Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 23SMCV04092, Date: 2024-03-13 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV04092    Hearing Date: March 13, 2024    Dept: P

Tentative Ruling

Gradney v. Kirakosian, Case No. 23SMCV04092

Hearing Date March 13, 2024

Defendant Kirakosian’s Motion to Strike Punitive Damages from FAC

Plaintiff purchased defendant’s business, a congregate care facility, and leased space from defendant. Plaintiff alleges via the first amended complaint that defendant tried to terminate the lease, gave plaintiff insufficient notice of abandonment of the property and sold plaintiff’s personal property valued at over $100,000. Defendant moves to strike plaintiff’s request for punitive damages on the grounds that the allegations supporting the request are impermissibly vague and do not state sufficient facts to support the claim.

Punitive damages are allowable only when plaintiff proves defendant has been guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. Cal. Civ. Code §3294(a). Facts giving rise to a claim for punitive damages must be pleaded specifically – vague or conclusory allegations are insufficient. G.D. Searle & Company v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29. Punitive damages must be pleaded specifically, and conclusory requests for punitive damages without factual support are subject to a motion to strike. E.g., Cyrus v. Haveson (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 306, 316-317; Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 164. Recklessness or negligence, even gross negligence, are insufficient to support an award of punitive damage – carelessness or ignorance are not enough. Dawes v. Superior Court (1980) 111 Cal.App.3d 82, 88. On a motion to strike, the allegations in a pleading must be treated as true. E.g., Clauson v. Sup. Ct. (1998) 67 Cal.App.4th 1253, 1255.

Plaintiff alleges “as Defendant was aware, Plaintiff was not always present at the property.” FAC, para. 13. Plaintiff further alleges “Defendant knew that Plaintiff was not always present at the Property. Defendant knew to send notices regarding the Lease to Plaintiff’s personal address, and/or her counsel, rather than the Property.” FAC, para. 20. Plaintiff also alleges “Defendant removed Plaintiff’s personal property…” FAC, para. 23.

The FAC alleges the notice of abandonment was groundless, Kirakosian knew the property had not been abandoned, and the process of delivering the notice of abandonment was defective. FAC paras. 42-45. For purposes of pleading, these allegations must be treated as true. If proven, they would demonstrate the eviction was conducted in bad-faith, based on a knowingly false allegation that the property was abandoned.

A reasonable fact-finder could conclude this constitutes malice or an intent to injure. The claim is supported not just by a conclusory allegation of malice, oppression, or fraud, but specific facts.

DENIED.