Judge Elaine W. Mandel, Case Number: 23SMCV00218, Date: 2024-02-14 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 23SMCV00218, Date: 2024-02-14 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV00218 Hearing Date: February 14, 2024 Dept: P

Tentative Ruling

Shahfar Namdar v. Tesla et al., Case No. 23SMCV00218

Hearing Date February 14, 2024

Defendants Macerich SMP LP and Tesla, Inc. dba Tesla Motors Inc.’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff Namdar sues for injuries sustained when she walked into a glass wall at a car showroom. Defendant Tesla moves for summary judgment based upon plaintiff’s admissions at deposition.

A court determining a summary judgment motion applies a three-step process: (1) identifying issues framed by the complaint, (2) determining whether moving party made an adequate showing that negates the opponent’s claim, and (3) determining whether the opposing party raised a triable issue of fact. Bostrom v. County of San Bernardino (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1654, 1662. A defendant moving for summary judgment has the initial burden to show one or more elements of plaintiff’s cause of action cannot be established or that an affirmative defense exists. If defendant makes that showing, the burden shifts to plaintiff to show a triable issue of fact. Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400 (2001) 25 Cal. 4th 763, 768.

At deposition, plaintiff admits she noticed the showroom walls were “totally glass.” Lawrence decl., exh. A, pgs. 34, 36. This alone is not sufficient to clear Tesla’s initial burden. The complaint does not allege Namdar was unaware the showroom walls were glass; it alleges she mistook a portion of the glass for an open door and walked into it. Her admission that she noticed the glass walls is not fatal to the claim.

Namdar testified she did not collide with the showroom door, but walked into a glass wall to the left of the door. She testified she believed a portion of the wall was an open door to the showroom. Id. pgs. 41-42. Tesla argues this is at odds with allegations in the complaint.

Namdar’s complaint alleges “[a] clear glass door was placed for entry into the store which had no frames or warning signs. Plaintiff walked into the glass.” Complaint pg. 4. Tesla’s motion assumes “the glass” in the complaint refers to the showroom door. This is a reasonable interpretation. Tesla argues plaintiff’s admission that she collided with a wall, not the door, contradicts the complaint, justifying summary judgment.

Although Tesla’s interpretation is reasonable, on summary judgment all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the nonmoving party. McAlexander v. Siskiyou Joint Community College (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 768, 774. When interpreted in the light most favorable to Namdar, the allegations regarding the collision with “the glass” are consistent with the deposition testimony. The complaint is ambiguous—it does not explicitly allege that plaintiff walked into the door, merely that she struck “the glass.” On summary judgment, this ambiguity must be resolved in plaintiff’s favor. The complaint alleges she collided with “the glass,” and her deposition testimony aligns with this allegation.

Tesla argues photographic evidence refutes the allegation that Tesla negligently failed to demarcate the glass with “frames or warning signs.” The photograph, taken three weeks after the injury, shows the showroom door framed with rods or beams and marked with labels. Lawrence decl., exh. B. The photo shows the door is clearly demarcated, and Tesla argues no reasonably attentive person could confuse the door with the adjacent walls, although both are glass.

The parties agree the photograph was taken a few weeks after plaintiff’s injury. Therefore, it does not necessarily establish the condition on the date of the incident. At deposition, Namdar states the door’s location was not as clear on the day of the incident. She testifies that day there was “no paper on the entrance. But after the incident they – I think they put the paper, some kind of paper to make the entrance more.” Lawrence decl., exh. A, pg. 38. According to Namdar, on the date of the incident, the door had no warning labels and was not clearly demarcated. There is a triable issue of fact as to the door’s appearance on the date of the incident and whether it was reasonable for her to mistake a section of the glass wall for an open door. DENIED.