Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 23SMCV03683, Date: 2024-11-25 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23SMCV03683 Hearing Date: November 25, 2024 Dept: P
Tentative Ruling
Blue Rider Media Finance, LLC v. War
Paint Movie LLC, Case no. 23SMCV03683
Hearing date November 25, 2024
Defendant’s
Ex Parte Application to Vacate Stipulated Judgment and Order of Assignment
Plaintiff
Blue Rider Media Finance sued defendant LLCs 13 Films, War Paint Movie and
Schenz for breach of contract. Defendants moved ex parte 11/5/24 to
vacate a stipulated judgment, arguing it was fraudulent. The court denied the
application and set the matter for hearing on 11/25/24. Min. Order 11/7/24.
Defendant Schenz, in pro per, moved ex parte 11/7/24 for an order
vacating the stipulated judgment and subsequent order of assignment and a TRO
enjoining plaintiff from pursuing defendants’ entitlements pending the 11/25/24
hearing. The court denied the applications. See Min. Order 11/19/24. Plaintiff
opposes defendants’ motion to vacate the stipulated judgment and objects to
defendant Schenz’s 11/5/24 declaration.
Plaintiff
objects generally to defendant Schenz’s declaration as inadmissible hearsay. SUSTAINED.
Objection 1 SUSTAINED (improper legal conclusion), objection 2-4 SUSTAINED
(argumentative, improper legal conclusion).
A
motion for relief from an order under CCP §473(b) must be filed within a
reasonable time, but no later than six months after the date of the order. CCP
§473(b); People v. The North River Ins. Co. (2011) 200 Cal.App.4th 712,
721. This time limit is jurisdictional.
A judge may not grant relief under CCP §473(b) after this time but may grant
equitable relief if the moving party shows extrinsic fraud or mistake. Rappleyea
v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975, 980-981. A judge has no authority under
CCP §473(b) to excuse a party's noncompliance with the six-month limit. Arambula
v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 333, 345.
To
set aside a final order based on extrinsic fraud, “the moving party must
demonstrate that he or she has a meritorious case, that [they have] a
satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defense to the original action and
that [they] exercised diligence in seeking to set aside the default once the
fraud had been discovered.” In re Marriage of Stevenot (1984) 154
Cal.App.3d 1051, 1071 (citations original); Hudson v. Foster (2021) 68
Cal. App. 5th 640, 664.
Defendant
Schenz is not currently licensed to practice law in California and is in pro
per. Supp. Decl. Coate, para. 22. Entity defendants 13 Films and War Paint
Movie must be represented by counsel as LLCs under California law; they cannot
be represented by defendant Schenz.
Defendant
Schenz argues the 11/11/23 stipulated judgment was obtained through extrinsic
fraud or mistake. Decl. Schenz para. 3. Per the declaration of former counsel
Morse, defendant Schenz actively engaged in the stipulation process and signed
the final agreement and subsequent errata. Decl. Morse paras. 5-9, exh. 3. Aside
from his own hearsay declaration, defendant Schenz offers no evidence or
explanation in support of his allegations of fraud. This is insufficient to
establish extrinsic fraud or mistake.
Plaintiff
also argues defendants fall outside the jurisdictional six-month time limit. CCP
§473(b). Defendants stipulated 11/11/23; the instant motion was filed 11/5/24. Even
if the court was inclined to grant relief under CCP §473(b), defendants fall well
outside the jurisdictional time limits. There is no basis for the court to
grant the requested relief. DENIED.