Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 23SMCV02311, Date: 2024-01-26 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV02311    Hearing Date: January 26, 2024    Dept: P

Tentative Ruling

Fuller, et al. v. Herman Properties, et al., Case No. 23SMCV02311

Hearing date January 26, 2024

Defendants’ Herman Investments, Herman and Holmes’ Demurrer & Motion to Strike the First Amended Complaint

Plaintiff tenants Fuller and Angela and Matthew Eldredge sued defendants Herman Investments, Vanessa Herman and Holmes for (1) violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code § 49.98.2; (2) wrongful eviction; (3) breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment; (4) bad faith retention of security deposit; (5) violation of LAMC § 45.33; and (6) violation of Los Angeles County Code § 8.52.130. The FAC alleges termination of the tenancy without just cause. Defendants demur to the first, second, third, fourth and fifth causes of action in the FAC and move to strike requested punitive damages and attorneys’ fees.

“The primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may prepare its case [citation], and a defect in a pleading that otherwise properly notifies a party cannot be said to affect substantial rights.” Harris v. City of Santa Monica (2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240.  

The demurrer and motion to strike is accompanied by the meet and confer declaration of Domineh Fazel as required.  Code Civ. Proc., §§ 430.41, 435.5(a).

First Cause of Action for Violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code §49.98.2

“Through December 31, 2019, the owner of residential rental property shall not terminate a lawful tenancy without at-fault just cause.” Los Angeles Municipal Code §49.98.2.

The parties argue as to whether section 49.98.2 was in effect at the time of the eviction. The FAC alleges on 11/25/19, defendants terminated plaintiffs’ lawful tenancy without at-fault just cause in violation of section 49.98.2. FAC ¶ 19. The statute applies “Through December 31, 2019,” which means it was effective when defendants purported terminated the tenancy. The allegation is sufficiently pled under § 49.98.2.

Defendants argue plaintiffs took possession of the property on three different dates. Defendants contend it is unclear whether plaintiffs claim all three entered into a lease. In addition, defendants contend it is unclear whether plaintiffs allege each paid a security deposit of $1,475.00.

Plaintiffs argue the FAC alleges Matthew Eldredge took possession pursuant to a written lease on October 2010; Angela Eldredge took possession on April 1, 2012, and on May 2018, Fuller took possession. Plaintiffs argue a roommate who is not a party to the original lease has the same rights as a tenant under the original lease and applicable ordinances, where the landlord approved the roommate’s occupancy.

Defendants argue the FAC does not allege plaintiffs were roommates and makes no allegations defendants consented to plaintiffs becoming tenants under the lease. Defendants contend the opposition fails to address the allegation regarding the security deposit because not all plaintiffs paid the security deposit, just Matthew Eldredge.

The FAC alleges Plaintiff Matthew Eldredge took possession pursuant a written lease in October 2011. FAC ¶ 12. Plaintiff Angela Eldredge took possession pursuant on April 1, 2012. FAC ¶ 13. Plaintiff Fuller took possession in May 2018. FAC ¶ 14. Plaintiffs deposited $1,475.00 in security, and defendants failed to return their security deposit. FAC ¶¶ 45, 47. The FAC alleges each plaintiff took possession pursuant a lease. To the extent defendants argue only Matthew Eldredge paid the security deposit, that is not sufficient for the court to sustain a demurrer. OVERRULED.

Defendants argue the FAC does not allege facts sufficient to establish a landlord-tenant relationship. Defendants contend there is no actual lease, no lease attached to the FAC and the FAC does not set out allegations of the terms of the lease. Defendants argue there are no allegations plaintiffs performed all obligations under the lease.

It is not required that a lease be attached to the FAC. The FAC alleges each plaintiff took possession pursuant to the lease, see above and FAC ¶ 12-14. The FAC alleges plaintiffs lawfully resided at the premises. FAC ¶ 15. In or around November 2019, defendants, in an attempt to influence and coerce plaintiffs to vacate, began repeatedly requesting plaintiffs’ signatures on documents purporting to acknowledge that they have no legal rights to occupy the premises. FAC ¶ 18. On or about November 25, 2019 defendants terminated the lawful tenancy without at-fault just cause. FAC ¶ 19. The FAC sufficiently alleges a lease and lawful tenancies as to all plaintiffs. OVERRULED. 

Second Cause of Action for Wrongful Eviction

“An essential element of a wrongful eviction claim is that the tenant has vacated. [Citations.]” Nativi v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 261, 293.

Defendants argue it is unclear what alleged acts or omissions caused a substantial disturbance and interference with plaintiffs’ possession or that plaintiffs were evicted or the reasons for that eviction. Defendants contend there is no allegations plaintiffs were in lawful possession and how they came into possession of the premises. See the court’s reasoning above as to these arguments, which are without merit.

Plaintiffs allege defendants’ conduct including terminating plaintiffs’ lawful tenancy without at-fault just cause was in violation of LAMC § 49.98.2 and constituted an unlawful eviction. FAC ¶ 27. The FAC alleges defendants’ acts and omissions were intentional (not accidental), deliberate, willful and done knowing they would force plaintiffs to involuntarily vacate. FAC ¶ 33. The allegations are sufficiently pled. OVERRULED.

Third Cause of Action for Breach of the Implied Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment

The breach of implied covenant of quiet enjoyment occurs “upon actual or constructive eviction of the tenant.” Erlach v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1299. “If the landlord ousts the tenant, there is an actual eviction.” Ginsberg v. Gamson (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 873, 897. “If the landlord's acts or omissions affect the tenant's use of the property and compel the tenant to vacate, there is a constructive eviction.” Id.

Defendants argue plaintiffs allege no facts regarding how defendants allegedly breached the covenant of quiet enjoyment. Plaintiffs allege defendants breached by repeatedly requesting signatures on documents purporting to acknowledge plaintiffs have no legal rights to occupancy, termination of the lawful tenancy without at-fault just cause and forced relinquishment of possession of the unit.

The FAC realleges allegations in prior paragraphs. FAC ¶ 35 alleges in each rental agreement in California, oral or written, is a covenant that the landlord will not interfere with a tenant’s quiet enjoyment during the term of the tenancy. FAC ¶ 37. The allegations are sufficiently pled; it is alleged defendants attempted to coerce plaintiffs into signing documents acknowledging they had no legal rights to the premises and terminated plaintiffs’ tenancy. OVERRULED.

Fourth Cause of Action for Bad Faith Retention of Security Deposit (CC § 1950.5)

“The bad faith claim or retention by a landlord or the landlord’s successors in interest of the security or any portion thereof in violation of this section, or the bad faith demand of replacement security in violation of subdivision (j), may subject the landlord or the landlord’s successors in interest to statutory damages of up to twice the amount of the security, in addition to actual damages. ” Civ. Code §1950.5(l).

Defendants argue the allegation regarding alleged bad faith lacks the necessary legal and factual specificity, and statutory damages under Civil Code § 1950.5 is akin to punitive damages, so constitutes a double recovery, as plaintiffs seek punitive damages.

FAC ¶ 43 alleges the lease provides for a security deposit, which defendants were required to return per Civil Code §1950.5. FAC ¶ 44. Plaintiffs deposited $1,475.00 in security. FAC ¶ 45. Plaintiffs allege they performed all conditions of the lease are entitled to return of the security deposit. FAC ¶ 46. Plaintiffs allege defendants failed to return $1,340.00 in bad faith and without cause per Civil Code §§1950.5(h), 1950.5(l). FAC ¶¶ 47-49. The allegations are sufficiently pled. To the extent defendants argue the request for statutory damages and punitive damages are double recovery, that issue will be addressed in the motion to strike. OVERRULED.

Fifth Cause of Action for Violation of Los Angeles Municipal Code § 45.33

“Tenant Harassment shall be defined as a landlord's knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific tenant or tenants that causes detriment and harm, and that serves no lawful purpose, including, but not limited to… Threatening or taking action to terminate any tenancy including service of any notice to quit or other eviction notice or bringing action to recover possession of a rental unit based on facts which the landlord has no reasonable cause to believe to be true.” LAMC §45.33.

Defendants argue LAMC §45.33 was not enacted, so not applicable. Defendants contend plaintiffs have not sufficiently pled defendants intended to induce plaintiffs’ reliance on the alleged misrepresented facts or justifiable reliance on the alleged misrepresentations.

Plaintiffs argue LAMC §45.33 is presumptively retroactive because it is remedial in nature. Plaintiffs contend the relevant provisions of §45.33 are not substantively different from corresponding sections in effect at the time of the eviction. Plaintiffs argue the conduct that violates the statute is outlined in the FAC.

The FAC alleges defendants violated §45.33 by threatening or taking action to terminate the tenancy; terminating the tenancy; and engaging in acts or omissions which interfered with the right to use and enjoy when defendants repeatedly requested plaintiffs sign documents purporting to acknowledge they have no legal rights to occupancy. FAC ¶ 50-51. The FAC alleges sufficient facts to state a claim. To the extent retroactivity is an issue, such is not properly decided on demurrer. OVERRULED.

Motion to Strike Punitive Damages & Attorney’s Fees

“Any party, within the time allowed to respond to a pleading may serve and file a notice of motion to strike the whole or any part thereof, but this time limitation shall not apply to motions specified in subdivision (e).” Code Civ. Proc. §435(b)(1). “The court may, upon a motion made pursuant to Section 435 …. (a) Strike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” Code Civ. Proc. § 436(a).

Defendants seek to strike paras. 26, 32-34, 42, 54-55 and the prayer for punitive damages, arguing the alleged conduct does not constitute despicable conduct and is not alleged with the requisite specificity. Defendants argue plaintiffs do not allege a basis for attorney fees because only one plaintiff signed the lease, which does allow for attorney fees.

To state a claim for punitive damages under Civil Code sec. 3294, a plaintiff must allege specific facts showing malice, oppression or fraud. Smith v. Superior Court (1992) 10 Cal.App.4th 1033, 1042. The basis for punitive damages must be pled with specificity; conclusory allegations devoid of factual assertions are insufficient. Id. A motion to strike may lie where the facts alleged, if proven, would not support a finding that the defendant acted with malice, fraud or oppression. Turman v. Turning Point of Central California (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.¿ 

Plaintiffs argue the FAC contains ample facts to support punitive damages. Plaintiffs contend punitive damages are expressly authorized by statute and based on intentional, malicious and fraudulent conduct by defendants. Plaintiffs argue the FAC adequately alleges attorneys’ fees pursuant the lease, LAMC §45.33(B) and 49.99.7.

Defendants argue the FAC does not allege which defendants evicted plaintiffs; which defendants allegedly attempted to trick plaintiffs into signing documents or which plaintiffs were asked to sign documents. In Castillo v. Friedman (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6, the court held punitive damages may be recovered on a wrongful eviction claim is malice is proved. Castillo v. Friedman (1987) 197 Cal.App.3d Supp. 6, 19.

The FAC alleges facts to support claim for punitive damages and attorneys’ fees. The FAC alleges defendants attempted to influence or coerce plaintiffs to vacate by requesting they sign documents purporting to acknowledge they have no legal rights to occupy the premises, which a reasonable jury could find to be contemptible. Defendants terminated the tenancy despite notice pursuant to LAMC § 49.98.2, which prohibited such, which a reasonable jury could also find to be outrageous conduct intentionally done with conscious disregard to plaintiffs’ rights.

The FAC alleges all plaintiffs were parties to the lease, and the prayer for relief seeks attorneys’ fees according to that lease. Further, the FAC alleges plaintiffs are entitled to attorneys’ fees under LAMC §§ 45.33(B) and 49.99.7. DENIED.