Judge: Elaine Lu, Case: 22STCV37797, Date: 2024-02-09 Tentative Ruling





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Case Number: 22STCV37797    Hearing Date: February 9, 2024    Dept: 26

 

 

 

 

 

 

Superior Court of California

County of Los Angeles

Department 26

 

 

hope young,

 

                        Plaintiff,

            v.

 

CITY OF LOS ANGELES; et al.

                        Defendants.

 

  Case No.:  22STCV37797

 

  Hearing Date:  February 9, 2024

 

[TENTATIVE] order RE:

plaintiff’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint

 

 

 

Procedural Background

            On December 2, 2022, Plaintiff Hope Young (“Plaintiff”) filed the instant whistleblower retaliation action against Defendant City of Los Angeles (“Defendant”).  On January 18, 2023, Plaintiff filed the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendant.  The FAC asserts a single cause of action for (1) Whistleblower Retaliation (Labor Code § 1102.5.)

            On August 8, 2023, the instant action was stayed pursuant to the parties’ stipulation so that Plaintiff could seek an administrative appeal of her termination.  On December 4, 2023, the stay was lifted.  (Minute Order 12/4/23.) 

            On December 8, 2023, Plaintiff filed the instant motion for leave to file a second amended complaint.  On December 12, 2023, Defendant filed an opposition. 

            On December 13, 2023, the Court granted Plaintiff’s ex parte application to advance the instant motion to February 9, 2024.  (Minute Order 12/13/23.)

            On January 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed an amended motion for leave to file a second amended complaint.  On February 2, 2024, Plaintiff filed a reply.

A party is permitted to file only one moving or opposing memorandum.  Here, Plaintiff has filed two sets of moving papers, and Defendant has filed two oppositions.  Accordingly, the Court will consider only the most recently filed moving papers and opposing papers.

 

Legal Standard

            Code of Civil Procedure § 473, subdivision (a)(1) states: “[t]he court may, in furtherance of justice, and on any terms, as may be proper, allow a party to amend any pleading or proceeding by adding or striking out the name of any party, or by correcting a mistake in the name of a party, or a mistake in any other respect; and may, upon like terms, enlarge the time for answer or demurrer.  The court may likewise, in its discretion, after notice to the adverse party, allow, upon any terms as may be just, an amendment to any pleading or proceeding in other particulars; and may upon like terms allow an answer to be made after the time limited by this code.” 

            Code of Civil Procedure § 576 states that: “[a]ny judge, at any time before or after commencement of trial, in the furtherance of justice, and upon such terms as may be proper, may allow the amendment of any pleading or pretrial conference order.”

            Judicial policy favors resolution of all disputed matters between the parties, and therefore, courts have held that “there is a strong policy in favor of liberal allowance of amendments.” (Mesler v. Bragg Management Co. (1985) 39 Cal.3d 290, 296-97; see also Ventura v. ABM Industries, Inc. (2013) 212 Cal.App.4th 258, 268) [“Trial courts are bound to apply a policy of great liberality in permitting amendments to the complaint at any stage of the proceedings, up to and including trial where the adverse party will not be prejudiced.”].)

            Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rule 3.1324(a), a motion to amend must: (1) include a copy of the proposed amendment or amended pleading, which must be serially numbered; and (2) state what allegations are proposed to be deleted from or added to the previous pleading and where such allegations are located.  Rule 3.1324(b) requires a separate declaration that accompanies the motion, stating: “(1) the effect of the amendment; (2) why the amendment is necessary and proper; (3) when the facts giving rise to the amended allegations were discovered; and (4) the reason why the request for amendment was not made earlier.” 

 

Discussion

            Plaintiff seeks to file a second amended complaint to add the factual allegation of Plaintiff’s termination and to add four causes of action for (2) Gender and Sexual Orientation Discrimination (FEHA), (3) Retaliation in Violation of FEHA, (4) Hostile Work Environment Harassment, and (5) Wrongful Termination in Violation of Public Policy.  Plaintiff’s Counsel states that she recently substituted in for Plaintiff on November 29, 2023 due to a conflict of interest between Plaintiff and Plaintiff’s prior counsel.  (Gillam Decl. ¶ 3.)  Plaintiff’s current Counsel “ determined that the facts already pleaded supported meritorious claims of wrongful termination and various Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA) claims: discrimination, retaliation, and harassment.”  (Gillam Decl. ¶ 5.)  Further, Plaintiff’s termination occurred only after the filing of the complaint and FAC.  (Gillam Decl. ¶ 2.)  Plaintiff has filed a proposed second amended complaint and filed a “redline” copy denoting all specific proposed changes.  (Gillam Decl. ¶ 6, Exh. 1.)

            In opposition, Defendant contends that the instant motion should be denied because the proposed amendments are futile as untimely and barred by the litigation privilege, and the proposed amendments will prejudice Defendant.

            Whether the proposed first amended complaint is deficient is beyond the scope of a motion for leave to amend.  In general, there is no requirement that a critical inquiry be made into the merits of the amendment on a request for leave to amend.  (See Ruiz v. Santa Barbara Gas & Elec. Co. (1912) 164 Cal. 188, 196 [ “The usual and orderly way to test the sufficiency of an amended complaint is, in the first instance, by demurrer, after the same has been filed, when the questions presented in regard thereto may be considered and determined, and leave given to the pleader to amend if the pleading be held insufficient and the court deem it proper that the party should have such leave.”].)  Rather, Defendant can challenge such deficiency in a motion challenging the claim such as a demurrer, anti-SLAPP motion, or motion for summary adjudication.  Accordingly, the Court will not opine as to whether some allegations are barred by the litigation privilege or are untimely.

            Moreover, regardless of any delay in bringing the instant motion, “trial courts are to liberally permit such amendments, at any stage of the proceeding[.]”  (Hirsa v. Superior Court (1981) 118 Cal.App.3d 486, 488–489.)  Rather, to justify a denial of a motion for leave to amend, the delay must have caused prejudice to the adverse parties.  (See Fair v. Bakhtiari (2011) 195 Cal.App.4th 1135, 1147, [“[W]here there is no prejudice to the adverse party, it may be an abuse of discretion to deny leave to amend.”].) 

            Here, Defendant contends that prejudice exists because the proposed second amended complaint “would require delaying the trial, increasing the burden of discovery, or adding motions such as a motion to strike and anti-SLAPP motion to the docket.”  (Opp. at p.3:19-20.)  However, such a claim of prejudice is unfounded.  Plaintiff was terminated only recently, and Plaintiff’s new Counsel only entered the case mere months ago.  (Gillam Decl. ¶¶ 2-3.)  Further, due to the stay in the action no discovery has taken place.  (Gillam Decl. ¶ 4.)  Moreover, while trial is currently set for May 6, 2024 the parties have already stipulated to a trial continuance as no discovery has yet been served.  (Gillam Decl. ¶ 7.)  Accordingly, while there may be a delay in the action going to trial, such delay is not attributable to the proposed amendments to the complaint.  Thus, Defendant fails to show any prejudice from the proposed second amended complaint. 

            As there is no prejudice from the proposed first amended complaint, it would be an abuse of discretion to deny.  Accordingly, Plaintiff’s motion for leave to amend is GRANTED.

 

Conclusion and ORDER

            Based on the foregoing, Plaintiff Hope Young’s motion for leave to file a second amended complaint is GRANTED.

            Plaintiff is to file the proposed Second Amended Complaint within five (5) days of notice of this order.

            Moving Party is to provide notice of this order and file proof of service of such.

 

DATED: February ___, 2024                                                 ___________________________

                                                                                          Elaine Lu

                                                                                          Judge of the Superior Court