Judge Elaine W. Mandel, Case Number: 20SMCV01622, Date: 2023-11-09 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 20SMCV01622, Date: 2023-11-09 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 20SMCV01622 Hearing Date: November 9, 2023 Dept: P

Tentative Ruling

Goosen v. Draz et al., Case No. 20SMCV01622 (Consolidated with 21SMCV00332)

Hearing Date November 9, 2023

Defendants Goosen’s Motion for Summary Judgment/Adjudication

Plaintiff Goosen sued tenant defendants Draz and Draz Investment Group for unlawful detainer. After Draz vacated, Goosen’s remaining claims are for waste and breach of lease. In the second action, plaintiff Draz alleges the Goosens breached the lease by failing to perform improvements and repairs Draz allegedly paid for. The Goosens move for summary judgment.

Declaratory Relief

Declaratory relief is a prospective remedy which exists to declare future rights rather than to redress past wrongs. Canova v. Trustees of Imperial Irrigation Dist. Employee Pension Plan (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1487, 1497.

Draz requests a declaration that he is entitled to a “ten-year amortization period to use the property in its business as intended and indicated in paragraph 42 of the lease[.]” SAC ¶9. The Goosens argue Draz’s vacating of the premises ending any ongoing relationship between the parties.

A motion for summary adjudication can resolve “one or more causes of action within an action, one or more affirmative defenses, one or more claims for damages, or one or more issues of duty.” Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §437c(f)(1). The request for declaratory relief is an element of the breach of lease and unjust enrichment claims; it is not an independent cause of action, affirmative defense, claim for damages or an issue of duty. Therefore, it is not subject to summary adjudication. DENIED.

Statute of Limitations

A statute of limitations “begins to run when a plaintiff has suffered damage from a wrongful act.” Lyles v. State of California (2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 281, 286. Once the damage is such that the cause of action accrues, additional damage from the same wrong does not alter the accrual of the cause of action. Id. Under the continuing violation doctrine, a statute of limitations for a series of wrongs accrues “for all of them upon commission of the last of them[.]” Aryeh v. Canon Business Systems (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1192. Under the continuous accrual theory, “a series of wrongs or injuries may be viewed as each triggering its own limitations period, such that a suit for relief may be partially time-barred as to older events but timely as to those within the appliable limitations period.” Id.

The Goosens argue the four-year statute of limitations on Draz’s breach of lease claim began running March 1, 2016, when Draz assumed control of the premises and allegedly discovered they were uninhabitable. Draz’s complaint was filed February 17, 2021, so the Goosens argue the breach of lease claim is time-barred. Draz argues the statute of limitations has not run because the Goosens’ failure to remedy habitability violations are subject to the continuing violation or continuous accrual doctrine.

Habitability issues present when Draz took possession in 2016 constitute a single wrong, not a continuing series of wrongs. To the extent the property had habitability issues in 2016, any breach of lease due to those issues was complete in 2016. Per Lyles, accumulation of additional damages over time due to that original breach do not toll or extend the statute. Draz cites no authority indicating the continuing violation doctrine or continuous accrual theory applies. As habitability issues existing in 2016 constitute a single violation, the burden shifts to Draz to show a material issue as to the statute of limitations.

Draz presents evidence from his own deposition that at least some of the habitability issues forming the basis of his breach of lease claim occurred “during the pandemic.” Draz exhibit 3-3:17. A reasonable interpretation of the phrase “during the pandemic” is that these alleged breaches occurred between 2020 through 2022. Habitability breaches “during the pandemic” fall within the four-year statute of limitations period, so are not time-barred. There is a triable issue of material fact as to whether some of the alleged breaches of the warranty of habitability fell within the statute of limitations period. DENIED.

Quasi-Contract

As a matter of law, a quasi-contract cause of action is unavailable where the parties admit an express contract governs the parties’ relations. California Medical Ass’n. v. Aetna U.S. Healthcare of California, Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 151, 172. A plaintiff may plead inconsistent claims alleging both existence of an enforceable agreement and a quasi-contract claim. A pleading that includes inconsistent contract and quasi-contract claims must include allegations denying the existence or enforceability of the agreement. Klein v. Chevron USA, Inc. (2012) 202 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1389.

The Goosens argue the second cause of action for unjust enrichment is quasi-contractual, so inconsistent with the breach of contract claim. They argue the SAC fails to fulfill the Klein requirement that an unjust enrichment cause of action pleaded alongside a breach of contract claim must deny the existence or enforceability of the agreement.

Draz’s first and second causes of action are mutually exclusive as pleaded under Klein. However, this is in substance a pleading issue (i.e. a motion for judgment on the pleadings or demurrer), not a motion for summary judgment. As such, summary judgment is DENIED.