Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 23SMCV05646, Date: 2024-06-11 Tentative Ruling
Case Number: 23SMCV05646 Hearing Date: June 11, 2024 Dept: P
Tentative Ruling
Robinson, et al.
v. Stanton, et al., Case No. 23SMCV05646
Hearing date June
11, 2024
Defendants Stanton
and Kenneth L. Stanton as Trustee of the Kenneth L. Stanton Trust’s (1)
Demurrer and (2) Motion to Strike
Defendants Stanton
and Traivette’s (1) Demurrer and (2) Motion to Strike
Plaintiff tenants sue
defendant landlords, alleging habitability issues, including mold, termites and
a non-functioning heating system. Plaintiffs allege despite repeated requests
for repairs, defendants did not address the requests until plaintiffs filed
complaints with governmental authorities. Further, plaintiffs allege defendants
violated their privacy, harassing them, taking photos of intimate areas of the home
without consent, entering the property without legitimate basis, repeatedly demanding
plaintiffs vacate without basis, and making false statements about plaintiffs to
unlawfully compel plaintiffs to vacate.
Plaintiffs alleged:
(1) breach of contract, (2) breach of warranty of habitability, (3) breach of
covenant of quiet enjoyment, (4) negligence, (5) wrongful eviction, (6)
retaliatory eviction-common law, (7) violation of Cal. Civ. Code §1940.2, and (8)
violation of Santa Monica Municipal Code §4.56.020
Defendant Kenneth
L. Stanton, as an individual and as trustee of the Kenneth L. Stanton Trust, demurs,
arguing uncertainty and failure to state a claim, and moves to strike punitive
damages and attorney’s fees requests. Defendants Stanton and Traivette file
substantially identical motions. The court addresses them collectively.
In reviewing the
legal sufficiency of a complaint against a demurrer, a court will treat the
demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. Blank v. Kirwan
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318 (Blank); C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford
Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062. A “demurrer lies only for
defects appearing on the face of the complaint[.]” Stevens v. Superior Court
(1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 594, 601. For purposes of ruling on a demurrer, the
complaint must be construed liberally by drawing reasonable inferences from the
facts pleaded. Wilner v. Sunset Life Ins. Co. (2000) 78 Cal.App.4th 952,
958.
A special demurrer
for uncertainty is appropriate where the pleading is so poorly written that
defendant cannot reasonably respond.¿Code Civ. Proc. §430.10(f); Khoury v.
Maly’s of California, Inc. (1993) 14 Cal.App.4th 612, 616 (Khoury).
A demurrer for uncertainty is a disfavored ground for sustaining a demurrer. Id.
Second Cause of
Action – Breach of Warranty of Habitability
The implied
warranty of habitability is implied in all leases by law. Stoiber v.
Honeychuck (1980) 101 Cal.App.3d 903, 913-914. The implied warranty of
habitability requires, “existence of a material defective condition affecting
the premise[’s] habitability, notice to the landlord of the condition within a
reasonable time after the tenant’s discovery of the condition, the landlord was
given a reasonable time to correct the deficiency, and resulting damages.” Erlach
v. Sierra Asset Servicing, LLC (2012) 226 Cal.App.4th 1281, 1297.
Plaintiffs allege
defendants were on notice of the material defective conditions and had a
reasonable time to correct the deficiency and make repairs. Plaintiffs allege
existence of a lease (Compl. ¶13) and material defective conditions in the form
of termites, mold, broken window seals, neglect, and no operable heating system
other than a fireplace. Compl. ¶15. Plaintiffs alleged they “made repeated
requests for repairs to Defendants” “[d]uring [their] tenancy at the Property,”
“which were not address[ed] until Plaintiffs filed complaints with governmental
authorities.” Compl. ¶17. The allegations are sufficient to state a cause of
action for the breach of the implied warranty of habitability. OVERRULED.
Third Cause of
Action – Breach of Covenant of Quiet Enjoyment
Cal. Civ. Code §1927
provides in every lease agreement landlords impliedly covenant the right to
quiet enjoyment. Spinks v. Equity Residential Briarwood Apartments
(2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 1004, 1034. This covenant prevents the landlord from any
“action which interrupts the tenant’s beneficial enjoyment.” Id.
Plaintiffs allege defendants
interfered with their quiet enjoyment, violated their privacy, harassed them, took
photos of the home without consent, entered the property, demanded plaintiffs
vacate, and made false statements about plaintiffs in order to compel plaintiffs
to vacate. Compl. ¶ 16. This pattern of harassment and intimidation is alleged
to have breached the right to quiet enjoyment.
Plaintiffs allege
failure “to repair unsafe, unsanitary and uninhabitable conditions at the
Property and failing to maintain the Property in a habitable condition.” Compl.
¶ 34. These allegations do not indicate notice of the conditions and a
reasonable time to cure. Nevertheless, defendants’ argument fails because the
complaint also alleges a pattern of harassment, violation of privacy, and other
actions which interfered with plaintiffs’ right to quiet enjoyment. OVERRULED.
Fifth Cause of
Action – Wrongful Eviction
Defendants argue
the wrongful eviction cause of action is governed by Civ. Code §1940.2; plaintiffs
do not dispute this in their opposition. This cause of action is duplicative of
the seventh cause of action for violation of Civ. Code §1940.2. SUSTAINED WITHOUT
LEAVE TO AMEND.
Sixth Cause of
Action – Retaliatory Eviction-Common Law
Cal. Civ. Code §1942.5(a)
provides a lessor may not cause a lessee to quit voluntarily, increase rent,
decrease any services, or recover possession of a dwelling within 180 days
after a lessee makes an oral complaint to the lessor regarding tenantability,
among other things. “[T]enants who are the victims of retaliatory conduct by
their landlords have complementary rights of action both in the common law and
under the statutory scheme adopted by the Legislature.” Rich v. Schwab
(1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 803, 811.
A tenant is
protected for making written or oral tenantability complaints to a landlord or
lessor about a dwelling. Civ. Code §1942.5(a)(1); Kemp v. Schultz (1981)
121 Cal.App.3d Supp. 13, 18 [“a tenant, who is not in default in the payment of
rent, may invoke the defense of retaliatory eviction, upon proof that he has
made an oral complaint to the landlord regarding the tenantability of the
premises,” even where no complaint was made to a governmental entity].
The complaint
alleges “[w]ithin the one-year period preceding the filing of this action,
Defendants committed the acts alleged herein against Plaintiffs with the intent
to retaliate against Plaintiffs for exercising their rights under the law,
including but not limited to, requesting, and complaining that Defendants
remedy the defective conditions at the Property as described herein, in
violation of the common law barring retaliatory eviction.” Compl. ¶ 16.
However, the complaint
does not allege plaintiffs were not in default of payment of rent.
Additionally, the complaint does not allege defendants (1) caused plaintiffs to
involuntarily quit the premises, (2) increased rent, or (3) decreased services
within 180 days of plaintiffs’ complaint to defendants about the tenantability
or defective conditions, among other things. The complaint fails to state facts
sufficient to support a cause of action for retaliatory eviction. SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.
Seventh Cause of
Action - Violation of California Civil Code §1940.2
Cal. Civ. Code §1940.2
makes it unlawful for a landlord to do any of the following for the purpose of
influencing a tenant to vacate a dwelling: … (3) Use, or threaten to use,
force, willful threats, or menacing conduct constituting a course of conduct
that interferes with the tenant’s quiet enjoyment of the premises….”
The complaint
alleges a pattern of harassment, violation of privacy, and other actions which
interrupted plaintiffs’ right to quiet enjoyment. The complaint alleges as a
result of defendants’ actions and conditions of the property, plaintiffs “moved
from” the Property on April 24, 2023. Compl. ¶18. Plaintiffs allege how
defendants’ alleged conduct influenced them to vacate or created an
apprehension of harm. OVERRULED.
Eighth Cause of
Action – Violation of Santa Monica Municipal Code §4.56.020
Santa Monica
Municipal Code section 4.56.020 prohibits a landlord from taking actions—such
as terminating or failing to provide housing services, failing to perform
repairs, or failing to exercise due diligence in completing repairs, abusing
the tenant with offensive words, threatening physical harm by word or gesture,
interfering with a tenant’s right to privacy, including entering or
photographing beyond the scope of lawful entry or inspection—in bad faith with
respect to property used as a rental housing unit under a rental agreement.
Santa Monica Mun. Code §4.56.020.
The complaint
alleges defendants violated the Municipal Code by failing to repair the unit,
including the heating, failing to waterproof, resulting in mold, failing to
repair, invading plaintiffs’ right to privacy, posting eviction notices to quit
without basis and verbally accosting plaintiffs. Compl. ¶66. These allegations,
taken as true, allege violation of the SMMC. OVERRULED.
Motion to Strike
Punitive Damages & Attorney’s Fees
Punitive Damages
To support a prayer for punitive damages, the complaint
must allege “oppression, fraud, or malice.” Cyrus v. Haveson (1976)
65 Cal.App.3d 306, 316-17.
“Malice means conduct which is intended by the defendant to
cause injury to the plaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on by the defendant
with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of
others.” Civ. Code §3294. “Despicable conduct’ is conduct which is so
vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be
looked down upon and despised by ordinary decent people.” Mock v. Michigan
Millers Mutual Ins. Co. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 306, 331.
The allegations, specifically alleged recording of and
verbally accosting plaintiffs, sufficiently allege malice within the meaning of
Civil Code section 3294. DENIED.
Because the demurrer has been sustained with leave to amend
as to the sixth cause of action and sustained without leave to amend as to the
fifth cause of action, a motion to strike punitive damages in those causes of
action is MOOT.
Attorneys’ Fees
Defendants move to strike the prayer for attorneys’ fees. Santa
Monica Mun. Code §4.56.040(d), alleged in the eighth cause of action, provides
a statutory basis for recovery of attorneys’ fees. DENIED. Attorney’s fees are
not available as to the other causes of action.