Judge: Elaine Lu, Case: 22STCV29232, Date: 2024-03-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22STCV29232 Hearing Date: March 5, 2024 Dept: 26
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GERMAN MURILLO; et
al., Plaintiffs, vs. SUNSET JUNIOR LLC; ROBERT ERIC STABACK, as Trustee of THE RUDOLPH
STABACK AND GRACE STABACK REVOCABLE INTER VIVOS TRUST; et al., Defendants. |
Case No.: 22STCV29232 Hearing Date: March 5, 2024 [TENTATIVE] order RE: plaintiff lucas herchenroeder’s motion
to quash Defendant SUNSET JUNIOR LLC’s subpoena for employment records |
Procedural Background
On September
8, 2022, Plaintiffs German Murillo, et al.[1] (collectively
“Plaintiffs”) filed the instant breach of habitability action against
Defendants Sunset Junior, LLC (“Defendant”) and Robert Eric Stabeck, as Trustee
of the Rudolph Staback and Grace Staback inter vivos Trust (jointly
“Defendants”). On April 11, 2023,
Plaintiffs filed the operative Second Amended Complaint (“SAC”) against
Defendants. The SAC asserts nine causes
of action for (1) Breach of the Implied Warranty of Habitability, (2)
Negligence, (3) Breach of the Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment, (4) Nuisance, (5)
Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress, (6) Violation of Business &
Professions Code section 17200 et seq., (7)
Violation of Civil Code § 1942.4, (8) Violation of LAMC section 45.30 et seq, and
(9) Violation of LAMC § 152.00 et seq.
On
December 14, 2023, Plaintiff Lucas Herchenroeder (“Herchenroeder”) filed the
instant motion to quash Defendant Sunset Junior, LLC’s (“Sunset”) subpoena to USC
for Herchenroeder’s employment records.
On February 21, 2024, Defendant Sunset filed an opposition. No reply has been filed.
Legal Standard
Where the witness whose deposition is sought is not a party, a subpoena must be served to compel
his or her attendance, testimony, or production of documents. (CCP § 2020.010(b).) A deposition subpoena
may request (1) only the attendance and testimony of a deponent, (2) only the production
of business records for copying, or (3) the attendance and testimony, as well
as the production of business records.
(CCP § 2020.020.) “A deposition
subpoena that commands only the production of business records for copying
shall designate the business records to be produced either by specifically
describing each individual item or by reasonably particularizing each category
of item . . .” (CCP § 2020.410(a).) The court, upon motion or the court’s own
motion, “may make an order quashing the subpoena entirely, modifying it, or
directing compliance with it upon those terms or conditions as the court shall
declare, including protective orders.”
(CCP § 1987.1(a).) In addition,
the court may make any other orders as may be appropriate to protect the person
from unreasonable or oppressive demands, including unreasonable violations of
the right of privacy of the person.”
(CCP § 1987.1(a).)
Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 2017.010:
Unless otherwise limited by order of the court…any party may
obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is relevant to the
subject matter involved in the pending action or to the determination of any
motion made in that action, if the matter either is itself admissible in
evidence or appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of
admissible evidence. Discovery may
relate to the claim or defense of the party seeking discovery or of any other
party to the action. Discovery may be
obtained of the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter, as well as of the existence, description, nature, custody,
condition, and location of any document, electronically stored information,
tangible thing, or land or other property.
(Ibid.)
“‘[F]or discovery purposes, information is relevant
if it might reasonably assist a party in evaluating the case, preparing for
trial, or facilitating settlement’ and ‘[a]dmissibility is not the test and
information, unless privileged, is discoverable if it might reasonably lead to
admissible evidence.’ These rules are
applied liberally in favor of discovery . . . and (contrary to popular belief)
fishing expeditions are permissible in some cases.” (Cruz
v. Superior Court (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 646, 653, [internal citations
omitted].)
Discussion
Plaintiff Herchenroeder
contends that the subpoena for employment records to USC invades Herchenroeder’s
right to privacy and should be quashed in its entirety.
In his October 11,
2023 response to Defendant Sunset’s Form Interrogatory, 2.6, Plaintiff Herchenroeder
identified USC as his employer.
(Derflinger Decl. ¶¶ 2-3, Exh. 1; Medina Decl. ¶ 4.) On November 17, 2023, Defendant Sunset served
a deposition subpoena on USC requesting:
All personnel records, payroll records, W-2s,
W4s, application for employment, resumes, pre-employment exam records, incident
reports, performance appraisals, awards, retirement benefits and any other
documents which refer or relate to the within named individual, as an employee,
independent contractor, or in any other capacity. Any and all records of any
COMMUNICATIONS to and/or LUCAS HERCHENROEDER and/or his legal representative up
until the present date (i.e. the date of production for the subject subpoena).
(Medina Decl. ¶ 5, Exh. A.)
Plaintiff’s Counsel
telephonically met and conferred with Defense Counsel on November 30, 2023 and
sent a further meet and confer letter on December 11, 2023. (Medina Decl. ¶¶ 6-7, Exh. C.) However, Defense Counsel refused to agree to
quash the subpoena. (Medina Decl. ¶
8.)
Privacy
The right of privacy in the California Constitution (art. I, § 1),
“protects the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy against a serious
invasion.” (Puerto v. Superior Court
(2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1242, 1250 [italics in original]; See Williams v.
Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 552 [“In Hill, we established a
framework for evaluating potential invasions of privacy. The party asserting a
privacy right must establish a legally protected privacy interest, an
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in the given circumstances, and a
threatened intrusion that is serious.
The party seeking information may raise in response whatever legitimate
and important countervailing interests disclosure serves, while the party
seeking protection may identify feasible alternatives that serve the same
interests or protective measures that would diminish the loss of privacy. A
court must then balance these competing considerations.”].)
As the Supreme Court has “previously observed, the right
of privacy extends to sexual relations (Vinson v. Superior Court,
supra, 43 Cal.3d at p. 841, 239) and medical records (Hill v.
National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 1, 41.).” (John B. v. Superior Court (2006)
38 Cal.4th 1177, 1198.) Similarly, the
constitutional right to freedom of association requires protection of a
person’s membership in associations, whether they pertain to religious,
political, economic, or even purely social matters. (Britt v. Superior Court (1978)
20 Cal.3d 844, 852; see also Pacific-Union Club v. Superior Court (1991)
232 Cal.App.3d 60, 71.)
In establishing a privacy interest, “the burden [is] on the party
asserting a privacy interest to establish its extent and the seriousness
of the prospective invasion, and against that showing must weigh the
countervailing interests the opposing party identifies, as Hill requires.” (Williams, supra, 3 Cal.5th 531,
557.) “Only obvious invasions of
interests fundamental to personal autonomy must be supported by a compelling
interest.” (Ibid.)
Here, there is a
privacy interest in employment records. (See Board of Trustees v. Superior
Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516, 528 disapproved on other grounds
by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531, 557, Fn.
8, [finding that confidential personnel files at a person's place of employment
are within the zone of privacy.]; accord El Dorado Savings & Loan Assn.
v. Superior Court (1987) 190 Cal.App.3d 342, 344 disapproved on other
grounds by Williams v. Superior Court (2017) 3 Cal.5th 531,
557, Fn. 8.) Thus – at a minimum – some relevance
is required to support Defendant Sunset’s subpoena for the employment records.
Here, Plaintiff Herchenroeder
contends that there is no relevance at all because Plaintiff Herchenroeder admitted
that he is not making a loss of earnings claim or loss of future earnings
capacity claim in the instant action. (Medina
Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. B [responses to Requests for Admissions 40-41].) In opposition, Defendant Sunset contends that
the documents sought are nonetheless relevant because they relate to Plaintiff Herchenroeder’s
claim of physical and emotional harm.
In response to
Defendant Sunset’s Form Interrogatory 6.2, Plaintiff Herchenroeder reported
physical injuries consisting of “[b]reathing problems, chest pains” and
emotional injuries consisting of “[a]nxiety, emotional distress, frustrated,
inability to sleep, or focus.”
(Derflinger Decl. ¶ 4, Exh. 1 at Form Interrogatory 6.2.) Defense Counsel claims that these claims of
harm would likely be significantly detrimental to Herchenroeder’s employment
with USC. (Derflinger Decl. ¶ 4.) Further, “Plaintiff Herchenroeder alleges
receiving treatment for these conditions, but has few details regarding such
treatment. In order to verify the legitimacy of Plaintiff’s claim, Defendant
seeks documents from Plaintiff’s employer indicating reports of illness,
missing days due to doctors appointments, doctors notes, or anything that may
somehow verify Plaintiff’s complaint.” (Deflinger Decl. ¶ 5.)
While Plaintiff Herchenroeder’s
claim of “[b]reathing problems, chest pains” and “[a]nxiety, emotional
distress, frustrated, inability to sleep, or focus” may warrant some document
production from Plaintiff’s employer, the request is overbroad. Defendant Sunset puts forth no evidence why
Plaintiff’s pay statements or employment tax records are relevant to the
instant action or how these would prove or disprove Plaintiff Herchenroeder’s
claim of physical or emotional injuries. Thus, Defendant Sunset’s subpoena to USC must
be limited to a more reasonable scope as follows:
All incident reports, performance appraisals,
awards, and requests for medical/sick leave which refer or relate to the within
named individual, as an employee, independent contractor, or in any other
capacity. Any and all records of any COMMUNICATIONS to and/or from LUCAS
HERCHENROEDER and/or his legal representative up until the present date (i.e.
the date of production for the subject subpoena).
Sanctions
Plaintiff requests
sanctions of $800.00 against Defendant Sunset.
(Medina Decl. ¶ 9.)
“[I]n making an order
pursuant to motion made under subdivision (c) of Section 1987 or under Section
1987.1, the court may in its discretion award the amount of the reasonable
expenses incurred in making or opposing the motion, including reasonable attorney's
fees, if the court finds the motion was made or opposed in bad faith or without
substantial justification or that one or more of the requirements of the
subpoena was oppressive.” (CCP §
1987.2(a).) “An award for sanctions
based on bad faith generally requires a subjective element of
bad faith.” (Evilsizor v. Sweeney (2014)
230 Cal.App.4th 1304, 1311.)
“‘Substantial justification’ means ‘that a justification is clearly
reasonable because it is well grounded in both law and fact.’ [Citation.]” (Id. at p.1312.) Further, the Court may issue sanctions for
misuse of the discovery process for failing to meet and confer. (CCP §§ 2023.010(i), 2023.030(a).)
The Court is of the
view that a more robust meet and confer by real time conversation could have
avoided the litigation of the instant motion.
In light of the mixed result of the instant motion, and the totality of
the circumstances, no sanctions are warranted.
Thus, Plaintiff’s request for sanctions is DENIED.
CONCLUSIONS AND ORDER
Based
on the foregoing, Plaintiff Lucas Herchenroeder’s motion to quash Defendant
Sunset Junior, LLC’s subpoena to USC for Herchenroeder’s employment records is
GRANTED IN PART. The subpoena is
modified to only include the requested documents as follows:
All incident reports, performance appraisals,
awards, and requests for medical/sick leave which refer or relate to the within
named individual, as an employee, independent contractor, or in any other
capacity. Any and all records of any COMMUNICATIONS to and/or from LUCAS
HERCHENROEDER and/or his legal representative up until the present date (i.e.
the date of production for the subject subpoena).
Plaintiff’s
request for sanctions is DENIED.
Moving Party is to give notice and
file proof of service of such.
DATED:
March ___, 2024 ___________________________
Elaine Lu
Judge of the Superior Court