Judge Elaine W. Mandel, Case Number: 23SMCV00544, Date: 2025-02-10 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 23SMCV00544, Date: 2025-02-10 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV00544 Hearing Date: February 10, 2025 Dept: P

Tentative Ruling

Swarm v. City of Los Angeles, Case no. 23SMCV00544

Hearing date February 10, 2025

Defendant/Cross-Defendant Martin’s Motion for Determination of Good Faith Settlement

Plaintiff Swarm sues defendants City of Los Angeles, County of Los Angeles and Martin for negligence and premises liability after plaintiff tripped and fell on an uneven sidewalk abutting Martin’s. The City cross-complained against Martin for indemnification and declaratory relief.

Plaintiff seeks a good faith determination regarding the settlement entered into with Martin for $305,000 and for dismissal of the City’s cross-complaint per Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §877.6.

The City opposes, offering the declarations of arborists Stivers and Harnisch. Martin offers 16 objections to the declaration of Stivers. Objections 1-16 OVERRULED. Martin offers 4 objections to the declaration of Harnisch. Objections 17-20 OVERRULED.

Per Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §877.6 the court may determine if the settlement between defendant and plaintiff is in good faith. The determination is left to the discretion of the trial court. Tech-Bilt, Inc. v. Woodward-Clyde & Assoc. (1985) 38 Cal.3d 488, 502; Mattco Forge, Inc. v. Arthur Young & Co. (1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 1337, 1349. Tech-Bilt, supra, 38 Cal.3d 499, sets forth the standards by which the “good faith” of a proposed settlement is determined. The factors include: (1) a rough approximation of plaintiffs’ total recovery and the settlor’s proportionate liability; (2) amount paid in settlement; (3) allocation of settlement proceeds among plaintiffs; (4) a recognition that a settlor should pay less in settlement than if were found liable after a trial; (5) the financial condition and insurance policy limits of the settling defendant; and (6) whether there is the existence of collusion, fraud, or tortious conduct aimed to injure the interests of non-settling defendants. The party asserting the lack of good faith has the burden of proof on that issue. Code Civ. Proc. §877.6(d); Tech-Bilt, supra, at p. 499; Mattco Forge, supra, at 1350, fn. 6.

Martin asserts she has little to no liability for plaintiff’s injuries, as plaintiff was injured on public property. The City argues Martin is wholly responsible for the dangerous condition of the sidewalk, supported by declarations of arborists Stivers and Harnisch, who opine Martin’s tree roots caused the sidewalk uplift. See Decls. Stivers and Harnisch, generally.

Martin cites Willits v. City of Los Angeles (Case No. CV 10-05782 CBM) to argue City bears responsibility for repairing sidewalks damaged by tree roots. This is incorrect; Willits addressed ADA accessibility issues, not sidewalk damages generally. Id.

Martin argues establishing liability at trial would be difficult, as the uplift was open and obvious. Though Martin’s liability at trial is speculative, Tech-Bilt requires only a rough proportioning of liability. Tech-Bilt, supra. The City has met its burden in establishing Martin bears significant liability for plaintiff’s injuries.

Martin argues plaintiff’s potential recovery is speculative, as out of pocket medical expenses were $6,000, and remaining expenses of $102,511 were paid by the health insurance. Decl. Babaian para. 18. Martin argues the reasonableness of plaintiff’s medical bills is subject to dispute, and plaintiff is receiving nearly 3 times in settlement what she could prove at trial.

The City argues $305,000 is unreasonably low compared to plaintiff’s potential recovery, citing plaintiff’s alleged future LOE of $4,078,200 as a result of possible early retirement. Decl. Stepanyan para. 3.

Martin argues future LOE is speculative, per plaintiff’s own deposition. Decl. Babaian para. 23; exh. D. Mere speculation does not establish the likelihood plaintiff would recover $4 million at trial. Further, “[a]lthough the sums paid may be grossly disproportionate to the sums prayed for in the complaint, they are not out of proportion to what the trial court might have considered the probable recovery of plaintiffs should they prove their case.” Tech-Bilt, supra. It is recognized that a settlor should pay less in settlement than if they were found liable at trial. Id.

The City argues Martin offered no evidence of her financial condition or capacity to pay, but the $305,000 is a policy limits settlement. Decl. Babaian para. 13. The City argues Martin’s $1,000,000 policy should apply. Martin asserts the property where plaintiff was injured was a rental, not a primary residential property, so the $1,000,000 policy is inapplicable. Decl. Babaian exh. B. Plaintiff and Martin both investigated and confirmed policy limits prior to agreeing to the settlement. Decl. Babaian para. 13. This inquiry is sufficient to demonstrate the $1,000,000 policy is inapplicable, as the City offers no evidence that plaintiff would accept a lesser recovery if a larger policy was applicable.

The City’s argument that Martin should remain in the case so City can depose Martin and conduct further discovery into her financial situation is unavailing. Martin has been a party since 2/2/23, during which time the City could have done discovery.

Martin bears significant liability for the injuries, and the proposed settlement is for thrice plaintiff’s medical expenses. Claims for future LOE are speculative by plaintiff’s own admission. The settlement is for policy limits. No evidence of fraud, collusion or tortious conduct is offered.

GRANTED. All parties are barred from making claims for equitable contribution or indemnity against Martin. The City’s cross-complaint is DISMISSED with prejudice per Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §877.6.