Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 22SMV01301, Date: 2023-10-20 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 22SMV01301    Hearing Date: October 20, 2023    Dept: P

Tentative Ruling

Jane Doe D.S. v. Doe 1, Case No. 22SMV01301

Hearing Date October 20, 2023

Defendant Doe 1’s Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings

Plaintiff Jane Doe D.S. alleges sexual abuse by a teacher while she was a student at a defendant Santa Monica-Malibu Unified school between 1977 and 1978. Plaintiff sues under Assembly Bill 218 (codified as Code of Civ. Proc. §340.1), which revived otherwise time-barred sexual abuse claims. The District moves for judgment on the pleadings, arguing AB 218’s amendments to the Government Code constitute unconstitutional gifts of public funds.

To proceed civilly against a public entity, a plaintiff must first timely present the claim according to statutory requirements. Cal. Gov. Code §905. AB 218 allowed for revival of otherwise time-barred civil actions for childhood sexual abuse if filed by December 31, 2022 (Cal. Code of Civ. Proc. §340.1(q)) and exempts these claims from the §905 requirement (Cal. Gov. Code §905(m)).

Article XVI Section 6 of the California Constitution states the legislature may not “make or authorize the making of any gift, of any public money or thing of value to any individual, municipal or other corporation whatever[.]”

Defendant District argues the waiver of the tort claim requirement constitutes a gift of public money in violation of the California Constitution. Defendant cites Bourn v. Hart (1892) 93 Cal. 321, for the proposition that any statute imposing retroactive liability on a public entity constitutes an unconstitutional gift of funds. Bourn dealt with a legislative act that appropriating $10,000 to Bourn, who was injured while a prison guard. The Supreme Court ruled the appropriation was unconstitutional because it violated the prohibition against “appropriations to individuals from general considerations of charity or gratitude[.]” Id. at 326. Bourn held “[i]f the state desires to make itself liable for such damages as may be sustained by those in its service, it must do so by a general law which shall embrace all cases which may come within its provisions.” Id. at 329.

In contrast, AB 218 did not appropriate any specific sum to any individual. AB 218 is a “general law,” applicable to all alleged victims of sexual abuse who meet its requirements, so does is not a “gift” under Bourn.

Defendant cites Conlin v. Bd. of Supervisors of the City & County of San Francisco (1893) 99 Cal. 17 and Powell v. Phelan (1903) 138 Cal.271, 272-274, which also dealt with acts by municipal legislatures that ordered direct appropriation of funds to specific individuals.

As AB 218 did not order direct payment of funds to any individual, it is a law of general application, not targeted to benefit a private individual or entity. Heron v. Riley (1930) 209 Cal. 507 held a statute allowing a “judgment to be obtained after the requirements of due process have been complied with” does not constitute a gift. Id. at 517. AB 218, rather than providing a direct payment, allows a judgment to be obtained after due process, so does not award a gift.

Defendant notes Heron found a statute imposing retroactive liability against a state entity could constitute an unconstitutional “gift.” But AB 218 does not impose retroactive liability to create liability where none existed before; it merely revives or extends a statute of limitations that might have previously expired. Of course, public schools have been subject to liability for sexual abuse committed on campus since well before AB 218. Wallace v. Der-Ohanian (1962) 199 Cal.App.2d 141, 143-148. Heron’s analysis of a hypothetical retroactive statute is inapposite.