Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 22SMCV01642, Date: 2023-11-17 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 22SMCV01642 Hearing Date: November 17, 2023 Dept: P
Tentative Ruling
Smith, et al. v. GNG
Development LLC, Case No. 22SMCV01642
Hearing date November 17,
2023
Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Summary Adjudication
Defendant Faryar Ghaemi’s
Motion to Quash Deposition Subpoenas (Employment Records)
The Smith plaintiffs hired defendants Farhad
Ghaemi and his company GNG Development to perform remodeling work on their home.
The contract warrants that GNG possessed a contractor’s license. Plaintiffs
allege GNG was unlicensed and defendants breached the contract by failing to
obtain work permits.
On July 21, 2023
the granted plaintiffs’ motion for summary adjudication in part, ruling
defendant GNG was liable for disgorgement as a matter of law under Business and
Professions Code §7031. The court denied summary adjudication as to individual defendants
Farhad and Faryar Ghaemi. Plaintiffs renew their motion against Farhad and
Faryar Ghaemi based on evidence from discovery responses and declarations after
the first motion was made. This is proper under Code of Civ. Proc. §437c
(f)(2), which allows a renewed motion for summary adjudication based on issues
asserted in a prior motion upon a showing of “newly discovered facts or
circumstances[.]”
A plaintiff
fulfills an initial burden on summary adjudication or judgment by proving each
element of the cause of action. Code of Civ. Proc. §437c(p)(1). The burden then
shifts to defendant to show a genuine issue of fact as to one or more elements
or an affirmative defense. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett (1986) 477 U.S 317,
323.
Bus. & Profs.
Code §7031 Claim – Farhad Ghaemi
A person who
utilizes the services of an unlicensed contractor may bring an action to
recover all compensation paid to the contractor “for performance of any act or
contractor.” The burden is on the contractor to prove proper licensure. Bus. &
Profs. Code §7031(b), (d). When the contracting party is unlicensed, it is
subject to §7031 liability even if the entity’s president or other principal
has a license. Opp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 71, 74-76. The statute applies to all persons and entities who act
as contractors, regardless of whether they “operate . . . by formal contract.” MW
Erectors, Inc. v. Neiderhauser Ornamental & Metal Works Co. (2005) 36
Cal.4th 412, 427. When the elements of §7031 are met, an unlicensed contractor
must disgorge all profits, regardless of the equities involved. Courts have
held the statute represents a legislative determination that deterring
unlicensed contractors outweighs any harshness between the parties. Id. at
665-666.
Plaintiffs argue that
though they did not directly contract with Farhad Ghaemi, he “acted as a
contractor” on the project. Therefore, they argue, his lack of a license means
he is liable for disgorgement under §7031(b).
Bus. & Profs.
Code §7026.1(2)(A) defines a contractor as a person who “purports to have the capacity
to undertake or submits a bid to construct any building or home improvement
project, or part thereof.” It states a “consultant to an owner-builder” who
meets the above criteria qualifies as a contractor, defining a “consultant” as
one who “provides or oversees a bid for a construction project,” or “arranges
for and sets up work schedules for contractors and subcontractors and maintains
oversight of a construction project.” Id.
Plaintiffs cite Farhad
Ghaemi’s declaration, wherein he admits he prepared construction contract on
behalf of his sister Faryar Ghaemi, he was the “point of contact” with
plaintiffs regarding the proposal and bid, determined the scope of work and
acted as construction manager. Plaintiffs’ separate statement nos. 1, 3, 6, 7. Farhad
Ghaemi does not dispute that he is unlicensed. His admission that he prepared
the construction contract and was the “point of contact” regarding the bid
indicates he acted as a contractor and is subject to the statutory licensing
requirement. This is sufficient to shift the burden to show a triable issue of material
fact under §7031.
Farhad Ghaemi presents
evidence he never received money from plaintiffs other than the initial deposit
of $1,000, which he immediately transferred to GNG Development. Defendants’
separate statement no. 13. Plaintiffs claim this is “irrelevant,” but Bus. &
Profs. Code §7031 states “a person who utilizes the services of an unlicensed
contractor may bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to
recover all compensation paid to the unlicensed contractor for
performance of any act or contract.” (emphasis added). The statute requires an
unlicensed contractor to disgorge funds plaintiffs paid to them. Though Farhad
Ghaemi was as an unlicensed contractor, plaintiffs can only obtain disgorgement
under §7031 to the extent they paid money to him. Defendant’s evidence that
plaintiffs paid GNG, not him, is sufficient to create a triable issue of fact
as to the availability of disgorgement. He can only be required to disgorge
what was paid to him. DENIED.
Faryar Ghaemi
Plaintiffs provide
evidence Faryar Ghaemi acted as a contractor by bidding on and managing the
project, did not have workers’ compensation coverage while the project was
ongoing and employed 18 individuals as subcontractors. Plaintiffs’ separate
statement Nos. 12, 16. Therefore, plaintiffs argue, her license was
automatically suspended as soon as the work began, subjecting her to liability
for disgorgement. Wright v. Issak (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 1116,
1121. This is sufficient to shift the summary judgment burden.
Faryar Ghaemi does
not dispute she had employees and lacked workers’ compensation, but she presents
evidence plaintiffs did not pay her. Defendants’ separate statement 10, 12-14. Faryar
Ghaemi can only disgorge funds paid to her. Therefore, as with the claim
against her brother, this evidence is sufficient to create a triable issue of
fact. DENIED.
Faryar Ghaemi’s Motion
to Quash Subpoenas re: Employment Records
Faryar Ghaemi
moves to quash plaintiffs’ subpoenas for her employment/payroll records from The
RealReal and V One, her prior employers.
A court may quash
a subpoena to protect a person from “unreasonable or oppressive demands,
including unreasonable violations of the right to privacy. Code of Civ. Proc.
§1987. Personnel records are protected by the right to privacy, so their
compelled disclosure within litigation must be justified by a compelling
interest. Board of Trustees v. Superior Court (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 516,
526.
Faryar Ghaemi’s prior
employment and payroll records are protected by the right to privacy, so to
compel production, plaintiffs must show the records are relevant and necessary
to the litigation. Plaintiffs argue the records are relevant to show Faryar Ghaemi
lied on her contractor’s license application, in which stated she worked full
time at a journeyman level in construction from 2015 through 2019. Plaintiffs argue
Ghaemi worked for The RealReal and V One during this period, and payroll
records will show she worked for them full-time, casting doubt on her
declaration regarding her construction experience.
Plaintiffs have
not shown this information is relevant, other than as possible impeachment.
They provide no authority for the proposition that a contractor’s license is
automatically invalid if the applicant provided false information on the
application or that work provided under a license based on a false application
gives rise to a private cause of action.
Faryar Ghaemi’s
work for these employers was years before the events giving rise to this
litigation. The records’ limited potential probative value does not justify production
of private financial records. GRANTED.