Judge Elaine W. Mandel, Case Number: 23SMCV05954, Date: 2024-12-17 Tentative Ruling

Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 23SMCV05954, Date: 2024-12-17 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 23SMCV05954 Hearing Date: December 17, 2024 Dept: P

Tentative Ruling

Doe v. The Frederick P. Lenz Foundation, Case no. 23SMCV05954

Hearing date December 17, 2024

Defendant Frederick P. Lenz Foundation’s Demurrer to the FAC with Motion to Strike

Plaintiff Jane Doe sues defendant The Frederick P. Lenz Foundation for American Buddhism (“Foundation”) under a successor in interest theory for damages arising from an alleged rape by decedent Lenz. Defendant Foundation demurs and moves to strike portions of the FAC asserting plaintiff’s successor-in-interest theory, as well as the prayer for punitive damages and fees.

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant requests judicial notice of the certificate of dissolution issued by Lakshmi, Inc. filed with the California Secretary of State 4/15/87. Cal. Evid. Code §452(c) permits judicial notice of administrative government records. GRANTED.

Defendant’s Demurrer to the FAC

“The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of law.” Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1420. A complaint “is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts,” Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550, but plaintiff must allege essential facts “with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint [the] defendant with the nature, source and extent” of the plaintiff’s claim. Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Ass’n., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1099.

Defendant Foundation demurs to the sole COA for cover-up of sexual assault. Defendant argues the claim is time-barred because Code Civ. Proc. §340.16’s revival is inapplicable. Section 340.16 provides the statutes of limitation applicable to certain claims for “recovery of damages as a result of sexual assault.” Section §340.16(e) revives claims where plaintiff alleges defendant “engaged in a cover-up or attempted a cover-up of a previous instance or allegations of sexual assault by an alleged perpetrator of such abuse.”

Defendant Foundation argues it did not exist when the alleged rape occurred, so could not have covered up any assault. Plaintiff alleges Lakshmi, Inc., as alter-ego to Lenz, covered up sexual assault. FAC para. 19. Plaintiff alleges Lakshmi, Inc. subsequently dissolved and transferred Lenz’s assets to Rama Seminars. Id. Plaintiff alleges Rama Seminars subsequently transferred to InterGlobal Seminars. FAC para. 21. Plaintiff alleges InterGlobal Seminars then transferred to Infinity Plus Consulting. FAC para. 22. Plaintiff alleges Lenz’s assets transferred to defendant Foundation following Lenz’s death in 1998. FAC para. 23.

Defendant argues plaintiff’s allegations do not trigger alter-ego or successor-in-interest liability. This is unavailing; on demurrer stage, all allegations must be taken as true. Doe, supra. Plaintiff alleged Lenz committed sexual assault and Lakshmi, as Lenz’s alter-ego, covered it up. Plaintiff alleged defendant is the successor-in-interest to Lakshmi, via the various transfers. These allegations are sufficient to survive demurrer.

Defendant argues plaintiff cannot establish liability even if defendant is a successor-in-interest. Plaintiff alleged respondeat superior liability via ratification. FAC paras. 18, 33. Plaintiff also alleges defendant’s managing agent covered up the sexual assault. FAC paras. 25-28. These allegations are sufficient on demurrer.

Defendant argues plaintiff originally alleged Lenz, not Rama Seminars, assumed Lakshmi’s liabilities and assets. Compl. para. 23. Defendant argues plaintiff’s current allegations are contrary to the original pleadings, so constitute a sham pleading. Plaintiff alleged alter-ego theories of liability against each corporation from Lakshmi to defendant Foundation. The current allegations are not contrary to previous pleadings; they clarify the chain of alleged transfers of assets between Lenz and the alleged subsequent alter-egos. OVERRULED.

Defendant’s Motion to Strike

A motion to strike permits the court to “[s]trike out any irrelevant, false, or improper matter inserted in any pleading.” Code Civ. Proc. §436(a); see also Garcia v. Sterling (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 17, 20. Motions to strike can reach pleading defects that are not challengeable by demurrer, including conclusory allegations and substantive defects affecting only a portion of a claim. See, e.g., PH II, Inc. v. Sup. Ct. (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 1680, 1682. They are also the appropriate means to attack requests for punitive damages or other relief not supported by adequate facts alleged. Turman v. Turning Point of Central California, Inc. (2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63-64.

Defendant Foundation moves to strike the successor-in-interest allegations as sham pleadings. As addressed above, the FAC does not constitute a sham pleading. Plaintiff’s conclusions regarding asset transfer and liability remain the same; plaintiff merely clarified the series of incorporations and transfers that allegedly give rise to liability.

Defendant moves to strike allegations of secondary liability as improper because defendant did not exist at the time of the alleged wrongdoing. This is unavailing; plaintiff alleged successor-in-interest, alter ego and respondeat superior theories of liability implicating moving defendant.

Defendant moves to strike the prayer for punitive damages under Code Civ. Proc. §§377.42 and 425.14. Defendant argues it is a religious corporation and, as such, plaintiff must have leave of court prior to requesting punitive damages. This argument is unavailing; for a corporate defendant to avail itself of the protections of §425.14, it must be a religious corporation or a religious corporation sole, which are particular corporate designations with the California Secretary of State. As defendant is neither, the protections do not apply. Plaintiff alleged a cover-up of sexual assault; this is sufficient to establish malice and oppression for purposes of pleading punitive damages. Turman, supra at 63.

Defendant moves to strike the request for attorney’s fees under Code Civ. Proc. §1021.5. Lawsuits whose primary effect is to vindicate personal rights and economic interests do not qualify for section 1021.5 fee awards, even if they also “‘sen[d] a message’” that the conduct at issue will not be tolerated. Flannery v. California Highway Patrol (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 629, 636-637. Plaintiff argues striking the prayer for fees would be premature, as plaintiff has not moved for fees. This argument is unavailing; plaintiff seeks financial renumeration for a personal tort. See Weeks v. Baker & McKenzie (1998) 63 Cal.App.4th 1128, 1170-71.

Defendant moves to strike the allegations of an indemnification agreement between defendant and the executor of Lenz’s estate as irrelevant. Plaintiff offers no opposition. This allegation is irrelevant and will be stricken.

GRANTED in part as to attorney’s fees and references to the indemnification agreement.