Judge Elaine W. Mandel, Case Number: 23SMCV02128, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 23SMCV02128, Date: 2025-02-19 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV02128 Hearing Date: February 19, 2025 Dept: P

Tentative Ruling

Styne v. Westfield, Case no. 23SMCV02128

Hearing date February 19, 2025

Defendant Universal Protection Service’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Defendants Westfield and Century City’s Motion for Summary Adjudication

Plaintiff sues defendants Westfield, LLC, Century City Mall, LLC and Universal Protection Service, LP (“Universal”) for injuries she sustained in a slip and fall incident in defendants’ parking lot. Defendants Westfield and Century City Mall cross-complain against LAZ Parking California, LLC for indemnity and breach of contract. Defendant Universal moves for summary judgment, plaintiff filed a notice of non-opposition. Defendants Westfield and Century City move for summary adjudication against LAZ. LAZ opposes.

Defendant Universal Protection Service’s Motion for Summary Judgment

Pursuant to Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §437c(a)(1) a party may move for summary judgment in any action if it is contended that the action has no merit. Pursuant to §437c(f)(1) a court may summarily adjudicate causes of action. A motion for summary judgment shall be granted if there is no triable issue of material fact, and the record establishes that as a matter of law, the plaintiff cannot prevail on a cause of action. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §437c(c). A defendant has met its burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if the party shows that one or more elements of the cause of action cannot be established, or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action. Once the defendant has met its burden, the burden shifts to the plaintiff to show that a triable issue of material fact exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §437c(p)(2).

Plaintiff alleges negligence. Universal argues it does not have a contractual duty to make inspections of the floors of the mall or the parking lot to discover dangerous conditions, such as oil spills. UMF 27. Universal argues there is no evidence Universal or any of its employees were aware of the oil spill. UMF 40. Universal has shown plaintiff cannot establish the negligence element of breach sufficient to meet its initial burden. Plaintiff filed a notice of non-opposition. Failure to oppose a motion may be deemed consent to the granting of the motion. CRC 8.54(c). GRANTED.

Defendants Westfield and Century City’s Motion for Summary Adjudication

The rules applicable to summary judgments apply equally to motions for summary adjudication. Blue Shield of California Life & Health Ins: Co. v. Superior Court (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 727. The moving party bears the burden of persuasion that there is no triable issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850. Once a moving party meets their burden, the burden shifts to respondents to show a triable issue of material fact. Id.

Westfield initially moved for summary adjudication as to: (1) whether LAZ owes Westfield an immediate duty to defend as a matter of law; and (2) whether LAZ owes Westfield a duty to defend and indemnify regardless of fault on LAZ’s part pursuant to an indemnity provision in the parties’ contract. The parties reached resolution on issue one and seek summary adjudication only as to whether LAZ’s duty to indemnify has been triggered.

Per the contract, LAZ undertook duties to “continually and diligently patrol and observe any area in which the Services are being or are to be performed, as well as any area through which Contractor’s employees travel, to detect and safeguard against any litter, debris, spills or other hazardous conditions.” UMF 1. The contract included an indemnification provision. UMF 3. The contract states LAZ will indemnify for claims “arising from, related to or in connection with, or caused by … the Services to be provided hereunder.” UMF 4.

The provision specifies a duty to indemnify arises when a claim related to the indemnifier’s services is brought. UMF 4. Plaintiff filed a third-party claim for negligence against Westfield and LAZ, alleging injury as a result of a slip in fall in oil in the parking lot. UMF 11-13. Plaintiff’s claims arise from circumstances contemplated by the contract between Westfield and LAZ. The burden is shifted to LAZ to demonstrate a triable issue of fact.

LAZ argues the oil spill was a “latent defect that could not be discovered through reasonable inspections conducted by LAZ.” Opp. 7: 22-25. LAZ argues Westfield offers no evidence that LAZ was negligent or otherwise in breach of its contractual duties. Westfield argues whether LAZ acted negligently is irrelevant for purposes of determining if the indemnification provision applies. See Heppler v. J.M Peters Co. (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th 1265, 1277.

Westfield is correct; California courts have rejected the notion that “every cause of action for indemnity requires a showing of fault on the part of the indemnitor.” Continental Heller Corp. v. Amtech Mechanical Services, Inc. (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 500, 505. LAZ contracted to indemnify claims arising out of, or in connection with, the services it provided. One of those services was to patrol the parking garage and safeguard against spills such as the one that injured plaintiff. There is no triable issue of fact as to LAZ’s duty to indemnify. Summary adjudication is GRANTED.