Judge Elaine W. Mandel, Case Number: 23SMCV04215, Date: 2025-03-21 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 23SMCV04215, Date: 2025-03-21 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV04215 Hearing Date: March 21, 2025 Dept: P

Tentative Ruling

Salinas v. Garcia, Case no. 23SMCV04215

Hearing date March 21, 2025

Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment

Plaintiff Salinas, who was riding a bicycle, suffered injuries when struck by defendants’ vehicle. Defendants move for summary judgment, arguing plaintiff tendered a global policy limits settlement demand, which defendants accepted. Plaintiff opposes and offers evidentiary objections.

Plaintiff offers 8 evidentiary objections to the declaration of defendants’ counsel Figueroa. Objections 1-8 OVERRULED.

“A motion for summary judgment may be made at any time after the answer is filed upon giving five days notice. Summary judgment shall be granted or denied on the same basis as a motion under Section 437c.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §1170.7. “The motion for summary judgment shall be granted if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §437c(c). Plaintiff’s burden is to show defendant has defaulted in his obligation and continues in possession. See Cal. Code Civ. Proc. §§1161 and 1166.

Plaintiff was struck by an automobile driven by Garcia and insured by Robinson on 12/16/21. SSMF 1. Plaintiff tendered a settlement demand 2/8/22 stating: “(1) …all of your company’s applicable policy limits in writing; (2) …other possible insurance policies and inform them of this offer; (3) provide us with a certified copy of your declaration page; (4) provide us with a notarized statement from your insured driver as to whether or not your insured driver was an agent at the time of the accident; and (5) provide us with an acceptable release.” SSMF 3. Plaintiff demanded written acceptance before 2/21/22. SSMF 3. Plaintiff conditioned acceptance on timely compliance with all 5 terms. SSMF 3.

Defendants tendered a letter 2/20/22 purporting to accept the settlement demand containing the certified policy, Robinson’s affidavit and a proposed release. SSMF 4. As a criminal case arising from the underlying automobile accident was pending against Garcia, defendants did not provide a notarized statement from Garcia, citing fifth amendment concerns. SSMF 4. Defendants subsequently tendered a notarized affidavit from Garcia 11/10/23. SSMF 13.

Plaintiff acknowledged receipt of defendants’ settlement letter 2/22/22 but rejected the settlement. SSMF 5. Defendants re-tendered the settlement letter 2/24/22 and 3/11/24. SSMF 6. Plaintiff again acknowledged receipt and confirmed rejection of the settlement. SSMF 8.

Defendants assert plaintiff’s action is barred by CSAA Ins. Exch. v. Hodroj (2021) 72 Cal. App. 5th 272 (holding that timely tender of a letter purporting to accept a settlement offer with substantial compliance creates a binding contract to settle). Defendants argue they timely tendered a letter accepting plaintiff’s settlement terms, and that they established their intent to be bound by plaintiff’s terms and substantially complied with four of the five terms of plaintiff’s demand letter. Defendants assert Garcia’s then-pending criminal case rendered compliance with plaintiff’s fourth term impossible, so unenforceable per Cal. Civ. Code §3531. Defendants argue the 2/20/22 acceptance letter formed an enforceable contract to settle.

Plaintiff argues CSAA Ins. Exch., supra, is inapposite, as defendants’ letter here was a counteroffer, which plaintiff did not accept. Plaintiff argues CSAA Ins. Exch., supra arose from a case where the court already found an agreement to settle, while this matter addresses whether an agreement was formed in the first place. Plaintiff argues defendants’ letter constituted a counteroffer due to defendants’ failure to tender a notarized statement from Garcia. Plaintiff argues acceptance of his initial settlement demand required timely compliance with all 5 operative terms, rendering defendants’ letter a counteroffer. See Apablasa v. Merritt & Co. (1959) 176 Cal.App.2d 719, 726 (holding terms proposed in an offer must be met exactly, precisely and unequivocally for its acceptance to result in the formation of a binding contract.)

Interpretation of defendants’ letter is a question of fact. Guzman v. Visalia Community Bank (1999) 71 Cal.App.4th 1370, 1376. Defendants assert they accepted plaintiff’s settlement offer and substantially complied, with performance of the fourth term excused by impossibility. Defendant argues the issue at hand is a question of law, as to whether a reasonable person looking at the parties’ communications would find an intent to settle.

Plaintiff asserts defendants tendered a counteroffer which plaintiff rejected. Plaintiff asserts the issue at hand is a matter of fact, as to whether mutual consent to settle was manifested.

CSAA Ins. Exch., supra, is inapplicable, as the court has not found an agreement to settle already exits. The parties disagree as to whether defendants’ 2/20/22 letter was an acceptance or a rejection and counteroffer; this is a triable issue of fact. See Guzman, supra. Defendants’ motion is DENIED.