Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 22SMCV00423, Date: 2023-05-05 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22SMCV00423 Hearing Date: May 5, 2023 Dept: P
Tentative Ruling
Greenspoon Marder,
LLP v. Crimson & Black, LLC, Case No. 22SMCV00423
Hearing Date May
5, 2023
Plaintiff’s Motion
for Summary Judgment or, in the alternative, Summary Adjudication
Plaintiff law firm
Greenspoon Marder (GM) alleges it provided legal work for defendant Crimson
& Black (CB), for which CB failed to pay. GM alleges its representation
agreement was established via an oral contract and confirmed via emails. GM
argues CB failed to pay and provides no evidence of an affirmative defense. GM
moves for summary judgment or adjudication on breach of contract, open book
account, account stated and quantum meruit claims.
Defense Objections
to Fante declaration: Objection 1 OVERRULED, objection 2 SUSTAINED (lack of
personal knowledge) objection 3 SUSTAINED (hearsay, lack of personal knowledge)
objections 4-12 OVERRULED.
Defense Objections to Ross declaration: Objection 1 OVERRULED, Objection 2
SUSTAINED (lack of personal knowledge) objection 3 OVERRULED.
GM relies primarily
on the declaration and exhibits from COO Jennifer Fante, who reviewed and
authenticates attached exhibits. Fante declaration ¶1. Fante states in August
2019 GM partner Sander Zagzebski agreed with CB manager Francisco Turner that GM
would represent CB. Fante declaration ¶3. On September 25, 2019 Zagzebski
emailed an engagement letter to Turner confirming CB would be GM’s client.
Fante declaration ¶6, exhibit C.
CB makes
evidentiary objections regarding the Fante declaration. Fante’s statement that
Zagzebski and Turner formed an oral contract is inadmissible as hearsay and lacking
in personal knowledge. Neither Zagzebski nor Turner provides a declaration regarding
their communication. Fante does not allege she was present during the conversation
or state the basis of her personal knowledge of meeting’s content. GM does not
suggest any hearsay exception that would allow admission of a third-party,
out-of-court discussion between Zagzebski and Turner. GM fails to prove
Zagzebski and Turner formed an oral contract for legal services in 2019.
Fante alleges the
terms of this oral contract were later memorialized in an engagement letter to
Zagzebski sent in September 2019. Fante declaration ¶6, exhibit C. The letter
is unsigned by Zagzebski. The court cannot conclude CB agreed to the terms of
an engagement letter that was never executed. The engagement letter and Fante’s
testimony regarding the conversation are the only evidence GM provides of a
contract. Since neither is sufficient, plaintiff fails to carry its burden as
to breach of contract.
Plaintiff also
fails to provide sufficient evidence to support its non-contract causes of
action for open book account, account stated and quantum meruit.
GM argues the
invoices (Fante decl., exhs. D, G, H, I and J) prove existence of the alleged
debt, even absent an explicit contract. The invoices, plaintiff argues, establish
liability under the account stated, open book account and quantum meruit causes
of action. A cause of action for open book account requires a contract or
fiduciary relationship between the parties. Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §337a. For
the reasons stated, plaintiff failed to prove either prerequisite.
GW argues CB’s
failure to object to the invoices proves as a matter of law that the amounts
stated are accurate, which is sufficient to carry its burden as to the account
stated cause of action. Fante decl. ¶¶6-9. While failure to respond to a
request for payment can be evidence of a debt’s validity, failure to object
cannot create liability where the parties did not previously agree to the debt.
George E. Trafton v. N.E. Youngblood (1968) 69 Cal.2d 17, 25-26. Fante
has not provided sufficient evidence to show CB agreed to pay for legal
services provided by GM. Plaintiff failed to meet its initial burden as to the
account stated cause of action.
Finally, the term
sheet and email from Turner (Fante decl., exhs A and B) are admissible business
records and serve as evidence that GW did provide legal services to CB. However,
they do not reference a rate CB agreed to pay for GW’s services or other
contract terms. Exhibits A and B do not prove CB owes the debt claimed, either under
contract or quasi-contract.
The Fante
declaration and exhibits provide insufficient evidence to meet plaintiff’s initial
burden. The other evidence – declarations of Ross and Nachimson – contain no
direct evidence of an agreement or understanding between the parties regarding
payment and likewise fail to carry plaintiff’s initial burden on summary
judgment. DENIED.