Judge Elaine Lu, Case Number: 22STCV29235, Date: 2023-07-20 Tentative Ruling

On September 8, 2022, Plaintiff Erika Gonzalez (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant class action against Defendants OSI Optoelectronics, Inc. and OSI Systems, Inc. (jointly “Defendants”) for various labor code violations.

On November 15, 2022, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants. The FAC asserted eight individual and class action causes of action for (1) Failure to Pay Minimum Wages, (2) Failure to Pay Overtime Wages, (3) Failure to Provide Meal Periods, (4) Failure to Permit Rest Breaks, (5) Failure to Provide Accurate Itemized Wage Statements, (6) Failure to Pay Wages Timely During Employment, (7) Failure to Pay All Wages Due Upon Separation of Employment, (8) Violation of Business and Professions Code §§ 17200, et seq., and (9) Enforcement of the Labor Code § 2698 et seq. (“PAGA”).

On December 16, 2022, Plaintiff requested dismissal of the class action and individual claims. On December 20, 2022, the Court – presided by the Honorable Lawrence P. Riff – granted the request, leaving only the PAGA claim pending. (Order 12/20/22.)

On January 5, 2023, the instant action was reassigned to the Honorable Malcolm Mackey. (Minute Order 1/5/23.) Pursuant to a preemptory challenge, the instant action was reassigned to the current department on January 12, 2023. (Minute Order 1/12/23.)

On April 6, 2023, Defendants filed the instant motion to compel arbitration of the individual PAGA claims and to dismiss the remaining representative PAGA action. On July 7, 2023, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On July 12, 2023, Defendants filed a reply.

In conjunction with the reply, Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of the following:

A. Pages JA 78 to JA 96 of the Joint Appendix filed on January 31, 2022 by petitioner Viking River Cruises, Inc. with the United States Supreme Court in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana, No. 20-1573

As the court may take judicial notice of court and state records, (See Evid. Code, § 452(c),(d)), the unopposed request for judicial notice is granted. However, the Court will not take judicial notice of the truth of assertions within those court records. (See Herrera v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1366, 1375.)

California law incorporates many of the basic policy objectives contained in the Federal Arbitration Act, including a presumption in favor of arbitrability. (See Engalla v. Permanente Medical Group, Inc. (1997) 15 Cal.4th 951, 971-72.) Under CCP § 1281, a “written agreement to submit to arbitration an existing controversy or a controversy thereafter arising is valid, enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist for the revocation of any contract.”

“On petition of a party to an arbitration agreement alleging the existence of a written agreement to arbitrate a controversy and that a party thereto refuses to arbitrate such controversy, the court shall order the petitioner and the respondent to arbitrate the controversy if it determines that an agreement to arbitrate the controversy exists, unless it determines that:

(c) A party to the arbitration agreement is also a party to a pending court action or special proceeding with a third party, arising out of the same transaction or series of related transactions and there is a possibility of conflicting rulings on a common issue of law or fact. . . .” (CCP §1281.2.)

The right to arbitration depends upon contract; a petition to compel arbitration is simply a suit in equity seeking specific performance of that contract. (Marcus & Millichap Real Estate Inv. Brokerage Co. v. Hock Inv. Co. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 83, 88.) When presented with a petition to compel arbitration, the trial court's first task is to determine whether the parties have in fact agreed to arbitrate the dispute. (Id.)

“Rosenthal v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394] explained: ‘[W]hen a petition to compel arbitration is filed and accompanied by prima facie evidence of a written agreement to arbitrate the controversy, the court itself must determine whether the agreement exists and, if any defense to its enforcement is raised, whether it is enforceable. Because the existence of the agreement is a statutory prerequisite to granting the petition, the petitioner bears the burden of proving its existence by a preponderance of the evidence. If the party opposing the petition raises a defense to enforcement—either fraud in the execution voiding the agreement, or a statutory defense of waiver or revocation (see §1281.2(a), (b))—that party bears the burden of producing evidence of, and proving by a preponderance of the evidence, any fact necessary to the defense.’ (Rosenthal, supra, at 413.) According to Rosenthal, facts relevant to enforcement of the arbitration agreement must be determined ‘in the manner . . . provided by law for the . . . hearing of motions.’ (Rosenthal, supra, at 413, quoting §1290.2.) This ‘ordinarily mean[s] the facts are to be proven by affidavit or declaration and documentary evidence, with oral testimony taken only in the court’s discretion.’ (Rosenthal, supra, at 413–414; . . .).” (Hotels Nevada v. L.A. Pacific Center, Inc. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 754, 761-62.)

Under both the Federal Arbitration Act and California law, arbitration agreements are valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, except on such grounds that exist at law or equity for voiding a contract. (Winter v. Window Fashions Professions, Inc. (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 943, 947.) In ruling on a motion to compel arbitration, the court must first determine whether the parties actually agreed to arbitrate the dispute, and general principles of California contract law help guide the court in making this determination. (Mendez v. Mid-Wilshire Health Care Center (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 534, 541.) “With respect to the moving party’s burden to provide evidence of the existence of an agreement to arbitrate, it is generally sufficient for that party to present a copy of the contract to the court.” (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1160.)

Here, Defendants assert that Plaintiff executed a pre-dispute arbitration agreement. In support of this assertion, Defendants present the declaration of Glenn Grindstaff, the Chief Human Resources Officer for Defendant OSI Systems, Inc. – the parent company Defendant OSI Optoelectronics, Inc. (Grindstaff Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.) Grindstaff states that as Chief Human Resources Officer, he has access to the employment and personnel files of current and former employees of Defendant OSI Optoelectronics, Inc. such as Plaintiff. (Grindstaff Decl. ¶ 5.) Grindstaff further states that he is familiar with Defendant OSI Optoelectronics, Inc.’s onboarding process, which includes a Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes. (Grindstaff Decl. ¶ 7.) Plaintiff’s personnel file includes – in relevant part – a signed a copy of Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes. (Grindstaff Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. A.)

The arbitration agreement provides in relevant part that “[OSI Optoelectronics, Inc.] and [Plaintiff] voluntarily agree that any claim, dispute, or controversy arising out of or relating to [Plaintiff’s] employment with [OSI Optoelectronics, Inc.] or the separation of that employment shall be submitted to final and binding arbitration in accordance with the terms of this Mutual Agreement to Arbitrate Disputes. … [¶] … This agreement applies to all claims that [OSI Optoelectronics, Inc.] may have against [Plaintiff], as well as all claims that [Plaintiff] may have against [OSI Optoelectronics, Inc.], including any of [OSI Optoelectronics, Inc.’s] parents, subsidiaries, affiliates, successors, assigns, owners, directors, officers, shareholders, employees, managers, members, and agents. [¶] [Plaintiff] and [OSI Optoelectronics, Inc.] agree that this agreement to arbitrate and any arbitration under this agreement shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’).” (Grindstaff Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. A [italics].) The arbitration agreement also appears to have been signed by Plaintiff. (Grindstaff Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. A.)

“[D]efendants may meet their initial burden to show an agreement to arbitrate by attaching a copy of the arbitration agreement purportedly bearing the opposing party’s signature.” (Espejo v. Southern California Permanente Medical Group (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 1047, 1060; see also Bannister v. Marinidence Opco, LLC (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th 541 [“The party seeking arbitration can meet its initial burden by attaching to the petition a copy of the arbitration agreement purporting to bear the respondent's signature.”].) Accordingly, Defendants have met their initial burden by attaching an arbitration agreement bearing what appears to be Plaintiff’s signature.

In opposition, Plaintiff does not dispute that she signed an arbitration agreement or that the arbitration agreement covers the claims raised in the FAC. Rather, Plaintiff contends that the terms of the agreement prohibit arbitration of the PAGA claims and that if Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims are subject to arbitration, the Court should not dismiss the representative PAGA claims.

“A party seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement has the burden of showing FAA preemption.” (Lane v. Francis Capital Mgmt. LLC (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 676, 684.) California law provides that parties may expressly designate that any arbitration proceeding should move forward under the FAA's procedural provisions rather than under state procedural law.^{^[1]} (Cronus Investments, Inc. v. Concierge Services (2005) 35 Cal. 4th 376, 394). Otherwise, the FAA provides for enforcement of arbitration provisions in any “‘contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce.’ (9 USC § 2.)” (Allied-Bruce Terminix Companies, Inc. v. Dobson (1995) 513 U.S. 265, 277.) Accordingly, “[t]he party asserting the FAA bears the burden to show it applies by presenting evidence establishing the contract with the arbitration provision has a substantial relationship to interstate commerce[.]” (Carbajal v. CWPSC, Inc. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 227, 234, [italics added].)

Here, the arbitration agreement specifically invokes the FAA. (Grindstaff Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. A., “[Plaintiff] and [OSI Optoelectronics, Inc.] agree that this agreement to arbitrate and any arbitration under this agreement shall be governed by the Federal Arbitration Act (‘FAA’).”].) Moreover, Defendants are engaged in interstate commerce as they provide “advanced optoelectronics and electronic assemblies for a wide variety of industries including aerospace and defense, medical and life sciences, automation and industrial production, and automotive and consumer electronics both domestically throughout the United States and internationally.” (Grindstaff Decl. ¶ 4.) Accordingly, the FAA applies to the instant arbitration agreement and preempts any California law in conflict.

Plaintiff contends that because the arbitration agreement provides that “[t]he arbitrator … may not otherwise preside over any form of a representative, collective or class proceeding” (Grindstaff Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. A), the Court must deny Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration. This contention fails to address the arbitrability of Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims, which the Supreme Court of the United States (“SCOTUS”) has recently addressed.

In Iskanian v. CLS Transportation Los Angeles, LLC (2014) 59 Cal.4th 348, the California Supreme Court held that “an arbitration agreement requiring an employee as a condition of employment to give up the right to bring representative PAGA actions in any forum is contrary to public policy.” (Id. at p. 360.) Subsequently in Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 142 S.Ct. 1906, SCOTUS abrogated Iskanian in part.

In Viking River Cruises, “Petitioner Viking River Cruises, Inc. (Viking), [was] a company that offer[ed] ocean and river cruises around the world. When respondent Angie Moriana [Moriana] was hired by Viking as a sales representative, she executed an agreement to arbitrate any dispute arising out of her employment.” (Viking River Cruises, Inc., supra, 142 S.Ct. at pp.1915–1916.) “After leaving her position with Viking, Moriana filed a PAGA action against Viking in California court.” (Viking River Cruises, Inc., supra, 142 S.Ct. at p.1916.) “Viking moved to compel arbitration of Moriana's ‘individual’ PAGA claim—here meaning the claim that arose from the violation she suffered—and to dismiss her other PAGA claims.” (Ibid.) The California trial court and appellate court denied Viking’s motion to compel arbitration which “was dictated by the California Supreme Court's decision in Iskanian.” (Viking River Cruises, Inc., supra, 142 S.Ct. at p.1916.) SCOTUS “granted certiorari in [Viking River Cruises] to decide whether the [FAA] preempts a rule of California law that invalidates contractual waivers of the right to assert representative claims under [PAGA].” (Id. at p.1913.)

SCOTUS concluded “that the FAA preempts the rule of Iskanian insofar as it precludes division of PAGA actions into individual and non-individual claims through an agreement to arbitrate.” (Viking River Cruises, Inc., supra, 142 S.Ct. at p.1924.) SCOTUS then concluded that “Viking [wa]s entitled to compel arbitration of Moriana's individual claim.” (Id. at p.1925.)

Pursuant to Viking River Cruises, the Court found that there is an individual and a representative aspect to a PAGA claim. (Id. at p.1924.) Only Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims can be compelled to arbitration. (Id. at p.1925.) The representative portion of Plaintiff’s PAGA claim cannot be compelled to arbitration. Nor do Defendants here seek to compel the representative portion of Plaintiff’s PAGA claims. Instead, Defendants seek dismissal of the representative portion of Plaintiff’s PAGA claims. Thus, Plaintiff’s reliance on the clause of the arbitration agreement providing that “[t]he arbitrator … may not otherwise preside over any form of a representative, collective or class proceeding” (Grindstaff Decl. ¶ 7, Exh. A), is inapposite because in granting the instant motion to compel arbitration, the Court will compel arbitration of only Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims, and the arbitrator will not be presiding over a representative action.

“Once such a document is presented to the court, the burden shifts to the party opposing the motion to compel, who may present any challenges to the enforcement of the agreement and evidence in support of those challenges.” (Baker v. Italian Maple Holdings, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 1152, 1160.)

“California courts analyze unconscionability as having a procedural and a substantive element.” (Kinney v. United Healthcare Services, Inc. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th 1329.) “[B]oth elements must be present before a contract or contract provision is rendered unenforceable on grounds of unconscionability.” (Id.) The doctrine of unconscionability refers to “an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party.” (Sonic-Calabasas A, Inc. v. Moreno (2013) 57 Cal.4th 1109, 1133.) It consists of procedural and substantive components, “the former focusing on oppression or surprise due to unequal bargaining power, the latter on overly harsh or one-sided results.” (Ibid.) Although both components of unconscionability must be present to invalidate an arbitration agreement, they need not be present in the same degree. (Armendariz v. Found Health Psychcare Servs., Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83, 114.) “Essentially a sliding scale is invoked which disregards the regularity of the procedural process of the contract formation, that creates the terms, in proportion to the greater harshness or unreasonableness of the substantive terms themselves. [Citations.] In other words, the more substantively unconscionable the contract term, the less evidence of procedural unconscionability is required to come to the conclusion that the term is unenforceable, and vice versa.” (Ibid.) “The party resisting arbitration bears the burden of proving unconscionability.” (Pinnacle Museum Tower Assn. v. Pinnacle Market Dev. (US), LLC (2012) 55 Cal.4th 223, 247.)

Here, Plaintiff’s opposition fails to raise any issue of unconscionability. Accordingly, Plaintiff fails to meet her burden in showing that the arbitration agreement is unconscionable. Therefore, Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims are subject to arbitration, and the Court hereby grants Defendants’ motion to compel Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims to arbitration.

Defendant contends that the Court should dismiss Plaintiff’s representative PAGA claims because (1) Plaintiff will no longer be an aggrieved employee after arbitration, and (2) res judicata will preclude Plaintiff from pursuing the representative portion of the PAGA claim. These arguments are against the clear weight of binding authority.

In Viking River Cruises, after holding that the plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims were to be compelled to arbitration, Justice Alito’s opinion turned to the “remaining question [of] what the lower courts should have done with Moriana’s non-individual claims. Under [SCOTUS’s] holding in [Viking River Cruise], those claims may not be dismissed simply because they are ‘representative,’” since “Iskanian’s rule remains valid to that extent.” (Viking River Cruises, Inc., supra, 142 S.Ct. at p.1925.) SCOTUS opined in section IV in Justice Alito’s opinion that:

PAGA provides no mechanism to enable a court to adjudicate non-individual PAGA claims once an individual claim has been committed to a separate proceeding. Under PAGA's standing requirement, a plaintiff can maintain non-individual PAGA claims in an action only by virtue of also maintaining an individual claim in that action. See Cal. Lab. Code Ann. §§ 2699(a), (c). When an employee's own dispute is pared away from a PAGA action, the employee is no different from a member of the general public, and PAGA does not allow such persons to maintain suit. See Kim, 9 Cal.5th at 90, (“PAGA's standing requirement was meant to be a departure from the ‘general public’ ... standing originally allowed” under other California statutes). As a result, Moriana lacks statutory standing to continue to maintain her non-individual claims in court, and the correct course is to dismiss her remaining claims.

However, section IV of Justice Alito’s majority opinion was not embraced by the majority of the Supreme Court. In her concurrence, Justice Barrett agreed with the judgment, agreeing that reversal was required because PAGA’s procedure “is akin to other aggregation devices that cannot be imposed on a party to an arbitration agreement.” (Viking River Cruises, Inc., supra, 142 S.Ct. at p.1926 (conc. opn. of Barrett, J.).) However, Justice Barrett’s concurring opinion, joined by Justice Kavanaugh and Chief Justice Roberts, expressly declined to join in the majority opinion’s further holding that Moriana lacked statutory standing to continue to maintain her non-individual claims. (Viking River Cruises, Inc., supra, 142 S.Ct. at p. 1926 (conc. opn. of Barrett, J. [“[t]he discussion in Parts II and IV of the Court’s opinion is unnecessary to the result, and much of it addresses disputed state-law questions as well as arguments not pressed or passed upon in this case.”]).)

The Court concludes that the FAA poses no bar to the adjudication of respondent Angie Moriana's “non-individual” PAGA claims, but that PAGA itself “provides no mechanism to enable a court to adjudicate non-individual PAGA claims once an individual claim has been committed to a separate proceeding.” Ante, at 1925. Thus, the Court reasons, based on available guidance from California courts, that Moriana lacks “statutory standing” under PAGA to litigate her “non-individual” claims separately in state court. Ibid. Of course, if this Court's understanding of state law is wrong, California courts, in an appropriate case, will have the last word. Alternatively, if this Court's understanding is right, the California Legislature is free to modify the scope of statutory standing under PAGA within state and federal constitutional limits. With this understanding, I join the Court's opinion.

(Viking River Cruises, Inc. v. Moriana (2022) 142 S.Ct. at p.1925, [conc. opn. of Justice Sotomayor].) As Justice Thomas dissented, only a minority of SCOTUS agreed with Justice Alito’s dicta that the representative claims should be dismissed for lack of standing.

Regardless, as Justice Sotomayor observed, SCOTUS lacks jurisdiction to make such a finding. “The state courts are the final arbiters of their meaning and appropriate application, subject only to review by [SCOTUS] if such construction or application is appropriately challenged on constitutional grounds.” (Beal v. Missouri Pac. R. R. Corp. (1941) 312 U.S. 45, 50; see Shams v. Revature LLC (N.D. Cal. 2022) 621 F.Supp.3d 1054, 1059, [“Although the Supreme Court suggests that under PAGA, Moriana lost standing to pursue her non-individual PAGA claims, because the California Supreme Court is the final arbiter of California law, this Court applies Kim’s interpretation of PAGA standing to this case.”].)

Recently, the California Supreme Court has definitively and conclusively answered this question in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (Cal., July 17, 2023, No. S274671) 2023 WL 4553702 --- P.3d ---. In Adolph, the California Supreme Court concluded that “a worker becomes an ‘aggrieved employee’ with standing to litigate claims on behalf of fellow employees upon sustaining a Labor Code violation committed by his or her employer. [Citations.] Standing under PAGA is not affected by enforcement of an agreement to adjudicate a plaintiff's individual claim in another forum. Arbitrating a PAGA plaintiff's individual claim does not nullify the fact of the violation or extinguish the plaintiff's status as an aggrieved employee…” (Adolph, supra, 2023 WL 4553702, at *6.) Thus, “where a plaintiff has filed a PAGA action comprised of individual and non-individual claims, an order compelling arbitration of individual claims does not strip the plaintiff of standing to litigate non-individual claims in court.” (Adolph, supra, 2023 WL 4553702, at *8.)

Here, Plaintiff has alleged Labor Code violations while working for Defendants. “[Plaintiff]'s allegations that Labor Code violations were committed against h[er] while [s]he was employed by [Defendants] suffice to confer standing to bring a PAGA action.” (Adolph, supra, 2023 WL 4553702, at *6.) The fact that the Court is compelling Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims to arbitration does not deprive Plaintiff of standing. (Adolph, supra, 2023 WL 4553702, at *8.)

Defendants’ second contention that res judicata precludes Plaintiff from pursuing the representative portion of the PAGA claim is equally unavailing.

“‘Res judicata’ describes the preclusive effect of a final judgment on the merits. Res judicata, or claim preclusion, prevents relitigation of the same cause of action in a second suit between the same parties or parties in privity with them. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, ‘precludes relitigation of issues argued and decided in prior proceedings.’” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 896.) Issue preclusion applies only to issues that were actually litigated in the earlier matter; whereas claim preclusion extends to all legal theories, proofs, and demands for relief that might have been presented in the first matter, provided both suits assert the same cause of action. (Ferraro v. Camarlinghi (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 509, 541, Fn. 21; Gottlieb v. Kest (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 110, 148; Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Corp. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 897; Burdette v. Carrier Corp. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1668, 1687.) “Res judicata [claim preclusion] bars the relitigation not only of claims that were conclusively determined in the first action, but also matter that was within the scope of the action, related to the subject matter, and relevant to the issues so that it could have been raised” and includes ‘matters which were raised or could have been raised, on matters litigated or litigable.’” (Burdette v. Carrier Corp. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 1668, 1674-1675; accord Mark v. Spencer (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 219, 229 [bars claims that parties had a fair opportunity to litigate].)

The prerequisite elements for applying the doctrine to either an entire cause of action or one or more issues are the same: (1) A claim or issue raised in the present action is identical to a claim or issue litigated in a prior proceeding; (2) the prior proceeding resulted in a final judgment on the merits; and (3) the party against whom the doctrine is being asserted was a party or in privity with a party to the prior proceeding. (Vandenberg v. Superior Court (1999) 21 Cal.4th 815, 829.)

Here, there is but one suit, and thus res, judicata is inapplicable. There can be no final judgment on the merits until both the arbitration and the instant court proceeding have resolved. Moreover, there is no second action to which the res judicata effect would apply. “When an action includes arbitrable and nonarbitrable components, the resulting bifurcated proceedings are not severed from one another; rather, the court may ‘stay the trial of the action until such arbitration has been had in accordance with the terms of the agreement.’ (9 U.S.C. § 3; see Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4.)” (Adolph, supra, 2023 WL 4553702, at *9, [italics added].) “‘Even though Viking [River] requires the trial court to bifurcate and order individual PAGA claims to arbitration when an appropriate arbitration agreement exists, the individual PAGA claims in arbitration remain part of the same lawsuit as the representative claims remaining in court. Thus, plaintiffs are pursuing a single PAGA action “on behalf of [themselves] and other current or former employees,” albeit across two fora.’ [Citation.]” (Adolph, supra, 2023 WL 4553702, at *10, [italics added].) “Indeed, it is a regular and accepted feature of litigation governed by the FAA that the arbitration of some issues does not sever those issues from the remainder of the lawsuit.” (Adolph, supra, 2023 WL 4553702, at *9.)

Thus, res judicata would not apply to prohibit Plaintiff from continuing this piecemeal litigation. Accordingly, the clear weight of binding authority is against Defendants, and dismissal of the representative portion of Plaintiff’s PAGA claim would be improper.

Based on the foregoing, Defendants OSI Optoelectronics, Inc. and OSI Systems, Inc.’s motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED as to Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims and DENIED as to Plaintiff’s representative PAGA claims.

The Court orders litigation of Plaintiff’s representative PAGA claims – the only portion of the action that remains before this court – stayed in its entirety until completion of the arbitration of Plaintiff’s individual PAGA claims pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1281.4. A status conference regarding the progress of arbitration and the stay is set for December 13, 2023 at 8:30 am.

[1] “But the parties may ‘expressly designate that any arbitration proceeding [may] move forward under the FAA's procedural provisions rather than under state procedural law.’ [Citation.] Absent such an express designation, however, the FAA’s procedural provisions do not apply in state court.” (Valencia v. Smyth (2010) 185 Cal.App.4th 153, 174; see also Rodriguez v. American Technologies, Inc. (2006) 136 Cal.App.4th 1110, 1122.)

County of Los Angeles

Department 26