Judge Elaine Lu, Case 22STCV28875 2023-02-07 Tentative Ruling

On September 6, 2022, Plaintiffs Claire Taborada, Rosel Zagado, and Wilma Zagado (collectively “Plaintiffs”) filed the instant habitability action against Defendants Tyrin W. Quigley and Louella C. Quigley both individually and as Co-Trustees of the Quigley Family Trust dated August 4, 2010 (collectively “Defendants”). The complaint asserts nine cause of action for (1) Violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code Chapter IV, Article 5.3, § 45.35, (2) Violation of Civil Code § 1940.2 – Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, (3) Breach of the Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, (4) Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress, Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (6) Nuisance, (7) Violation of Civil Code §52.1 – Bane Act, (8) Violation of Business and Professions Code § 1700 et seq., and (9) Negligence.[1]

On October 12, 2022, Defendants filed the instant motion to strike portions of the complaint. On January 23, 2023, Plaintiffs filed an opposition. On January 31, 2023, Defendants filed a reply.

As of 2010, Defendants are owners/managers of 234 ½ North Carondelet Street, Los Angeles, California 90026 (the “Premises”). (Complaint ¶¶ 1-2, 9.) Plaintiffs were tenants of Defendants residing at the Premises under rent control. (Id. ¶¶ 1-3, Exhs. 1-2.)

Beginning June 2021, Defendants began harassing Plaintiffs in an attempt to get them to vacate the premises so that Defendants could replace Plaintiffs with tenants who would pay market rent. (Id. ¶ 10.)

“In furtherance of Defendants' goals, Defendants have, among other actions, taken away Plaintiffs' parking privileges, removed Plaintiffs' washing machine, storage (resulting in Plaintiffs having to secure storage at an alternate location) and clothesline, illegally positioned a video camera which directly faces Plaintiffs' window giving Defendants the ability to look into the inside of Plaintiffs' rental unit and therefore violate Plaintiffs' privacy rights (Plaintiffs have had to keep their shades constantly closed for this reason), having their son harass Plaintiffs by staring them down and making them uncomfortable and serving Plaintiffs with a number of unwarranted notices to perform covenants or quit. Defendants also have refused to accept rent from the Plaintiffs Zagados directly claiming that the Zagados are not tenants and the rent can only be paid by Plaintiff Taborada. Of note, the Plaintiffs Zagados have been making rent payments for years prior to the start of Defendants’ recent rejection of their attempted payments and those prior payments were accepted by Defendants. On or about August 2, 2022, the City of Los Angeles Housing Department advised Defendants that failure to accept rent constituted harassment under the Tenant Anti-Harassment ordinance.” (Id. ¶ 11.)

“On June 23, 2022, Plaintiffs' counsel wrote Defendants' counsel demanding that Defendants immediately cease and desist from perpetually harassing Plaintiffs … [However,] Defendants failed to comply with Plaintiffs' demand and, instead, have only increased their offending activity.” (Id. ¶ 12, Exh. 3.)

Motions to strike are used to reach defects or objections to pleadings that are not challengeable by demurrer (i.e., words, phrases, prayer for damages, etc.). (See CCP §§ 435-437.) A party may file a motion to strike in whole or in part within the time allowed to respond to a pleading, however, if a party serves and files a motion to strike without demurring to the complaint, the time to answer is extended. (CCP §§ 435(b)(1), 435(c).)

A motion to strike lies only where the pleading has irrelevant, false, or improper matter, or has not been drawn or filed in conformity with laws. (CCP § 436.) The grounds for moving to strike must appear on the face of the pleadings or by way of judicial notice. (CCP § 437.)

Code of Civil Procedure section 435.5, subdivision (a) requires that “[b]efore filing a motion to strike pursuant to this chapter, the moving party shall meet and confer¿in person or by telephone¿with the party who filed the pleading that is subject to the motion to strike for the purpose of determining whether an agreement can be reached that would resolve the objections to be raised in the motion to strike.” The parties are to meet and confer at least five days before the date the responsive pleading is due and if they are unable to meet the demurring party shall be granted an automatic 30-day extension. (Code Civ. Proc., § 435.5(a)(2).) The moving party must also file and serve a declaration detailing the meet and confer efforts. (Id.¿at (a)(3).)¿ If an amended pleading is filed, the parties must meet and confer again before a motion to strike may be filed to the amended pleading. (Id.¿at (a).)

Here, Defendants have sufficiently met and conferred. (Webb Decl. ¶¶ 2-6, Exhs. A-B.)

California Civil Code section 3294 authorizes the recovery of punitive damages in non-contract cases where “the defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice . . . .” (Civ. Code, § 3294(a).) “‘Malice’ means conduct which is intended by the defendant to cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others.” (Id. at (c)(1).) “‘Oppression’ means despicable conduct that subjects a person to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of that person’s rights.” (Id. at (c)(2).) “‘Fraud’ means an intentional misrepresentation, deceit, or concealment of a material fact known to the defendant with the intention on the part of the defendant of thereby depriving a person of property or legal rights or otherwise causing injury.” (Id. at (c)(3).) Punitive damages thus require more than the mere commission of a tort. (See Taylor v. Superior Court (1979) 24 Cal.3d 890, 894-895.)

Moreover, a demand for punitive damages for the commission of any tort requires more than the mere conclusory allegations of “oppression, fraud, and malice.” (Civ. Code § 3294; see Perkins v. Superior Court (1981) 117 Cal. App.3d 1, 6-7.) Rather, “[t]here must be circumstances of aggravation or outrage, such as spite or malice, or a fraudulent or evil motive on the part of Defendant, or such a conscious and deliberate disregard of the interest of others that its conduct may be called willful or wanton.” (Taylor, supra, 24 Cal.3d at pp.894-895, [italics added].)

Here, the complaint alleges in relevant part that “Defendants have, among other actions, taken away Plaintiffs' parking privileges, removed Plaintiffs' washing machine, storage (resulting in Plaintiffs having to secure storage at an alternate location) and clothesline, illegally positioned a video camera which directly faces Plaintiffs' window giving Defendants the ability to look into the inside of Plaintiffs' rental unit and therefore violate Plaintiffs' privacy rights (Plaintiffs have had to keep their shades constantly closed for this reason), having their son harass Plaintiffs by staring them down and making them uncomfortable and serving Plaintiffs with a number of unwarranted notices to perform covenants or quit. Defendants also have refused to accept rent from the Plaintiffs Zagados directly claiming that the Zagados are not tenants and the rent can only be paid by Plaintiff Taborada. Of note, the Plaintiffs Zagados have been making rent payments for years prior to the start of Defendants’ recent rejection of their attempted payments and those prior payments were accepted by Defendants. On or about August 2, 2022, the City of Los Angeles Housing Department advised Defendants that failure to accept rent constituted harassment under the Tenant Anti-Harassment ordinance.” (Complaint ¶ 11.) Plaintiffs allege that Defendants have done so with the intent to get Plaintiffs to vacate the premises so that Defendants could replace Plaintiffs with tenants who would pay market rent. (Id. ¶ 10.)

These allegations are sufficient to state a prayer for punitive damages. While “mere negligence, which—even if gross, or reckless—cannot justify punitive damages[,]” (Krusi v. Bear, Stearns & Co. (1983) 144 Cal.App.3d 664, 679), these allegations amount to more than just mere negligence. These additional allegations – if proven true – would show that Defendants are intentionally harassing Plaintiffs to force them to vacate the property. Further, these allegations are more than mere conclusory allegations of “oppression, fraud, and malice[,]” (Perkins, supra, 117 Cal. App.3d at pp.6-7.) Plaintiffs have alleged clear specific facts to support their prayer for punitive damages.
Accordingly, Defendants’ motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages is DENIED.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants Tyrin W. Quigley and Louella C. Quigley both individually and as Co-Trustees of the Quigley Family Trust dated August 4, 2010’s motion to strike the prayer for punitive damages in the complaint is DENIED.

Defendants are to file an answer no later than March 7, 2023. The case management conference is continued to March 10, 2023 at 8:30 am.

Moving Party is to provide notice of this order and file proof of service of such.

[1] On October 24, 2022, the Court granted the parties’ stipulation to strike the fourth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress.

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 26