Judge: Elaine W. Mandel, Case: 24SMCV01152, Date: 2024-10-01 Tentative Ruling

Case Number: 24SMCV01152    Hearing Date: October 1, 2024    Dept: P

Tentative Ruling

Cho v. Trader Joes, Case No. 24SMCV01152

Hearing Date October 1, 2024

Defendant Trader Joe’s Demurrer to Complaint with Motion to Strike Attorney’s Fees and Punitive Damages

Plaintiff Cho sues his former employer defendant Trader Joe’s for breach of contract and tortious breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. After plaintiff organized an alcohol tasting on defendant’s property, defendant terminated him. Defendant demurs to the claims for breach of contract and breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, arguing failure to state sufficient facts. Defendant also moves to strike requests for attorney’s fees, costs, and punitive damages.

Defendant’s Request for Judicial Notice

Defendant requests judicial notice of a July 16, 2024 Order Sustaining Demurrer in the matter entitled Jorge Rodriguez v. Trader Joe’s Company, Los Angeles Superior Court Case Number 24SMCV01221. The court may take judicial notice of “records of…any court of this state.” Cal. Evid. Code §452(d). Judicial notice is properly requested as to the fact of the order, but not as to the facts alleged. GRANTED.

Defendant’s Demurrer

“The function of a demurrer is to test the sufficiency of the complaint as a matter of law.” Holiday Matinee, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc. (2004) 118 Cal.App.4th 1413, 1420. A complaint “is sufficient if it alleges ultimate rather than evidentiary facts” Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 550, but plaintiff must set forth the essential facts of the case “with reasonable precision and with particularity sufficient to acquaint [the] defendant with the nature, source and extent” of the plaintiff’s claim. Doheny Park Terrace Homeowners Ass’n., Inc. v. Truck Ins. Exchange (2005) 132 Cal.App.4th 1076, 1099. In reviewing the legal sufficiency of a complaint against a demurrer, a court will treat the demurrer as admitting all material facts properly pleaded. Blank v. Kirwan (1985) 39 Cal.3d 311, 318; C & H Foods Co. v. Hartford Ins. Co. (1984) 163 Cal.App.3d 1055, 1062.

First COA: Breach of Contract

Labor Code §2922 provides that an employment, having no specified term, may be terminated at the will of either party on notice to the other. Employment for a specified term means an employment for a period greater than one month. The at-will presumption may be overcome by evidence that the employer and employee impliedly agreed to termination only for cause. Camp v. Jeffer, Mangels, Butler & Marmaro (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 620, 629. The existence of an implied contract to discharge only for good cause is normally a factual question for the trier of fact. Haycock v. Hughes Aircraft Co. (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 1473, 1490, citing Foley v. Interactive Data Corp. (1988) 47 Cal.3d 654, 677, 680, 682.

Defendant argues plaintiff does not allege sufficient facts to show an employment contract existed or that a breach occurred. Plaintiff alleges :

¿       The acts that are the subject of this complaint began on or about 03/02/2022. At that time, CHO was a "mate" which meant he was a member of supervision. Compl. para. 6.

¿       Plaintiff was hired by Traders Joes in approximately 1997. Compl. para. 11.

¿       During the course of plaintiff’s employment with defendant, there existed an express and implied in fact employment contract between plaintiff and defendant. Compl. para. 13.

¿       Plaintiff would be able to continue his employment with defendant indefinitely so long as he carried out his duties in a proper and competent manner. Compl. para. 13(a).

¿       This total employment contract was evidenced by various written documents, oral representations to plaintiff by defendant's agents and employees, and the parties’ entire course of conduct. Compl. para. 14.

¿       Plaintiff is informed that portions of this contract are embodied in defendant's written policies and discipline procedures. Compl. para. 14(a).

¿       As independent consideration, plaintiff refrained from seeking other employment . Compl. para. 15.

¿       Despite representations made to plaintiff and the reliance he placed on them, defendant failed to carry out its responsibilities under the terms of the employment contract. Compl. para. 17.

Defendant is correct that plaintiff failed to plead particular facts sufficient to establish a claim for breach of contract. Plaintiff alleges existence of an express employment contract and an implied employment contract. Plaintiff pleads no facts that specifically demonstrate existence of an express employment contract, simply alleging “this total employment contract was evidenced by various written documents.” Compl. para. 14. This is not sufficient to allege a written contract.

Plaintiff alleges an implied employment contract but fails to state who allegedly made “oral representations” that would create an implied contract. Nor does plaintiff allege senior management or anyone he should have reasonably relied on made such representations. Compl. para. 14.

Plaintiff fails to allege any particular terms of this implied employment contract.“So long as he carried out his duties in a proper and competent manner” does not sufficiently establish a basis for an implied employment contract. Compl. para. 13(a). Further, plaintiff does not allege what responsibilities defendant may have had under the alleged contract, such as wages, leave or promotions. Plaintiff fails to allege all facts necessary to support existence of an implied employment contract. SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Second COA: Breach of Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing

“[A]llegations which assert [a breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing] claim must show that the conduct of the defendant, whether or not it also constitutes breach of consensual contract term, demonstrates failure or refusal to discharge contractual responsibilities, prompted not by an honest mistake, bad judgment or negligence but rather by conscious and deliberate act, which unfairly frustrates the agreed common purposes and disappoints the reasonable expectations of the other party thereby depriving that party of the benefits of the agreement.” Careau & Co. v. Security Pacific Business Credit, Inc. (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d 1371, 1395. “If the allegations do not go beyond the statement of mere contract breach and, relying on the same alleged acts, simply seek the same damages or other relief already claimed in companion contract cause of action, they may be disregarded as superfluous as no additional claim is actually stated.” Id.

Defendant argues plaintiff has not pled facts sufficient to find a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. The court agrees. While a COA for breach of the covenant will necessarily arise out of some of the same allegations as a COA for breach of contract, plaintiff does not allege any facts to indicate that his second COA is anything other than duplicative of the first.

Plaintiff asserts his breach of contract COA arises out of defendant’s termination of him for taking part in the alcohol tasting. Plaintiff asserts defendant’s alleged breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing arises from the same incident. Both COAs arise from the same set of facts, and rely on the same alleged wrongdoing. Plaintiff cannot seek damages for breach of covenant of good faith and fair dealing when he has sought relief from the exact same wrongdoing in another COA; that is duplicative. SUSTAINED WITH LEAVE TO AMEND.

Defendant’s Motion to Strike

To obtain punitive damages, plaintiff must prove oppression, fraud or malice. Cal. Civ. Code §3294(a). Facts giving rise to a claim for punitive damages must be pleaded specifically – vague or conclusory allegations are insufficient. G.D. Searle & Company v. Superior Court (1975) 49 Cal.App.3d 22, 29. Conclusory requests for punitive damages without factual support are subject to a motion to strike. E.g., Cyrus v. Haveson (1976) 65 Cal.App.3d 306, 316-317; Grieves v. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 164.

Plaintiff seeks punitive damages and fees. Defendant argues plaintiff failed to cite authority allowing recovery of attorney’s fees (e.g., Civil Code 1717) and punitive damages are not recoverable in breach of contract claims.

Plaintiff does not contest defendant’s argument regarding attorney’s fees on opposition, and such are STRICKEN.

Plaintiff argues punitive damages are allowed in discrimination, harassment, and retaliation cases if plaintiff proves by clear and convincing evidence that "an officer, director, or managing agent" of a corporation personally engaged in oppressive, fraudulent, or malicious conduct, or "authorized or ratified" that conduct. Civ. Code §3294(b). Plaintiff has made no such allegations nor asserted a claim for discrimination, harassment, or retaliation. Punitive damages are STRICKEN.