987) 43 Cal.3d 833, 842.)  However, discovery should not be denied if the information sought has any relevance to the subject matter. Thus, while relevancy is a possible ground for an objection, it is difficult to adequately justify it.  (See generally Coy v. Superior Court of Contra Costa County (1962) 58 Cal.2d 210, 217.)  “These rules are applied liberally in favor of discovery, and (contrary to popular belief), fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases.”  (Gonzalez v. Superior Court (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1539, 1546 [internal citation omitted].) 

Under the Song-Beverly Act, “[i]f the buyer establishes that the failure to comply was willful,” the buyer may be entitled to receive a civil penalty, up to two times the amount of actual damages.  (Civ. Code § 1794(c).)  A defendant that did not replace or refund a vehicle under a “good faith and reasonable belief that the facts imposing the statutory obligation were not present” is not willful. (Lukather v. General Motors, LLC (2010) 181 Cal.App.4th 1041, 1051.)  Nor does willfulness require a showing of malice or wrongdoing towards the other party.  (Ibrahim v. Ford Motor Co. (1989) 214 Cal.App.3d 878, 894.)  Rather, willful “amounts to nothing more than this: that the defendant knows what it is doing and intends to do what it is doing.”  (Bishop v. Hyundai Motor America (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 750, 759.)  “Whether a manufacturer willfully violated its obligation to repair the car or refund the purchase price is a factual question for the jury[.]”  (Oregel v. American Isuzu Motors, Inc. (2001) 90 Cal.App.4th 1094, 1104.)

Accordingly, “information regarding whether the same defects were reported to [Defendant] in other cars of the same make, model, and year as Plaintiff's subject vehicle could conceivably be relevant to whether [Defendant] acted reasonably in denying Plaintiff's warranty claim. A fact finder may find [Defendant]'s knowledge or lack of knowledge about the same defects to be a consideration in deciding whether [Defendant] acted in good faith as to Plaintiff's specific case.”  (Jensen v. BMW of North America, LLC (S.D. Cal. 2019) 328 F.R.D. 557, 562–563, [italics added]; see also Elsworth v. Beech Aircraft Corp. (1984) 37 Cal.3d 540, 555 [“Evidence of prior accidents is admissible to prove a defective condition, knowledge, or the cause of an accident, provided that the circumstances of the other accidents are similar and not too remote.”].)

As to burden, “burden must be sustained by evidence showing the quantum of work required” and “to support an objection of oppression there must be some showing either of an intent to create an unreasonable burden or that the ultimate effect of the burden is incommensurate with the result sought.”  (West Pico Furniture Co. of Los Angeles v. Superior Court In and For Los Angeles County (1961) 56 Cal.2d 407, 417.)  Moreover, even if [discovery requests] are found to be “burdensome and oppressive,” the Court should not simply sustain the objection and thereby excuse any answer. Rather, the Court should limit the question to a reasonable scope. (Borse v. Superior Court (Southern Pac. Co.) (1970) 7 Cal.App.3d 286, 289.)

            Here, as to burden objection, Defendant fails to substantiate the quantum of work it would take to respond to these requests in either the responses or the opposition.  Moreover, the requests are relevant to whether Defendant was aware of the alleged defect in the Subject Defect due to prior incidents and thus was willful in denying Plaintiff restitution. 

            However, the Court agrees that the scope of these requests is overbroad.  The complaint alleges defects with the engine and cooling system.  (Complaint ¶ 14.)  Thus, information regarding other vehicles of the same make, model, and year as the Subject Vehicle with the same engine and cooling system defects would be relevant.  Accordingly, some relevant information is sought.  However, the requests are overbroad as they seek documents beyond those of vehicles with the same make, model, and year as the Subject Vehicle.  Therefore, the requests are hereby limited to vehicles in California of the same make, model, and year as the Subject Vehicle.

            Similarly, requests regarding policies are relevant to whether the policies show that Defendant was intentionally violating its Song-Beverly obligations or that Defendant deviated from policy with regards to Plaintiff’s claims showing that Defendant willfully did not comply with its Song-Beverly obligations.  However, the requests are overbroad as the only time period would be when Plaintiff’s issues with the vehicle arose and when Defendant wrongfully rejected Plaintiff’s claim for restitution.  As noted in the complaint, Plaintiff did not purchased the Subject Vehicle until August 12, 2018.  (Complaint ¶ 9.)  As such, only the internal policies applicable from August 12, 2018 to when the complaint was filed on June 7, 2022 would be relevant.  Moreover, the request is slightly overbroad as it is not limited to California.

 

RPDs No. 3, 7, 9, 36, and 78

            “All investigations, reports, and/or studies conducted by YOU and/or on YOUR behalf regarding the root cause or failure analysis of any parts that were repaired or replaced on the SUBJECT VEHICLE and returned by any of YOUR authorized repair facilities to YOU/or anyone acting on YOUR behalf for analysis. [This request also requires the responding party to search for and produce responsive DOCUMENTS regarding any parts that were removed from the SUBJECT VEHICLE and returned by the repairing dealer to the responding party for root cause analysis, failure analysis, and/or any other analysis, and to produce a copy of such reports, analysis, and/or similar documents. This request also requires GM to provide any documents showing how the returned part was handled after its return to GM (e.g., refurbished, returned to supplier for reimbursement, etc.]”  (RPD No. 3.)

            “All DOCUMENTS, including recalls, technical service bulletins, special service messages, dealer alerts, reports, Star Reports, campaigns, extended warranties, dealer advisories, summaries, etc. that were issued for the SUBJECT VEHICLE. [This request requires the responding party to produce the entire document. A production that only lists the name, number, and/or title of the document will not be responsive to this request. This also requires the responding party to produce all current, prior, amended, and drafts of such DOCUMENTS, which shall be produced in their entirety.]”  (RPD No. 7.)

            “All Vehicle Data Recovery Reports for the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”  (RPD No. 9.)

            “All DOCUMENTS, including ESI and emails, concerning any decision to issue any notices, letters, campaigns, warranty extensions, service messages, technical service bulletins and recalls, concerning the COOLING SYSTEM DEFECT(S) in CADILLAC VEHICLES equipped with the cooling system like the SUBJECT VEHICLE. [This request requires the responding party to provide the underlying investigation, report, and/or analysis that resulted in the issuance of any such notice, letter, campaign, warranty extension, technical service bulletin, and recall, concerning the COOLING SYSTEM DEFECT(S). Thus, such information shall predate the issuance of any such notice, letter, campaign, warranty extension, technical service bulletin, and recall.]”  (RPD No. 36.)

            “All Early Warning Reports (“EWR”) YOU submitted to NHTSA concerning CADILLAC VEHICLES.”  (RPD No. 78.)

 

            In addition to objections discussed above, Defendant’s responses to these requests also include substantive responses as follows:

            “Subject to and without waiving any objections, GM states that it is not currently aware of any parts from the SUBJECT VEHICLE that were sent to it by any authorized repair facilities for analysis. Therefore, no documents will be produced.”  (Substantive Response to RPD No. 3.)

            “Subject to and without waiving these objections, GM will comply in part and produce the following documents in its possession, custody and control: a list of technical service bulletins (“TSBs”) issued for vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE. After it has produced a list of TSBs, GM will – at Plaintiff’s request – search for and produce, if located, copies of a reasonable number of TSBs, if any, that Plaintiff has identified as specifically regarding the defects alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. GM will also produce copies of the bulletins for every field action, including any recalls, it issued for the SUBJECT VEHICLE as identified in the following image from the Global Warranty History Report: [Image].”  (Substantive Response to RPD No. 7.)

            “Subject to and without waiving any objections, GM will comply in part and produce the following documents in its possession, custody and control: any repair orders that GM may have obtained from GM-authorized dealerships who may have serviced, maintained, or repaired the SUBJECT VEHICLE.”  (Substantive RPD No. 9.)

            “Subject to and without waiving these objections, GM will comply in part and produce the following documents in its possession, custody and control: a list of technical service bulletins (‘TSBs’) and informational service bulletins (‘ISBs’) issued for vehicles of the same year, make, and model as the SUBJECT VEHICLE. After it has produced a list of TSBs and ISBs, GM will – at Plaintiff’s request – search for and produce, if located, copies of a reasonable number of TSBs and ISBs, if any, that Plaintiff has identified as specifically regarding the defects alleged in Plaintiff’s complaint. GM will also produce copies of the bulletins for every field action, including any recalls, it issued for the SUBJECT VEHICLE as identified in the following image from the Global Warranty History Report: [Image].”  (Substantive Response to RPD No. 36.)

            “Subject to and without waiving any objections, GM responds that EWR for various model years and vehicles are equally available to all parties and can be obtained at NHTSA’s website at http//www-odi.nhtsa.dot.gov/ewr/qb/. No documents will be produced.”  (Substantive Response to RPD No. 78.)

 

            The Substantive Response are Improper and Unclear

            As quoted above, each of Defendant’s responses includes an objection and a substantive response.  The substantive responses each note that they are “subject to and without waiving any objection”.  These substantive responses are not code compliant. 

            Defendant has not waived any objections.  Thus, it is unclear whether any responsive documents are being withheld based on such objections.  Defendant was required to identify the documents being withheld and the basis for the withholding.  (See CCP § 2031.240(b)(1-2), [“b) If the responding party objects to the demand for inspection, copying, testing, or sampling of an item or category of item, the response shall do both of the following: (1) Identify with particularity any document, tangible thing, land, or electronically stored information falling within any category of item in the demand to which an objection is being made. (2) Set forth clearly the extent of, and the specific ground for, the objection. If an objection is based on a claim of privilege, the particular privilege invoked shall be stated. If an objection is based on a claim that the information sought is protected work product under Chapter 4 (commencing with Section 2018.010), that claim shall be expressly asserted.”] [Italics added.].)  If all responsive documents are being produced the response must clearly identify as such stating that Defendant has produced all responsive documents in its possession, custody, or control and identify the responsive documents. 

            Accordingly, further code complaint responses are required.

 

Sanctions

            Plaintiff requests sanctions against Defendant for $3,000.00 to compensate Plaintiff for bringing the instant motion.  Plaintiff’s Counsel claims to have spent eight hours drafting the instant motion at $375 per hour.  (Sanaia Decl. ¶ 42.) 

            For a motion to compel further responses, “[t]he court shall impose a monetary sanction … against any party, person, or attorney who unsuccessfully makes or opposes a motion to compel a response to [request for production], unless it finds that the one subject to the sanction acted with substantial justification or that other circumstances make the imposition of the sanction unjust.”  (CCP § 2031.300(c), [italics added].)  Further, it is an abuse of discovery to make an evasive response or make unsubstantiated objections to discovery.  (CCP § 2023.010(e)-(f).)

            Here, the Court finds that some sanctions are warranted.  However, the requested sanctions are excessive given that many of the requests were overbroad, and the time claimed spent on the instant motion is excessive.  Based on the totality of the circumstances, the Court finds that sanctions of $1,500.00 are warranted.

            Defendant General Motors, LLC is ordered to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,500.00 to Plaintiff Barbara McGee, by and through counsel, within thirty (30) days of notice of this order.

 

CONCLUSION AND ORDER

Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Barbara McGee’s motion to compel further responses to the Request for Production of Documents, Set One from Defendant General Motors, LLC is GRANTED.

Defendant General Motors is to serve further code compliant responses to Requests for Production, Set One Nos. 3, 7, 9, 12, 17, 21, 22, 25, 27, 31, 33, 34, 36, 41, 42, 43, 51, 68, 72, 76, 78, 79, and 82 without objection except as to attorney-client/work product privilege within 25 days of notice of this order.  To the extent that the requests seek information regarding other vehicles, said requests are hereby limited to vehicles purchased or leased in California for the same year, make and model of the subject vehicle.  To the extent that the requests seek internal policies, the requests are limited to internal policies applicable to California and temporarily limited to policies in place between August 12, 2018 to June 7, 2022.

Defendant is to serve responsive documents – compliant with the further responses – and any applicable privilege log within 30 days of notice of this order.

Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is GRANTED AS MODIFIED.

            Defendant General Motors, LLC is ordered to pay monetary sanctions in the amount of $1,500.00 to Plaintiff Barbara McGee, by and through counsel, within thirty (30) days of notice of this order.

Moving Party is to provide notice and file proof of service of such.

 

 

DATED: January ___, 2024                                                   ___________________________

                                                                                          Elaine Lu

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court



[1] The only notable difference in the responses are the specific terms that Defendant contends are vague and ambiguous.