Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 20SMCV01214, Date: 2023-11-30 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 20SMCV01214 Hearing Date: March 12, 2024 Dept: P
Tentative Ruling
Cohen, et al. v.
Kaplan, et al., Case No. 20SMCV01214
Hearing Date March
12, 2024
Cohen
Cross-Defendants’ Demurrer/Motion to Strike Portions of Third Amended
Cross-Complaint
Kaplan
Cross-Complainants’ Motion for Sanctions
The parties sued
regarding property in Malibu. Kaplans’ Third Amended Cross-Complaint alleges
the Cohens agreed to a settlement that included an easement, but later reneged
on the agreement. The Cohens disagree that a settlement agreement was ever formed,
as party Elaine Cohen failed to sign.
Cross-defendants Paul
and Elaine Cohen demur to the third cause of action for breach of a settlement
agreement and seventh cause of action for estoppel. They also move to strike
portions of the cross-complaint. The Kaplans request sanctions against Paul
Cohen and his former counsel Bloch for falsely representing that Elaine Cohen
signed the settlement agreement.
Cohens’ Demurrer
Breach of
Settlement
On demurrer, the
contents of exhibits control over contradictory allegations in the complaint to
which they are attached. Bank of New York Mellon v. Citibank, N.A.
(2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 935, 943.
The Cohens argue
the breach of contract cause of action fails because the settlement agreement (TACC,
exh. A) states it shall take effect “immediately upon execution by the last
signatory,” and Elaine Cohen never signed the agreement. See Demurrer, pg. 8; TACC
¶27, pg. 9.
It is undisputed
that the settlement agreement does not contain Elaine Cohen’s signature. Paul
Cohen’s signature appears over the lines reserved for both Cohens’ names. Since
the TACC requires signatures from all parties before it can be enforced (see
Exhibit A ¶27), the lack of a signature from Elaine Cohen would appear to
defeat this cause of action.
In opposition, the
Kaplans admit Elaine Cohen did not sign the settlement, but argue the breach of
contract claim is based on allegations that Paul Cohen executed the agreement
as his wife’s agent. This may be a valid basis for a breach of contract cause
of action, and, if alleged, it must be treated as true on demurrer. However, this
theory is not alleged in the TACC. SUSTAINED with ten days leave to amend.
Estoppel
The Cohens argue
the estoppel claim fails because estoppel is not a stand-alone cause of action.
Behnke v. State Farm General Ins. Co. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1463.
The Kaplans
correctly point out that “equitable estoppel ‘must be pleaded, either as a part
of the cause of action or as a defense. [citation omitted]’” Blaser v.
California State Teachers’ Retirement System (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th 507, 528.
They concede it is not a separate cause of action but part of their claim for
breach of the settlement agreement. Their separately pleaded cause of action
for estoppel is subject to demurrer, as it must be alleged as part of the
breach of contract cause of action. SUSTAINED with ten days leave to amend.
Cohens’ Motion to
Strike
Mediation
Allegations
“All
communications, negotiations, or settlement discussions by and between
participants in the course of a mediation or a mediation consultation shall
remain confidential.” Cal. Evid. Code §1119. Any writing prepared in connection
with a mediation is inadmissible, including unsigned drafts of settlement
agreements. Rael v. Davis (2008) 166 Cal.App.4th 1608, 1619. A written
settlement agreement is admissible if signed by the settling parties and
containing language stating it is “enforceable or binding or words to that
effect.” Cal. Evid. Code §1123. Mediation ends when there are no communications
between mediator and parties for ten days. Cal. Evid. Code §1125.
The Cohens argue
the settlement agreement, the easement agreement and all allegations related to
the settlement negotiation are inadmissible. They argue that since the
settlement and easement were not executed by Elaine Cohen, they should be
treated as drafts, inadmissible under Rael.
The TACC, paras.
27-28, reveal communications made during mediation and by the mediator, so must
be struck under Evid. Code §1119. Subsequent allegations, however, such as
paras. 29-39, reference communications made more than ten days after
communication between the mediator and the parties; these are not subject to
the mediation privilege.
To the extent the
Kaplans quote the settlement agreement – which all parties admit was not signed
by Elaine Cohen – it is inadmissible as a draft. In opposition, the Kaplans
argue the references to the settlement agreement should not be struck because Elaine
signed the agreement through her husband as her agent, and the settlement
creates “enforceable or binding” language. However, the TACC does not allege an
agency theory (see above). It is improper to cite the agreement unless the
Kaplans can allege it was fully executed or signed on behalf of Elaine Cohen by
her husband. SUSTAINED without leave to amend as to paragraphs 27 and 28. OVERRULED
as to the other challenged portions of the TACC.
Causes of Action
for Fraud, Conspiracy and Negligent Misrepresentation
The Cohens argue
these claims should be struck under the litigation privilege and because
cross-complainants agreed to strike them. On February 9, 2024 the Kaplans filed
a request for dismissal of the fraud, conspiracy and negligent
misrepresentation causes of action. See 2/9/2024 request for dismissal. When
the fourth amended cross-complaint is filed pursuant to the leave to amend
granted above, those causes of action will be struck, as will requests for
punitive damages derived from those causes of action. GRANTED.
Causes of Action
for Breach of Settlement and Estoppel
The motion to
strike these causes of action is derivative of the demurrer to those causes of
action, so the motion to strike is MOOT.
Kaplans’ Motion
for Sanctions
Under Cal. Code of
Civ. Proc. §128.5(b)(2), “a trial court may order a party, the party’s
attorney, or both to pay the reasonable expenses, including attorney’s fees,
incurred by another party as a result of actions or tactics made in bad faith
that are frivolous or solely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” “A
misrepresentation of material fact is subject to sanction under §128.5.” Levine
v. Berschneider (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 916, 922. Sanctions cannot be awarded
under §128.5 absent a showing of subjective bad faith. Levy v. Blum (2001)
92 Cal.App. 4th 635-636.
The Kaplans argue
the Cohens’ prior counsel Bloch twice misrepresented that both Paul and Elaine
Cohen signed the settlement agreement, when Elaine had not signed. They argue one
of those misrepresentations was made before the court on July 5, 2023. In
reliance on that (mis)representation, the court dismissed the case.
Bloch states when
he told the court the settlement was signed by both Cohens, he failed to notice
the duplication of Paul Cohen’s signature on both blocks. Bloch decl. ¶¶4-5. The
evidence suggests at least carelessness. However, Bloch fails to explain why he
did not inform the court or opposing counsel of his July 6, 2023 discovery that
the Cohens had not actually signed the settlement until five months later.
Bloch decl. ¶7. His invocation of attorney-client privilege is misplaced. Bloch
decl. ¶5. That Elaine Cohen did not sign the agreement is not an
attorney-client communication. This is a fact – either she signed or did not.
This fact is not subject to attorney-client privilege and does not become
attorney-client privilege protected simply because the alleged signature
belonged to Bloch’s client.
The Cohens and
Bloch waited months, from July until October 2023, knowing the Kaplans were
under the misapprehension that Mrs. Cohen signed the agreement and the parties
reached a binding agreement. They failed to respond to communications regarding
the status of the settlement or to correct the Kaplans’ understanding. They
allowed the Kaplans to file a motion to enforce the settlement agreement in
reliance on the (mis)understanding that both Cohens signed, knowing the
agreement was not signed by Elaine Cohen.
The Cohens and
Bloch acted in bad faith by failing to alert the Kaplans after the July 5, 2023
OSC hearing that Elaine Cohen did not sign the agreement. The Kaplans filed a
motion in reliance on the misapprehension that Elaine Cohen signed, when the
Cohens and Bloch knew she had not.
Sanctions pursuant
to CCP 128.5 are appropriate. However, the Zuidema declaration in support of
the motion and additional fees sought in the reply are vague as to the tasks
performed. The court cannot assess whether the hours requested are reasonable,
as there are no time sheets attached, nor a detailed description of tasks
performed.
The requested hourly
rate of $450 is not unreasonable. However, 27.2 hours, plus 9.7 hours (Zuidema
decl., para. 10), plus another 14.7 hours responding to the oppositions
(Zuidema reply decl., para. 6) plus 2 hours for the hearing is not reasonable.
The court will allow counsel to provide additional information regarding the
hours sought prior to issuing a sanctions award. The court will issue sanctions
for the time to draft the motion, review oppositions and reply. The court will
also issue sanctions for time subsequent to Cohens’ counsel’s admission that he
learned the settlement had not been signed and he failed to tell Kaplans’
counsel the document was never signed by Elaine Cohen.