Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 21SMCV01884, Date: 2022-09-08 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 21SMCV01884    Hearing Date: September 8, 2022    Dept: P

Tentative Ruling
Chein v. Providence St. John’s Health Center (PSJHC) 21SMCV01884
Hearing Date September 8, 2022
Defendant PSJHC’s Demurrer to First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff Chein alleges defendant PSJHC wrongfully suspended her staff privileges, then terminated her in retaliation for exposing alleged racial discrimination and substandard patient care. PSJHC demurs, arguing failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

Before filing a lawsuit challenging a hospital’s denial or withdrawal of privileges, a physician must exhaust available internal remedies. Westlake Community Hospital v. The Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1976) 17 Cal.3d 465, 476. To avoid a demurrer on these grounds, plaintiff must allege facts demonstrating all available administrative remedies were exhausted. Hood v. Hacienda La Puente Unified School Dist. (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 435, 439. This rule does not apply if the review process is inadequate or would be futile. Terese Tiernan v. Trustees of California State Universities and Colleges et al. (1982) 33 Cal.3d 211, 217. An administrative remedy is inadequate if it fails to satisfy the requirements of due process or if the challenged administrative procedures are the source of the asserted injury. E.g., Unnamed Physician v. Board of Trustees of Saint Agnes Medical Center, et al. (2001) 93 Cal.App.4^th 620-622. The minimum due process requirements for peer review of a complaint or incident involving a physician are set forth in Cal. Bus. and Profs. Code §§809.1, 809.2 and 809.3. Id. pg. 622.

PSJHC argues plaintiff has not alleged exhaustion of internal remedies. Chein alleges she requested a hearing, which is still pending; plaintiff argues the hearing process is inadequate, so exhaustion is excused. Chein argues PSJHC’s bylaws fall short of the due process requirements of Bus. and Profs. Code §§809 et seq. and alleges the peer review process does not provide for neutral and impartial decisionmakers. Plaintiff also claims the peer review bylaws deprive physicians of adequate notice of charges, a meaningful opportunity to be heard and the ability to cross-examine.

However, plaintiff does not provide any non-conclusory support for the contention that the peer review procedure does not afford due process. Plaintiff does not describe how the provisions are allegedly inadequate, nor does she do not substantiate other claims of procedural inadequacy.

The argument that the Bylaws violate due process because they enjoin any judicial challenge to their own terms is irrelevant, since the basis of this lawsuit is not a challenge to the hospital’s peer review rules. Chein has not established the peer review process fails to provide due process, so she is not excused from the administrative exhaustion requirement.

Chein argues administrative exhaustion does not apply to the breach of contract and promissory fraud claims because these claims are premised on questions of law that cannot be resolved at an administrative hearing. Though both causes of action include questions of law, they arise out of the core factual dispute: whether privileges were suspended properly. This question of fact can be addressed by a peer review board.

SUSTAINED as to the first, second, fourth, fifth, and sixth causes of action. Because the demurrer has been sustained as to all targeted causes of action, the court will not address the other alleged pleading defects.