Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 23SMCV05232, Date: 2024-02-20 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23SMCV05232 Hearing Date: February 20, 2024 Dept: P
Tentative Ruling
Ari Pourat v.
Arias Sanguinetti Wang & Torrijos, LLP, Case No. 23SMCV05232
Hearing Date February
20, 2024
Defendants Arias
Sanguinetti Wang & Team LLP (ASWT) and Mickel Montalban Arias’ Demurrer to
Complaint
Plaintiff attorney
Pourat represented third party Jane Doe in a lawsuit. Doe signed a fee sharing
agreement under which Pourat’s firm would split contingency fees with Doe’s
other counsel, defendant Arias Sanguinetti Wang & Team LLP (ASWT) and Janet
Janet & Suggs (JJS). After the underlying case settled, Pourat alleges Doe
and the defendants failed to pay his fees.
ASWT and managing partner
Arias demur, stating they were not party to any fee sharing agreement with
Pourat and are required by ethics rules to hold the disputed fees in trust
until Pourat’s fee dispute with Doe is resolved.
Service and Filing
of Demurrer
Pourat argues the
demurrer should be stricken because it was filed on January 26, 2024, one day
after the due date. The court file stamp shows the demurrer was filed at 12:04
AM on January 26, 2024, a de minimis delay.
Pourat argues the
demurrer was improperly served by email, but does not claim prejudice. The
court will address the merits, while reminding defendants to abide by Rule 8.78
regarding service.
Meet and Confer
Daniels’
declaration states the parties met and conferred on November 28, 2023. Daniels
decl. ¶5. Pourat states the declaration is false, as the demurrer was not
discussed during the meeting. Nazarian decl. ¶¶4-6, Pourat decl. ¶¶4-6. In the
interest of a hearing on the merits, the court will not strike the demurrer due
to the disagreement regarding the subject of that meeting.
Breach of Contract
(Retainer Agreement)
A cause of action
for breach of contract requires the existence of an agreement between the
parties. Reichert v. Glen. Ins. Co. of Am. (1968) 68 Cal.2d 822, 830. At
the demurrer phase, all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint are
treated as true. Redfearn v. Trader Joe’s (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th 989,
1005.
Defendants ASWT and
Arias state they are not parties to the retainer agreement underlying the first
cause of action. Arias’ declaration states “[a]t the time the retainer
agreement was executed between Plaintiff and Defendant Jane Doe, I was not a
party to the retainer agreement nor was ASWT,” and “[a]t no point did I, ASWT,
Defendant Jane Doe and/or Arias ever sign any form of addendum to the retainer
agreement.” Arias decl. ¶¶7, 8. The declaration is extrinsic evidence and is
not judicially noticeable. The court cannot rely on such evidence when ruling
on a demurrer. All allegations in the pleading – including allegations that
Arias and ASWT were parties to an agreement with Pourat – must be treated as
true on demurrer.
Nonetheless, the
first cause of action is uncertain. It alleges “plaintiff entered into a
written contract (contingency fee agreement) with Jane Doe, entitling plaintiff
to 40% of the recovered damages[,]” then states “plaintiff entered into a
written agreement with Arias and JJS[.]” Complaint ¶¶22, 23. It is unclear if these
two alleged contracts are separate and if the cause of action is based on one
or both. Additionally, though the claim is brought against all defendants, neither
contract names ASWT as a party. The contract alleged in paragraph 22 is between
Pourat and Doe; the contract in paragraph 23 is with Pourat, Arias and JJS.
ASWT is not a party to either.
Paragraph 14 of
the complaint references a fee sharing agreement and names all defendants as
parties. If that contract is the basis of the first cause of action, Pourat
must so state. SUSTAINED with 10 days leave to amend.
Breach of Contract
(Fee Sharing Agreement)
This cause of
action is uncertain. Paragraph 30 references a fee sharing agreement between
Pourat, Arias, JJS and Doe; paragraph 31 references a fee sharing agreement
between Pourat, Arias and JJS. It is unclear whether Pourat’s contract claim is
based on two contracts or one, and which defendants were parties to each
contract. SUSTAINED with ten days leave to amend.
Conversion
The elements of
conversion are (1) plaintiff’s ownership or right to possession of property,
(2) defendant’s conversion by a wrongful act or disposition of property rights,
and (3) damages. Welco Electronics, Inc. v. Mors (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th
202, 208.
Arias and ASWT
argue the complaint fails to allege Pourat’s ownership or a property right to
possession of the settlement funds or conversion by a wrongful act or
disposition. The court agrees as to the first objection. The conversion cause
of action is derivative of the breach of contract claims, since Pourat’s
alleged right to the funds derives from his contract (or contracts) with Doe
and defendants. The complaint is uncertain as to how many contracts existed and
the parties to each. Pourat must allege the contract or contracts that gives
rise to his alleged property right in the disputed funds. SUSTAINED with ten
days leave to amend.
Unjust Enrichment
This cause of
action fails for vagueness. The complaint states “[t]he economic benefit
derived from JANE DOE’s claims is a direct and proximate result of DEFENDANT’S
unlawful practices,” but fails to clearly state these alleged unlawful
practices. Complaint ¶44. Additionally, it is not clear which contract forms
the basis of Pourat’s alleged right to receive the funds retained by
defendants. SUSTAINED with ten days leave to amend.
Intentional
Interference with Contractual Relations
As with the conversion
claim, this cause of action is derivative of the breach of contract claims and
fails for the same reason. The complaint contains numerous references to
various contracts, with different parties – a retainer agreement, a fee sharing
agreement with Arias, JJS and Doe, and an apparent second fee sharing agreement
with JJS and Doe only. E.g., complaint ¶¶22, 23, 30, 31. The intentional interference
cause of action references “its/their contract” and “the contract,” without
clarifying which contracts it means. SUSTAINED with ten days leave to amend.
Fraud
The elements of a
fraud cause of action are (1) misrepresentation, (2) knowledge of falsity, (3)
intent to defraud, (4) justifiable reliance, and (5) damage. Lazar v.
Superior Court (1996) 12 Cal.4th 631, 638.
Defendants argue
Pourat fails to allege a misrepresentation. The complaint alleges “Arias
represented to plaintiff that Jane Doe does not want to pay Plaintiff’s
attorney fee and does not consent to the share of the attorney fee,” but does
not allege that representation was false. Complaint, pg. 8. The other causes of
action rely on the assumption that the representation was true, and Doe did not
want to pay the attorney fee. The complaint further alleges “defendants
fraudulently colluded . . . to defraud plaintiff,” but does not allege any
misrepresentation. SUSTAINED with ten days leave to amend.
Motion to Strike
Because the
demurrer has been sustained as to all causes of action, the motion to strike is
MOOT.